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THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE

A SKETCH OF THE DIPLOMATIC AND
MILITARY HISTORY OF CONTI-
NENTAL EUROPE

FROM THE RISE TO THE FALL OF THE SECOND
FRENCH EMPIRE

BY

HAROLD MURDOCK

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

JOHN FISKE



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PREFACE.

THIS work, originally undertaken as a recreation, has been completed in its present form in the hope that it may serve the busy public as a helpful epitome of the events which have transformed the Europe of 1850 into the Europe of to-day, and also afford a clue to future events as foreshadowed by present complications. While no claim is made to extensive research, yet the works consulted are probably too numerous and voluminous to be perused by most people in the active pursuits of life. To attempt anything more than a sketch of events so recent, while political animosities still run high, and while so many of the principal actors are living, would be a task that few historical students would care to undertake. This book purports to be merely a running narrative, introducing the great leaders and noting the great convulsions of twenty-one years of contemporaneous European history.

The general style of this work partakes somewhat of that "drum and trumpet" character which Mr. Green deplored, but it ought to be considered that every great change during these years has been wrought by

force of arms, for which diplomacy has served merely as a convenient stepping-stone. Cavour's greatest stroke was the entangling of the French emperor in the military alliance of 1859. Bismarck's foreign policy has been directed with a view of drawing his enemies upon the newly whetted Prussian sword. On nearly every battlefield great questions of dynastic and national reconstruction have hung in the balance. Italy would scarcely have been united to-day if the Austrians had been directed at Magenta and Solferino by the military genius which moved the Prussians in Bohemia and the Germans in France. The Frankfort Diet might have been still dozing on the Main if military science had been more carefully studied in the Austrian staff, or if the Prussian crown prince had been remiss on the day of Königgrätz. Metz might not have fallen if Bazaine had been alive to his situation on the 14th and 16th of August, 1870, and Alsace and Lorraine might not have become German provinces if Metz had not fallen. Is not one justified in saying that military operations have been the decisive factors in Europe since 1850, that the fortunes of rulers and of peoples have rested upon such men as Gyulai, Benedek, Moltke, and Bazaine?

Possibly too much space has been devoted to the Crimean War, but it was the French emperor's military bow to Europe, and it affords a glimpse of Korniloff's "Russian Defense," as well as the spectacle of England engaged once more in war with a first-rate power. Few have time to read Mr. King-

lake's ponderous volumes, and the first chapters on this war as well as the one on the Eastern Question are largely based upon his work, modified, it is true, by Todleben and Rousset.

A bibliographical note has been appended, giving a list of works for the use of those who desire to go deeper into the subject, and to which the author acknowledges his obligation. He has endeavored to express himself with moderation and allow full scope to the judgment of the reader; any more positive decisions belong to future times and the verdict of events.

BOSTON, *September*, 1889.

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INTRODUCTION.

HE who is inclined to take optimistic views of human history must contemplate the course of events during the past forty years with genuine satisfaction, for to whatever part of the globe he turns his attention he will find much more to confirm than to discredit his hopeful attitude. Everywhere, doubtless, there are difficult and anxious problems to be solved ; the spirit of evil, in one shape or another, goes on rearing its head defiantly ; and the condition of mankind improves but slowly. Nevertheless, in almost every quarter of the world since 1850 we can point to solid and unmistakable progress. In the departments of scientific discovery and industrial art this has been so conspicuous a fact that to mention it is like uttering a truism. But in political history the illustrations of progress are no less striking. A marvelous revolution in Japan has transformed the feudal régime of the Shogun and daimios into a constitutionally governed empire, eager to learn wisdom from every available source. The English rule in India, since the dreadful days of Cawnpore and Lucknow, has been marked by a prosperity unparalleled in the history of that teeming population. Australasia is witnessing the rapid growth of a new English civilization, destined soon to become a valuable moral power in the world. With the labors of

Livingstone and Stanley during this same period, a new and more hopeful era has begun in the career of Africa. In the southern parts of South America, on the shores of both oceans, Spanish civilization has assumed a thrifty and progressive character, more especially since the triumphs of Montt in Chili and of Mitre in the Argentine Republic (1852-60). As for North America, we need only to remember that 1850 was the year in which the Fugitive Slave Law was enacted, with the consent of the foremost American statesman then living, who could see no other way of saving the United States from disunion and anarchy. That negro slavery has been abolished, while the spectre of secession has been exorcised, and a reconciliation achieved between states so recently hostile, marks an amount of political progress which may well be set off against the tale of public corruption and extortion of which the daily report is slowly but surely kindling the righteous indignation of a long-suffering people.

In no part of the world has the improvement in the political situation since 1850 been more striking than in Europe. The author of the present book has done well to entitle it "*The Reconstruction of Europe.*" It has been indeed a reconstruction such as one could hardly have dared hope for in the days of Haynau and Radetzky. Yet no intelligent observer could even at that time suppose that the crude adjustments made by sheer military force were likely to prove enduring. It seemed in 1850 as if despotism were triumphant, but appearances were deceitful. Sisera could not conquer, for the stars in their courses were fighting against him. The movement toward constitutional freedom and the independence of oppressed

nationalities, temporarily checked by the arms of Radetzky and Paskevitch, was a movement that had been gathering strength for more than two generations. For its remote sources we must look back to the middle of the eighteenth century, when English ideas of constitutional liberty, vindicated by Vane and Cromwell and expounded by Locke and Milton yet a century earlier, were at length taken up and incorporated into the speculations of French philosophers whose writings were widely read upon the continent. In deference to the spirit of the age, as represented in various ways by Montesquieu and Voltaire, by the Physiocrats and the Encyclopædists, the work of reform was begun by crowned philosophers and public-spirited despots, such as Frederick of Prussia, Catherine of Russia, Joseph of Austria, and Charles III. of Spain.

In the country which had become a more coherent nationality than any other upon the continent, which had less enlightenment in its dynasty and more in its people, and which had been brought most closely into contact with English and American ideas, the terrible revolution beginning in 1789 at once brought matters to a crisis and inaugurated for the European world the great modern movement of which our author describes the most recent phases. With the French revolutionary propaganda it became a movement toward democracy, toward the final abolition of feudalism with its arbitrary privileges for the few and its excessive burdens for the many, toward the fuller participation of the people in the work of government and their more efficient protection in the enjoyment of the fruits of their labor. When the governments of Austria and Prussia in 1792 undertook

to stem the rising tide by invading France, they called into existence a French *levée en masse* of revolutionary soldiers destined forthwith to overrun all Europe, carrying democratic notions with them everywhere. When the National Convention published its famous proclamation of November 19, 1792, offering French assistance to all peoples who wished to get rid of their governments, it laid down a revolutionary programme which Napoleon in very considerable measure carried out. In many respects the policy of the First Empire was a reversal of the policy of the Revolution, and keenly disappointed the generous aims and hopes that had sustained the nobler spirits amid the horrors of that time ; but there were ways in which the Napoleonic conquests, albeit marked by a most shameless and cynical disregard of morality and decency, were beneficial and stimulating to the people of Europe. One of these ways was the temporary extension of the new French laws, and of methods of administration connected therewith, over certain regions, especially the so-called Confederation of the Rhine and some parts of Italy. Another was the partial consolidation effected in the same regions, along with the overthrow of a swarm of petty tyrants who were not reinstated in 1815. A third was the spirit of nationality evoked in resistance to Napoleon, especially in northern Germany, under the lead of the noblest statesman of that age, the gallant and glorious Stein.

The seed sown in these ways had become too deeply rooted in 1815 to be destroyed by the ingenious arrangements made at the Congress of Vienna. The next thirty years were, by comparison with what had gone before, a time of profound peace ; yet they wit-

nessed political and military events characteristic enough as indicating the general drift of affairs. Such events were the establishment of independence by the Spanish colonies in America, the successful revolt of Greece, the unsuccessful revolt of Poland, the troubles in Spain after the death of Ferdinand VII., the uprising which drove Charles X. from France in 1830. The most characteristic feature of this period was restlessness. Ideas of reform, aspirations after a better state of things, were everywhere in the air. The moral influence of the great Parliamentary Reform of 1832, and other contemporaneous reforms in England, such as Jewish and Catholic emancipation and the abolition of the slave-trade, counted for much. The success of democracy on a vast scale in the United States, however dimly apprehended by the people of continental Europe, doubtless also counted for much. Increasing comfort, scientific discoveries, railroads and steamboats, cheaper and more abundant popular literature, were powerful factors in stimulating the revolutionary spirit. The revival of historic studies, the keenly aroused interest in the past, as shown in Guizot and Sir Walter Scott, in the romantic school in poetry, painting, and music, did much to strengthen the growing sense of the sacredness of nationality. It came to be more and more generally felt that it was wrong for Greeks and Bulgarians to be trampled down by the ruthless Turk, and for Magyars and Italians to be held in subjection by a ruler at Vienna.

It was especially in the Italian peninsula that the aspiration toward political reform was identified with the aspiration toward national unity. Since the arrangements of 1815, Austria had held Lombardy and

Venice in subjection, but Austrian control over the peninsula really went much farther than this. In 1821 an insurrection against Bourbon tyranny in Naples was suppressed by Austrian bayonets; and in 1831 a revolution in the Papal States was suppressed in the same way. Gradually, therefore, it became apparent to all thoughtful Italians that the only practicable way of putting an end to misgovernment was to unite the population of the peninsula in the effort to throw off the Austrian yoke. The cause of Lombardy and Venice must be made the common cause of all Italy. In this conclusion Italian statesmen came to agree, however they might differ as to the means by which the desired end was to be attained; whether with Mazzini they looked forward to a united Italian Republic, or with Gioberti dreamed of a reformed and enlightened Papacy taking the lead in driving out those whom bellicose Julius II. used to call "the barbarians," or with Cavour saw clearly that the hope of Italy lay in Piedmont, the one Italian state which combined political freedom with organized military strength.

Where there is so sound a principle at work as that represented in the policy of Cavour, it is sure to profit by every opportunity that is offered for steady and healthful expansion, as was illustrated in the masterly skill with which the Italian statesman made use of the French emperor from the time of the Crimean war to the time when the people of one Italian state after another elected Victor Emmanuel as their king. But perhaps the most curiously significant feature in the complex process of European reconstruction is the wholesome Nemesis that has overtaken Austria, and at the cost of a brief military

humiliation placed her in the ranks of progressive states. In the days of our fathers the very name of Austria had a hateful sound. It stood for mean and cruel oppression. A survival of the contemptuous anger with which all true lovers of liberty then regarded Austria may still be seen in Mr. Freeman's writings, whenever that great historian has occasion to allude to her. But the policy to which Metternich had devoted his rare abilities provoked reaction; and Cavour, securing by the sacrifice of Nice and Savoy at first the active help and then the secret connivance of the French emperor, struck the blow which called into existence the Kingdom of Italy. Then in the final phase of the struggle between Austrian conservatism and the movement toward German unity begun by Stein and carried on by Bismarck, the Italian kingdom played its part as an ally of Prussia, and brought itself nigh to completeness by the acquisition of Venetia. Austria, driven from the German federation to shift for herself, discovered that she could no longer maintain her footing in the world without granting to Hungary all that Kossuth and his brave companions had vainly contended for in 1849. From the moment that she was thus freed from the deadly burden of peoples held in unwilling subjection, Austria began to show symptoms of healthy national life. The surgery of 1859 and 1866 was sharp but salutary. Then in that year of doom, 1870, a united Germany, freed from complications with Austria, made short work with the French emperor, the greatest sham of the century, and left France humbled and exasperated, but probably in a less unsound condition than at any previous moment since 1789. The Italian kingdom, seizing this

opportunity, attained completeness by acquiring the city of Rome and putting an end to the temporal rule of the Papacy. Lastly, the causes of dissension between Germany and Austria, as well as between Austria and Italy, having been removed, we see these great powers leagued together in a triple alliance that bids fair, especially if favored by the wealth and maritime power of England, to serve as a potent guarantee for the maintenance of peace in Europe. Truly the advance since the days of Paskevitch and Radetzky has been wonderful.

The tares that the enemy has so industriously sown have not, however, all been uprooted; some of them are still thrifty and seem likely to prove fruitful in disturbance. Our author, no doubt, does well in bringing his narrative to a close with the victory of Germany over France; for if he had gone on to treat of the Balkan war of 1878, he would have begun upon a chapter of history which, in a peculiar degree, is not yet ended. It is a pity that the beastly Turk could not then have been sent over to Brusa, as a preliminary step toward improving him off from the face of the earth; for not until that has been done can we hope to see civilization restored in those beautiful lands which to the historian, the philosopher, and the Christian are fraught with such hallowed memories. But how the cumberer of the earth can be disposed of without kindling a general European conflagration is a question that puzzles the wisest statesmen.

To this Eastern difficulty, which is an old one, the issue of the war between France and Germany unfortunately added a new source of probable contention in the future. The Germans deemed it necessary to annex Alsace and Lorraine in order to secure a bet-

ter military frontier in case of any future war with France. By so doing they made it almost impossible for France to abandon her attitude of enmity toward Germany, and they annexed a hostile population sure to be a source of weakness to Germany, as the possession of Venetia had been a source of weakness to Austria. Moreover in doing this they shocked public sentiment, so that if in some future European complication France goes to war with Germany in order to recover her lost provinces and free their people from foreign domination, then enlightened public sentiment in both hemispheres will probably sympathize with France in this one particular, even though it may sympathize with her in nothing else. And this is because the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany was really a violation of what is the sound basis of the principle of the sacredness of nationalities; in other words, it was a violation of the sacredness of self-government. It was easy to argue that in blood and speech the people of Alsace-Lorraine were almost more German than French, and that in point of history their connection with France was scarcely two centuries old. Such arguments go but little way when confronted with the fact that the people of Alsace-Lorraine — who are among the most intelligent, cultivated, and virtuous people in the world — consider themselves Frenchmen. They love France and hate Germany, and would hail with delight any such opportunity as was offered to Lombardy in 1859 and to Venice in 1866. Their present position immensely increases the difficulty of dealing with the Eastern question. It remains to be seen whether the Germans did wisely in 1871 in allowing military considerations to prevail over such grave

objections to the forcible severance of these people from France. Perhaps it may by and by appear that in this one instance they made the same sort of mistake that the first Napoleon was so apt to make, in setting a higher value upon sheer brute force than upon the sagacious statesmanship that takes morality and sentiment into the account. Time will show.

JOHN FISKE.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE.

CHAPTER I.

EUROPE IN 1850.

EUROPE IN 1850. — LOUIS NAPOLEON ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC. — HIS PREVIOUS CAREER. — THE REVOLUTION IN GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND ITALY. — STATE OF ITALY IN 1850. — THE ATTITUDE OF PIEDMONT. — TRANQUILLITY OF RUSSIA. — PRESTIGE OF THE CZAR IN EUROPE. — THE GREAT POWERS IN 1850.

IN the year 1850 Europe was emerging from the throes of a revolutionary era, with military autocracy generally triumphant, at the expense of liberal and free ideas. France, Germany, Austria, Denmark, and the Italian states had been shaken by the great popular upheaval, but in France alone was the revolution sustained. The government of Louis Philippe had fallen, never to rise again. A provisional government, established to direct affairs pending the election of a republican president, was obliged to maintain itself with powder and ball against an insurrection of the Commune in Paris. The Faubourg St. Antoine was mercilessly bombarded, barricaded streets were raked with cannon and musketry, before order was restored, and the government enabled to turn its hand to the

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last act in a Paris revolution, the execution and transportation of prisoners.

The election of 1848 summoned to the presidency of the new republic Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, the recognized heir of the great Napoleon. He had been elected to the Assembly in June and September, and had taken his seat in the latter month, in the face of protests by the faction most warmly attached to the cause of the republic.

The character and views of Louis Napoleon were not unknown to his supporters. He had always asserted his belief that he was one day to rule over his uncle's empire, and had proved the sincerity of his convictions by twice attempting to seize supreme power by tampering with the army. For the latter of these ill-starred attempts he had suffered imprisonment in the fortress of Ham, but, escaping, had fled to England. When he returned to Paris in 1848 it was virtually to accept at the hands of the people a recall from exile. The prestige of his name won the votes of lovers of domestic order, while the absurdity of his conduct at Strasburg and Boulogne gained him the support of a less patriotic element, who regarded him as clay to be moulded at will by unscrupulous potters. The state of affairs in France at the opening of 1850 was without parallel in Europe. The revolution had overthrown Louis Philippe, crushed out a revolution that conspired against itself, established the republic, and crowned its work by choosing an imperial pretender for a republican president.

Of all the continental governments, those represented in the Germanic Diet at Frankfort had suffered most severely. Mobs raged through the streets of Berlin, Dresden, Munich, and Vienna. The Hun-

garian and Italian subjects of the Kaiser revolted and defeated the troops sent to suppress them. The Kaiser fled from Vienna, the king of Bavaria abdicated his throne, while the petty princes of Germany were driven to the promulgation of constitutions, and the adoption of liberal ministries. In the general uprising against absolutism, the Frankfort Diet itself was swept away. It had never been popular with the masses, as it represented the princes, and not the people, of the German states. In its stead there was convened a national assembly, elected by popular suffrage, whose leading articles of faith were constitutional liberty and national unity. Adherence to the latter principle induced it to order Prussian troops to the assistance of the people of Schleswig-Holstein, who were endeavoring to throw off the Danish yoke, while devotion to the former led it to offer to Frederick William of Prussia the crown of united Germany. Prussia had clearly outstripped Austria in the favor of the German people. Her advocacy of the Zollverein which had made Germany a commercial unit, and the adoption by Frederick William of certain liberal reforms advocated by the Berlin revolutionists, had done much to establish this state of things. Frederick William, however, had never really sympathized with the new views of his subjects. He was a devout believer in his divine right, and in the power of the Austrian army, and furthermore felt a deep veneration for the House of Hapsburg. He mistrusted the wisdom and stability of the Frankfort assembly, and refused its offer of imperial honors. This proved the deathblow of the liberal assembly on the Main. Had Russia remained quiescent, perhaps it might have risen superior to this rebuff. In fact,

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however, the Czar placed his troops at the disposal of the Kaiser, and confided to his famous lieutenant, Paskevich, the subjugation of Hungary. With his right arm free again, the Kaiser turned to the rectification of affairs in Germany. Despotism took fresh heart, liberal ministries came tumbling down, and Frederick William, who had been playing fast and loose with the Prussian revolutionists, turned a cold shoulder to their requests. The Prussian troops were recalled from the Elbe Duchies, while Austrian troops succeeded them, and reëstablished the Danish authority. In the mean time, Paskevich in Hungary, and Radetsky in Italy, had crushed out all opposition. Austria was again dominant, not only in Germany, but in Central Europe and Italy as well.

The condition in which Hungary and Italy were left by the Russo-Austrian triumph was a deplorable one. While the former was the victim of the sternest military reprisals, the state of affairs in Italy was even worse.

With an intensely national spirit animating all classes from the Alps to the Tiber, the Italians for generations had been held asunder by foreign bayonets. Austria held Venetia and Lombardy as provinces of the empire, but her influence extended far beyond their frontiers. The Neapolitans crouched under the Bourbon lash with the might of Austria behind it. Tuscany, Parma, and Modena had their old rulers, who had fled upon the outbreak of 1848, again forced upon them, while the troops of the Kaiser were billeted on their territory. The Pope returned from his retirement in the Neapolitan dominions under the protection of Austria, the French Republican army having previously occupied Rome.

Even Piedmont, the little northern kingdom, the sole representative of constitutional government in Italy, had suffered from a temporary Austrian occupation consequent upon Radetsky's victory at Novara. But the Piedmontese were not cast down. As Austria stood for despotism in the peninsula, so Piedmont had come to stand for constitutional government and Italian regeneration. From the dismal night of Novara, when the broken-hearted Charles Albert abdicated the Sardinian throne to his son, a new era was inaugurated in Italian history. While the battle-smoke still brooded over the field of Radetsky's greatest victory with evidences of misery and disaster on every hand, Victor Emmanuel had voiced the oath "*Per Dio, Italia sarà!*" In the presence of the principal dignitaries of the kingdom, he committed himself to the fostering of the liberal institutions of the state and the furtherance of the Italian cause. Even as early as 1850, while still reaping the bitter fruits of unsuccessful revolution, the Italian people were coming to regard Piedmont as the national David, by whom the giant strength of foreign oppression should one day be broken.

Throughout this period of turmoil in Europe, the vast realms of the Czar had remained undisturbed. Not certainly that there were no burdens to be lightened or wrongs to be redressed, but simply from the fact that liberty such as was being fought for in Germany, Austria, and Italy had never entered into the conception of the stupid, plodding Russian serf. As for the sprinkling of uneasy, restless agitators, from which Russia is never free, perhaps the memory of Poland and the fear of Paskevich held them back. Russia remained tranquil, a fact that won new pres-

tige for the Czar. The generous, majestic fashion in which he came to the assistance of Austria, and hurled back the Hungarian patriots before his stubborn battalions, impressed all Europe with a sense of his great might. While every continental government was employing the full strength of its military arm to preserve or restore order within its territories, the Czar was demonstrating the fact that his armed power was far beyond his necessities. The withdrawal of his troops from Hungary was no less imposing than their entry had been. No allusion to compensation lessened its moral influence. Austria was grateful and profuse, while the rest of Europe was awed by the splendid courtesy and boundless power of the northern autocrat.

The general position of the great European states at the opening of the year 1850 may be summed up briefly as follows:—

England still remained engrossed in the arts of peace and the doings in the Commons. The reforms for which the continental peoples contended were only those which the English fought for at Naseby and Marston Moor, and had enjoyed for centuries.

France, emerging from a complication of revolutions, was again sailing smoothly, but with the Bonaparte pretender at the helm.

In the German states, despotism, temporarily in danger, had resumed its sway, with the Diet again established on the Main. Imperialism, reëntrenched in Vienna, cast its baleful shadow over Germany, Hungary, and Italy.

Finally, Russia loomed vast and haughty in the far East, an object of dread and misgiving, and clothed in newly-acquired prestige.

CHAPTER II.

THE COUP D'ÉTAT.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF FRANCE IN 1851. — THE PRESIDENT'S OATH. — ENMITY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE ASSEMBLY. — THE SPEECH AT DIJON. — ST. ARNAUD AND MAUPAS APPOINTED TO THE MINISTRY. — THE 2D OF DECEMBER. — THE PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION AND THE ARRESTS. — DISPERSION OF THE ASSEMBLY. — HOW THE COUP D'ÉTAT WAS MANAGED. — THE EVENTS OF THE 3D. — THE 4TH OF DECEMBER. — STATE OF AFFAIRS ON THE BOULEVARD. — THE MASSACRE AND ITS INFLUENCE. — CONFLICT OF TESTIMONY IN REGARD TO THE MASSACRE. — THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSIBILITY. — DISPOSITION OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. — THE PRESIDENT SUSTAINED BY THE NATIONAL VOTE. — THE TE DEUM IN NOTRE DAME. — THE PRESIDENT BECOMES EMPEROR.

IN the year 1851 France was attracting more attention than any other of the great powers on account of her conspicuous foreign policy. With an army in Rome as a body-guard to the Pope, and an ambassador in Constantinople vigorously claiming the Holy Places at Jerusalem, this policy was strongly suggestive of the Crusades. But the fact, above all, that arrested the attention of the world was the unique experiment then in progress of a republican government, with the heir of the First Napoleon as president.

Prince Louis entered upon his duties as president of the French republic December 20, 1848. On that day, before the Assembly, he swore "to remain faithful to the democratic republic," and declared, "My duty is clear. I will fulfill it as a man of honor. I shall

regard as enemies of the country all those who endeavor to change by illegal means that which all France has established."

The president and the Assembly were soon at war. The Assembly, or a large proportion of its members, suspected the president of treasonable designs against the republic, while he believed that the Assembly was conspiring for his overthrow. A state of affairs like this could not be attended with much good for France. In May, 1851, the president declared at a public banquet in Dijon, "The Assembly has given me its co-operation in every means of repression, but has failed me in all the measures which I have devised for the welfare of the people."

On October 27 Achille St. Arnaud, an officer in the French Algerian army, with a bold, venturesome spirit and a reputation by no means stainless,¹ was appointed by the president minister of war. On the same day M. de Maupas was appointed prefect of police. Maupas unfortunately had won a reputation which seemed better calculated to bring him under the surveillance of the police, than to place him in charge of its intricate machinery.² It certainly could not be regarded otherwise than as a grave danger to France that the army should be under the orders of an unscrupulous soldier like St. Arnaud, and the police in charge of a character like Maupas. The true significance of these appointments was indicated by the events which occurred in Paris between the 1st and 5th of the following December.

On the morning of December 2, 1851, Paris awoke to find its walls blazing with proclamations by the presi-

¹ Kinglake, chapter xxix.; Ténnot, pp. 78, 79.

² See Kinglake, chapter xiv.

dent, declaring that he had dissolved the Assembly, charging it with being "the hotbed of sedition," that it forged the weapons of civil war, that it imperiled the tranquillity of France, and that he, the president, made the whole people judge between him and it. "I make, therefore, my loyal appeal to the whole nation, . . . and I say if it be your will that the present state of disturbance continue, choose another to fill my place, for I will no longer retain a power which is ineffectual for good." Parisians found, furthermore, that the press had been muzzled, and they learned only by word of mouth from the wild stories that circulated upon the boulevards, that there had been wholesale arrests during the night, and that the leading statesmen and soldiers of France were behind prison bars. The vast massing of troops at strategical points proved that some move of unusual importance had been made. A brigade was drawn up on the Quai d'Orsay, another was stationed in the Place de la Concorde, another in the garden of the Tuileries, while a fourth under Canrobert, with no less than three brigades of cavalry, was located about the palace of the Elysée.

Later in the morning the Assembly came together, but were ejected by a body of troops, and several of the members arrested. Another attempt was made to hold a session at the mayoralty of the tenth arrondissement. A resolve was passed that the high-handed acts of the president were a forfeiture of his office. At this juncture General Forey arrived before the building at the head of several battalions. A detachment entered the room where the deputies were sitting, and an officer ordered them to disperse. This they refused to do, but upon the seizure of the president

by the soldiers the whole body declared themselves prisoners, and were marched through the streets to the Quai d'Orsay, hemmed in by a cordon of bayonets. They were confined here through the day, but after dark they were sent, in close vans, some to the fortresses of Vincennes and Mont Valérien, and others to the prison of Mazas. This concluded the first act in the *coup d'état* which overthrew the republic and left Louis Napoleon the dictator of France.

The ministers of the president discharged their duties with such skill and vigor that people were willing to believe they had been chosen with this object in view. Maupas, at the head of the police, isolated the state printing-office during the striking-off of the proclamations dissolving the Assembly, and arranged with beautiful precision and a brazen disregard of law the early morning arrest of the military and civil leaders of France. The total number of arrests was seventy-eight, and they included all those statesmen who were regarded as most likely openly to combat the bold step of the president and incite the people to resist him. St. Arnaud directed the soldiery against the Assembly, and stationed them in imposing masses through the city, to intimidate those who might feel impelled to protest with the customary barricade arguments. M. de Morny, generally known as a daring speculator, assumed charge of the home office shortly before light, and the rising sun found him at his post, superintending the vast telegraphic system which was conveying to the country such accounts of the state of enthusiasm in Paris as the president and his ministers deemed best suited to their interests.

The second part of the *coup d'état*, which drenched

the boulevards with innocent blood, has cast a shade of horror over the whole transaction that time has been unable to efface. Paris is never so reduced in a crisis, whether the cause be just or unjust, that she is bereft of hands to erect and defend barricades in her streets. In the Faubourg St. Antoine an incipient rising on the 2d was suppressed immediately by the troops. The volcanic district from the Hôtel de Ville northward to the boulevards also showed signs of uneasiness, and throughout the morning of the 3d the military were busy pulling down partially completed barricades and dispersing small bodies of insurgents. There seems to be little question that the army was embittered against the populace. If this were so, the proclamation circulated by the president through the ranks on the 2d was not calculated to appease it. He styled the soldiers as "the flower of the nation." He pointed out to them that his interests and theirs were the same, and that they had suffered together in the past from the course of the Assembly. He reminded them of the years 1830 and 1848, when the army had fought the people in the streets of Paris, and concluded by an allusion to the military grandeur of the Bonapartes.

During the afternoon of the 3d and morning of the 4th the troops remained inactive, pending orders from the minister of war, and in this interval several strong barricades were erected in the restless quarters. On the afternoon of the 4th the boulevards, from the Madeleine to the Rue du Sentier, were occupied by a great body of troops awaiting orders to move east through the Boulevard Bonne Nouvelle upon the barricaded district. The soldiers stood at ease, and the officers lounged about, smoking their cigars. The

sidewalks, windows, and balconies were crowded with men, women, and children, thoughtless onlookers of the great military display. Suddenly a single shot was heard. It was fired from a window near the Rue du Sentier. The troops at the head of the column faced sharply to the south, and commenced a deliberate fusillade upon the crowded walks and balconies. The battalions farther west caught the murderous contagion, until the line of fire extended into the Boulevard des Italiens. In a few moments the beautiful boulevards were converted into a bloody pandemonium. The sidewalks were strewn with corpses and stained with blood. The air was rent with shrieks and groans and the breaking of glass, while the steady, incessant rattling of the musketry was intensified by an occasional cannon-shot, that brought down with a crash the masonry from some fine façade. This continued for nearly twenty minutes, when a lack of people to kill seems to have restrained the mad volleys of the troops. If any attempt was made by officers to check their men, it was wholly unavailing, and in some cases miserable fugitives were followed into buildings and massacred. Later in the day the barricades were attacked, and their defenders easily overcome. By nightfall insurgent Paris was thoroughly cowed.

These allegations, though conflicting with sworn statements of Republicans and Imperialists, can hardly be refuted. The efforts of the Napoleonic faction to portray the thoughtless crowd of the boulevards as desperate and bloody-minded rebels have never been successful, while the opposition so brilliantly represented by the author of "*Histoire d'un Crime*" have been too fierce and immoderate in their accusations to win public credence. The questions as to who fired

the first shot, and whether it was fired as a signal for, or a menace against the military, are points on which Frenchmen of different political parties still debate. It is charitable to accept M. Hugo's insinuation that the soldiery were drunk with the president's wine, even though the fact implies a low state of discipline in the service.

To what extent was the president responsible for the boulevard horror? M. Victor Hugo and M. de Maupas do not agree upon this point, and it seems useless to discuss it. Certain facts are indisputable. We know the army bore small love toward the Parisians, and we know it was in the streets by order of the president. We know that the latter was in bad company, and playing a dangerous game. We may discard M. Victor Hugo's statement as to the orders issued by the president from the Elysée on the fatal day, but we cannot disguise the fact that the boulevard horror subdued Paris, and crowned his cause with success. In other words, Louis Napoleon was the gainer by the slaughter of unoffending men, women, and children, and in after-years, when referring to the 4th of December, he found it for his interest to distort facts, and make figures lie.¹

There was no deviation from time-honored customs in regard to the treatment of prisoners taken in arms against "the government." Many were executed, while several hundreds were transported to Africa and Cayenne, and so ended the heroic measures that were deemed necessary to shatter the power of the Assembly and place Louis Napoleon and his ministers in control of France.

¹ For a concise and able review of the evidence bearing on the events of the 4th of December, see Ténot's *Paris in December, 1851*, chapter vi.

But Louis Napoleon had expressly stated in the proclamation that astonished Paris on the 2d that he made the people judge between him and the Assembly. The citizens of France were called upon to vote on the 20th and 21st of December "Yes" or "No" to the question as to whether the president should be sustained in the measures he had taken, should be empowered to draw up a new constitution, and should retain the presidential chair for a period of ten years. The army had already voted two weeks previously, indorsing the president with a remarkable unanimity. Furthermore, the vote "No," if successful, provided no substitute for Napoleon, and, leaving the land without a legal ruler, would of a certainty plunge it into anarchy. Moreover, many of the provinces were under martial law, which, taken in connection with the fact that the police and military machinery was in the hands of the president and his ministry, left but one possible result to the voting. Napoleon was opposed in a total vote of 8,000,000, by only 640,000.

On January 1, 1852, the morning after the result of the vote had been officially announced to him at the palace of the Elysée, he repaired to the cathedral of Notre Dame, and there, in the presence of his ministers and the agents of his schemes, he invoked the divine protection and blessing upon his future administration of the affairs of France.

On January 14, 1852, the new constitution was promulgated, which the plebiscite had empowered the president to frame. It eradicated almost the last jot of republicanism from France. The presidential power was well-nigh absolute, while the popular branch of the government was reduced to impotency. There was only one more step to be taken, and the republic

would be extinct. Louis Napoleon still retained the title of president. On the 21st of November the people of France voted upon this proposition as framed by the Senate: "The people desire the re-establishment of the imperial dynasty in the person of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte," etc., etc. On the 1st of December the members of both houses repaired to the shades of St. Cloud, and there officially announced to the president that he had been elected Emperor of France. Since the 14th of the previous January he had been imperial in all but name, but now he stood before the world the legal inhabitant of the Tuileries, "Napoleon the Third, by the Grace of God and by the will of the people, Emperor of the French."

CHAPTER III.

THE REVIVAL OF THE EASTERN QUESTION.

THE FRENCH EMPEROR'S STANDING IN EUROPE. — HE HAS RECOURSE TO THE EASTERN QUESTION. — THE QUARREL OVER THE HOLY PLACES. — THE ATTITUDE OF RUSSIA. — THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CARRIES HIS POINT. — WRATH OF THE CZAR. — NESSELRODE ON THE SITUATION. — MENSCHIKOFF'S MISSION TO CONSTANTINOPLE. — LORD STRATFORD AS PEACEMAKER. — MENSCHIKOFF'S DEMAND AND ITS RECEPTION BY THE PORTE. — STRATFORD'S POSITION. — EUROPEAN SUSPICION OF RUSSIA. — ATTITUDE OF THE POWERS ON THE EASTERN QUESTION. — ENGLAND THE MOST INTERESTED. — THE CZAR'S VISIT TO ENGLAND IN 1844. — "THE SICK MAN" INTERVIEWS AND THEIR RESULT. — STRENGTH OF THE CZAR'S CLAIM TO A PROTECTORATE. — PROGRESS OF MENSCHIKOFF'S MISSION. — HE IS OPPOSED BY STRATFORD. — MENSCHIKOFF'S ULTIMATUM. — STRATFORD'S COMMUNICATION TO THE SULTAN. — POSITION IN WHICH ENGLAND WAS PLACED BY IT. — FAILURE OF MENSCHIKOFF'S MISSION. — THE RUSSIAN ARMY CROSSES THE PRUTH. — THE CZAR'S PROCLAMATION. — THE VIENNA CONGRESS. — THE WAR FEVER IN TURKEY. — THE FRANCO-ENGLISH FLEET ENTERS THE SEA OF MARMORA. — TURKEY AND RUSSIA AT WAR.

THE influence of the *coup d'état* extended far beyond the limits of France. The bold overthrow of the popular assembly was a bitter blow to the friends of constitutional government in all countries, and however satisfactory the results may have been to the despotic continental sovereigns, the methods adopted by the president for their consummation awakened toward him, in every court, a feeling of distrust. In England the news of the *coup d'état* was received with mingled feelings of horror and alarm. Lord

Palmerston, then foreign secretary, alone seems to have approved it, and his unwise avowal of his views resulted in his withdrawal from the cabinet.

The French emperor began to appreciate the fact that in all quarters he was looked at askance. He also realized the absolute necessity of making some move that should overshadow the hideous events of the *coup d'état*. The prestige, and perhaps the existence, of his government depended upon his making himself a prominent figure in European politics.

For a number of generations in Europe there has been one question that, carelessly or maliciously touched upon, has never failed to stimulate strife and discord among the nations. This is "the Eastern Question," the problem how to settle the disputes, political and religious, in the east of Europe. In 1850 it had temporarily ceased to disturb the continental councils, and Europe was rejoicing in a respite from the diplomatic strife that always attends its agitation. But Louis Napoleon deliberately applied the torch that kindled Eastern fanaticism, when he instructed the French ambassador at Constantinople to demand from the Porte a strict enforcement of the grant in regard to the Holy Places. Lord John Russell accused France directly in a letter to Lord Cowley, then British ambassador at Paris, of interrupting the general concord: "Her majesty's government cannot avoid perceiving that the ambassador of France at Constantinople was the first to disturb the *status quo* in which the matter rested."

The Holy Places is the general title applied to those sacred precincts about the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem where tradition has located the scenes of the sufferings, death, and burial of the

Saviour. The dispute for the protectorate of these sacred shrines has been maintained for centuries between the Greek and Latin churches. In the year 1740 France, as the champion of the Latin Church, succeeded in obtaining from the Porte a grant of distinguished privileges in regard to these sacred shrines. Later, however, the Greeks pushed their claims with greater zeal than their rivals, and succeeded from time to time in obtaining firmans from the Sultan, which were in nearly every case opposed to the concession. France, as the champion of the Latin cause, silently acquiesced, until the zealous Greeks and the world at large came to regard the grant as null and void.

The emperor of Russia is the great protector of the Greek Church, and his popularity as a sovereign depends largely upon the zeal he displays in the defence of her sacred interests. The Russian people, religious and superstitious, regard the Holy Places of Jerusalem with a veneration wholly incomprehensible to the practical peoples of Western Europe; and when the French ambassador assumed to revive the grant of 1740, it sent a shudder of pious horror throughout the length and breadth of the Czar's dominions.

The French ambassador at Constantinople, upon finding his demands refused by Turkish statesmen imbued with fear of Russia, openly threatened the use of a French naval force, and even hinted at a military occupation of Jerusalem. The Russian envoy was less violent, but no less firm, than the representative of France. Some concessions were made by both sides, until finally the questions in dispute were narrowed down to such points as these: whether

the Latins should possess a key to the great door of the Church of Bethlehem, and the privilege of placing in the grotto of the Nativity a silver star with the arms of France. Situated between two fierce fires, the Porte was in a sad quandary. Private guarantees of an assuring nature were made to both ambassadors, but were repelled with demands for public action. The Frenchman pressed his case unflinchingly, and temporarily the fear of the French fleet outweighed the Ottoman dread of Russia. On December 22, 1852, the silver star with the arms of France, having previously been brought from the sea with great ostentation, was placed in the sanctuary of the Nativity, and at the same time the long-coveted key passed into the possession of the Latin Church.

The Czar was in a furious rage, and all Russia was deeply stirred. "To the indignation of the whole people following the Greek ritual," wrote Count Nesselrode, the Russian chancellor, to Baron Brunnow, "the key of the Church of Bethlehem has been made over to the Latins, so as publicly to demonstrate their religious supremacy in the East. The mischief, then, is done, M. le Baron, and there is no longer any question of preventing it. It is now necessary to remedy it. The immunities of the orthodox religion which have been injured, the promises which the Sultan had solemnly given to the emperor, and which have been violated, call for an act of reparation. It is to obtain this we must labor. . . . It may happen that France, perceiving any hesitation on the part of the Porte, may again have recourse to menace, and press upon it so as to prevent it from listening to our just demands. . . . The emperor has therefore considered it necessary to adopt in the outset some precautionary meas-

ures, in order to support our negotiations, to neutralize the effect of M. Lavalette's threats, and to guard himself in any contingency which may occur against a government accustomed to act by surprises."

There was an ominous movement in the Russian military establishment, and at the time it became definitely known throughout Europe that three *corps d'armée* were advancing upon the Pruth, Prince Menschikoff appeared in Constantinople to extort satisfaction from the Sultan for the affront suffered by the Greek Church. France was represented at Constantinople by M. de la Cour, who had succeeded M. Lavalette, and England by Lord Stratford. Menschikoff did not ask for an entire repeal of the privileges just conferred upon the Latins, but demanded merely counter privileges for the Greeks. Chief among these were the following: that the Greeks should have the right to repair the cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, that they should have the precedence as regards hours of worship at the tomb of the Virgin, and that a Greek priest should always preside over the great door of the Church of Bethlehem. To the mind of western Europe the questions in dispute seemed strangely trivial, but the Russian ambassador stood as the mouthpiece of an angry sovereign and millions of pious people, while the Frenchman represented a master bent on creating some disturbance which might tend to obscure the memory of his usurpation. Lord Stratford was the peacemaker, and notwithstanding the obstacles in the way, the dispute was finally settled before the close of April by the general acceptance of Russia's demands. The Greek Church had been vindicated, but the end was not yet.

The Czar was not satisfied with this reparation, and he also realized that no concessions could render his subjects other than joyful for an opportunity to wreak vengeance upon the enemies of the church. He had determined to cripple Turkey, and so place his holy church beyond the possibility of the repetition of such an indignity. In fact, Menschikoff had taken other instructions from St. Petersburg than those regarding the Holy Places. No sooner had this dispute been cleared away than he demanded an acknowledgment by the Porte of the protectorate of the Christian peoples of Turkey, which had been given to the Czars by virtue of the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji in 1774.

The Sultan knew that the acceptance of this would make the Czar the practical ruler over ten millions of his subjects. Menschikoff pushed his demands haughtily, and even fiercely. The ministers of the Porte, while appreciating the results of yielding, also foresaw the disastrous issue attending a conflict with the great northern power. Behind the rough commands of the ambassador they could hear the low rumble of the Russian military advance, and could almost catch the glint of the Muscovite bayonets reflected in the waters of the Pruth.

Unsupported, they must have yielded, but an unlooked-for ally came to their aid. Prince Menschikoff soon found himself opposed, not only by the Ottoman ministers, but by the English ambassador as well. Before noticing the progress and result of this diplomatic contest, it will be well to glance at the general attitude of England in regard to the Eastern Question, and realize how it came about that at this time Lord Stratford, in behalf of his government,

was found standing squarely in the path of Russian ambition as a barrier to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

Throughout Europe in general, but especially in England, a deep feeling of suspicion prevailed toward the great Muscovite Empire. The suddenness of its rise from a condition of indolent barbarism to the position of a first-rate power in the list of European states had fairly amazed the western nations of slower growth. The disposition of Russia to extend her frontiers in all directions was a serious bugbear to Europe, but the standing menace against Constantinople which she had maintained since the days of Peter the Great had always been a terror to English statesmen. The strongest movement on the part of the Russian Empire was toward the south. Political reasons aside, there was a deep-seated longing in the heart of every true Russian to liberate the Christian peoples of the Balkan peninsula from the Mohammedan yoke, and convert the mosques of the Byzantine capital into sanctuaries of their sacred church.

The statesmen of Europe viewed this tendency of the Czar and his people from widely different standpoints.

Prussia cared but little for the Eastern Question, while Austria, on the other hand, was deeply interested. The Russian path to the Hellespont lay through the Danubian Principalities, and the presence of a Russian force hovering upon her flank was something from the Austrian view never to be permitted.

France was indifferent to the matter save in a general way as a Mediterranean power, but England, the most distant power from any scene of trouble in eastern Europe, was interested far beyond any of the rest.

Though she was regarded as the leading Christian state of Europe, it seemed to her right and satisfactory that the fairest lands of the old Byzantine Empire should remain the possession of a foreigner and an infidel, whose only achievements had been those of treachery and blood, simply because he had no power to menace her line of Indian communication. It seemed far better to England that the resources of this fair country should remain undeveloped, and that its Christian population should be crushed in ignorance and degradation, than that it should ever pass into the hands of a more energetic owner, with the power to threaten that delicate water-way to India. In short, England's practical Christianity was seriously hampered by her anxiety for her possessions in the far East.

Suspicion of Russia was never wholly at rest in England, but perhaps it was less marked than usual in the period immediately following the Czar's visit in 1844. Every one was charmed with his frank ways and pleasant speeches. Only a few were aware how far his frankness had carried him in his conversations with the cabinet ministers in regard to the future of Turkey. He spoke almost tenderly of her, but assured the ministers that however matters might appear upon the surface, the Ottoman power was surely falling to pieces. He regarded it as better for Europe that England and Russia should arrive at some understanding in regard to the disposition of the Porte's dominions before the downfall really came. After his return to Russia he forwarded to the English government, through his chancellor, a memorandum or statement of the understanding existing between Russia and England. It was merely a repe-

tition of what he had previously stated in his conversations with the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen. The memorandum, it seems, was never replied to by the English government, but was filed away among the state papers. Nicholas, on the supposition that "silence gives consent," regarded the English government as in sympathy with his ideas on the Eastern Question.

The dispute in regard to the Holy Places, first engendered, as we have seen, by the French ambassador, had awakened the Czar from his temporary lethargy in regard to the fate of the Ottoman Empire. All Russia was burning with religious and patriotic fervor. It was an imperative necessity for the Czar to retrieve the prestige of the church; was it not also the fitting time to break the Ottoman power in pieces with the weapon which the outraged feelings of his subjects had placed at his command?

His influence at Berlin was all powerful, and Prussia was his friend. The memory of the Hungarian revolt was not forgotten in Vienna, and he felt secure in the friendship of the young Kaiser. England was engrossed in commercial pursuits and opposed to war, and furthermore her statesmen had been in accord with his views in regard to Turkey for years. France was the only power he had to reckon with, and France unsupported would hardly deem it wise to combat his schemes. This was unquestionably the general line of argument that Nicholas was following at the opening of the year 1853.

On January 9 a ball was given at the palace of the Archduchess Helen in St. Petersburg. Few who mingled in the brilliant throng on that winter's evening dreamed that the occasion was destined to become

more famous in the diplomatic than in the social annals of Europe. In the course of the festivities the Czar drew aside with the British ambassador, Sir G. Hamilton Seymour, and in his frank, engaging way divulged his views, as to a sympathetic hearer. The conversation was upon the prospects of Turkey and its speedy downfall, and was renewed again and again during the few days succeeding. "We have on our hands a sick man, a very sick man," said the emperor; "it will be a great misfortune if, one of these days, he should slip away from us before the necessary arrangements have been made." He declared that he did not desire a permanent Russian occupation of Constantinople and would allow no other power that privilege. He preferred that the Christian provinces north of the Balkan Mountains should become independent states under his protection. If England wanted Egypt "he had no objection to offer;" if Candia, he would not oppose her. He dwelt especially upon the sad condition of the Christian peoples under Turkish rule, and the duty that devolved upon him to exercise a protecting care over them. This duty was made incumbent upon him, he explained, by the treaty of 1774. The Czar sought these conferences for the purpose of acquainting the English government with his intentions and eliciting a ratification of the views expressed in the memorandum of 1844. The response to his overtures was far different from what he had expected, and chilling in the extreme. It was hardly customary, Lord Aberdeen replied, to distribute the possessions of a friendly state still in existence. England had not lost confidence in the stability of the Turkish government.

The Czar was enraged at the useless exposure of

his schemes. At least, he argued, if England is not in sympathy, she will not fight; the English people are opposed to fighting. Then he dispatched Menschikoff to Constantinople, literally to force a quarrel, — a quarrel in which the wrongs of the church would be thoroughly revenged, and the hateful dominion of the Sultan overthrown. Thus it was that in the spring of 1853, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire being threatened, Lord Stratford was at Constantinople stimulating the Turkish ministers to resist the demands of Prince Menschikoff and his imperial master.

Russia's claim to a protectorate over the Greek Christians was based solely upon the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji. This treaty was forced upon the Sultan by Catherine II. after her victorious war in 1774. The Ottoman power had been thoroughly humbled, and by the terms of the treaty Russia gained vast territorial acquisitions and the free navigation of Turkish waters. Furthermore this treaty allowed Russia to erect a Christian church in Constantinople, to be always under her protection.

It was in reference to this church that Russia and Europe were openly at variance in 1853. Russia claimed that when the Sultan allowed the right of Russian interference in the case of the Constantinople church, he admitted her claim to do likewise in behalf of all Christians within his dominions. Turkey denied that any such protectorate was implied. A superficial glance at the disputed clauses seems adverse to the Russian view of the case, but it is interesting to note that even among her enemies Russia has found prominent defenders of her position.¹ Lord John Russell,

¹ Mr. Gladstone has defended Russia's position in this matter.

perhaps unintentionally, justified the Russian claim at a critical time. In writing to Sir G. Hamilton Seymour at St. Petersburg under date of February 9, 1853, he said: "The more the Turkish government adopts the rules of impartial law and equal administration, the less will the emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptional protection which his imperial majesty has found so burdensome and inconvenient, though no doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty." This was pleasant reading to Nicholas. He had stated to the English ambassador in his famous "sick man" interviews that he was bound by treaty to protect the Christians of the Balkan peninsula, and this letter was a virtual acknowledgment of his claim. He felt that he could press the Porte without fear of England. Perhaps it was due in some part to this admission of Lord John Russell's that the Czar failed to comprehend for so long a time that Lord Stratford really represented the spirit of the English government.

Prince Menschikoff had arrived at Constantinople early in March. Lord Stratford arrived upon the 5th of April. Count Nesselrode had given the English government to understand that Menschikoff's mission concerned solely the question of the Holy Places. The English government thought otherwise, and Lord Stratford soon found that their suspicions were well grounded. In four days he had won the confidence of the Turkish ministry so far as to learn that Menschikoff had been pressing upon them the Czar's claim for a protectorate, and urging, furthermore, the necessity of strict secrecy in the matter. By the time the dispute over the Holy Places had been settled, it had become useless for the Russian ambassador to attempt

longer to preserve secrecy in regard to the more important matter. It was plain to him that Lord Stratford was aware of the nature of his demands, and that he was responsible for the increasing firmness of the Turkish ministry. He saw, to his chagrin, the terror inspired by his harsh commands and the presence of the army on the Pruth failing to impress the mind of the Sultan under the counsel and support of the English ambassador.

On May 5 Menschikoff, in a haughty note, openly demanded of the Porte an immediate compliance with the requests of the emperor of Russia in regard to the protectorate of the Greek Christians in Turkey, declaring in conclusion that he could not "consider longer delay in any other light than as a want of respect towards his government, which would impose upon him the most painful duty." This was just one month after Stratford's arrival. The matter had been under active discussion for three weeks, and it was evident that the Russian ambassador was determined to push things to a conclusion.

The Turkish ministry were seriously alarmed at this peremptory summons. They conferred anxiously with Lord Stratford, and sought to obtain from him some pledge of material aid in case they pushed the Czar too far by their opposition. In this they were unsuccessful; Stratford counseled them to firmness and patience, and wrote to Menschikoff, pointing out to him the danger of the path in which his imperial master was treading, and the deep stain that he was bringing upon his hitherto just and temperate reign. Menschikoff was immovable, and the Porte was brought to another pitiful strait. As a last resort Stratford requested a private audience with the Sul-

tan, and then informed him that in case the Turkish integrity was seriously threatened, he should order the admiral of the English Mediterranean fleet to hold himself in readiness for service. The effect of this communication was electrifying. The quick-witted pashas comprehended its full import. It was something tangible, it smacked of men and guns, and was far more satisfactory than any amount of disinterested counsel.

England was rapidly drifting into a critical position. Lord Stratford had not openly opposed the Russian claims, but the Czar realized that the English ambassador alone stood between him and the accomplishment of his desires. Stratford rebuked every sign of wavering in the Ottoman councils, and always advocated refusal to the Russian demands. He became absolutely responsible for the strength of the Turkish opposition.

On the 10th Menschikoff received from the Porte a courteous but firm refusal of all his demands regarding the protectorate, and after a few days more of fruitless threatening he declared his mission at an end. Before this Lord Stratford had assembled the ambassadors of the three powers for consultation, and secured their approval of the course so far pursued by the Ottoman government. On the 21st, taking with him the entire legation, Menschikoff departed for Russia to face the wrath of an angry and disappointed sovereign.

Upon the receipt of the intelligence of Menschikoff's failure, Count Nesselrode immediately informed Reschid Pasha that "in a few weeks the Russian troops will receive the order to cross the boundaries of the empire, not for the purpose of making war, but in order

to obtain material guarantees," etc. Almost at the same time with the receipt of Nesselrode's threat, Lord Stratford received from Lord Clarendon a statement to the effect that England was "bound to maintain the independence of Turkey," and that "the use of force was to be resorted to as a last and unavoidable resource." From this time England was hopelessly bound to the Porte. The policy of Lord Stratford had of necessity brought her to a pass where she was in honor compelled to sustain the Sultan in any crisis that might arise from the stand he had taken against the Czar.

On the 3d of July the vanguard of the Russian army crossed the Pruth and entered Moldavia. "Having exhausted all persuasion," declared the emperor to his faithful subjects, "we have found it needful to advance our armies into the Danubian Principalities, in order to show the Ottoman Porte to what its obstinacy may lead. But even now we have not the intention to commence war. By the occupation of the principalities we desire to have such a security as will insure us the restoration of our rights."

However the presence of Russian troops in the principalities might be interpreted by the Czar, it was practically an invasion of the territory of the Porte, and as such formed a good and sufficient *casus belli*. Lord Stratford, however, held the belligerent party at Constantinople in check, and the ministry were not slow in realizing that their safety depended on the closeness and fidelity with which they followed his instructions.

Diplomatists did not despair, even after this hostile move of the Czar. The representatives of the four

powers assembled in Vienna during July for another effort to settle the questions in dispute without war. The fruit of this meeting was the drafting of an agreement purporting to come from the Sultan. This paper, which became famous under the title of "The Vienna Note," practically insured to the Czar the right of a protectorate, thus yielding the chief point of dispute. If there could have been any doubt of this fact, it was dispelled by the extreme eagerness with which the proposals were received by the St. Petersburg cabinet. The note reached Constantinople early in August. Lord Stratford declared it to be a complete acceptance of all Russia's objectionable demands, and under his direction the clauses in regard to the protectorate were amended in such a way as to make it plain that the Sultan, and he alone, should exercise a tender watchfulness over the Greek Christians in his dominions. The note in its altered form was promptly rejected at St. Petersburg. The Vienna Congress came to an end, leaving matters exactly as they stood before its labors began.

This was the last serious effort made toward the preservation of peace. The war feeling throughout the Moslem population of the Sultan's dominions grew in intensity day by day. The ministry did not fail to take advantage of this, and to warn the ambassadors of foreign courts in Constantinople that the peace of the city and the lives of Christians were seriously jeopardized in consequence. The impression upon the French ambassador was so strong that he openly advocated to his government the expediency of moving the French fleet from Besika Bay to Constantinople. This was exactly what the Ottoman ministry wished. The Emperor Napoleon, perhaps

nothing loath to force hostilities, called the attention of the British cabinet to the subject, and strenuously urged the policy of sending the allied fleets into the Sea of Marmora. The English government had a respect for treaties, and demurred. Under the treaty of 1841 no war vessel was allowed to enter the Dardanelles in time of peace. The English cabinet were not certain as to whether the state of affairs between Russia and Turkey could be regarded as one of war. Omar Pasha, the Turkish commander, had on October 8 summoned the Russian forces to evacuate the principalities within fifteen days, and upon the acceptance or refusal of this demand the question of war was hanging. The influence of the French emperor, however, prevailed, and on the 22d the combined fleets steamed through the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmora, and came to anchor off Constantinople. On the next day, Omar Pasha's summons having been disregarded, Turkey was openly at war with Russia.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DANUBIAN CAMPAIGN.

THE RUSSIAN ARMY ENTERS MOLDAVIA. — THE MILITARY BLUNDER OF THE CZAR. — THE TURKISH ARMY AND ITS COMMANDER. — THE TURKS CROSS THE DANUBE. — FIGHTING ABOUT KALAFAT. — THE CZAR DETERMINES UPON THE OFFENSIVE. — THE CAREER OF PASKEVICH. — HIS ADVICE TO THE CZAR. — THE RUSSIANS CROSS THE DANUBE. — SIEGE OF SILISTRIA AND FALL OF PASKEVICH. — AUSTRIA INTERFERES. — RETREAT OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND BATTLE OF GIURGEVO — GORTSCHAKOFF ABANDONS BUCHAREST. — ENTRY OF THE TURKISH AND AUSTRIAN ARMIES. — ISOLATION OF THE CZAR IN EUROPE.

THE Russian army entered Moldavia under command of Prince Gortschakoff, and the advance was made without haste.¹ Gortschakoff established his headquarters at Bucharest, where he was received in great pomp by the nobility and functionaries of the church. In a few weeks the advanced posts were on the Danube and the uniform of the Czar was a common sight in the streets of the larger towns. The strength of the army during the first weeks of the occupation was close upon 75,000 men, with 74 guns.

Upon the declaration of war by Turkey, the power of this army was compromised by the foolish decision

¹ Prince Mikhail Gortschakoff. He entered the Russian army in 1807, took part in the Persian campaign in 1810 and those of 1812-15 against France. He also served in the Turkish campaign of 1828, the Polish campaign of 1831, and commanded the Russian artillery against the Hungarians in 1849. He must not be confounded with his brother Prince Peter, who figured as a corps commander at the Alma and Inkermann.

of the Czar which Nesselrode dispatched to all the European courts on October 31. He declared that notwithstanding the declaration of war the Russian troops would still refrain from the offensive and merely stand in defense of the principalities. This rendered it incumbent upon Gortschakoff to cover nearly the whole length of the Danube from Widdin to Galatz, making it possible for the Turks to fall upon his extended line at any point in overwhelming numbers.

Throughout the negotiations at Constantinople the Porte had been steadily preparing for war, and the fanatical hatred of the Moslem for the Giaour had been thoroughly whetted. When imbued with this religious zeal and ably led, the fierce soldiery of the Sultan have always proved themselves the equals of any in Europe. They are at their best when commanded by officers of foreign birth and education, and in the campaigns of the Danube in 1853-54 they were officered by representatives of the two peoples principally interested in checking Russian aggression. Omar Pasha, the Ottoman generalissimo, was an Austrian, while in nearly every critical engagement the Turkish soldiers were encouraged to success by volunteers from the service of the English queen.

Toward the close of October, Omar Pasha had under his command in Bulgaria a Turkish army of at least 120,000 men. He was quick to see and improve the advantage offered by the mistake of his enemy, and commenced massing troops at Widdin, situated on the Danube just above the point where its course changes to the east. Opposite Widdin, in Wallachia, is the smaller town of Kalafat, and on October 28 the Turkish force crossed the river and occupied it after

a short skirmish. The result of the move was to establish a strong Turkish defense squarely upon the Russian flank. Another crossing was made by the Turks from Turtukai to Oltenitza, while they also met with temporary success in an attempt from Silistria upon Kalarash.

These were practically the only movements of the year, the approach of winter and the enforced inactivity of the Russians conducing to a temporary lull. About the middle of November, Omar Pasha withdrew his troops from Oltenitza, leaving the force at Kalafat his only large detachment on Wallachian soil. The position of this force was too serious a menace to be left unheeded by the Russian commander, who proceeded to mass his available troops in Lesser Wallachia. Achmet Pasha, commanding the garrison at Kalafat, determined to anticipate the Russian attack, and on the 6th of January moved with 15,000 men against Citate. A Russian brigade held the village, and had thrown up earthworks in its rear. The Turks attacked the village furiously with the bayonet, and in the streets and lanes a terrible conflict took place. The Russians, heavily clothed and accoutred, were soon worsted by their agile adversaries, but driven from the streets they threw themselves into the houses and maintained a desperate resistance. It was four hours before the last Russian detachment was dislodged, and by that time their supports were at hand. Achmet Pasha brought up his reserves to confront these troops, whose movement placed him between two fires and threatened his communications with Kalafat. The Russians advanced in close column under cover of their artillery, and despite their numerical inferiority they finally

recaptured Citate and compelled the retirement of the Turks upon Kalafat.¹ During the week succeeding there was severe and indecisive fighting, after which the Russians commenced a leisurely retreat toward the east, abandoning finally the object of their advance.

The Russian situation was by no means promising. The Czar, mortified at the Ottoman successes, determined to relinquish his defensive plan, and inaugurate without delay an invasion of Turkey. To insure success he called Prince Paskevich, and sought his counsel as to the best way to push his battalions to the Bosphorous. Paskevich, then an old man, was an honored soldier and the most successful general that Russia possessed. He first saw service in 1805, and fought in the campaign that ended with the disastrous sunset of Austerlitz. In 1812-14 he was again in the field, participating in the battle of Leipsic and the victorious march to Paris. In 1825 he led the armies of the Czar in a victorious campaign against the Persians, and in the Turkish campaign of 1828-29 he conquered Armenia, subjugating even the great fortresses of Kars and Erzeroum. In 1831, when Poland was in revolt, it was his firm if cruel hand that crushed out the insurrection. In 1848 he entered Hungary at the head of the imperial troops, and in 1850 the fiftieth anniversary of his entry into the military service was celebrated at Warsaw amid general rejoicing, and the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia created him field marshal in their respective

¹ This action was reported in Vienna, London, and Paris as a great Turkish victory. Achmet Pasha's course certainly protected Kalafat from an attack, if he cannot be credited with winning a victory in the field.

armies. With this event the old soldier would willingly have closed his active career, but the summons of the Czar in 1854 found him ready for service as heretofore. Paskevich insisted that it was useless to attempt to cover the length of the Danube, and that Lesser Wallachia should be abandoned. An invasion of Turkey, he contended, was only feasible *via* Silistria and Shumla, and the success of this plan depended upon the ability of the imperial troops to reduce Silistria by the 1st of May.

The pride of the Czar was touched at having to relinquish any portion of his "material guarantee," but he yielded nevertheless to the hard counsel of his general. The Russian military establishment entered into vigorous action once again. Heavy masses of troops began to converge upon the Danube toward Silistria, while all through April the Moldavian villagers witnessed the march of fresh battalions passing southward from Russia to the front.

But the Czar had waited too long, and no amount of energy could now retrieve his failing fortunes. Russia was openly at war with both France and England, and their fleets had been blockading the Black Sea since the opening of the year. Furthermore, Austria was increasing her army on her eastern frontier and the Vienna cabinet left no room for doubt as to its purpose. Paskevich knew well that even if Silistria fell by May 1, if his hardy soldiers succeeded in forcing the intrenched camp at Shumla, and indeed if they should pass the Balkan range in the face of the Ottoman resistance, all this would be but the preface to a sterner conflict beyond. On the plains of Roumelia, if not before, he would have to face the combined strength of England and France. Nor

was this the worst feature of his dilemma. The Austrian army was a yet more fatal menace, possessing as it did the power to break in upon his flank. By April 1 the Czar had lost his last chance of pushing his forces within sight of the minarets of St. Sophia. Paskevich entered upon his difficult task in the hope, perhaps, of gaining for Russia a position of some military advantage, when she might be better prepared to throw her case upon arbitration.

Silistria, with about 20,000 inhabitants, was a fortified Bulgarian town on the Danube, forming at this time with Rustchuk and Shumla a formidable military triangle. Its naturally strong defenses had been rendered almost impregnable during the year 1853 by the erection of a series of detached forts on the south and southeast. The Turkish attempts to cross the Danube here had been unsuccessful, and when the Czar removed the restrictions from his troops they forced a passage and laid siege to the town on the Bulgarian side. About the same time the Russians crossed the river lower down near Matchin, and after a little fighting obtained control of that large but unhealthy tract of country known as the Dobrudscha. Omar Pasha, leaving Moussa Pasha with 15,000 men to defend Silistria as best he could, began to concentrate all his available troops about Shumla.

Paskevich arrived to superintend in person the siege of Silistria, but May was far advanced before serious operations commenced. The 1st of June found its defenses terribly battered by the Russian artillery, but still stubbornly defended by the soldiers of the Sultan. Paskevich was badly wounded and obliged to relinquish his command, while the garrison of Silistria was reduced to extremities. Moussa

Pasha was killed on June 2, and the command devolved upon Hussein Pasha. After this the affairs of the garrison became daily more desperate until the efforts of the besiegers suddenly relaxed.¹ An influence more potent than Ottoman military succor had come to the deliverance of beleaguered Silistria.

On the 3d of June Austria had formally summoned the Czar to withdraw his troops from the Danubian Principalities. This fell like a death-knell upon the heavy-hearted Autocrat of all the Russias. He had seen his hopes for a conquest of Turkey fading away, and had beheld with pain the wounding of his greatest general and the aimless slaughter of his choicest troops. These were as nothing, however, compared with the ingratitude of Francis Joseph. He had "reckoned" upon Austria because he felt secure of the Kaiser's love.²

On the 14th of June the fate of the Czar's campaign was finally sealed by the agreement signed between Austria and Turkey, wherein it was declared that "his majesty the emperor of Austria engages to exhaust all the means of negotiation, and all other means, to obtain the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities by the foreign army which occupies them, and even to employ, in case they are required, the

¹ Lieutenant Nasmyth, an English officer of the garrison, upon whose statements English accounts of the siege have been generally founded, estimates the Russian losses at twelve thousand men. General Todleben, on the other hand, ridicules the much vaunted defense of Silistria, and declares the Russian casualties during the investment amounted to only twenty-five hundred, or an average of fifty a day.

² In one of the sick man interviews with Sir Hamilton Seymour the Czar spoke of his relations with Austria as follows: "You must understand that when I speak of Russia, I speak of Austria as well. What suits one suits the other. Our interests as regards Turkey are perfectly identical."

number of troops necessary to attain this end." "The number of troops necessary" were already in position awaiting orders to sweep down upon the Russian flank and rear. Furthermore, the green uplands about Varna were already whitened by the camps of the French and English soldiery. It was clear that the Austrian summons was not to be disregarded.

On the morning of June 23 the weary defenders of Silistria awoke to find the Russian works deserted and their recent occupants across the Danube retreating northward. The troops in the Dobrudscha likewise began to retire, and soon all the roads leading to the north were crowded by the broken and retreating battalions of the Czar. Omar Pasha, stealing out of his camp at Shumla, cautiously advanced as his foes retired, and on July 7 the final engagements of the campaign were fought in the neighborhood of Giurgevo. The Turkish soldiery crossed the river in small detachments from Rustchuk, and furiously assailed the retiring Muscovites. On an island close to the Giurgevo shore the fighting was especially fierce, and cost the lives of several English officers who were leading the Ottoman troops. The day's fighting may have served to increase the rapidity of the Russian retreat, but the results were hardly commensurate with the loss of life. After these engagements Omar Pasha crossed the Danube in force from Rustchuk and moved leisurely upon Bucharest.

On July 28 Prince Gortschakoff, having already informed the Wallachians that his troops were to be temporarily withdrawn, broke up his headquarters at Bucharest, and ten days later a Turkish army entered. On the 6th of September the principalities were destined to undergo one more humiliation, when the

Austrian troops under Count Coronini marched into Bucharest. Coronini proclaimed to the Wallachians that his troops came among them as friends, and would remain only as long as danger existed of a second Russian occupation of the territory of the Porte.

The Russian Czar, as the summer of 1854 was waning, found himself hopelessly isolated from the consummation of his dearest schemes. He was openly at war with England, France, and Turkey, while any move toward Constantinople was sure to be opposed by Austrian as well as Ottoman bayonets. The fleets of England and France controlled the Black Sea, and compelled the retirement of his inferior squadrons under the guns of Sebastopol. It was literally the Czar against all Europe. With anger and sorrow Nicholas realized the bitter truth that with all his vast army, and the years of careful preparation he had lavished upon it, he stood powerless against these overwhelming odds.

CHAPTER V.

THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.

FRANCE AND ENGLAND IN 1853. — CAUSE OF THE EMPEROR'S FORWARDNESS. — HIS INFLUENCE OVER THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT. — THE BATTLE OF SINOPE. — INJUSTICE OF PUBLIC SENTIMENT IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE RESPECTING IT. — THE EMPEROR ADVOCATES A NAVAL SEIZURE OF THE BLACK SEA. — HE CARRIES HIS POINT. — RAGE OF THE CZAR. — CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE EMPEROR AND THE CZAR. — DECLARATION OF WAR BY ENGLAND AND FRANCE AND SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE. — AUSTRIA'S WARLIKE ATTITUDE. — THE ALLIED COMMANDERS. — CHARACTER OF LORD RAGLAN. — THE ALLIES AT CONSTANTINOPLE AND AT VARNA. — RAVAGES OF THE CHOLERA. — LORD RAGLAN'S VIEWS ON THE INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. — THE ALLIES EMBARK AT VARNA FOR THE CRIMEA.

THE great western powers were at war with Russia. A narrative of the events that preceded the declaration of hostilities will help to demonstrate upon whose shoulders should rest the responsibility for this disturbance of the continental peace.

If Stratford's course at Constantinople had bound England to support the Sultan, then France was bound to the support of England. As early as January, 1853, the Emperor Napoleon had expressed the opinion to the English cabinet that France and England together should preserve "the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." On July 8, 1853, Lord Palmerston declared in the House of Commons "that England and France were agreed, that they continued to follow the same policy, and that they had the most

perfect confidence in each other." The speech from the throne was to the same effect.

In fact, so vigorously had the Paris government adopted the hereditary English views on the Eastern Question that it actually pushed Lord Aberdeen and his ministers into decisive measures which otherwise they might have been slow to adopt.

The question naturally arises, Why should France have thrust herself so prominently forward in a matter so foreign to her interest as the Eastern Question? It was not France which was responsible, but the French emperor. It was the same influence that led M. Lavalette to threaten the Porte with fleets and armies during the first debates on the Holy Places. Napoleon was bent on a showy policy, and was willing to enter upon any course that promised prestige for his government. The English people, from the queen downward, had been shocked at his *coup d'état*, and he well knew the moral effect which an English alliance would have upon his standing in Europe. England's "hobby," so to speak, being the Eastern Question, he adopted unreservedly her policy. His gratification must have been keen when, as the months went by, he found his influence over Lord Aberdeen's cabinet steadily growing, until at last it became all powerful.

Through the spring of 1853, while Lord Stratford was duelling with Menschikoff at Stamboul, the hand of the French emperor did not prominently appear, and his representative at Vienna agreed to the Note which it was hoped would preserve the peace of Europe. Upon the rejection of this, however, and the entry of the Russian troops into the principalities, while still retaining his representative at the Vienna

Congress, he commenced to urge warlike measures upon the London cabinet. It was his influence that sent the allied fleets to Constantinople on the 22d of October, one day before Russia and Turkey were actually at war.

The presence of a foreign war-flag in the Sea of Marmora was perhaps the most galling affront that Nicholas could suffer. Whether or not there was any immediate connection between this event and the one which followed, the movement of the allied fleets was terribly revenged on the 30th of November. It had been known for several days to the Turkish ministers, and the allied admirals as well, that the Russian fleet was cruising in the Black Sea, and that, if so disposed, it could easily annihilate the inferior Turkish squadron at Sinope. The Turkish commander at Sinope realized the danger, and repeatedly warned his government of the great peril in which he stood. Perhaps Turkey, like England and the rest of Europe, was lulled into a sense of security by Nesselrode's declaration of October 31, that Russia would "remain with folded arms, resolved only to resist all aggression."¹ At all events, the appeal of the Turkish admiral remained unheeded, while Omar Pasha attracted all attention by his brilliant operations on the Danube. Early in December the tidings reached Constantinople that the Sultan's fleet at Sinope had been destroyed; that four thousand men had been killed, and the town of Sinope itself badly battered by Russian broadsides. The news was received with dismay by the Ottoman government, while in England and

¹ This expression was used by Nesselrode in conversation with Sir Hamilton Seymour, but the same idea was embodied in the October circular.

France it aroused a storm of rage. All England was stirred to its depths, and so unreasonable had popular opinion become that the Czar was universally condemned as having broken his plighted word. He stood before the English people as a man devoid of honor, with innocent blood upon his hands. The Sinope affair was never dignified by the title of "battle," but was alluded to as a treacherous massacre. English writers of the present day, in cooler blood, candidly admit the distortion of public opinion on this point. In the activity of Omar Pasha, whose achievements on the Danube they applauded to the echo, the public failed to detect any provocation for aggressive measures on the part of the Czar. The presence of the allied fleet at Constantinople was entirely overlooked, as was also the fact that the first shot at Sinope had been fired by a Turkish vessel.

The voice of the nation was for war, and the cabinet with its peaceable hopes and projects came to represent but tamely the spirit of the masses.

The French government declared the "massacre" of Sinope to be an insult to France, perpetrated as it was almost under the guns of the allied fleet. The English cabinet, while deploring the event, was little inclined to take a decisive step. Lord Palmerston resigned in consequence; but as December advanced, Napoleon again tried his hand with the London statesmen. He urged that a summons should be immediately forwarded to St. Petersburg to this effect, "that France and England were resolved to prevent the repetition of the affair of Sinope, and that every Russian ship thenceforward met in the Euxine would be requested and, if necessary, constrained to return to Sebastopol; and that any act of aggression after-

wards attempted against the Ottoman territory or flag would be repelled by force." The English cabinet yielded, and Palmerston returned. Napoleon's responsibility in this move is clearly shown by Lord Clarendon's statement that the government "believed the whole matter might be left to the discretion of the admirals, but they attach so much importance, not alone to the united action of the two governments, but to the instructions addressed to their respective agents being precisely the same, that they are prepared to adopt the specific mode of action now proposed by the government of the emperor."

In compliance with instructions forwarded from Paris and London, the allied fleets entered the Black Sea on the 4th of January, 1854. A few days later the Emperor Nicholas at St. Petersburg was officially informed of the determination to drive his flag from the Euxine. He responded by recalling his legations from Paris and London. If the presence of hostile war-flags in the Dardanelles had been a thorn to the Czar, their appearance in the Black Sea could have been little less than maddening. The Black Sea he regarded as his own peculiar property, and in fact, the treaties of 1774 and 1828 had rendered it in all save name a Russian lake. To see its supremacy snatched from him by the tremendous naval preponderance of the western powers was a staggering blow, and from the day that the allied fleets passed into the Bosphorus there never existed a chance of peace.

The Emperor of the French now came before Europe in the rôle of a pacific letter-writer, and posed as a ruler who was being forced into hostilities for the sake of principle alone. His correspondent was the Czar of all the Russias. If you do thus and so,

the letter implied, peace is assured ; “ if you do otherwise, then France as well as England would be obliged to leave to the arbitrament of arms and the chances of war that which might be decided at once by reason and justice.” This letter was written with the knowledge and consent of the English government. Useless in any circumstances as a medium of peace, the closing threat only added fuel to the anger of the Czar. “ Whatever your majesty may decide,” replied Nicholas, after reviewing the letter, “ threats will not induce me to recede. My trust is in God and in my right, and Russia, as I can pledge, will prove herself in 1854 what she was in 1812.” This last reference to the year of the discomfiture of the grand army on the bleak plains of Russia could not be lost upon the heir of the First Napoleon. Personal animosity now served to quicken the movements of the Emperor of the French in warlike channels.

Russia's isolation was complete. The four powers were in full accord as to the evacuation of the principalities and the preservation of the “ integrity of the Ottoman Empire.” Austria was bellicose in the extreme, and Prussia, while less aggressive, had entered into an agreement with Austria that bound them both alike for the protection of their respective territories. On the whole, the attitude of Austria, even after the fleets had entered the Euxine, was the most warlike of any of the powers. Her troops were swarming in the Banat and on the Transylvanian frontier, while on February 22 Count Buol, the Austrian chancellor, informed the representative of France at Vienna that “ if England and France will fix a day for the evacuation of the principalities, the expiration of which shall be the signal for hostilities, the cabinet of Vienna will support the summons.”

On February 27 Lord Clarendon dispatched a special messenger to St. Petersburg *via* Vienna, where, however, no effort was made to obtain a further pledge of Austria's "support." The summons declared that if the Czar did not pledge himself to evacuate the principalities by the 30th of April, "the British government must consider the refusal or the silence of the cabinet of St. Petersburg as equivalent to a declaration of war, and will take its measures accordingly." A similar message was forwarded from Paris at the same time. The messengers reached the Russian capital on the 13th of March, and on the fifth day after their arrival Count Nesselrode stated that the emperor "thought it unbecoming to make any reply."

On the 27th of March the Emperor of the French informed the Senate and Assembly that the refusal of his demands by the Czar had placed France in a state of war with Russia. On the same day the queen communicated the situation to Parliament, and on the next issued her declaration of war. On the 10th of April was signed the treaty of alliance between England and France that bound them to act harmoniously together for the protection of the Sultan's dominions and the restoration of peace in Europe. They professed a willingness to receive any other power into their agreement, but were not solicitous in this regard.

The last demand of the western cabinets had been that the Czar should evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, and upon his refusal they had taken up arms. Austria had far more interest in securing this evacuation than either of the powers which had made it their ultimatum. Austria's hand was upon her sword hilt,

and apparently she was determined at all hazards to break the Muscovite grip on the Danubian Principalities. Perhaps she was nothing loath to find what seemed her own especial task undertaken by the two powers, which, in their hot zeal, never waited to secure even her coöperation. Austria was not destined to fire a shot, but when, after three months of hostilities, she found the principalities still held by the Russian troops, she sternly commanded the Czar to retire. What the summons of the allies, supplemented by three months of military and naval demonstration, had failed to bring about, the command of Austria effected.

The war fever in England increased steadily after the Sinope affair. For weeks before the declaration of war, preparations for the struggle had been vigorously pushed in all the military and naval centres. From time to time troops were forwarded to Malta, while Liverpool, Southampton, and Cork were gay and sad together, as to the strains of martial music the men marched aboard the transports. The first detachment of the enormous fleet destined for service in the Baltic under the command of Sir Charles Napier sailed from Spithead. The Guards departed for Gibraltar late in March, and upon receiving the news of the declaration of war were forwarded to the East.

In France, too, the war was popular. No Frenchman is indifferent when an opportunity to achieve martial glory is in prospect. The officer appointed by the French emperor to command his armies in the field was Marshal St. Arnaud, of Algerian and *coup d'état* fame. The direction of the forces of the queen was given to Lord Raglan, an honorable gen-

tleman, a brave soldier, and a friend and pupil of the great duke. Lord Raglan's only military experience had been in Wellington's campaigns. He was his aide and military secretary, and lost his arm during the thickest of the fighting about La Haye Sainte on the day of Waterloo. He served as military secretary at the Horse Guards from 1827 to 1852, when he was made master general of the ordnance and raised to the peerage. In February, 1854, he was made a general, and in April, at sixty-six years of age, found himself at the head of the army destined for service in the East. Lord Raglan left England on the 10th of April. He called at Paris, and with the Duke of Cambridge was received at the Tuileries by the emperor, presented to Marshal St. Arnaud, and treated to a military pageant on the Champ de Mars.

French as well as English troops began to congregate at Malta, and in the quaint streets of Valetta the Zouave and Highlander met as friends and gazed in gaping wonder upon each other. Gallipoli was soon fortified by an allied force, and Constantinople itself was thronged with tangible evidence of the great alliance. Guardsmen, cuirassiers, and soldiers of the line jostled each other in the narrow streets, and swarmed in the cafés, while the placid sea was alive with the boats of pleasure-loving officers passing to and fro between the camps.

As summer approached, however, and the situation at Silistria became more and more precarious, the rendezvous at Constantinople was broken up and the troops pushed on to Varna, to be ready if need be, to repel the Russians on the north of the Balkan range. The plans of the western powers do not seem at this

time to have been clearly defined. If Silistria fell, there would be work enough in Bulgaria, beating back the tide of Russian invasion that would be sure to follow, but while the Russians were held on the Danube, the military councils were at sea. The armies concentrated slowly at Varna, but by the 1st of August at least 60,000 troops were in camp about the town. The green rolling country beyond, with its broad views and glimpses of the blue swelling Balkans, is a feast to the eye, but proved the last glimpse of life to many a stout soldier. Cholera appeared in the allied camps during the last of July, and spread rapidly through the ranks. The news had arrived that the siege of Silistria was raised, and the Russians in retreat. There was nothing left to stimulate the heavy-hearted troops, and the generals saw that some change of plan must be immediately fixed upon. "We must escape from this sepulchre of Varna," wrote Marshal St. Arnaud.

The Russians retreating, and the Austrians in the principalities, the nominal end for which the expedition had been sent out was accomplished. The western governments, however, had determined upon a more thorough humiliation of Russia. It was now that the plan for the invasion of the Crimea was promulgated. It originated among the statesmen in Paris and London, and not among the soldiers in the field. On the 29th of June the Duke of Newcastle wrote to Lord Raglan advocating the reduction of Sebastopol with a vigor which rendered it tantamount to an order from the government. Lord Raglan, realizing the almost total ignorance that prevailed in regard to the Czar's strength and resources in the Crimea, was opposed to the plan. So were Omar

Pasha and St. Arnaud. Lord Raglan's reply to the Duke of Newcastle was that of an honest soldier who disbelieved in the move he felt obliged to make. "It becomes my duty," he said, "to acquaint you that it was more in deference to the views of the British government as conveyed to me in your grace's dispatch, and to the known acquiescence of the Emperor Louis Napoleon in those views, than to any information in the possession of the naval and military authorities, either as to the extent of the enemy's forces, or their state of preparation, that the decision to make a descent upon the Crimea was adopted."

The last of August the camp about Varna was broken up and the troops began to embark for the new field of action. The generals were entering upon the new project with doubt and misgiving, but as for the men, the whole mighty Muscovite army possessed no such dread for them as the smiling but pestilential country they were leaving.

CHAPTER VI.

THE INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.

POPULARITY OF THE CONQUEST OF SEBASTOPOL IN ENGLAND. —

LANDING OF THE ALLIES IN THE CRIMEA. — THE ADVANCE ON SEBASTOPOL BEGINS. — PRINCE MENSCHIKOFF SEIZES THE LINE OF THE ALMA. — CHARACTER OF THE POSITION AND STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY. — MENSCHIKOFF'S FATAL BLUNDER. — THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA. — THE FRENCH TURN THE RUSSIAN LEFT WING. — PROGRESS OF THE ENGLISH. — THEIR ADVANCE CHECKED. — THE FRENCH FLANK ATTACK SUCCEEDS. — RETREAT OF THE RUSSIANS. — ST. ARNAUD'S OPINION OF THE BATTLE — THE ALLIES CONTINUE THEIR ADVANCE. — THEIR FLANK MARCH. — OBTUSENESS OF MENSCHIKOFF. — HIS LETTER TO KORNILOFF. — OCCUPATION OF BALACLAVA BY THE ENGLISH. — DEATH OF ST. ARNAUD. — CANROBERT OPPOSES THE MOTION TO ATTACK SEBASTOPOL. — PROBABLE RESULT OF SUCH AN ATTACK.

DESCRIPTION OF SEBASTOPOL. — ARRIVAL OF COLONEL DE TODLEBEN THERE. — THE ALLIED FLEET IS SIGHTED. — EFFECT OF THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA UPON SEBASTOPOL. — MENSCHIKOFF'S ORDERS — HE RETIRES FROM THE TOWN WITH THE ARMY. — DESPAIR OF KORNILOFF AND TODLEBEN. — KORNILOFF ACCEPTS THE COMMAND OF THE GARRISON. — HIS ENTHUSIASM. — THE DEFENSES OF SEBASTOPOL. — KORNILOFF'S CONTROVERSY WITH MENSCHIKOFF. — THE LATTER INDUCED TO SEND TROOPS TO SEBASTOPOL. — STRENGTH OF THE GARRISON ON OCTOBER 6. — THE ALLIED BOMBARDMENT OF OCTOBER 17. — KORNILOFF'S DEMEANOR ON THAT DAY. — HIS DEATH. — RESULT OF THE BOMBARDMENT.

I.

THE conquest of Sebastopol was thoroughly popular in England and France outside of military circles. The rage engendered by the Sinope affair was still high, and to the public mind there was a poetic justice in the destruction of the naval port that equipped

and sheltered the obnoxious Black Sea fleet. "The Times" voiced the popular opinion, when it declared that "the grand political and military objects of the war could not be attained, so long as Sebastopol and the Russian fleet were in existence; but, if that central position of the Russian power in the south of the empire were annihilated, the whole fabric, which it had cost the Czars of Russia centuries to raise, must fall to the ground."


Toward the middle of September the great allied armada in the Black Sea began to converge upon the northwestern coast of the Crimea. Eupatoria was occupied without resistance, and on the morning of the 14th the general debarkation of the troops began at a point fourteen miles south of that town. By the 18th the whole army, comprising 30,000 French, 27,000 English, and 7,000 Turks were on Russian soil.¹ The commanders found themselves in a hostile country, only a score of miles from the famous fortress of Sebastopol, entirely ignorant as to the strength or whereabouts of their enemy. It was determined to follow the coast in the advance, keeping in communication with the fleet, upon which the armies were dependent for supplies.

On the 19th the advance commenced, with the Turks on the right close to the sea, the French in the

¹ The English possessed the only cavalry in the one thousand sabres of the weak division under Lord Lucan. They had five infantry divisions with artillery attached, as follows: First Division commanded by Duke of Cambridge; Second Division, by Sir De Lacy Evans; Third Division, by Sir Richard England; Fourth Division, by Sir George Cathcart; Light Division, by Sir George Browne. The French had four infantry divisions, commanded as follows: First Division, by General Canrobert; Second Division, by General Bosquet; Third Division, by Prince Napoleon; Fourth Division, by General Forey.

THE COUNTRY FROM THE ALMA TO BALACLAVA

1. Land Quarantine Bastion.
2. Central Bastion.
3. Flagstaff Bastion.
4. Redan.
5. Malakoff.
6. Little Redan.



centre, and the English on the left, with the hostile country on their flank. It was an inspiring pageant, and the men moved over the grassy, rolling country in excellent spirits. That night the army bivouacked a few miles north of the Alma River, and it was rumored through the ranks that the enemy were close at hand.

Prince Menschikoff,¹ commander of the Czar's military and naval forces in the Crimea, had seized with all his available troops an exceedingly strong position on the heights south of the river Alma. These heights rise abruptly from the river, and, while higher farther east, are steepest from a point nearly opposite the village of Almatamaek and from there to the sea. Prince Menschikoff regarded this portion of the heights as insurmountable, and consequently neglected to occupy it. A space of two miles thus intervened between the sea and the left of his forces, his entire front extending about three miles. Rather on the left of his position, opposite the village of Bourliouk, is a deep ravine through which the road from Eupatoria to Sebastopol passes. This road crosses the Alma at Bourliouk, but Menschikoff destroyed the bridge, and placed his heaviest batteries to cover the ravine, which he regarded as the weak spot in his position. To defend these lines he had a force aggregating nearly 34,000 men.² It comprised some of the choicest battalions in the Russian establishment, and he was confident in his ability to hold his ground against any force at the disposal of the allies. A good general would certainly have been justified in

¹ The same who conducted the negotiations at Constantinople.

² According to Todleben. Mr. Kinglake figures the Russian strength at 40,000 men.

this feeling of assurance, but Menschikoff, when he determined to leave his left protected only by cliffs presumably insurmountable, committed a blunder, to which the result of the battle that followed can be justly attributed.

The allied armies came within sight of their enemies shortly before noon on the 20th. From a height of land that sloped gently into the Alma valley, they could see the cliffs beyond capped with artillery and bristling with infantry. The English were on the left, the French and Turks on the right as usual. The French commenced the action, and their skirmishers soon discovered that the heights in their front were not inaccessible. The conflict that ensued for the next three hours has become famous under the title of the battle of the Alma. It has been designated by an eminent English historian as "a big scramble," and this conveys the true idea of the action. General Canrobert's French division clambered up the heights between Bourliouk and Almatamack almost unopposed. General Bosquet¹ reached the summit of the cliffs farther west from Almatamack. Menschikoff's plan of battle was thrown hopelessly out of joint by these movements, and he dispatched all his available forces to protect his left. Meanwhile the English were dashing blindly and bravely against the face of the main Russian position. Avoiding the blazing village of Bourliouk, fired by the Russian outposts, they pushed through the vineyards, forded the river, and clambered up the heights to get at bayonet's point with their foes. Codrington's brigade was

¹ Mr. Kinglake cites Bosquet as being the only divisional or brigade commander in the French army of the East who was not prominent in the Paris massacre of the 4th of December.

driven back with awful slaughter, but was supported by the Guards in the nick of time. Prince Gortschakoff¹ came up with the Vladimir regiment, and the struggle became desperate and stationary in the heart of the Russian position. At this crisis the French made their presence severely felt on the Russian flank. Menschikoff had lost all idea of his battle, and his troops began sullenly to retire. The retreat was a strange mixture of order and confusion. The "big scramble" was at an end, and the French and English rested on the summits they had so gallantly carried.

It is rarely that a battle reveals such a total lack of generalship as did this. The English claim that St. Arnaud's movements were bungling and left them practically to fight the battle single-handed. The French assert, however, that they saved the English from defeat.² St. Arnaud expressed himself tersely as to both English and Russian generalship: "As Lord Raglan was the pupil of the Duke of Wellington, so Prince Menschikoff followed the rules bequeathed by Suvarof to Kutusof."³ Fortunately for the allies, generalship was not a necessity for them. The great strength of the Russian position and the acknowledged bravery of the Russian soldiers were wholly neutralized by the gross carelessness and miscalculation of Menschikoff.⁴

¹ Prince Peter Gortschakoff, brother of Mikhail.

² Todleben agrees with St. Arnaud, and regards the French movements as the decisive ones of the day. He ascribes the Russian defeat to bad manœuvring and the inferiority of their muskets, which had only one third the carrying power of the allied weapons. He deplores the machine tactics practiced by the Russians as tending to destroy the self-reliance of the soldier and to render him dependent upon masses.

³ Rousset, vol. i. p. 330.

⁴ The English loss at the Alma was 2,002 killed and wounded. The

No pursuit was attempted, the English having but one thousand cavalry, and the French being wholly destitute of this branch of the service. On the 23d the advance recommenced, and the armies encamped that night in the vicinity of the Katscha River. On the next day the march was continued to the Belbek, and from the high ground south of the river the city of Sebastopol, the coveted prize of the expedition, was plainly visible. So near, indeed, had the army approached to the great stronghold of the Czar that the military councils were rendered spicy by the questions as to how and from what point the city should be approached. The opinion prevailed that the north side had been rendered impregnable by the garrison, and it was determined to make a flank march, and, leaving the town on the right, approach it from the south. The route of this march was over a rough, broken country, covered with low, thick woods. The English led the advance, and the army wound about among the hills like an attenuated serpent. On the afternoon of the 25th a detachment of cavalry and horse artillery debouched upon a broad plateau known to the allies as Mackenzie's farm, and came squarely upon a Russian column moving northeast at right angles to their line of march. The surprise was mutual, but the Russians were seized with something like a panic. The English artillery fired a few shots after the fugitives, and the excitement was over. Lord Raglan surmised correctly that the Russian troops were the rear-guard of an army that had just left Sebastopol. It was, in fact, the army of Prince Men-

Russians estimated their losses at 5,709 and the French theirs at 1,343. Mr. Kinglake asserts that Lord Raglan considered the French loss to be grossly exaggerated. He placed it at less than 600.

schikoff that for thirty-six hours, during the 25th and 26th, had the allies completely in its power. Had Menschikoff taken any measures to learn the whereabouts of his enemy and his line of advance, he could have hopelessly crushed him, as he struggled through the difficult, wooded country. At the very hour, however, when the allied army was painfully defiling within a few miles of his headquarters, he was writing these words to Admiral Korniloff in Sebastopol: "Our further movements will depend upon the position of the enemy, and it would be therefore desirable to get, from time to time, some information from Sebastopol as to the position of our adversaries. We neither see nor hear anything of the enemy here."

Delivered again from peril by the carelessness of their opponent, the allied generals pushed on their columns toward Sebastopol. The English occupied Balaclava after a bloodless skirmish with its handful of defenders. This was a gratifying success, as this place had already been settled upon as the base of supplies for the army before Sebastopol. Its harbor is narrow, surrounded by high hills, and so deep as to afford access to the largest ships. The highlands of the Chersonese, sloping off on the north into the harbor of Sebastopol, are traversed from Balaclava by a good road. Upon these heights, carpeted with green grass and swept by the pure sea breezes, the English and French began to establish themselves. The clear air cheered and invigorated the men, wasted by fatigue and the disease that had followed them from the deadly Bulgarian coast. Marshal St. Arnaud, however, was beyond the reviving powers of the sea winds, and yielding, like many a lesser soldier, to the grim scourge of cholera, was soon overcome by the uni-

versal conqueror. He was in ill health on leaving France, and on the day of the Alma was barely able to keep his saddle. On the 29th he was taken aboard a French man-of-war, where he expired in a few hours. General Canrobert succeeded to the command of the French armies, and entered upon his duties at a most critical time. The question of assaulting the city was then under discussion. Lord Raglan was in favor of an immediate attack, and entertained but little doubt of its success. Canrobert, however, was opposed, and advocated awaiting the arrival of the siege trains, when the place could be reduced with less waste of life.

Canrobert's opinion was based upon sound military grounds and prevailed, but we know at this day that had the allies attacked, either from the north or the south, any time previous to September 29 they could hardly have failed of success. The interval between the battle of the Alma and this date was not lost by the defenders of the town. Thanks to the devotion of soldiers, seamen, and citizens, inspired by the patriotic enthusiasm of an admiral, and directed by the splendid genius of a colonel of engineers, its defenses were made well-nigh impregnable. The operations of the allies during the last ten days of September were tame indeed compared with the stirring events that occurred within Sebastopol. The skill, energy, and unselfish patriotism displayed by all classes of its defenders certainly deserve some notice.

II.

Sebastopol in 1854 had a population of 45,000, of which 38,000 were connected with the army and navy. It stood on the southern shore of the roadstead or

great harbor, a deep cut between the hills extending eastward a distance of three and a half miles from the sea to the mouth of the Tchernaya River. The city was separated from the Karabel suburb on the east by a branch of the larger harbor known as the "Port" of Sebastopol. The main city was traversed by broad thoroughfares running north and south, while the streets crossing these at right angles were narrower and less pretentious. On the most commanding point of the city stood the building known as the Naval Library, a sort of exchange or kursaal, where the officers of the garrison met for business or social intercourse. The Karabel suburb contained the government storehouses, barracks, and dock-yards. On the northern side of the roadstead opposite the city there were other military buildings covered by strong sea forts, but almost unprotected from land attacks.

Under the Emperor Nicholas Sebastopol had become strictly a naval port. The Black Sea fleet had its headquarters here, where all the machinery and supplies that would insure its efficiency were to be found. The docks were among the finest in the world, being in many cases hewn out of the solid cliffs. Toward the sea the place had been rendered impregnable by a chain of magnificent forts and batteries. Against land attacks, however, Sebastopol was almost defenseless. A series of fortifications had been projected to protect the place on the south, but little work had been accomplished at the breaking out of the war.

Prince Menschikoff steadily refused to credit the idea that the allies would attempt an invasion of the Crimea. He was not, however, left without warnings. As the Danubian campaign approached its disastrous end, Prince Gortschakoff sent a messenger to him

with a letter calling his attention to the immediate necessity of fortifying Sebastopol on the landward side. The letter also informed Menschikoff that in this work of fortification the messenger would be found a valuable counselor. This messenger was Lieutenant-Colonel de Todleben of the engineers.

It was the 22d of August when Todleben reached Sebastopol with the letter of his commander. He was well received by Menschikoff until he began to urge too strenuously the fortification of the place. Menschikoff was still unconvinced even by Gortschakoff's warning, and it is certain that Todleben would have been dismissed from Sebastopol, had not the allied fleet suddenly appeared off the coast.

The hostile squadrons were first sighted on September 12. In the harbor lay the Russian Black Sea fleet, comprising about forty ships of all classes, carrying 1,908 guns, and manned by 18,500 well-disciplined seamen. Leaving this fleet in command of Admiral Korniloff, his chief of staff, Menschikoff proceeded to mass his land forces on the Alma. All the afternoon of the 20th the firing was plainly audible in Sebastopol, and toward night Korniloff and Todleben rode out toward the battlefield. They met the prince returning from the scene of disaster, heavy-hearted and almost prostrated with fatigue. His only orders that night were to sink some of the ships across the entrance of the roadstead to prevent the entry of the enemy's fleet. To Korniloff, an enthusiastic naval officer, these were cruel orders. By dawn of the 23d, however, eight fine ships had been scuttled, the harbor had been closed, and the hearts of thousands of brave seamen had been wrung with sorrow. It was on this day that Menschikoff came to his extraordi-

nary decision to withdraw the army and leave Sebastopol to its fate. He determined to move northeast and gain possession of the great road to Simpheropol, in order to secure his communication with Russia. Against this Korniloff protested, but the prince assured him of his coöperation against the flank of any enemy that threatened Sebastopol. On the night of the 24th the army withdrew from the town, Menschikoff leaving General Möller in command of the handful of militia and gunners, Admiral Nachimoff¹ in command of all the seamen that had been transferred to the south side of the roadstead, while to Korniloff he left the charge of the forces on the north side, against which it was believed the allies would move.

The position in which Sebastopol was left by the withdrawal of the army was a desperate one. The whole garrison, including the seamen landed from the fleet, comprised but 16,000 men, a force wholly inadequate to cope with the allied armies behind half-finished works. Korniloff, a true-hearted, religious patriot, made the best use of his scanty means of defense on the north side. He encouraged his men, but to the officers on his staff he openly expressed his hopelessness. "From the north side," he declared, "there is no retreat. All of us who are there will also find our graves." He carefully assigned his staff officers to positions elsewhere. "I should not like," he said, "to have all fall with me." Colonel Todleben was scarcely more hopeful. Speaking of the efforts made by the garrison, he declared that "there remained to them no alternative, but that of seeking to die gloriously at the post committed to their bravery."

¹ This officer commanded the Russian fleet at Sinope.

It was about noon on the 25th that the officers congregated at the Naval Library saw the allied armies marching southward over the heights at the head of the harbor. It was plain at a glance that the north side was not to be molested. Korniloff immediately threw up the command imposed upon him by Menschikoff, and passing over to the south side, offered his services to Nachimoff. Later a conference was held between Nachimoff, Möller, Korniloff, and Todleben. Precedence of rank was disregarded, and influenced only by motives of the purest patriotism, Möller and Nachimoff offered the supreme command of the Sebastopol garrison to Korniloff. Korniloff accepted, and from that moment, shoulder to shoulder with Todleben, for whom he had conceived a great respect and admiration, he pushed with all his energy the work of defense. Korniloff inspired the men by his piety and enthusiasm, while Todleben turned the energy thus awakened into the most useful channels. The work on the fortifications was pushed with the most unremitting zeal. Soldiers, sailors, citizens, and even women toiled night and day unceasingly. While the engineer grew more and more absorbed in the vast system of defenses he had planned, Korniloff still continued anxious. Where was Menschikoff with the army? On the 26th, heavy-hearted and harassed by many cares, he made the entry in his diary, "Of the prince nothing is heard." The next day he had divine service performed in the presence of the soldiers, and then addressed them himself. "Let the troops," he said, "first be reminded of the Word of God, and then I will impart to them the word of the Czar." That evening he seems again to have been overcome by despondency. "Of the prince

nothing still is to be heard. The evening passed in gloomy thoughts about the future of Russia."

On the 28th tidings were received from Menschikoff, but he evinced little inclination to come to the aid of the city. He merely wished to know the whereabouts of the enemy. On the 29th the defenses were practically completed, forming a half circle on the south of the city, four miles in length. On the western side, from north to south, the three salient points in the lines became known as the Land Quarantine Bastion, the Central Bastion, and the Flagstaff Bastion. On the east side were three other strong works, from south to north, as follows: the Redan, the Malakoff Tower, and the Little Redan.¹ To arm these fortifications the ships were dismantled, and their great guns brought ashore. The seamen likewise were transferred to the land service, but even with this addition Korniloff knew that the presence of trained troops was a necessity of the situation.

On the 30th Prince Menschikoff himself appeared on the north side of the harbor, and had an interview with Korniloff, whom he found in command of the place. He reiterated his intention to keep his army aloof, upon which Korniloff, hot with patriotic rage, retorted, "If that takes place, then farewell to Sebastopol!" The entry that night in Korniloff's diary shows that he was brooding over the strange policy of the prince. "To hold Sebastopol with troops is very possible; nay, it is possible even to hold out long, but without troops — that alters the case!"

Korniloff's retort had induced Menschikoff to call a council of war, and upon hearing this Korniloff

¹ These are the names by which they were known to the allies and to the world.

determined upon presenting there a written protest. Upon being informed of this Menschikoff weakened. Whatever the motives that were inducing him to pursue his extraordinary tactics, he was not prepared to let this emphatic paper pass under the eye of the Czar. He yielded before the council met, and detached twelve battalions from his field army to the assistance of the garrison. Korniloff and Todleben could now breathe freely for a time, for on October 6 25,000 soldiers and 13,000 seamen were ready for the defense of the town. The energy of the defenders never flagged; and when on the 17th of October the allies opened their bombardment, they were enabled to return a fire of equal power. At early dawn the French batteries opened against the western defenses, the English against the lines on the east, while from the sea the men-of-war trained their broadsides upon the coast forts. Shortly after ten o'clock the French batteries were silenced by the explosion of a powder magazine, nor was their fire resumed during the day.

Korniloff was early on horseback, riding from work to work, watching the progress of the contest, and encouraging the gunners at their toil. His course could be traced from a distance by the "hurrahs" that greeted him as he passed along. He had an eye for everything. At one moment he was directing the care of the wounded, at another superintending the transfer of some regiment to a place of greater security, at another arranging for the transportation of water to the men at the front. He exposed his life almost recklessly, and was often on the parapets among the screaming shot, peering through the smoke to detect, if possible, the effect of the Russian fire. It was in vain that his officers entreated him to cau-

tion. To one he replied, "What will the soldiers say of me if they do not see me to-day?" to another, with a smile, "You can never run away from a shot." Just before noon, as he was leaving the Malakoff Tower, he was struck down by a cannon ball. "Now, gentlemen," he said to the officers who thronged about him, "I leave you to defend Sebastopol. Do not surrender it." He was carried to the hospital, where he lived for a short time in great pain. "Tell all," he said, "it is sweet to die when the conscience is at rest;" then, as the roar of the bombardment fell upon his ears, he prayed again and again, "O God! bless Russia and the emperor. Save Sebastopol and the fleet." An orderly came into the apartment with the tidings that the English guns were being silenced. Korniloff, summoning all his strength, cried out, "Hurrah! hurrah!" and a few moments later expired.

All unconscious of Korniloff's death, the Russian gunners still toiled at their heated pieces; and when darkness began to fall it was plain that the allied attack had been a failure. The ships were withdrawing, and the English guns alone were left to maintain the unequal contest. No assault had been attempted, and Todleben still lived to direct the defense. The Russian people regard their prolonged and resolute defense of Sebastopol with pride, but they look upon it as something more than a common honor to have been numbered in the garrison during this brief, heroic period of Korniloff's command.

CHAPTER VII.

BALACLAVA AND INKERMANN.

THE ALLIED POSITIONS ON THE CHERSONESE. — FAILURE OF THEIR BOMBARDMENT. — THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL IN LONDON. — EFFECT OF THIS REPORT UPON THE ARMIES. — CHAGRIN OF LORD RAGLAN. — THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL BEGINS. — ITS PECULIAR CHARACTER. — THE RUSSIAN FIELD ARMY ASSUMES THE OFFENSIVE. — BATTLE OF BALACLAVA AND CHARGE OF THE LIGHT BRIGADE. — RESULTS OF THE BATTLE. — THE BATTLE OF INKERMANN. — ITS IRREGULAR CHARACTER AND ITS RESULTS. — THE GREAT HURRICANE. — TERRIBLE SUFFERING AND LOSSES OF THE ALLIES. — PUBLIC OPINION IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND CONCERNING THE CAMPAIGN.

THE allied positions south of Sebastopol formed a half circle. The French held the lines on the west, from a point nearly south of the formidable Russian work known as the Redan. The English positions extended from the Redan to Mt. Inkermann, overlooking the Tchernaya a short distance above its confluence with the harbor of Sebastopol. General Canrobert's judgment having prevailed, intrenching was pushed during the first weeks of October, while heavy guns were brought up from the coast. The confidence of the allied commanders in the success of their bombardment increased with every day, and when on the 17th the batteries opened fire, the least sanguine were inclined to limit the Muscovite defense to three days. By the night of the 17th not only had this confidence disappeared, but all hope of reducing

the place with artillery had gone down with the sun. The naval and military commanders were compelled to admit that they had made no serious impression upon the Russian works, while they had received a return fire at once vigorous and destructive. The next day the bombardment was renewed, and indeed it was not finally relinquished until the 25th; but after the first day of fruitless powder burning, no decisive results were looked for.

On the 18th a mail arrived from England with London papers enthusiastically announcing "the fall of Sebastopol." To the men on the shot-swept ridges of the Chersonese these glowing and ill-founded accounts were the most cruel mockeries. Said "The Times:" "The latest dispatches received from our correspondents at Vienna and Paris remove all doubt as to the triumph of the allied armies, and the reality of the most splendid achievement of modern warfare, an exploit alike unequaled in magnitude, in rapidity, and in its results. It may now be confidently stated that the forts of Sebastopol fell successively before the combined forces of the assailants; that at least half of the Russian fleet perished; that the flags of the allies were waving on the Church of St. Vladimir, and that, on the 26th at latest, Prince Menschikoff surrendered the place. The battles are over, and the victory is won. . . . Never since the days of Napoleon, we may almost say since the days of Cæsar, has an exploit of arms been attended with such entire, or such instantaneous, success. The arrival, the sight, and the conquest form parts of one and the same event. The final triumph followed close on the first disembarkation; and all the anticipated incidents of an arduous campaign — marches, battles, sieges, and

stormings — have been crowded into a single impulse of onslaught and victory.¹

So spake "The Times," and from the perusal of such pompous exultations the British soldier turned again to the reality about him, the air screaming with Russian missiles and the wounded passing to the rear. Lord Raglan was deeply chagrined and mortified that such a rumor should have been circulated as truth in England. On the day of the receipt of the mail he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle as follows: "I cannot but deplore the ready credence which has been given by the public in England to the announcement in the newspapers of the capture of Sebastopol; and indeed it is an injustice to our troops to view the accomplishment of the enterprise as an easy operation, and with the full determination to do everything to insure success, I must still regard it as one of extreme difficulty, and of no great certainty."

With the abandonment of the idea of the speedy reduction of Sebastopol the allies entered upon "the siege," — a siege, however, in which at times, they themselves were the besieged. By the middle of October, as we have noticed, Sebastopol was garrisoned by a force sufficiently large to insure a stout defense of all its works. The allied forces at the same time, including seamen and marines from the fleet, comprised 40,000 French, 25,000 English, and 11,000 Turks. The Sebastopol garrison was left free to communicate

¹ Mention of this false rumor is found in Prosper Mérimée's *Letters to an Incognita*. Writing from Vienna, he says: "We are agitated by news from the Crimea. Is Sebastopol taken? It is believed so here; and the Austrians, with the exception of a few ancient families who are Russian at heart, congratulate us. God grant that the news may not be an invention such as the telegraph delights in when at leisure."

with Russia, and open at all times to the receipt of supplies and reinforcements. In other words, unless the allies could render Sebastopol untenable by direct assault or the power of their bombardment, its garrison had nothing to fear. The 4th Russian army corps, which had been detained on the Bessarabian frontier through fear of the Austrians in the principalities, was moved to the south when it became evident that the Kaiser's government was not for war. As a result, the Sebastopol garrison was again reinforced, while it was assisted furthermore by the appearance of the field army which Menschikoff so long and fatally mismanaged. With the Sebastopol garrison nearly equal in numbers to the hostile force on the Chersonese, and in perfect communication with a field army of considerable strength, the difficulty of settling at all times the question as to who was besieged will be readily appreciated.

On the 25th of October the Russian field army under General Liprandi, comprising about 25,000 men of all arms, advanced from the northeast and east for a demonstration against Balaclava. It was early morning when their movements were first described, and much later when Lord Raglan learned the fact and ordered two infantry divisions down to the plain for the protection of the threatened point. The town itself was covered by the guns of an English frigate, and garrisoned by a force of marines and artillery. On the north, a short distance from the village of Kadikoi, was the camp of the 93d Highlanders, while the advanced line of defenses on the Causeway heights, which cross the plain from east to west, was held by the Turks. Against these latter works, preceding their action by a heavy artillery fire,

the Russians moved in overwhelming numbers. The Turks, finding themselves unsupported and their line of retreat threatened, were seized with a panic and abandoned their guns. With the capture of these redoubts the affair might have ended but for a chain of accidents that precipitated more useless carnage.

Upon the flight of the Turks, a portion of the English heavy cavalry brigade, under General Scarlett, moved from its position near the western base of the Causeway heights in a southeasterly direction to cover Balaclava. At the same time a heavy column of Russian cavalry, advancing from the northeast, passed over the Causeway heights and down the southern slope, toward the plain where the English cavalry were marching. Notwithstanding his great inferiority in numbers (he had but 300 men) Scarlett charged the Russians furiously, overthrowing them by the mere impetus of his onset. The discomfited troops fell back over the ridge, and again the fighting seemed over.

At this time the Russians still held in force the Causeway heights and the Fedioukine Hills across the valley on the north. At the eastern end of this valley their discomfited cavalry halted and reformed under the protection of some batteries of horse artillery. At the western end of the valley, under the heights of the Chersonese, stood the English light brigade, nearly 700 strong, under Lord Cardigan, which up to this time had not been engaged. Lord Raglan, from his commanding position on the Chersonese, thought he detected signs of withdrawal among the Russians on the Causeway ridge. Anxious, if possible, to recover the guns lost by the Turks in the morning, he forwarded by Captain Nolan an order to the

Earl of Lucan commanding the cavalry division as follows: "Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop of horse artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left." Lord Lucan, it seems, protested against the movement in Nolan's hearing. He asked him where and what he should attack. Nolan's reply was not a model of military respect; he asserted that Lord Raglan's orders were positive, and as he rode away, it is said, pointed up the valley, at the farther end of which the Russian guns were located.¹ "The guns" that Lord Raglan meant were the captured ones on the Causeway heights, and this had been clearly designated to Lucan in a former order. In some way, however, the orders became hopelessly jumbled in the process of conveyance from Lord Raglan to Lord Cardigan, the general commanding the light brigade. Cardigan certainly failed to comprehend that any other guns were meant than those of the batteries in the valley. Exposed the whole distance to a murderous flanking fire, few of his gallant corps reached the hostile guns. Some indeed penetrated beyond and crossed swords with the supporting cavalry, but in fifteen minutes from the moment that the brigade had left its position the scattered survivors were streaming back toward their rendezvous. The corps might have been utterly destroyed but for the timely and brilliant charge of the French 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique against the Fedioukine Hills. This temporarily demoralized the Russian artillery stationed

¹ This is Lord Lucan's description of what passed between Nolan and himself. Nolan accompanied the brigade, and was the first man killed.

there, and left the valley comparatively clear for the retreat of the light brigade.¹

The Chersonese heights were thronged with military spectators gazing down upon the battlefield. In fact, the cavalry manœuvred all day under the eyes of some of the keenest military critics in Europe. Perhaps the day's work showed that English cavalry generals did not know how to handle their men, but the bold ride of the light brigade through that tempest of plunging cannon-shot proved that the men knew how to handle themselves. The French general Bosquet appreciated the affair in all its phases when he exclaimed, "*C'est magnifique ; mais ce n'est pas la guerre.*"

Who was to blame for the charge of the light brigade? To this day opinions differ as to where the weight of responsibility should lie. This much is certain, that Lord Lucan, Lord Cardigan, Lord Raglan, and the memory of Captain Nolan, who fell in the charge, have all suffered in consequence. Furthermore, it cost Lord Lucan his command.

The results of the battle of Balaclava, aside from the disputes it engendered in English military circles, were the loss of the Woronzoff road to the allies, the practical blockade of the English in Balaclava, and the earning of a great prestige for the English cavalry soldier.

This October skirmish proved but the prelude to the grand effort of the Russians to break the allied hold upon the Chersonese. On the evening of November

¹ The light brigade out of 673 men lost 247 killed and wounded. Only 195 horses escaped. The English losses in the day's fighting were about 600 men, the French and Turks losing 200 more. The Russian casualties amounted to 600 men killed and wounded.

4th the English pickets on Mt. Inkermann were warned that some unusual event was taking place among the Russians from the clanging of the Sebastopol bells that was borne along to them on the wind. The evening being rainy, nothing could be seen; and as dawn approached, the fog rising from the dripping valleys settled down upon the Chersonese like a pall. It was scarcely light when the rattle of musketry and the scream of shells announced to the astonished pickets that the Russians were upon them. Bewildered by the suddenness of the attack, the English camps sprang quickly into life. There was no time to form, and in broken detachments the half-awakened soldiers moved forward through the mist to where the uproar told them that the enemy was attacking. Colonels lost their regiments, captains their companies, while officers were found in the ranks that day, armed with rifles. In fact, during the battle of Inkermann, from the moment when the Russian shells began to cleave the fog until the hour when the last dropping fire was dying away, there was absolutely no system in the English defense.

On the Russian side the scheme of attack was boldly conceived and bravely, if clumsily, executed. The movement against Mt. Inkermann was confided to General Dannenburg. One column, under General Soimonoff moved up from the Karabel suburb through the Careenage ravine, while another, under General Pauloff, attacked from the Tchernaya valley on the north. Prince Gortschakoff¹ with 22,000 men occupied the Tchernaya valley toward Kadikoi, with orders to move upon the Chersonese when the English grip upon Mt. Inkermann had been broken. An-

¹ Prince Peter Gortschakoff.

other force under General Timoféieff was detailed to create a diversion from Sebastopol against the French left. Owing to Dannenburg's failure to make any serious impression upon the Inkermann position, Gortschakoff's troops remained inactive through the day.¹ The Russians engaged against Mt. Inkermann comprised nearly 40,000 men,² and to them were opposed 8,000 English and 6,000 Frenchmen. Owing to the dense mist, it is doubtful if at the time the allies had any idea of the vast odds against which they were contending, while, on the other hand, it is clear that the Russians wholly failed to comprehend the weakness of the forces opposing them. The great numerical superiority of the Russians was largely neutralized by the unfavorable character of the ground, which prevented the coöperation of their columns³ and allowed the allies to fight on a narrow front. General Soïmonoff's death early in the action paralyzed the Russian right column, nor was it rallied again during the day. The battle swayed to and fro upon the heights during the early hours of the morning, and the French regiments arrived not a moment too soon. At noon the Russians practically relinquished the struggle, retiring all along the line by order of General Dannenburg.

The battle of Inkermann cost the British in killed and wounded nearly 2,600 men, while the French losses aggregated nearly 1,800. On the other hand, the Russian losses have been computed as between eleven and twelve thousand. This unequal showing

¹ This inaction is alluded to by Todleben in an uncomplimentary manner

² 34,835 according to Todleben.

³ It is questionable if the Russians had 20,000 men engaged at any one time.

at least reflects credit upon the stolid bravery of the poorly armed Russian soldier.

In England Inkermann became renowned as "the soldiers' battle." The private soldiers took the affair in charge and fought it through, unhampered by "generalship." They demonstrated the fact that forty years of enervating peace had failed to eradicate from the national character those indomitable qualities that rendered Wellington's squares impregnable on the slopes of Mt. St. Jean.¹

Prince Menschikoff was bitterly disappointed over the failure of his crowning effort to crush his foes. Had his troops succeeded in getting a permanent foothold on the Inkermann heights, the allied situation could have been nothing less than desperate. The defeat at Inkermann dissipated his last hope of gaining a position on the Chersonese before winter.

Relieved in a measure by their victory from the danger of Russian aggression, the allies found themselves called upon to confront other trials and hardships. Winter was approaching, and the management of the Russian campaign was slowly drifting into the hands of those two merciless chieftains, "Janvier and Février."² The blue sky had become murky, the bright expanse of the Euxine a leaden gray. The grassy slopes of the Chersonese were transformed into slippery mire, while the white city of Sebastopol appeared black and forbidding through drifting clouds of fog. Everything was cheerless and gloomy. Rain fell incessantly, and the road from Balacava to

¹ The battle of Inkermann demonstrated the force of the remark attributed to Marshal Soult, "The British infantry is the finest in the world, but I thank God there is n't much of it."

² The Emperor Nicholas used to say that Russia had two generals upon whom she could always rely, "Janvier and Février."

the camps became a slough, in which men waded and supply wagons floundered and collapsed. Notwithstanding these surroundings, up to November 14 the tents were fairly dry and habitable. On this day, however, during the early morning hours a great hurricane arose. It was accompanied at first with torrents of rain, which diminished toward dawn, as the wind increased in violence. The furious blast roared through the camps, literally sweeping away the tents. The men came staggering in from their fatiguing duties in the trenches to find their habitations gone, and their belongings scattered for miles over the miry plains. The hospital tents went with the rest, and the sick as well as the strong were left unprotected in the gale.

To the men on the ships at Balaclava and all along the coast it was a trying time. The seas, beating in at Balaclava harbor, brought huge masses of floating débris that told of destruction among the shipping outside. When the gale subsided it was found that between forty and fifty vessels had been wrecked or disabled and 1,000 lives lost. Eleven transports were lost and with them vast amounts of supplies, including ammunition, medical stores, and warm clothing for the troops. The *Henri Quatre*, the finest ship in the French navy, was driven ashore near Eupatoria. The losses suffered by the allies through this disastrous freak of nature could not be reckoned in gold. The men on the heights found themselves almost shelterless, with nothing but their ragged summer uniforms to protect them from the wintry blasts. To add to their misery cholera broke out again with renewed severity, and the dismal scenes of Bulgaria were repeated. The rain was superseded by sleet and

snow, and portions of the trenches were knee-deep with icy water. Fuel was scarce, and provender for the animals as well. The horses died in great numbers, and their carcasses festered on the plains until they sank out of sight in the mire or were devoured by the hungry dogs which infested the camps.

Meanwhile in England the people were wrought up to a high pitch of rage and disgust, and it was asserted on all hands that the war had been an unmitigated failure. The contradiction of the fictitious statement of the fall of Sebastopol was the first blow to the calm assurance that had existed before. To make matters worse, the Baltic fleet, of which so much had been expected, returned after an experience resembling that of the king of France who marched up the hill and down again. The details of the sufferings of the soldiers, resulting from the total incapacity of the medical and commissary departments, stirred the popular feeling almost to frenzy. Miss Florence Nightingale, a lady of vast experience in hospital affairs, was induced by the government to go to the East and supervise personally a reform in the wretched state of affairs existing in the Crimea and at Scutari. This move allayed but little the public discontent. Parliament met just before Christmas, and a motion to investigate the management of the war was carried by a large majority. As a result Lord Aberdeen's government went out of office, and it devolved upon Lord Palmerston to form a new one.

It was the habit of the English people during these times to exalt the French military establishment as a model for their government to follow. The French people naturally became magnificently conceited over their admitted superiority. Perhaps the different

estimate in England and France in regard to the state of their military affairs was owing somewhat to the measure in which free speech was allowed in the two countries. In England every weakness in the army was ruthlessly exposed by an unhampered press. In France disagreeable facts were smothered, or so perverted by a cringing press as to suit the ends of a government whose existence depended upon success.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL.

DEATH OF THE CZAR NICHOLAS. — SARDINIA JOINS THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. — PROGRESS OF THE ALLIES BEFORE SEBASTOPOL. — PÉLISSIER SUCCEEDS CANROBERT IN COMMAND OF THE FRENCH ARMY. — THE JUNE BOMBARDMENT AND FIRST ASSAULT. — CAPTURE OF THE MAMELON BY THE FRENCH. — FAILURE OF THE SECOND ASSAULT. — DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN. — DESPERATE CONDITION OF SEBASTOPOL. — TODLEBEN WOUNDED. — THE RUSSIANS DEFEATED ON THE TCHERNAYA. — THE GREAT ALLIED ASSAULT IN SEPTEMBER. — THE FRENCH CARRY THE MALAKOFF. — EVACUATION AND BURNING OF SEBASTOPOL. — PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF'S ESTIMATE OF THE DEFENSE. — THE FRENCH EMPEROR AND THE CZAR DESIRE PEACE. — THE CONGRESS OF PARIS. — SIGNATURE OF PEACE. — RESULTS OF THE WAR. — SARDINIA THE ONLY GAINER.

Two events of deep import to Europe opened the year 1855. The first was the death of the emperor of Russia, the other the entrance of Sardinia into the Western Alliance.

The death of the Czar occurred on the 2d of March. The battle of the Alma was his deathblow, and after that all hope forsook him. The window of his sick-room commanded the stately splendor of his capital, but his mind still retained the vision of the hostile fleet before Cronstadt, his ear seemed to catch the low moan of his suffering people, and the ominous roar of the Sebastopol cannon. Upon realizing that his end was near, he dictated the telegram for transmission to the country, "The emperor is dying." On

the 2d of March he delivered these parting words to his son and successor: "All my care, all my endeavors, have been directed for Russia's welfare. I was anxious to continue to labor so that I might leave you the empire steadfast and orderly, safe against dangers from without, thoroughly prosperous, and at peace. But you see at what a time and under what circumstances I am dying. God has willed it so. You will find the burden hard to bear." A few hours later, with a simple prayer upon his lips, the broken-hearted emperor passed away.

It was not apparent to the superficial observer what interest Sardinia, one of the smallest of European states, could have in the Eastern Question, but coming forward at a critical time, her aid was not to be despised. On the 26th of January King Victor Emmanuel signed at Turin the treaty that bound him to furnish 15,000 men for service against Russia. Early in the spring the first detachments sailed for the Crimea, and a few weeks later, under the command of General La Marmora, were in camp side by side with the soldiers of two of the great European powers.

The first military movements of the year 1855 occurred at Eupatoria, where Omar Pasha, in an intrenched position, worsted a Russian force sent from Sebastopol to dislodge him. This affair concluded Menschikoff's long season of mismanagement in the Crimea and threw the burden of the Russian leadership upon Prince Gortschakoff, who had directed the Danubian campaign.

Meanwhile the siege of Sebastopol was being actively pushed by the allies. By the first of March the hospitals were thoroughly renovated, the English commissariat overhauled, and the thinned ranks rein-

forced. The severity of the winter had been favorable to the allies, inasmuch as by rendering the roads impassable it checked the flow of Russian reinforcements and supplies. During January, February, and March skirmishing frequently occurred, but as the allies pushed their siege lines nearer to the Russian defenses, the genius and ceaseless activity of Todleben foiled them at every turn. New redoubts sprang up in their front as if by magic, to sweep their path with "mitrail."¹ On the 9th of April the second bombardment of Sebastopol was undertaken. It was a repetition of the events of the preceding fall, and on the night of the 20th, when the firing ceased, nothing had been accomplished.

On May 16 General Canrobert resigned his command in consequence of ill health.² The French army at this time numbered 120,000 men. The English strength, which during the winter months had fallen as low as 12,000, had been restored to nearly 30,000. Beside these there were 50,000 Turks under Omar Pasha and the 15,000 Sardinians under La Marmora. In consequence of their superior strength,

¹ This is the word used by Todleben to indicate the cross fire of the defenders of Sebastopol.

² Mr. Kinglake asserts in his closing volumes that Canrobert's cautious tactics and final resignation were induced by the extraordinary orders of the French emperor, who contemplated going to the Crimea to assume command himself. "No one seems to have divined that the emperor, though a man strangely fond of effecting theatric surprises and believed to be intent on the notion of assuming high command at the seat of war, might desire to keep Canrobert's army in a state of restraint, with its fires, as the phrase is, 'banked up,' until the time of his own arrival, when troubles unnumbered and successive disappointments and the weariness of hope long deferred would be all at once followed by what the play-books call 'flourishes,' by victory, conquest, and triumph." — Kinglake, "From the Morrow of Inkerman to the Fall of Canrobert," chap. v.

the French had gradually assumed the defense of the ground occupied by the English during the early days of the campaign. Indeed, by the middle of May the English were only holding a small portion of the allied line, with the Redan in their front. General Péliissier,¹ who succeeded Canrobert, was anxious to justify his reputation as a brilliant soldier, and the belief became prevalent throughout Europe that some extraordinary efforts would now be made toward breaking down the Russian defense.

A council of war held early in June decided to reopen the bombardment on the 6th, to be followed by a general infantry assault. Accordingly on the afternoon of the appointed day the cannonade recommenced, and was maintained through the night to prevent the Russians repairing damages. The bombardment on the part of the allies was of greater power and better sustained than either of the previous ones, while the Russians maintained a comparatively sluggish fire in response. On the 7th the allied commanders delivered their assault. Péliissier was to direct his main attack against the Mamelon redoubt, a dangerous outpost of the Malakoff, and upon its capture the English were to make a rush for the Quarries under the Redan. All through the afternoon the cannonade languished, and the troops destined for the attack were drawn up in readiness. At half past six the signal rockets were discharged, and the French columns broke forward with wild cheers. The Russians, lulled into a sense of security by the waning of the bombardment, were

¹ Péliissier, "the short, thickset, resolute Norman," as Mr. Kinglake describes him, entirely disregarded the commands of the Tuileries. He persisted in handling his army with reference to the enemy in his front.

taken unawares, and the French bayonets were swarming over the parapets on the Mamelon before they realized that an attack was in progress. Had the French troops been under good control at this time, their victory might have been cheaply bought. The heat of the charge was upon them, however, and as they clambered over the crest of the hill they saw before them, separated only by a gentle hollow, the shot-scarred Malakoff looming defiantly against the evening sky. They charged down the slope, while its great guns played upon them and the dusk was illuminated by the flashing of the Russian musketry. When the rush is on them French troops care little for death-dealing missiles, and it was not till they came close under the deadly work, and, baffled by the abattis and abrupt parapets, found themselves helpless under a galling fire, that the reaction came. A Russian column emerged from the redoubts adjacent to the Malakoff and fell furiously upon them. The retreat became a rout and swept over the crest of the Mamelon, leaving it again in the hands of the Russians. The whole object of the attack seemed lost, and it was with extreme difficulty that the discomfited troops were rallied in the trenches at the foot of the Mamelon. The reserves under General Brunet coming up, however, at eight o'clock, just after sunset another attack was made, and when darkness had fallen on the Chersonese, at a terrible cost of life the French had again made themselves masters of the coveted hill.

Meanwhile Lord Raglan, upon the first capture of the Mamelon, had sent a column of 1,000 men against the Quarries. The conquest was achieved with slight loss, but in defending the position against the Rus-

sian attacks that followed, the English suffered great slaughter. At intervals throughout the night, the heavy rolling of musketry and the lurid flickerings in front of the English lines told the weary soldiery on the heights that the Russians were still disputing the possession of the Quarries with their comrades.

The next morning the allied commanders could congratulate themselves upon having made progress, almost the first since the siege began. The English in the Quarries and the French on the Mamelon were within striking distance of the Redan and Malakoff.

Pélissier was impatient of delay. On the 15th a council of war was held, and it was determined to strike another blow for Sebastopol. It was to be no affair of outworks this time, but a general assault along the whole line. The French were to exercise their main strength against the Malakoff, and the English, as usual, against the Redan. The details were arranged with great precision. Upon the capture of the Malakoff a flag was to be displayed on the work as the signal of success, when Lord Raglan would make his assault upon the Redan.

At two o'clock on the morning of the 18th the expectant French infantry was under arms, massed in three strong divisions. The mistaking of a bomb for the signal rocket threw Pélissier's plans into hopeless confusion. The three divisions were beaten in detail, and the whole assault repulsed before it had been ordered. The English, too, failed utterly at the Redan. Their columns became confused in the advance and were beaten back with terrible slaughter.

To the English commander this was a heavy blow. Worn with care and emaciated by cholera, he was

unable to rise above the mortification of his defeat, and his sorrow at the useless sacrifice of so many lives. On the 28th, just ten days after the disaster, he passed away. He was succeeded by Sir James Simpson, who had been sent out by Lord Palmerston to investigate the management of the campaign. Once again the siege settled down into trench work and desultory skirmishing.

Meanwhile within Sebastopol the Russian leaders realized that events were approaching a crisis. The parallels of the enemy had approached close under their main defenses, and the new artillery placed in position against them had proved of far greater power than any in their possession. Furthermore the destruction of the great granaries on the Sea of Azov made it necessary to bring their supplies from Russia, and the roads were often rendered impassable by the weather. From this and other causes reinforcements were slow in arriving. The army in Sebastopol and its vicinity numbered less than half as many bayonets as the allies. Of the 18,000 seamen who had fought under Korniloff in the previous October only 4,000 were left, and on July 11 Admiral Nachimoff their commander was killed in the Malakoff Tower. Todleben himself was suffering from a severe wound, though he still continued to superintend the defense from a villa in the suburbs.¹

By August 1 the Russian commanders were at loggerheads as to whether it were wise to prolong the defense of the city, already badly injured by repeated bombardments. On the 9th a council of war was

¹ The personal presence of Todleben had become an inspiration to the garrison. From the day he was wounded the vigor of the defense began to wane.

held, upon the arrival of General Vrevski from St. Petersburg. The sentiment of the assembly was for a vigorous sortie, and Gortschakoff, while personally opposed to the measure, issued his orders for an attack upon the Franco-Sardinian positions on the Fedioukine heights in the Tchernaya valley. The object of this attack was to secure control again of the whole valley as far as Kadikoi, and to threaten the allied positions on the Chersonese from the east. That he was almost hopeless of success Gortschakoff's dispatch to the minister of war proves. "There is no doubt about it. I am attacking the enemy under wretched circumstances. . . . If things go wrong, it will not be my fault. I have done my best, but the task has been too difficult ever since I came to the Crimea." On August 16 the attack was made at dawn under cover of a dense fog. The rank and file of the Russian army had imbibed something of the hopelessness of their general, and failed to fight as stoutly as usual. Several assaults were made, and at first with some success. Later, Generals Read and Vrevski were killed, and before noon Gortschakoff abandoned the struggle and a general retreat commenced. This contest, generally known to the allies as the battle of the Tchernaya, was the last aggressive movement of the Russians in the Sebastopol campaign. Their next step was of a different nature, the construction of a floating bridge from Sebastopol to the north side of the great harbor. Even the common soldiers could not mistake the meaning of this. Sebastopol was to be given up. Their generals were securing their retreat.

The long campaign was surely drawing to a close.

With their vastly superior resources the allied generals were determined at whatever cost to break the Russian defense. On September 5 the allied batteries began to rain a destructive tempest of missiles upon forts, town, and suburbs. All through the 6th and 7th the cannonade was steadily maintained, the Russian works were terribly battered, while at night dull, lurid clouds of smoke told of devastation worked in the town itself. At noon on the 8th the bombardment, which had been waning for a few hours, broke out with redoubled violence. This was maintained for about twenty minutes, when suddenly it entirely ceased. Scarcely had the reverberation died away than the pealing of the French bugles rang out upon the air, and the chasseurs and zouaves of MacMahon's division swept up the slope of the Malakoff Hill. It was a rush of only seventy-five feet to the ditch of the tower, which had been almost filled by the débris of the bombardment. The Russians were surprised again, and, opposed only by a feeble musketry fire, the French in a twinkling were clambering over the parapets and through the embrasures of the work. General Pélissier, from his position on the Mamelon, scanned with intense anxiety the progress of the struggle. Regiment after regiment swept across the hollow to the support of the troops already engaged, hand to hand, with the defenders of the Malakoff which had cost France so many lives. At last with exultant eyes the French commander descried the tricolor waving from the parapet. "Tenez! voilà mon bâton de maréchal!" he exclaimed as he lowered his field-glass.¹

¹ Pélissier was right. He became a Marshal of France with the title of Duc de Malakoff.

The attacks at all other points had utterly failed. The French were repulsed at the Little Redan, while at the Redan itself the English soldiers, after struggling valiantly to a position close under the work in the face of a decimating fire, were compelled to retreat for lack of supports.

But the possession of the Malakoff was the possession of Sebastopol. It completely dominated the harbor, the town, and all its important defenses. The Russians, realizing this, made almost superhuman efforts to recapture it. A terrible contest was waged in its passages and inclosures throughout the afternoon, the Russians pushing up heavy columns from the north, while the French supports poured in from the other side. At dusk, however, the Russians were sullenly retiring. The last fight for Sebastopol had been fought and won.

With the cessation of the struggle at the Malakoff an almost complete silence reigned. The sky was murky and overcast, and an impenetrable darkness settled upon the country. As the night deepened the muffled tread of marching columns arose from the gloomy town. Then puffs of flame became visible far below, and spreading rapidly they began to dispel the darkness and reveal buildings on fire. The crackle and roar of the flames soon became audible on the heights, while the explosion of vast magazines shook the very hills of the peninsula. At midnight Sebastopol was literally in flames. The harbor, the ships, the heights, and ruined forts were all revealed as by day, while the French tricolor, on the Malakoff, as once at Moscow, tossed in the fierce glare of a Russian conflagration. The English outposts found the Redan unoccupied, and soon it became evident

that the Russians had abandoned their defenses all along the line. Their retreating masses of bayonets, that flashed back the glare of the fire, could be traced passing over the bridge to the north, while the constantly recurring explosions in the ill-fated town effectually prevented any interruption with their movements.

When morning dawned the Russians were gone, the ships burned or sunk, and the bridge destroyed. Sebastopol itself was a smoking waste, scarce a dozen buildings remaining. Well might Prince Gortschakoff declare, "It is not Sebastopol which we have left to them, but the burning ruins of the town, which we ourselves set fire to, having maintained the honor of the defense in such a manner that our great-grandchildren may recall with pride the remembrance of it, and send it down to all posterity."

With the fall of Sebastopol the campaign in the Crimea came practically to a close, though the Russians still clung to the north side of the harbor and confronted their foes in the Tchernaya Valley.

With Sebastopol in their possession, and the prosecution of hostilities still upon their hands, the allied generals were at a loss what course to pursue. An advance into the interior of the bleak and thinly settled Crimea was not an attractive or promising undertaking. The cabinets of London and Paris took the question in hand, while the military men occupied themselves in the destruction of those magnificent docks and fortifications that had rendered Sebastopol famous.

The Emperor of the French, having awakened in Europe a satisfactory opinion of his military strength,

was anxious to be rid of the war and gather new laurels as a peacemaker. The English government, on the other hand, was more strongly inclined toward aggressive movements. English pride had been touched. The second Baltic expedition under Admiral Dundas had returned after bombarding Sveaborg and executing a few harmless manœuvres off the Russian coast. The operations in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov had been mostly confined to the destruction of the batteries at Odessa and the reduction of Kertch, Yenikale, and Kinburn, and there was little in these affairs to gratify the British ambition for naval glory.

The sentiment of the continent was for peace. Austria at this crisis redoubled her efforts for the achievement of a settlement of the dispute. She found the French emperor in accord with her designs, and the new Czar to be far more pliable than his imperious father. Alexander II. was not of a warlike temperament, and he regarded peace at this time as an absolute necessity to the empire. The finances were in a terribly reduced and disordered state, the expenditure of life had been enormous, and he was willing to avail himself of any plan that seemed to afford an honorable retreat. The tidings of the fall of Kars, the celebrated Turkish fortress in Armenia, came as a soothing balm to the mortified military pride of Russia. In fact, the campaigns in Armenia had been throughout generally favorable to the Russian arms. The capture of Kars was a brilliant consummation of the fighting in Asia, and with this fortress in his possession the Czar might reasonably hope for easier terms from the western powers.

During the last of December Austria submitted

to the St. Petersburg cabinet proposals for peace. After some bickering over the clauses relative to the supremacy of the Black Sea, on January 16 the Czar accepted the propositions entire. On February 25 the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey convened at the palace of the ministry for foreign affairs in Paris.¹ An armistice was concluded between the belligerents, and on March 30, the day before its expiration, the plenipotentiaries waited upon the emperor at the Tuileries, and informed him of the conclusion of a treaty of peace.

This famous congress discussed and acted upon other matters than those immediately pertaining to the belligerents in the eastern war. Privateering was declared abolished, and the state of affairs in Belgium, Greece, and Italy was brought to notice. It was owing to the exertions of Count Cavour that the Italian question was introduced, and forced into a prominence that committed every power to an expression of opinion. This discussion, which practically closed the work of the congress, developed at least three facts: First, that the French emperor was willing to withdraw his troops from Rome; second, that the Austrian occupation of the Papal States was in no sense beneficial; and third, that there was no probability that Austria would of her own free will discontinue that occupation.

Peace having resumed her sway, the belligerents in the eastern war could count the cost. Russia, it is

¹ Prussia was not represented at the congress until some days later, when Baron Manteuffel was admitted at the instigation of the French emperor. This incident gives a striking idea of the relative standing of France and Prussia in Europe in 1856.

said, lost 250,000 men by wounds, exposure, and disease, France lost nearly 100,000, England 26,000, Turkey 35,000, and Sardinia 3,000. Russia entered the war to maintain her right of protectorate over the Greek Christians in Turkey, to humiliate the Porte, and perhaps destroy it. By the terms of the treaty of Paris she not only failed in this, but lost her nominal protectorate over the Danubian Principalities. She also lost her supremacy on the Black Sea, being forbidden to maintain a naval fleet on its waters. She yielded Kars for Sebastopol and other points held by the allies, and was obliged to suffer a loss of territory on her southeastern frontier. Aside from the expenditure in blood and treasure, Russia stood as the principal loser by the war.

The Emperor of the French had entered the contest for military "glory," and to strengthen the insecure foundations of his throne. He gained the plaudits of an admiring world, which hastened to crown him as the sovereign of the first military power of Europe.

England had taken up arms to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman empire, to curb the ambition of Russia, and to settle the Eastern Question: England was regarded in the light of a power that had gained her ends.

Turkey fought for self-preservation, and, propped by the strong arms of the western powers, she still lived. Furthermore, she gained admittance into the great family of European states, with all that the dignity implied. The Sultan renewed his old pledge to close the Sea of Marmora to ships of war during times of peace.

Sardinia fought to gain the attention and ear of

Europe. The 8th of April at the Paris congress demonstrated her success.

This is the way in which the nations were affected by the terms of the treaty of Paris, in the days when the treaty was young. After a lapse of twenty-five years, what are the permanent results achieved by two years of bloodshed in the East?

Russia has scoffed at the treaty, and resumed her sway on the Euxine and in the principalities.

The French emperor sleeps in exile, and the "glory" the world awarded him has passed away in the wreck of his tinsel empire.

England still frets over the unsettled Eastern Question.

The "sick man" lives on, but his palsied hand has lost its grip on the north of the Balkan range.

Sardinia, and Sardinia alone, has proved to be the real gainer by the Crimean war; for from the day when the gallantry of the Bersaglieri on the heights of the Tchernaya gained Cavour an influential voice in the congress of Paris dates the birth of the kingdom of Italy.

CHAPTER IX.

THE RISE OF SARDINIA.

THE MAP OF ITALY IN 1850. — POLITICAL STATE OF SARDINIA. — THE TWO SICILIES. — STATES OF THE CHURCH. — TUSCANY. — PARMA. — MODENA. — LOMBARDY AND VENETIA. — SECRET SOCIETIES. — YOUNG ITALY AND ITS MISSION. — THE SARDINIAN KING AND HIS POLICY. — HIS PARLIAMENTARY TRIALS AND LOYALTY TO THE CONSTITUTION. — LEGISLATION IN THE SARDINIAN PARLIAMENT AGAINST CLERICAL ABUSES. — ADVENT OF CAVOUR. — THE DIPLOMATIC DUEL BETWEEN SARDINIA AND AUSTRIA AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON EUROPE. — CAVOUR TAKES THE HELM. — HIS DISLIKE FOR SECRET SOCIETIES. — HIS POLICY DEFINED. — THROWS SARDINIA INTO THE ALLIANCE AGAINST RUSSIA. — DEPARTURE OF THE ARMY FOR THE CRIMEA. — EFFECT OF THE WAR NEWS IN PIEDMONT. — VICTOR EMMANUEL VISITS LONDON AND PARIS. — NAPOLEON'S SOLICITUDE FOR ITALY. — IS APPEALED TO BY CAVOUR. — CAVOUR IN THE PARIS CONGRESS.

In the year 1850 Italy had almost realized the prediction of Prince Metternich as a "mere geographical expression." The divisions of the peninsula remained practically as they had been settled by the treaty of 1815. The kingdom of the Two Sicilies comprised all southern Italy, including the island of Sicily. The States of the Church, with the grand duchies of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, occupied all central Italy northward to the Po. The territory of the Sardinian kingdom on the west and the Lombardo-Venetian provinces of Austria on the east carried the Italian frontiers high up among the Alps.

Of all these states Sardinia was the only one governed constitutionally by an Italian prince. The

Bourbon dynasty continued to disgrace the throne of the Two Sicilies. The Pope directed the temporal as well as the spiritual affairs of his realm, while the grand dukes followed the standard set by the Vienna government in its administration of its Italian provinces.

The condition of the majority of these states was most deplorable. As for the Two Sicilies, the government of "King Bomba" had become a scandal to civilization. The history of the state since 1815 had been one dark page of royal perjury and popular insurrections cruelly suppressed. Twice, in 1820 and in 1848, the unhappy people had seen their hopes strangled by sovereigns whose lack of honor was as notorious as their ingenuity in all manner of oppression and misrule. In only one respect did this foreign dynasty seem to become nationalized. The inhabitants of the volcanic districts of southern Italy are notoriously careless of the future, and refuse to be taught by hard experience. The dwellers on the slopes and along the base of Vesuvius, after losing their all in some sudden outburst, will rebuild on the same precarious spots. With the smoking mountain in view from his palace windows, perhaps the Bourbon caught this much of the national character. At all events he failed to profit by previous experience, and in the lurid flickerings of discontent that blazed out here and there within his realm, he failed to comprehend the great popular upheaval that it presaged. So the Neapolitan dungeons swarmed with miserable prisoners arrested on suspicion and committed without trial. So the people sank lower in ignorance and degradation, while poverty, villainy, and brigandage grew apace.

In the States of the Church matters were scarcely better. Pius IX. forfeited the love and confidence of his subjects when, in 1848, he refused to use his troops against Austria and fled into the arms of the Neapolitan king. When under the protection of French bayonets he resumed his rule in Rome, no Italian patriot looked to him for the lightening of the national burdens. With his return the Jesuits again resumed their sway, and the whole state became miserably priest-ridden. Liberalism in religion became the worst crime of which a subject of the Pope could be guilty, offenses against the civil law receiving comparatively slight attention. As a result crime flourished, and brigands found another successful field for operation. The papal government was cruel yet weak, oppressive yet inefficient. The subjects of the Holy See were held in check only by the French in Rome and the Austrians in the Legations.

In Tuscany greater liberty and comfort were enjoyed, thanks to the disposition of the Grand Duke Leopold. But the Tuscans had never forgiven the duke for his course in 1848, when, disregarding their invitation to return to them in peace, he chose to come back with Austrian bayonets and over the wreck of a short-lived constitution.

In the grand duchies of Parma and Modena the will of Vienna was maintained in a rigorous rule, while the Austrian eagle with whetted beak hovered ever ready within the famous "Quadrilateral." The turbulence of the people of the Lombardo-Venetian provinces necessitated the employment of a vast secret police. The work of this organization in a province charged with conspiracy can be better imagined than described. The Austrian dominion in Lombardy and

Venetia deserves little else than condemnation, and none the less that Austria was one of the leading powers of the civilization of the nineteenth century.

Such, briefly, was the condition of the Italian states in 1850. It was the old sad story. Wars had swept over the peninsula again and again, only to leave it more hopelessly enslaved. In that year there seemed no ray of light on the horizon to the millions of Italians gazing longingly for the rising of the sun of liberty and national regeneration.¹

One result of the stolid indifference of the rulers to the interests of their peoples was the formation of secret societies. The most celebrated of these was the Carbonari, which, originating in the south of Italy, spread rapidly into the Papal States and northern provinces. It included within its ranks the noble and gifted as well as the ignorant and villainous. The ends to be attained were vague, beyond the overturning of the existing order of things. No opportunity was to be lost to incite and promote revolution. The torch and stiletto were its legitimate weapons.

The papal power, finding itself helpless against this hidden danger, had sanctioned the organization of a counter society opposed to its aims. The notorious sect of the Sanfedisti was the result. The character of the work to be accomplished by this organization can be comprehended by a few clauses from their oath. The neophyte swore "to have no pity either on children or old men, and to shed the last drop of the Liberals' blood without regard to sex or rank."²

¹ For a condensed narrative of the terrible state of Italian affairs in 1852 see the letter of Luigi Carlo Farini written in December of that year to Mr. Gladstone. It is appended to vol. iv. of Mr. Gladstone's translation of Farini's *Roman State*.

² See introduction to Godkin's *Victor Emmanuel II.* p. xvii.

Furthermore this society, working presumably in the interest of Christ on earth, swore to "implacable hatred of the enemies of our Holy Roman Catholic and only true religion." So the subterranean struggle grew fiercer and fiercer, until the whole structure upon which the Roman and Neapolitan governments rested was honeycombed to the core.

But the most active society in 1850, for the achievement of Italian independence, was known as "Young Italy." It was founded by Joseph Mazzini, and first came into notice about 1831. "Young Italy" had one advantage over the Carbonari inasmuch as it aimed at a definite result, the foundation of an Italian republic with Rome as its capital. "Young Italy" was bitterly opposed to all things monarchical. The numbers of the society increased rapidly, but its movements were governed by zeal rather than judgment. The misdirected efforts of its devotees threw serious obstacles in the path of the calmer and more constitutional methods of achieving national unity.

There is but one state that we have failed to notice, the kingdom of Sardinia, including Piedmont, Savoy, Nice, and the island of Sardinia. From the year 1850 the history of this little state is the history of Italy. In 1848 Charles Albert, king of Sardinia, at the head of his brave and enlightened people, took the field against Austria in the cause of Italian independence. Deserted in the hour of need by Rome and Naples, he sacrificed the blood and treasure of his little state on the altar of Italian freedom. Since the mournful evening when his abdication left the destinies of the kingdom in the hands of his son, Sardinia had taken no step backward. When Victor Emmanuel assumed the duties his father had laid aside, he found his peo-

ple wearied with the war and heart-broken at its results. At the outset the fidelity of the king to constitutional principles was severely tested, the parliament refusing to ratify the treaty of peace he had concluded with Austria at Milan. The terms were by no means light, but he had refused to adopt the one course that would have won Austrian leniency, the abolition of constitutional government in his realms. It was a hard position for a young king. On the one hand an easy peace and Austrian protection over his despotism, on the other, harsher terms and a conflict with an injudicious and ungrateful parliament. His high sense of honor asserted itself in this the first crisis of his reign. He rejected the 40,000 bayonets which Marshal Radetzky declared to be at his service, and returned to his capital and hostile parliament.

It became clear immediately that nothing reasonable could be hoped from the Chambers. They were composed largely of "Young Italy," while the judgment of many of the wiser heads had become distorted by the national misfortunes. The king seized boldly the only course open to him and dissolved the Chambers. Then, calling a new election, he entreated the people to return wise and patriotic representatives for his support. The result was a more reasonable parliament, which recognized above all that the necessities of the state compelled an immediate settlement of peace. The first danger of Victor Emmanuel's reign was over, and constitutional government became more strongly rooted by the ordeal through which it had passed.

The king and his ministry then turned to the development of the country, healing the ravages of the

war, and righting long condoned clerical abuses. The prime minister was the Marquis Massimo d'Azeglio, a man of intelligence and refinement, who had made himself famous by his exposure of misrule in central Italy, and by his general prominence in matters relating to national unification. For these tendencies he was expelled from Tuscany in 1846, returning to Piedmont, his native state. The reorganization of the army was confided to General Alfonso La Marmora, while Count Siccardi was sent to Rome to discuss reforms of the church in Piedmont. Siccardi found the Pôpe obdurate and unwilling to yield a jot. Upon his return in February, 1850, and his admission to the cabinet as minister of grace and justice, he brought a bill before parliament abolishing the "*Foro Ecclesiastico*," the courts held by the bishops of the church, and the only ones to which ecclesiastical offenders against the civil law were amenable. In spite of the opposition of Rome the bill was finally carried, and its practical enforcement was soon demonstrated by the arraignment of clerical criminals in the civil courts.

It was in the fall of 1850 that Count Camillo Benso di Cavour first appeared in the cabinet as minister of agriculture and commerce. He was a true representative of the old Piedmontese aristocracy, had been trained for the army, and later made himself a reputation for great political ability. He had strong liberal tendencies, and was an ardent advocate of English governmental methods. He was a prominent supporter of Siccardi's bill for the abolition of the ecclesiastical courts. His talents were of such an order as to immediately impress the king. Upon the decision to tender him a portfolio, the king is reported

to have said laughingly to D' Azeglio, "Look out what you are doing; Cavour will soon be master of you all."

The royal speech at the opening of parliament in November, 1850, evinced no intention of retracing a step taken in the teeth of papal protestation. It was plain that the papal thunders were powerless against the resolution of the king. Already he had earned the title of "*Il Ré Galantuomo*," in which he gloried through his life.

The efforts of the Sardinian government toward the development of free institutions received a temporary check when the influences awakened by the French *coup d'état* swept over Europe. The only popular government of the continent had been overthrown, and the supreme power seized by a man who appealed to the military traditions of the Bonapartes to stir enthusiasm. The downfall of the French Republic left Piedmont like a green spot of liberty in the far-spreading desert of European autocracy.

Austria, already dreading the influence of Turin upon the people of Italy, seized this moment of apparent despotic ascendancy to terrorize the Sardinian king by protestations and warnings which the Berlin cabinet supported. On December 10, 1851, the Marquis d' Azeglio replied, defending the policy of Piedmont, and concluded in this fashion: "His majesty was unable to forbear observing that the political condition of the two countries governed by the two sovereigns who addressed to him this species of ultimatum, appeared to him to stand much more in need of advice than to give them any right to offer their advice to others. The king added that he was master in his own house, that he in no way interfered with

what other sovereigns thought fit to do, and that he desired, on his part, perfect liberty of action; he again expressed his perfect confidence in the efforts by which he continued to support the wise and moderate course of his government."

This was hot shot for the governments of central Europe. It was plain to Austria, as it was to the Pope, that the Sardinian king was incorrigible. She saw trouble in the future, and went on building up her military strength within the Quadrilateral.

In the fall of 1852 D' Azeglio, wearied with his long contest with the papal authority, resigned his premiership, and it devolved upon Cavour to form a new ministry. Scarcely had he assumed his duties when in February, 1853, he was diverted from his contemplated task of internal development by an incipient uprising against the Austrian authority in Milan. It was probably the work of "Young Italy," and perhaps the product of Mazzini's plotting brain. The Austrian government, however, laid the charge of being accessory to it at the door of Sardinia. This was indignantly denied by Cavour, who proved the innocence of his government to the satisfaction of the continental courts.

Cavour had always deprecated the violent methods of the great Italian societies in the cause of freedom. As for "Young Italy," it had been from the first a serious embarrassment to the benevolent designs of Sardinia. In former days Charles Albert, upon his refusal to take up arms against Austria at Mazzini's appeal, had found himself compelled to defend his borders against Mazzini's revengeful attack from Switzerland. Cavour deplored lawlessness and assassination as political methods, and was especially tena-

cious of maintaining constitutional obligations. The Carbonari and "Young Italy" might be striving for the same end as the Sardinian government, but they struggled on in secret and divergent channels, inspiring crime and impeding healthful progress. In the mind of Cavour no less than in Mazzini's, was the picture of a united Italy, but Cavour's sight was clearer and more definite, revealing the House of Savoy dominant on the banks of the Tiber. He believed Piedmont must of necessity be the principal agent in effecting this transformation. "Events have led Piedmont to take a clear and decided position in Italy," he wrote at this time. "That position is not, I am well aware, without danger, and I feel all the weight of the responsibility that in consequence presses on me, but duty and honor alike impose it upon us. As providence has willed that in Italy Piedmont alone should be free and independent, Piedmont ought to use her liberty and her independence to plead before Europe the cause of the unhappy peninsula. We shall not recoil from this perilous task: the king and the country are decided to go through with it to the end."

In furtherance of this policy, and while using every endeavor to force the Italian question upon the attention of Europe, Cavour went on strengthening his own state for the great duties to which with the approval of the king he had dedicated it. The taxation was overhauled, free trade introduced, railways opened, and bridges built under the encouragement of the government. In 1854 the final and decisive blows were struck at clerical abuses. A law of civil marriage was passed, while certain religious corporations were abolished and church property gen-

erally brought under control of the state. Against these measures, as was anticipated, the Pope protested in unison with the local clergy. Cavour was immovable, however, in his consistent adherence to his policy of a "free church in a free state."

Moreover, during these debates in the Chambers, Cavour's mind was running in other channels. The Crimean war was in progress, winter was approaching, and the condition of the allied armies was known to be anything but satisfactory. Piedmont with its well-trained army would be no contemptible succor in a time like this. Cavour was little inclined to run a great risk, but he recognized in the condition of affairs a glorious opportunity. In fact, he favored the sending of a military force to the Crimea to assist the allies. England was known to be desirous of this, and here was an opportunity to win her gratitude and perhaps assistance, later, in his settlement of the Italian question. Furthermore the alliance of Sardinia with England and France would accomplish the great purpose of bringing her into friendly sympathy with the two great courts. A successful campaign in the Crimea would also raise the "morale" of the Piedmontese army and give it confidence for future service. This consideration had great weight with the king. "Our defeat," he exclaimed, referring to Novara, "was too ignominious, we have need of a little glory to raise us up." There was one other reason, perhaps, that may have influenced Cavour's mind; a blow at Russia was a blow at European despotism.

The ministry was opposed to Cavour's bold plan. In the Chambers, too, it provoked bitter criticism. It was represented as ruinous, as suicidal, for a little

state scarcely able to preserve her free institutions against vast hostile influences, to waste her strength in a quarrel in which she had not even a remote interest. But Cavour remained steadfast to his purpose, confident in the royal approbation. His firmness and patience were rewarded ; the Chambers supported his project, the treaty of alliance was signed, and the battle-flags of Sardinia again committed to the charge of her devoted soldiery.

These were trying days for the king. At the opening of the year 1855, with the church still heaping its anathemas upon him, and the strong minority in the Chambers bitterly condemning his folly, the hand of domestic affliction was laid heavily upon him. The treaty of alliance between Piedmont and the western powers was signed on January 10, and within a month of that event the king lost his wife, mother, and his only brother, the Duke of Genoa. These trials aroused the deep sympathy of his people, but they were cited by the church as the punishment of God upon an impious monarch. The king, fatigued and sorrowing, leaned more than ever upon the wisdom of Cavour. He would have been glad to leave the atmosphere of civil and clerical strife that surrounded him, for the head of his army in the East. On April 14, at a review of the troops destined for the Crimea, he bade farewell to General La Marmora with these words : "Ah, general, happy you. You go to fight soldiers. I remain to fight monks and nuns."

Meanwhile the struggle in the Chambers went on over the Rattazzi bill for the abolition of religious corporations. The clamors of the angry clergy that followed its passage were soon drowned in the en-

thusiastic acclamations that greeted the tidings of the Franco-Sardinian victory of the Tchernaya. The last note of the opposition was silenced, and no one could question longer that the prime minister's foreign policy had been right. The narrow streets of Genoa and the broad avenues of the royal capital only reflected the pride and joy that were animating every village and mountain chalet over the news that the gallant soldiers of Sardinia had again proved their valor against one of the first military powers of Europe.

Cavour determined to strike while the iron was hot, and force Sardinia still more upon the notice of the courts and people of western Europe. It was in furtherance of this policy that in November the king paid a visit to Paris and London. He was received with courtesy and an interest bordering perhaps upon curiosity. It was during his stay in Paris that the king received his first intimation from the lips of the emperor that he was deeply interested in the solution of the Italian question. What did the emperor mean by that inquiry, "*Que peut on faire pour l'Italie?*" After all, the destroyer of the French republic might become the destroyer of Austrian despotism in Italy. Soon after the return of the king, Cavour, presuming upon the solicitude the emperor had expressed, wrote as follows to him: "The emperor can render immense service to Italy: first, by inducing Austria to do justice to Piedmont and maintain her engagements; secondly, by obtaining from her a mitigation of the régime that weighs upon Lombardy and Venetia; in the third place by forcing the king of Naples not to scandalize civilized Europe by a deportment contrary to all the principles of justice and equity; in the fourth

place, by reëstablishing an equilibrium in Italy such as was settled by the treaty of Vienna, that is to say, rendering possible the removal of the Austrians from the Legations and the Romagna; by placing these provinces under a secular prince, or procuring them the benefit of a laic and independent administration."

Then followed the congress of Paris, and it was the French plenipotentiary who opened the way for Cavour's exposure of the evils resulting from the Austrian domination in Italy. Cavour much desired the support of England as a constitutional power of far greater moral weight than the French empire. He was not, however, to be lulled into a sense of false security. While still hoping for signs of tangible encouragement from the reticent statesmen of Great Britain, he never for a moment relaxed that vigilance and marvelous skill which in their subtle development were drawing the French emperor into the position of the champion of Italian unity.

CHAPTER X.

ITALY AND CAVOUR.

AUSTRIA'S INFLUENCE UPON THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS. — METTERNICH ON CAVOUR. — CAVOUR DISAPPOINTED IN ENGLAND. — HE TURNS TO FRANCE AS AN ALLY. — THE ORSINI INCIDENT. — CAVOUR APPEASES THE EMPEROR, AND STRIKES AT THE PAPAL GOVERNMENT. — THE CONFERENCE AT PLOMBIÈRES. — CAVOUR JUBILANT. — WARLIKE DECLARATIONS AT THE TUILERIES AND AT TURIN. — MARRIAGE OF PRINCE NAPOLEON AND THE PRINCESS CLOTILDE. — CAVOUR IMPELS THE EMPEROR TOWARD WAR. — GUIZOT ON CAVOUR. — SIGNING OF THE FRANCO-SARDINIAN ALLIANCE. — FUTILE EFFORTS OF THE POWERS TO PRESERVE THE PEACE. — AUSTRIA DECLARES WAR. — ENTHUSIASM IN ITALY. — NAPOLEON'S MANIFESTO. — HE LEAVES FOR THE FRONT. — CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMIES.

THOUGH only a small portion of Italian territory was occupied by her troops, Austria was largely responsible for the oppression exercised by the despotic rulers throughout the peninsula. The tyranny in the Two Sicilies and the bigoted inefficiency of the papal government could not have stood a month without the support of Vienna. The Pope and "King Bomba" relied implicitly upon the material as well as the moral aid of Austria against their rebellious subjects.

The more rational of the Italian patriots had already begun to pin their hopes to the king of Sardinia as a champion. His liberal course, pursued in the face of Austrian opposition, had compelled even the most ardent republicans to acknowledge that there was one monarch in Italy true to his pledge and the

interests of his people. Secret societies had only harassed the despotic governments, and shown themselves not only incapable of improving opportunities, but propagators of anarchy as well. It began to be realized that to wage a successful battle with the Italian governments supported by the might of Austria, it would be necessary to adopt methods sufficiently honorable to arouse and retain the sympathy of Europe.

Of course the great societies died slowly, and Cavour, who was constantly replying to Austrian accusations, was sometimes handicapped by the misguided zeal of "Young Italy." Nevertheless he always defended his state successfully, turning with telling force the responsibility of political outrages upon the governments whose intolerance rendered such deeds possible. "We have always followed a frank, loyal policy," he declared in the Chambers, "without duplicity, and as long as we shall be at peace with other potentates we will not employ revolutionary means, nor ever seek to excite tumults or rebellions in their states." The energy, skill, and straightforwardness displayed by Cavour in these disputes with Austria was not lost upon Europe. Old Prince Metternich could already see the drift of public opinion setting in against the empire he had so long and faithfully served. An Austrian and an imperialist to the core, he could not conceal his admiration for the Sardinian minister. "Diplomacy is passing away," he is reported to have said; "there is only now one diplomatist in Europe, and unfortunately he is against us; I mean M. de Cavour."

Before the close of 1856 Cavour realized that England's interests were drawing her closer to Austria, and

of necessity farther away from the championship of Italian freedom. Cavour's creed being undying hostility to Austria, it was plain to him that England could never be his ally in the sense he wished. The loss of England was a heavy disappointment to him, for no support could ever be as satisfactory as that of the great people whose institutions he always held up to his countrymen as worthy of emulation. "Public affairs hold me in very great suspense," he wrote at this time. "Abandoned by England, having in front of us Austria, malevolent and hostile, obliged to struggle against Rome and the other Italian princes — you can imagine how difficult our position is. In spite of all, I am not quite discouraged, because I believe that the country is with us."

The English influence upon Austria tended to bring about certain reforms in Lombardy and Venetia, amnesty being granted for political offenders and Prince Maximilian appointed viceroy of the provinces. Cavour, however, saw in this, as well as in the Kaiser's visit to Venice and Milan that followed, only a tardy effort on the part of the Vienna government to win the loyalty of its Italian subjects. Cavour had no faith in Austrian reforms; Austria was a usurper on Italian soil, and her rule could never be endured by the true sons of the fair peninsula.

Cavour's only hope now was in the Emperor of the French. It is true that the turn of the diplomatic wheel that had estranged constitutional England brought about more friendly relations with despotic Russia, still it was to France that he must look for material support. The emperor's course, since his first profession of interest in the Italian question, had been so consistently friendly as to awaken within

Cavour the brightest hopes. All the ingenuity and seductive wiles of his diplomacy were now directed toward drawing the Emperor of the French into an alliance with the Sardinian state.

The unhappy attempt upon the emperor's life in January, 1858, threw a temporary cloud upon the growing cordiality that existed between the courts of Paris and Turin. The crime was traced to Felice Orsini, an Italian agitator, who expiated his guilt upon the scaffold. If the whole matter could have been forgotten with Orsini's death, it would have been to Cavour's liking. There followed, however, a long series of charges, counter-charges, and denials between the French, English, and Sardinian governments. Orsini had been striving, by means legitimate and criminal, to incite in all quarters hostility to Austrian rule in Italy. In England he addressed public meetings, but soon awoke to the knowledge that English enthusiasm would never blossom into action. While engaged there, the French emperor visited the queen at the Isle of Wight, and it seems probable that the deluded enthusiast gained the idea that in some way Napoleon was responsible for English indifference. The attempted assassination on the Rue de l'Opera may have been actuated by motives of revenge or for the purpose of frightening the emperor into hostility to Austria. The correspondence that passed between England and France was extremely bitter. England was denominated by the French press as a den of assassins, while the retorts from England galled the emperor by their uncomplimentary allusions to his *coup d'état*. In contrast with England, the conciliatory tone of Sardinia was extremely marked and agreeable. The king wrote a

note to the emperor, expressing his sorrow and horror at the attempt upon his life, and begging him not to allow the impious deed of an unhappy zealot to influence him to abandon the Italian cause. Nor was this all, for in the Chambers stringent laws were passed in regard to regicide and conspiracy. The charges against Piedmont as a nurser of conspiracies being renewed at this time by the Austrian and Italian courts, Cavour again turned skillfully at bay. He struck a vigorous blow at the papal power, laying the prevalence of political lawlessness in Italy at the door of the Vatican. The system of expulsion practiced by the pontifical government in regard to its subjects could not, he claimed, fail to be attended by "dreadful consequences" in filling other states with homeless, discontented, and desperate Italians. "To the measures adopted by the Holy See is to be attributed the extraordinary vitality of the Mazzinian party."

What seemed at first to be the deathblow to French intervention in Italian affairs was turned by Cavour into an impelling force in the right direction. However much the French emperor was thrown out of conceit with the Italian cause by the explosion of Orsini's bombs, he was completely mollified by the course of the Sardinian government. In fact, so suddenly did the fierce zeal of the emperor for the oppressed Italians blaze forth, that for some years it was a prevalent belief in Europe that he was driven forward through fear of other Orsinis that might infest his gay capital.¹

¹ "The truth is that he is determined to go to war with Austria to propitiate the Italians, and to save his own life from assassination since the *attentat* of January, 1858. Cavour worked upon this at their inter-

An open alliance with Sardinia meant war, and perhaps the emperor thought that it was time to break another lance for his popularity at home. Possibly, too, a war with Austria, as has often been intimated, was one of the great strokes of the policy he had determined upon when he seized his uncle's throne. It is certain that his spleen and jealousy had been whetted by the preponderance of Austrian influence in Italy. His bayonets preserved the peace in Rome, but in the papal councils the will of the Kaiser was more potent than his own. He might style himself "the eldest son of the church," but it had become a hollow title. Whatever his motives, when he turned the face of encouragement to the appeal of Sardinia in behalf of a down-trodden people, he entered upon a course that has entitled him to the gratitude of the civilized world.

On the 20th of July, 1858, Cavour met the emperor at Plombières. The conference was private; and when they parted, the outside world could only surmise as to the topics discussed and the conclusions reached. But though the world was in darkness, a great light shone upon Cavour's path. He had long looked forward to a death grapple with Austrian despotism as a necessity, and he no longer confronted the crisis with only the help of the slender ranks of Piedmont, but he felt behind him the mighty support of the French military empire. In case of an Austrian attack upon Piedmont, the French army would take the field in her defense. As for aggressive movements, they were to be left to the judgment of the

view at Plombières last autumn, and persuaded him that taking up the cause of Italy will save his life, forfeited according to the laws of the Carbonari." — Malmesbury's *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, p. 466.

emperor. Already while Europe plodded on, never suspecting war, while the Bourbon persecuted and misruled calm in the sense of Austrian protection, while the clergy fumed and conspirators plotted, Cavour saw, fair and beautiful, a united Italy, and all its roads converged toward Rome.

On the 1st of January, 1859, an event occurred that rudely shattered the quiet of Europe. At a reception at the Tuileries the French emperor expressed himself as follows to the Austrian ambassador: "I regret that our relations with your government are not as good as in the past, but I pray you to inform the emperor that my sentiments toward him are not changed." Words like these from the Emperor of the French could not fail to be regarded in all quarters as a menace to the peace of Europe. Following close upon this came the royal speech at the opening of the Sardinian parliament on January 10. "Our country," declared the king, "though small in territory, has acquired credit in the councils of Europe, because it is great by the ideas it represents, and by the sympathies it inspires. This state of things is not devoid of perils, for while we respect treaties, we are not insensible to the cry of grief which comes up to us from so many parts of Italy." The Chamber was crowded; and as these words were uttered the enthusiasm could no longer be restrained. The room rang with cheers for the king and the House of Savoy.

The declaration at the Tuileries, followed so closely by the exciting scene in Turin, left no room for doubt that France was pledged to support Sardinia in pushing the Italian question to a solution. The emperor had always been made to feel a sense of isolation in

his intercourse with European monarchs, and had long been anxious to ally himself with some ancient royal line. A match with the House of Savoy was certainly a step in the right direction, and on January 29 his cousin Prince Napoleon was married to the Princess Clotilde, daughter of Victor Emmanuel. The union was by no means agreeable to the king, but it was urged by Cavour as a portion of the price to be paid for French bayonets in the coming struggle. In short, it was a bargain: a few army corps for a princess. The necessities of the state blinded Cavour to every other consideration.

The emperor needed at the last some stimulating influence to drive him forward. When he saw war staring him in the face, he seems to have half repented his course. Cavour had been leading him on step by step from encouraging remarks to positive pledges, now craftily picturing Austrian dominance at Rome, and then offering inducements like a tract of country or the hand of a princess. After committing himself at the Tuileries, the Emperor of the French was hopelessly bound to Sardinia, to rise or fall with her fortunes. Cavour was determined to draw the sword, and there was nothing for Napoleon but to support him. "There are," exclaimed M. de Guizot at this time, "but two men upon whom the eyes of Europe are fixed, the Emperor Napoleon and M. de Cavour. The game is being played. I back M. de Cavour."

The treaty of alliance between France and Sardinia was signed on the 18th of January, but already the startled powers had commenced to exert themselves in the interests of peace. Their efforts were hopeless from the first. Both Austria and Sardinia had been

pushing their war preparations for weeks, and the first question for the peacemakers was how to effect at least a partial disarmament. Neither Austria nor Sardinia wished to take the first step. As for Cavour, there was nothing he dreaded so much as peace, for he had much to lose and nothing to gain by it. So he claimed he was acting strictly on the defensive, and continued to augment the military strength of his state. A congress was next suggested, but now, to the joy of Cavour, the Austrian government began to raise serious objections. The Vienna statesmen decided that in case a congress were held, Sardinia, not being a power of the first class, could not claim admittance. Cavour protested, and through the efforts of England, Austria agreed to the admission of Sardinia, but to discuss the question of disarmament alone. Cavour refused this compromise. At last England urged the French emperor to induce Sardinia to disarm on condition of her entering the congress on equal terms with the great powers. This proposition was so fair that Cavour was forced to accept it. The Sardinian acquiescence was dispatched from Turin on April 18, and it only remained to secure the approval of Austria. But Austria, hopeless of peace and goaded to rage by the insolence of her petty foe, solved all Cavour's difficulties by dispatching an ultimatum to Turin. On April 23 the Austrian ambassador delivered to Cavour the message of Count Buol, that unless Sardinia should disarm within three days, the Austrian government would enforce its demands by force of arms. There could be only one response to this. Everything was as Cavour wished it. He still appeared to Europe to be standing purely on the defensive.

The enthusiasm with which the declaration of war was hailed was not confined to Sardinia alone. While the well-disciplined strength of that state was being rapidly massed, thousands of volunteers from all parts of Italy poured into Piedmont to offer their aid to "Il Ré Galantuomo." In fact, the force that Victor Emmanuel led to the field might properly be designated as an Italian army. His proclamation was addressed to the nation. "People of Italy," he exclaimed, "Austria assails Piedmont because I have maintained the cause of our common country in the councils of Europe, because I was not insensible to your cries of anguish. Thus she violently breaks now the treaties which she never has respected. . . . I fight for the right of the whole nation. We confide in God and in our concord; we confide in the valor of the Italian soldiers, in the alliance of the noble French nation; we confide in the justice of public opinion. I have no other ambition than to be the first soldier of Italian independence. Viva l' Italia!"

The excitement in Paris was hardly less intense, though scarcely of so sacred a character as that which animated the Sardinian capital. Immediately upon the declaration of war by Austria, the emperor issued his manifesto to his people. "Austria, by ordering the entry of her armies into the territory of the king of Sardinia our ally, declares war against us; setting at nought treaties and justice, and menacing our frontiers. All the great powers have protested against this aggression. Since Piedmont has accepted every condition proposed for the preservation of peace, we may naturally ask, What inducement can have led to this sudden invasion? It is simply this: Austria has pushed matters to such an extremity that either her

dominion must extend to the Alps, or Italy must be free to the Adriatic. . . . Courage, then, and concord. The world shall see yet again that our country has not degenerated. Providence will bless our efforts, for the cause must be holy in the sight of Heaven which rests on justice, humanity, love of country, and of independence."

It was not the moral side of the question that inspired the throngs on the boulevards and made the streets ring with their plaudits as the emperor passed along. It was rather the romantic glory attaching to another contest with Austria on the classic fields of Bonaparte's great victories. Paris was gay in the pomp and music of departing battalions. It pleased the martial spirit of France to hear that the imperial eagles were again climbing the Alps and glittering on the sunny Italian plains. It was not for the excited populace crying "Vive l'empereur" and "Vive la guerre" to know at that time how slowly and lamely mobilization progressed, and how unprepared after all the emperor was for a trying war. On May 10, the day the emperor left Paris for the army, he was to all appearances at the zenith of popularity and power.

The war manifesto of the emperor of Austria had been issued on April 28, defending the course of his government and regretting the necessity that compelled him to order his armies over the Sardinian frontier. The war was not popular in Austria, as it was in France and Piedmont. Austria was too complex internally, with too much discontent at the core, to display great enthusiasm at this time. The hatred of France was the one influence that lent popularity to the Kaiser's project, and in Munich, on their way to

the front, the Austrian troops were hailed as the executioners of the hated Napoleon.

The three armies converged steadily toward the theatre of carnage, accompanied by their respective sovereigns, each relying on the justice of his cause and the blessing of Heaven upon his arms.

CHAPTER XI.

THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1859. — GENOA TO MILAN.


ROMANTIC CHARACTER OF THE THEATRE OF WAR. — UNPREPAREDNESS OF THE FRENCH ARMY. — ITS ORDER OF BATTLE. — ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION OF THE FRENCH TROOPS AT GENOA. — ARRIVAL OF THE EMPEROR AT GENOA. — THE AUSTRIAN GENERALISSIMO AND HIS CAREER. — HIS TIMID TACTICS. — COMBAT AT MONTEBELLO. — THE EMPEROR VISITS THE FIELD. — THE EMPEROR PLANS A FLANK MARCH. — GYULAI DECEIVED. — BATTLES OF PALESTRO. — ACTION AT TURBIGO. — SUCCESS OF THE FLANK MARCH. — THE EMPEROR'S ORDERS FOR JUNE 3D. — POSITION OF THE TWO ARMIES AT NOON ON THE 4TH. — BATTLE OF MAGENTA. — THE FRENCH GUARD ON THE NAVIGLIO GRANDE. — ANXIETY OF THE EMPEROR. — CRITICAL CONDITION OF THE GUARD. — ARRIVAL OF CANROBERT AND NIEL. — MACMAHON CARRIES MAGENTA. — DEATH OF ESPINASSE. — RÉSUMÉ OF THE BATTLE.


THE campaign of 1859 in Italy, as the meeting of the first military powers of Europe, was regarded with supreme interest. The peculiar nature of the French emperor's *casus belli*, and the historic country in which the scenes were to be enacted, added a tinge of romance to the picture. It was as if the days of Marengo and Rivoli had returned, to read of "Napoleon in Italy" battling with the hosts of Austria. Moreover, despite the two sanguinary battles that characterized it, the Italian campaign had more of pageantry than is common in modern days of scientific warfare.

The story must be told to-day in a manner less eulogistic to French generalship, than characterized the works based on official data which appeared be-

THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY, 1859.

THE COUNTRY FROM ALESSANDRIA TO MILAN.





Struthers & Co., Eng'rs N. Y.

fore the disasters of Sedan and Metz laid bare the defects of the imperial military establishment. Indeed, the Emperor of the French, although he had officially announced to the Vienna cabinet that he should regard the passage of the Ticino by an Austrian army as an act of hostility, found himself at a disadvantage upon the acceptance of his gauge. Great confusion attended the mobilization of the army, and matters were especially deplorable in everything pertaining to its equipment. The supply of horses, tents, ammunition, and shoes was found to be insufficient, while the majority of the battalions went to the front with thin ranks.

Upon issuing his manifesto of war, the emperor declared his intention of taking the field at the head of the Imperial Guard and directing in person the operations of his army. The five corps of the army were commanded as follows : 1st corps, Marshal Baraguey d'Hilliers ; 2d corps, General MacMahon ; 3d corps, Marshal Canrobert ; 4th corps, General Niel ; 5th corps, Prince Napoleon. All these officers had earned more or less distinction in the Crimean campaign. Baraguey d'Hilliers had won his baton in the Baltic expedition. Canrobert had commanded the army for several months, and Niel had officiated at his headquarters as the emperor's mouthpiece. Prince Napoleon commanded a division at the Alma, while it was MacMahon's division that bore the brunt of the fighting at the taking of the Malakoff. Many of the divisional commanders, too, had won laurels on the same field of action. While the 1st, 2d, and 5th corps embarked at Toulon, Marseilles, and Algeria for Genoa, the 3d and 4th passed the Alps by Mont Cenis into Piedmont. There was a grand scramble to

attain the battle-ground, as the Sardinian army was supposed to stand in jeopardy from the overwhelming strength of its foe.

On April 26 the eager watchers on the ramparts of Genoa descried on the horizon the first French transport. A few hours later General Bazaine landed on the quay, and the troops began to disembark. The excitement of the Genoese knew no bounds, and they swarmed about the soldiers with the most extravagant expressions of joy and welcome. Day after day, as the booming cannon announced the arrival of reinforcements and the chasseurs and zouaves went swinging through the streets to their camps, the enthusiasm grew in intensity. Citizens walked the streets arm in arm with the red-trousered soldiery, while in the *Acqua Sola* and public promenades, the Genoese ladies in spotless white did not shrink from the society of the jaunty officers of the empire. The enthusiasm culminated on May 12, when the emperor himself arrived in the imperial yacht. As he looked about upon the sea of glad faces that surrounded him, and heard the shouts of "*Viva Napoleone*," he must have felt that here at least was true sincerity: not the fawning of the fickle Paris mob, but the demonstration of a grateful people. Upon landing, the emperor found fresh proofs of the popular joy. The streets were strewn with flowers, and the house fronts were ablaze with the intertwined colors of France and Sardinia. As night deepened, the city became transformed. Every window seemed illuminated, from the poorest hovels to the stately palaces that in other days rendered Genoa truly "*the superb*." From the sea the appearance of the terraced city was brilliant in the extreme, while the colored illumina-

tions on the shipping were reflected in the placid mirror of the harbor. The emperor left Genoa on the 14th, proceeding to Alessandria, in the vicinity of which his army was massing.

Meanwhile the Austrian commander had utterly neglected to make use of his splendid opportunities. For weeks previous to the final rupture he had been steadily massing his troops in Lombardy, until in the last week of April he was able to cross the Ticino at the head of five *corps d'armée*. What Count Gyulai had achieved to merit his distinction as general of the Kaiser's forces, it is difficult to determine. He won some credit as governor of Trieste in 1848 and as minister of war for a few months previous to 1850. After that he reappeared in Italy as a corps commander under Radetsky, and upon the death of that distinguished general he was appointed to command the army in Lombardy. With little reputation as a soldier, at sixty years of age he found himself in command of the army advancing on Turin. Had he been to any degree energetic, he might easily have overthrown or masked the Piedmontese army, and by the close of the month been thundering at the gates of Turin. He advanced timidly, however. The absence of foes seemed to alarm him as much as their presence could have done. He became possessed with the idea that his wily antagonists were preparing some trap for the engulfing of his devoted battalions. After occupying Novara and Vercelli he came to a halt; and while he deliberated upon the situation, the head of Canrobert's corps entered Turin. The first point in the game was lost to the Kaiser.

On the 19th of May Gyulai withdrew his headquarters to Garlasco. The king of Sardinia was at

Occimiano, the French emperor at Alessandria. The five Austrian corps held a line from Mortara to Stradella, the Sardinians being massed about Casale and the French between Voghera and Alessandria. Gyulai interpreted the presence of the French in such force about Voghera as an evidence of their intention to attempt the passage of the Po somewhere south of Pavia. In order to better assure himself on this point, he determined to push a reconnoissance against Voghera to test the French strength. On May 20 he dispatched five Austrian brigades under Count Stadion upon this service. Stadion moved in three columns converging toward Voghera.

General Forey's division of the 1st corps was holding Voghera, supported by three regiments of Piedmontese cavalry, and his outposts were in Casteggio and the adjacent villages. The advancing Austrians drove the French from Casteggio through Montebello and Genestrello with slight loss. Forey, with only two brigades at his disposal, would have been justified in declining battle and in standing on the defensive at Voghera. He was little inclined, however, to miss the possibility of winning the first success of the war, and in consequence, what had been intended by the Austrian commander as a mere reconnoissance soon developed into a warm engagement. While General Blanchard's brigade operated against the Austrians on the north of the Montebello road, Forey threw Beuret's brigade against Genestrello. The village was carried at the point of the bayonet, the Austrians falling back in some confusion upon Montebello. The contest for the possession of this village was stubborn and protracted. Driven from the streets after hot bayonet-work, the Austrians made a last stand in the

cemetery on some rising ground just outside the village. General Beuret was killed at this point, and his troops were roughly handled. The position was finally carried, however, and the Austrians retired in good order upon Casteggio.

The whole contest, known to the French as the battle of Montebello, was a furious, disorderly scrimmage from the moment that Beuret first pointed his men to Genestrello. There was no system or cohesion either in the attack or defense. Stadion was completely demoralized and glad to retire unmolested. He had mismanaged throughout. He failed to utilize his strong right against Blanchard's brigade, and left Urban's division to bear the brunt of the fighting at Genestrello and Montebello, while a brigade at Casteggio and one at Casatisma remained inactive throughout the day.

The following day the emperor visited the battlefield. He gazed upon the stricken country, upon wheatfields torn and trodden by horses and cannon-wheels, upon dismantled Montebello with its shot-scarred church and wreath of fire-withered vines, and upon dead men lying as they fell, the blue and crimson of his chasseurs thickly interspersed with the white livery of the Hapsburgs. Finally he congratulated Forey, embraced him, and returned to Alessandria.

Gyulai was confirmed in his belief that the French were heading for Piacenza, and would cross the Po south of Pavia. Napoleon, knowing this, determined to profit by it. He decided to execute a long march to the north, carrying his army *via* Casale and Vercelli to Novara, and, crossing the Ticino near the latter place, turn the Austrian right and place them at

a disadvantage for the defense of Milan. On May 27 his orders to this effect were issued, and on the following day the various corps were on the move. The possession of the railway between Alessandria and Novara proved a great advantage in this enterprise. The unsuspecting Gyulai still maintained his strength between Mortara and Stradella, with his headquarters at Garlasco. On the 30th occurred the battle of Palestro, brought on by an advance of the Piedmontese army eastward from Vercelli. With the approval of the emperor the move was made against the Austrian posts at Casalino, Vinzaglio, and Palestro. Lilia's division of the Austrian 7th corps was opposed by the three Piedmontese divisions of Cialdini, Durando, and Fanti. The former dislodged the Austrians from Palestro after a sharp conflict, while his colleagues gained equal success with less difficulty. On the day following, General Zobel, commander of the Austrian 7th corps, came up with Jellacich's division of the 2d corps to assist in recovering the lost ground. The result was some heavy fighting about Palestro, though the Austrians scarcely had a chance of success against the overwhelming numbers that opposed them. Szabo's brigade of Jellacich's division made a desperate effort to seize the river bridges and cut off the Sardinians from their supports. They advanced as far as the bridge of La Bridda, and here the contest became so dubious that the sword of the Sardinian king himself flashed in the smoke of the *mêlée*. At the critical moment for the Sardinians the 3d French zouave regiment was brought up to their support. Their impetuous charge carried everything before it, and Szabo was driven from all his positions. At the

same time the Austrian centre and right withdrew from before Palestro and Confienza, General Zobel having learned of the vast strength of the Sardinian supports west of the Ticino.

The battles of Palestro were the result of questionable strategy on the part of the emperor and the king of Sardinia. It was all-important to them that the Austrian commander be kept in ignorance of their northward movement, and a demonstration of force in the vicinity of Vercelli was certainly calculated to draw Austrian attention in the very direction in which it was least desired. That the two days' battle was not attended with evil results to the allies was due largely to Austrian obtuseness. It was not until the 2d of June that Gyulai learned of the presence of the French on his right, and began to hurry his troops northward. On the 3d the action took place in which MacMahon's corps crossed the Ticino at Turbigo, and wrested the village of Robecchetto from the Austrians. This aroused Gyulai to a full sense of his error, and threw the Austrian camps into a paroxysm of energetic preparation.

On the evening of the 3d the headquarters of the French emperor were at Novara. He was all in the dark regarding the numbers and whereabouts of the enemy. He was aiming for Milan, but was undecided as to the best means of reaching it. The guard was at Trecate and Turbigo, the 2d corps at Robecchetto, and the rest of the army close at hand. The Sardinian headquarters were at Galliate. The emperor finally decided upon a plan, and issued his orders accordingly on the evening of the 3d. General MacMahon with the 2d corps was to move in the morning upon Buffalora and Magenta, supported by the


light division of the Guard and the Sardinian army, which was to cross the Ticino at Turbigo. The 3d corps was to remain at Novara with the exception of Picard's brigade, which was ordered to Turbigo. The grenadier division of the Guard was to cross the Ticino at San Martino, while the 4th corps was to move from Trecate to the same place. On the morning of the 4th, however, the emperor changed his mind, and dispatched messengers to Canrobert and Picard to support the Guard at San Martino.

It was noon when the emperor reached San Martino. The engineers were repairing the stone foot and railway bridge that spanned the river at this point, two arches of which had been blown up by the Austrians. After passing the river, the next obstruction was the Naviglio Grande, the great canal that connects Milan with the Ticino and Lake Maggiore. The canal was crossed in this vicinity by four bridges — at Buffalora, at Ponte Nuovo di Magenta, Ponte Vecchio di Magenta, and at Robecco.

It was plain to the emperor that the Austrians held these villages, though he did not anticipate that they were in force. He determined to await some signal from MacMahon before advancing. It was a fair sight that his eye dwelt upon, meanwhile, from his position above the Ticino. The sun blazed forth from a cloudless sky. Before him he could trace the line of the canal by the red-roofed villages peering through their wealth of dark foliage. Beyond these, rising above the verdure that clothed the hills, was the bell tower of Magenta. On the northern and southern horizons the Alps and Apennines shone dimly through the haze, seeming to melt into the blue of the heavens.

Meanwhile the Austrian commander was entirely

BATTLEFIELD OF MAGENTA



innocent of any definite knowledge concerning his foe. Count Clam Gallas was in command about Magenta, and had at his disposal six brigades of the 1st and 2d corps. Three of these brigades were intrenched at Ponte Nuovo and in the outskirts of Buffalora; another occupied the heights on the east bank between Ponte Nuovo and Robecco. The other two held Magenta itself. In addition to these, there were two brigades of the 7th corps at Casa Cerella, while the two other brigades of the same corps and the whole of the 3d corps were at Abbiate Grasso. At ten o'clock, the hour when his sentries in the bell tower of Robecco reported the enemy in sight, Gyulai had the bulk of his army well in hand. Napoleon, on the other hand, was at San Martino with a single division, never imagining the magnitude of the forces in his front. He supposed that the approach of MacMahon to Buffalora would compel the retirement of the Austrians from all their positions on the canal north of the railway. About two o'clock the grumbling of artillery toward the north told him that MacMahon was at hand. He determined to accelerate the movements of the Austrians before him, and ordered an advance upon their positions at Buffalora, Ponte Vecchio, and Ponte Nuovo.

The Austrians blew up the bridge at the former place upon the approach of the French, but at Ponte Nuovo they were driven across the canal and from all their defenses on the other bank. They were utterly demoralized by the fury of the French assault. One of the brigades that came up from Magenta to their support was carried away in the general rout. Kinzel's brigade abandoned its positions about Ponte Vecchio, and fell back toward Robecco. The brigade

at Buffalora was completely isolated. The panic extended to Magenta itself, where the streets became blocked by supply-wagons, artillery, and fugitive soldiers.

This was the first stage of the battle, but the advantage gained by the French was too great to be maintained by so small a force. The Austrian General Reischach came up at the head of two brigades from Casa Cerella, and rallying a few of the broken battalions on the way, fell fiercely upon the French at the bridges. The tide of battle was turned in a twinkling, and it was plain that if left unsupported the Guard must be wholly overthrown at this point. The emperor from his post in front of the Ticino contemplated the struggle with a stolid countenance. To requests for supports he could only reply that he had none to send. He betrayed his anxiety to his staff by his frequent interrogations as to the whereabouts of Canrobert and MacMahon. Canrobert had not been signaled, and MacMahon's artillery had become silent. All eyes were turned toward Buffalora, but in vain. If MacMahon was beaten, what was to become of the Guard? Perhaps the doubt flitted through the mind of the emperor as to MacMahon's loyalty. It was the price of his throne that he must always suspect his servants. He looked to the south and there, as if he had not foes enough in front, the head of the Austrian 3d corps could be descried advancing from Robecco between the canal and the Ticino. The emperor seemed dazed and bewildered. It was at this crisis, at about 3.30, that Picard's brigade arrived, having come in hot haste through the fields and over crowded roads from Turbigo, inspired by the urgent messages of the emperor and the dis-

tant roar of the battle. Picard threw his brigade into action between Ponte Vecchio and Ponte Nuovo, and for a time the Austrian advance was checked. It was not long, however, before the Austrian 3d corps began to develop its strength against Ponte Vecchio. The French were beaten back, though fiercely contesting every inch of ground. Another crisis arrived.

It was five o'clock. Marshal Canrobert appeared at San Martino and reported the head of Niel's column close at hand. Half an hour later and the bridge of the Ticino was resounding to the hurried tramp of the long expected battalions. It was Vinoy's division. General Niel rode up to the emperor, who had no order to give, and Vinoy pushed on to the bridges without a halt. The troops continued to defile past the emperor, and his aides reported the long delayed flood of reinforcements as flowing in a steady stream over the Novara road. Better than all, the air began to throb again to the music of artillery on the north, telling the staff that MacMahon was not beaten, and the emperor that after all he was true.

At six o'clock Canrobert's corps was also arriving, and it was plain to every one save the emperor that the Austrian resistance was weakening. Threatened by MacMahon on the north, they slowly retired from their positions on the canal. The Austrian 5th corps had arrived at Robecco, all ignorant of the state of the contest. They advanced slowly up the west bank of the canal until, finding their path illuminated only by the flashing of the French artillery, they halted for orders. Darkness put an end to the battle, and as it settled down upon the country the French emperor

was still in his old place, his anxiety unallayed, peering through the darkening air toward Magenta, and glancing ever and anon at the fresh regiments as they poured on to the already crowded banks of the canal. When the firing finally died away he was fearful as to how matters had terminated. Where was MacMahon? More important still, where were the Austrians? The uncertainty on these points oppressed his mind, and he could glean no intelligence from his staff. He returned to San Martino, and in a room dimly lighted by a smoky candle paced restlessly up and down. He dispatched an orderly toward Magenta to learn if possible MacMahon's whereabouts. After a weary period of anxiety the messenger returned. He reported that MacMahon had won a great victory, and that Magenta was in his possession. The emperor breathed freely again and lay down to rest.

The movements of MacMahon decided the fate of the day. To incumber the roads as little as possible, he had divided his columns in the morning, sending the division of General Espinasse by a circuitous route on the left. MacMahon, with the division of General Motterouge, advanced rapidly, and about two o'clock engaged the Austrians before Buffalora. This was the cannonading that first attracted the notice of the emperor at San Martino. In his haste, however, MacMahon had advanced regardless of his other divisions. A brief survey convinced him that the Austrians were in great force before him. Fearing to involve his single division too deeply, he fell back and effected a junction with Camou's division of the Guard. He realized how the cessation of his cannonade might be misconstrued by the emperor, and waited impatiently for the approach of Espinasse.

Finally in a paroxysm of anxiety, escorted only by a platoon of horse, he galloped across country to Marcallo, where he found Espinasse and urged upon him the necessity of haste. At five o'clock, with his line of battle extending from Bernate to Marcallo and guiding on the bell tower of Magenta still visible through a screen of smoke, MacMahon began his advance. The Austrians had evacuated Buffalora, and the advance of Motterouge's division found the French Guards already in possession. Prince Liechtenstein, who commanded the Austrians on the north of Magenta, had only a few battalions, already disheartened by hard knocks received at other points. A brigade from Buffalora, in attempting to execute its orders to occupy Marcallo, was taken on the flank by Espinasse and routed. Two fresh brigades at Corbetta remained inactive on account of conflicting orders. As a result the French advanced rapidly. While their artillery swept the plain before Magenta, the infantry closed in upon the village, carried the line of the railway, and turned the station into a slaughter-pen. The brave survivors of the broken Austrian brigades barricaded the streets of the village, converting every house into a fortress from which the Tyrolese riflemen fired with unerring aim. Enraged at the murderous opposition encountered by his troops, General Espinasse threw himself at the head of the 2d zouave regiment and led them to the charge. He fell mortally wounded, but his example electrified the men. In the dubious light they cut their way through the streets and coöperated with the column of General Motterouge in the storming of the cemetery. With Magenta thoroughly in his possession, MacMahon arrested the battle at dark.

The battle of Magenta consisted of two distinct battles, for the emperor at San Martino and MacMahon on the north did not communicate from morning until after the fighting was over. The Emperor of the French did nothing to merit approbation. He did not plunge into the smoke, sword in hand, as at one time the world was led to believe, but with muddled brain and brooding dread watched from a distance the varying fortune of the day.

Gyulai comprehended little more of the contest than the emperor. In fact, on the evening of the battle, from his headquarters at Robecco he issued orders for a renewal of the combat to brigades that did not exist, or were scattered over the fields and roads toward Milan. He failed to appreciate the fact that a large portion of the army had been routed, until informed by Clam Gallas that the execution of his orders was an impossibility.

The French soldiers carried away the honors of Magenta. The conduct of the Guard and the few regiments that bore with them the burden of the day shed new lustre upon the military glory of France. That the Austrians, though numerically superior, showed to such poor advantage at many points was due largely to the fact that their battalions were weighted by Italian blood. One brigade composed exclusively of Italian subjects of the Kaiser broke at the first fire. In this war the Italians fought well only under the standard of Italy.

CHAPTER XII.

THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1859. — SOLFERINO AND VILLAFRANCA.

ENTRY OF THE FRENCH ARMY INTO MILAN. — THE TE DEUM. — FIGHTING AT MELEGNANO. — GYULAI RETREATS UPON VERONA. — THE EMPEROR ADVANCES FROM MILAN. — IGNORANCE OF EACH COMMANDER AS TO THE PLANS OF THE OTHER. — THE AUSTRIAN ARMY HARASSED BY CONFLICTING ORDERS. — IT OCCUPIES THE HEIGHTS OF SOLFERINO ON JUNE 23. — ADVANCE OF THE FRENCH ARMY ON THE 24TH. — COMMENCEMENT OF THE BATTLE OF SOLFERINO. — REPULSE OF THE SARDINIANS. — THE EMPEROR ARRIVES ON THE FIELD. — HEAVY FIGHTING AT SOLFERINO AND ON THE FRENCH RIGHT. — THE LETHARGY OF CANROBERT. — SOLFERINO OUTFLANKED AND ABANDONED BY THE AUSTRIANS. — FAILURE OF WIMPFEN TO RETRIEVE THE DAY ON THE AUSTRIAN LEFT. — CANROBERT ARRIVES. — GENERAL ADVANCE OF THE FRENCH. — THE EMPEROR AT CAVRIANA. — FIRMNESS OF GENERAL BENEDEK. — THE FRENCH ADVANCE RENEWED JULY 1. — THE ARMISTICE AND CONFERENCE AT VILLAFRANCA. — RAGE OF CAVOUR. — HIS UNDIGNIFIED CONDUCT. — WHY THE MONARCHS MADE PEACE.


THE battle of Magenta compelled the abandonment of Milan by the Austrians. The emperor did not appreciate the full extent of the victory until the 6th, when he met at Magenta the deputation representing the municipality of Milan, who came to offer the crown of Lombardy to the Sardinian king. They reported the city evacuated by the Austrians and awaiting with open arms the arrival of its liberators. The emperor became jubilant. He congratulated the army, and acknowledged the heroism of the Guard

by conferring the rank of marshal upon its commander. As for MacMahon, he not only received the marshal's bâton, but was hailed as the conqueror of the day and created Duke of Magenta.

That night MacMahon's corps bivouacked on the Milan road, with orders to enter the city next day. Consequently at nine o'clock on the morning of the 7th, with bands playing and flags flying, the first French troops passed into the ancient capital of Lombardy. The reception tendered them by the Milanese surpassed the April scenes at Genoa. A little girl offered the marshal a bouquet of flowers, and was lifted to his saddle, where she rode at the head of the column.¹ The long pent-up feelings of the populace broke forth into cheers and the wildest demonstrations of joy. Men and women saw through their tears the foreign soldiers bronzed by Italian suns and begrimed with the smoke of Austrian cannon. The men who had carried Magenta under a tempest of bullets traversed the streets of Milan under a rain of flowers. All through the day the excitement in the city increased. In the public squares the military bands played patriotic airs long prohibited by the Austrian government.

Next morning before light MacMahon was again on the march southward, while the head of the 1st corps entered the city, bound in the same direction in execution of the imperial orders to "intercept the Austrian army retiring by Binasco and Landriano on Lodi." The emperor and king of Sardinia arrived in the city at early dawn with a small escort. They were soon recognized, and once again the emperor saw

¹ This incident is alluded to by Mrs. Browning in her poem, *Napoleon III. in Italy*.



in the happy faces that pressed about his cavalcade, and heard in the shouts that burst from thousands of throats, an evidence of popular enthusiasm and gratitude. The day following both sovereigns attended service in the cathedral. The tinted rays that fell across the misty nave glanced upon a profusion of military and priestly splendor, as the two monarchs bowed before the altar with its candles gleaming dimly through the smoke of burning incense. In the afternoon appeared the proclamation of the king, accepting the union of Lombardy with his kingdom, and that of the emperor addressed to Italians, urging them to "be nothing to-day but soldiers, to-morrow you will be free citizens of a great country."

The final feature of these four days of jubilation, the happiest perhaps that Milan had known for centuries, was the performance at the theatre of La Scala. The auditorium was ablaze with the colors of France and Sardinia, gay with rich toilets and brilliant uniforms, while the two monarchs were cheered to the echo. All the officers of the liberating army were not so agreeably entertained during these days as the patrons of La Scala, and at the hour when the brilliant audience was assembling, the ambulances from Melegnano were rumbling through the streets.

Marshal Baraguey d'Hilliers, after leaving Milan on the morning of the 8th, had received information from the emperor that the Austrians were at Melegnano. The same messenger brought the order for him to assume command of the 2d and 4th corps and dislodge them from that place. The 2d corps was directed to pass east of Melegnano and cut off the Austrian retreat on Lodi. The 4th corps was moving southeast from Corsico. The marshal, with

Bazaine's division of his corps, followed the highway from Milan to Melegnano, with Ladmirault's division traversing the villages on his left, and Forey those on his right. These dispositions, employing so large a force, seemed to portend a heavy battle. They were, however, merely the result of the ignorance of the French headquarters concerning the position of the Austrians. Three *corps d'armée* were moving upon Melegnano defended by a single brigade!

The marshal pushed rapidly over the highroad, and at half past five, when he approached Melegnano, both Ladmirault and Forey were still distant. Actuated, perhaps, by the same spirit that induced Forey to risk the action of Montebello, at six o'clock he gave Bazaine orders to carry the village. The Austrians made but slight resistance in the outskirts, but defended the streets and houses with their usual tenacity. The French were unable to make the least progress in the face of the murderous fusilades they encountered. But the appearance of Ladmirault's division soon convinced the Austrian General Berger of the uselessness of a longer defense, and he gave orders for the retreat. Great confusion attended this movement, as his men were distributed in small detachments in the houses throughout the village. The French entered the streets and attacked with the bayonet. General Berger, however, transferred his brigade safely to the other side of the Lambro. Here he was joined by Boer's brigade, but upon the appearance of MacMahon's corps on the north, the whole column began its retreat upon Lodi.

This action, so far as the French were concerned, was a blunder. The Austrian commander had determined to evacuate Melegnano, and the French attack

only hastened his movements by a few useless hours. The capture of Berger's brigade was all that could have justified the action, and this was prevented by the impatience of the French commander, who allowed MacMahon no time to come up and intercept the Austrian retreat.

It was on the day of the fight at Melegnano that Gyulai had finally determined to fall back upon the army which was being concentrated at Verona under the eye of the Kaiser. Reduced in numbers, with the *morale* of his troops seriously affected by successive defeats, Gyulai was not inclined to risk another battle. He argued that every step in retreat would raise the spirit of his soldiers, as it brought them nearer to the impregnable Quadrilateral and the imperial army at Verona.

Meanwhile the French emperor had determined in the future to avoid such dangers as he had encountered at Magenta, by keeping his army well together. How to move an army of 160,000 men in one mass was a serious problem to the commissary department. It would be necessary to keep open rapid communication with a distant base of supplies. The Po was dominated by the Austrians, and there was no alternative for the French but to hug the railway from Milan to Venice in their advance. The engineers were soon at work repairing the numerous breaks in the line, the troops were all recalled to the vicinity of Milan, and on the 11th the advance was recommenced. The Sardinian army moved on the left of the French and advanced with imprudent zeal. On the 14th Victor Emmanuel had carried his headquarters to Brescia, while the French were just approaching the Oglio, two days' march in the rear. This state of af-

fairs was by no means agreeable to the emperor. The isolation of the Sardinians was a grave danger to the whole army. No one knew where the Austrians were, though it was not doubted that they were retreating upon the Quadrilateral.

On the 16th news arrived from Brescia that General Garibaldi had encountered an Austrian detachment at a little village a few miles east of that place. This intelligence still further disconcerted the emperor and induced him to adopt the precaution of always advancing in line of battle. On the 18th he effected a junction with the Sardinians, establishing his headquarters at Brescia, while his forces were distributed between Brescia and Bagnolo.

On the day of the emperor's arrival at Brescia, the Austrian headquarters were at Pozzolengo. The Feldzeugmeister had brought his army in good condition to the Chiese, hoping to induce the Kaiser to take up a strong defensive position in the hills about Solferino and Cavriana south of the Lago di Garda. His scheme, however, was overruled at headquarters, where the opinion prevailed that the French would follow the Po to turn the Quadrilateral. On the 15th of June the command had passed to the Kaiser, and on the day following the army was in full retreat toward the Mincio.

The skirmish near Brescia had shaken the theory in every mind that the allies were following the Po. Could it be possible they were advancing from Milan upon the front of the Quadrilateral? If this were so, certainly there was no spot so favorable to oppose them as that which Gyulai had suggested. Orders were issued to regain the Chiese, but when they were received the troops were already approaching the


Mincio. Again the councils wavered. The old orders were renewed, and on the next day the army was crossing the Mincio. On the 19th, owing to the confusion of orders, the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 8th corps were still midway between the rivers. Count Schlik went out to assume command of these troops and conduct their retreat on the Mincio. These four corps became known as the second army, the remainder formed the first. On the 21st the whole army was in the rear of the Mincio. The headquarters of the first army were at Tormene, of the second at Valeggio. The Kaiser was at Villafranca. The idea steadily gained credence that the French were approaching the front of the Quadrilateral. Their patrols had been seen several times during the retreat, and they were reported in force at Montechiaro. On the 22d a reconnoissance was made toward Rivoltella, Castiglione, and Carpenedolo. There could be no longer any question that the whole French army was on the banks of the Chiese. It was imperative to seize at once the heights about Cavriana to withstand them. The instructions to this effect were hurriedly given, and at nine o'clock on the morning of the 23d the advance began. All that day the troops poured across the Mincio at Valeggio, Ferri, and Goito. At evening the 5th corps bivouacked on the heights about Solferino; the 1st corps at Cavriana, with one of its brigades at San Cassiano; the 8th corps at Foresto and Volta; the 3d and 9th corps at Guidizzolo, with their outposts in Medole and at Casa Morino, a farmhouse on the road to Castiglione. The 7th corps was approaching Volta, and the 11th corps was distributed along the road from Cerlungo to Goito.


From the heights of Solferino the French bivouacks

could be seen. It was determined to continue the advance the next day and take up a position in front of the hills. The 8th corps was to move upon Lonato, the 5th toward Castiglione, the 1st to Essenta with the 7th in reserve. The 9th corps on the left was to advance by Medole, and the 3d on its right toward Carpenedolo. These last two were to cross the Chiese at Bosco, their left covered by cavalry with the 2d corps in reserve.

In the mean time the French emperor had become convinced that the Austrians had passed beyond the Mincio. Even the alarming reports of his patrols on the evening of the 23d failed to convince him that anything more formidable than reconnoitring parties were in his front. In the evening the orders for the next day's march were given as usual. The Sardinian army had Pozzolengo for its destination; the French Guard, Castiglione; the 1st corps, Solferino; the 2d, Cavriana; the 3d, Medole; and the 4th Guidizzolo. A glance at the map will indicate how the plans of the rival monarchs were unconsciously bringing their hosts into collision.

The Austrians had the advantage of position in possessing that group of abrupt heights that extends southward from the Lago di Garda to the vicinity of Volta. The "rock" of Solferino, the loftiest and most precipitous of these, was clearly the key to the adjacent country. The conspicuous tower that crowned its summit, and appropriately styled "*Spia d' Italia*," commanded a view for miles in all directions, while on the west it swept to the blue horizon, the green plain diversified by canals, villages, orchards, and mulberry groves. The French emperor committed a grave error in leaving this point unoccupied.





In order to avoid the extreme heat of the day the French took up their march soon after midnight. Canrobert crossed the Chiese at Visano and advanced upon Castel-Goffredo *via* Acqua-Fredda. Niel followed the highway to Medole. MacMahon moved from Castiglione over the Mantua road. Baraguey d'Hilliers marched straight upon Solferino through the great ravines that admit the roads clambering up the heights to the town.

Canrobert approached Castel-Goffredo about seven o'clock, and after a brush with the Austrian cavalry took possession of that place. Here he was disconcerted by the receipt of a message from the emperor to the effect that an Austrian corps was reported to have left Mantua for the north on the day previous. From this he inferred that his right flank was endangered, and called a halt to await developments. Niel found Medole stubbornly defended.¹ He battered it with his artillery, and at seven o'clock carried it at the point of the bayonet. Advancing cautiously toward Guidizzolo the Austrian bivouacks were revealed.² Niel halted and deployed his divisions between Robecco and Casa Nuova on the Mantua road.

About three o'clock MacMahon from Monte Medolano had assured himself that the Austrians were in great force before him, and dispatched a messenger to the emperor with that information. He then dislodged the Austrians from the farmhouse of Casa Morino, and, deploying his divisions on the right and left of the road, awaited word from Niel before advancing.

Baraguey d'Hilliers, advancing from the northeast,

¹ Held by two battalions with two cannon.

² Bivouacks of the 3d and 9th Austrian corps.

was driving in the enemy's outposts upon Solferino. At eight o'clock he carried Le Grole.

With a view to effect an early junction with the French at Solferino, General Durando's division of the Sardinian army moved from Malocco across the hills to the chapel of Madonna delle Scoperte. Generals Mollard and Cucchiari moved southward from Rivoltella by the Strada Lugana upon Pozzolengo. Durando's vanguard, after reaching Madonna delle Scoperte, was surprised by the enemy and compelled to retreat. Their colleagues, after gaining the vicinity of Pozzolengo, were attacked by heavy Austrian columns advancing from the south and driven through San Martino to Rivoltella.

Such was the state of the battle at eight o'clock. Along a front of twelve miles the French commanders found themselves confronted by a powerful foe. The corps were acting almost independently of each other. As for the Sardinians, their repulse at Madonna delle Scoperte and the presence of the Austrians at Solferino left them completely isolated from their allies.

The messengers of MacMahon and Baraguey d'Hilliers arrived at the headquarters in Montechiaro about seven o'clock. The emperor was asleep at the time, but before an hour had elapsed his equipage was whirling into Castiglione. There he climbed the staircase of the bell tower and peered westward to the "Spia d'Italia," a silhouette against the morning sky, and southward to where the early mists had given place to white billows of battle-smoke. As to the state of the contest, however, he could gain no idea, and galloped away to MacMahon for information. He found the marshal in the alignments he had taken

up after carrying Casa Morino. He also found him reticent. "When I am assured of the coöperation of General Niel, I shall advance on Cavriana," he said. The emperor knew Niel was waiting for Canrobert. He struck the matter at the root by dispatching an order to the latter to hasten his movements on Medole, and then rode away to the 1st corps, whose progress had been checked in the ravines before Solferino.

The Austrian General Wimpffen furiously assailed Niel's corps at Guidizzolo. Beaten back from this attack, he formed another line of battle from Guidizzolo to the Val de Termine. At nine o'clock the Kaiser reached Volta, and sent orders to Wimpffen to advance toward Medole without delay, in order to relieve the tremendous pressure upon Stadion's corps at Solferino. In fact, that corps was nearly exhausted. The French batteries on the heights west of the village swept the advance positions with a murderous fire. Stadion had but two brigades of his corps to hold the French in check. One had already been demoralized by the cannonade, and the other two were in pursuit of the Sardinians, who had suffered another repulse. Just before noon the Kaiser directed the 1st corps to the aid of the 5th at Solferino, and the 7th upon San Cassiano, while he sent another message to Wimpffen, urging him again to advance, not toward Medole, but in the direction of Castiglione. Wimpffen had his hands full, however. All through the morning his two corps vainly assailed the three divisions of General Niel in line between Robecco and Casa Nuova. In the village, in the orchards, in the inclosures of farm-buildings, and in the fields, the combat was savagely maintained without advan-

tage to the Austrians. Niel watched anxiously the fortune of the day, and scanned the country on the southeast for some sign of Canrobert, who was still busily engaged at Castel-Goffredo worrying about his flank.¹ How long Niel could hold his ground unsupported was uncertain. His retreat meant the cutting in two of the French army, and in consequence its utter defeat.

In the mean time the Emperor of the French had become convinced by the reports he had received, and by the clouds of dust among the hills, that the Austrians were reinforcing their position at Solferino. He arrived at the conclusion that the battle was to be settled in that vicinity, and that delay was fatal to his cause. He sent a message to the king of Sardinia to advance immediately on Pozzolengo, while he held the light division of the Guard to assist the 1st corps. Baraguey d'Hilliers was making superhuman efforts to carry the heights of Solferino. While General Bazaine with his division attacked the village itself, Ladmirault stormed the heights on his left, and Forey the positions on Monte Alto and summits south of Solferino. Before the development of this attack the Austrians on Monte Alto had been heavily reinforced,² while a few battalions arrived in Solferino itself. Bazaine's columns advanced doggedly up the ravine, but at the entrance of the village were stag-

¹ Canrobert's action in withholding his aid during the crisis of the battle deepened the bitterness between Niel and himself that had existed since the Crimean campaign. Matters had reached such a pass in the French army even in 1859 that the generals suspected each other of being capable of actual treason in order to bring disgrace upon a rival. Canrobert's delay seems to have been induced only by that extreme caution that governed all his movements, and prevented his taking a high place among military commanders.

² By the 1st corps.

gered by the close fusillades and brought to a halt. Bazaine hurried a battery up the steep incline and opened on the village at short range, but the massive stone houses resisting well the cannonading, the battle became stationary at this point. General Ladmirault was also checked, while at Monte Alto Forey's division was beaten back in confusion. The emperor at this crisis sent forward the Guards. They rallied Forey's division, and advanced straight against the heights south of Solferino. They carried the positions. This settled the fate of Solferino, for the Austrians there, finding themselves flanked, abandoned the contest and retired from the village. The French following close, the Austrian retreat became a disorderly flight. In fact, the capture of Solferino and adjacent heights resulted in the almost complete dispersion of the 1st and 5th corps. Moreover, the 8th corps, still engaged with the Sardinians before Pozzobello, was completely isolated from the main Austrian army.

But the Austrian generals did not despair. Their line of battle was still intact from Cavriana to Guidizzolo, while the 7th and 11th corps had not yet been engaged. A strong advance upon Castiglione would compel the abandonment by the French of their conquests about Solferino. At three o'clock, however, the hopes of the Kaiser received a death-blow in this dispatch from Count Wimpffen: "I have twice taken the offensive, and have engaged my last reserves. I cannot hold out much longer, and find myself under the necessity of beating a retreat under the protection of the 11th corps. I direct the 9th toward Goito; the 3d by Cerlungo on Ferri; the 11th by Goito on Roverbella. I regret that I can report

nothing more satisfactory to your majesty." There was nothing more to be done, and the Kaiser issued orders for the general retreat.

Before this time MacMahon had thrown off his lethargy, and was advancing upon Cavriana. He expected the coöperation of Niel, but upon reaching San Cassiano found no sign of him. In conjunction with the Guard on his left he pressed rapidly on toward the heights of Cavriana. A change in the Austrian tactics prevented Niel's coöperation. Wimpffen, detecting MacMahon's advance, and seeing the road to Castiglione open, determined, despite his message to the Kaiser, to make one final effort to save the day. Niel's men were nearly exhausted by their long contest with overwhelming numbers, and the Austrians gained ground. He was even reduced to the use of cavalry to gain a brief respite for his infantry. Between four and five o'clock the vanguard of Canrobert's column passed through Medole to his aid. About the same time a furious tempest burst upon the country. The wind that prefaced it swept the dust in blinding clouds across the plains, completely obscuring the operations. The violence of the storm was enhanced by thunder and lightning, as though the elements were in sympathy with the fierce passions of wayward humanity. When the clouds broke away the air was cleared of polluting smoke, and the long slanting rays of the sun glittered on the sparkling foliage of the valley. The battle was then over, Canrobert and Niel were joined, Wimpffen was in retreat, and MacMahon was at Cavriana. Only on the extreme right were the Austrians still in line. There General Benedek with the 8th corps still confronted the baffled Sardinians, adding to a fame that

a few years later was to place him in command of the armies of his sovereign. Perhaps he hardly deserved all the credit he gained at San Martino. His defense was stubborn and skillful, and to the close of the day he worsted his antagonists. He committed the error, however, of overrating the numbers opposed to him, and refused to dispatch a portion of his forces to the defense of Solferino. Upon finding how the day had gone he began his retreat, regaining the Mincio in perfect order during the night.

The French made no pursuit. The emperor rode on to Cavriana, and established himself in the house occupied by the Kaiser in the morning. Darkness fell. The army of the second empire slept for the last time on a victorious field.¹

On the 1st of July the advance was continued. The French army passed the Mincio, and the Sardinians invested Peschiera. On the 2d the emperor's headquarters were at Valeggio, while the 1st, 2d, and 4th corps held a line from Castelnovo through Sommacampagna to Villafranca. The Guard and 3d corps were at Valeggio, the 5th corps had joined the army at Goito. It seemed plain that another battle was to be fought before Verona. On the 6th of July the emperor issued his orders for the following day with unusual minuteness. The whole army was to be under arms by daybreak. Long before light the eager battalions were awaiting the order to advance, but none came. The morning passed without event, and then early in the afternoon the tidings ran through the astonished ranks that an armistice was to be signed.

¹ This is a fact, if we disregard the petty successes of the Mexican campaign.

In fact, the French emperor had decided to make peace. He had turned to Lord Palmerston the day following the battle of Solferino, inviting his mediation on the basis of a cession of Lombardy and Parma to Sardinia. Palmerston was in favor of driving Austria from Italy, and would not lend the good offices of his government to effect any other arrangement. Determined to bring hostilities to a close, Napoleon communicated directly with the Kaiser at Verona. His note suggesting an armistice was on its way while he was busy issuing his elaborate instructions to the army on the 6th. The next day he received a favorable reply, and on the 8th an armistice was signed.

On the 11th the two monarchs met at a small house in Villafranca to discuss the preliminaries of peace. The Kaiser was inclined to peace for other reasons than that his army had been beaten in the field. He had entered the contest calm in the assurance that the Frankfort Diet would never allow him to be stripped of a foot of his Italian territory. With the mobilization of the German federal army his confidence had increased; but when the command of that army passed to the prince regent of Prussia, his feelings underwent a change. He longed to be free from his Italian difficulties, that he might devote his energies to the recovery of Austrian prestige in Germany. Of course the mediation of Prussia was not to be thought of; that might prove too costly. England was against him, and Russia had not forgiven his abandonment of her in 1854. Napoleon's note of July 6 opened to him a means of escape from his dilemma without mortifying his pride. With both monarchs of one mind, there could be no serious difficulty in

coming to an understanding. Napoleon even modified his demands from the shape in which Lord Palmerston had disapproved them. He had made no allusion to Parma, but only insisted upon the cession of Lombardy. He even compromised on this so as to leave the Austrian Quadrilateral intact. The preliminaries were signed in the afternoon. Napoleon was glad to have an end of the fighting, and Francis Joseph had come off much better than he expected.

There was nothing for the king of Sardinia but to acquiesce in these arrangements. His task was rendered doubly hard by the action of Cavour, whose judgment failed him for the first and only time in his diplomatic career. Cavour left Turin immediately upon the receipt of the news of the armistice. He hastened to the Sardinian headquarters, and in the royal presence bitterly denounced the measure, while he raved against the emperor, and urged the non-acceptance of Lombardy. The king was deeply offended, and naturally was not dissuaded from his course. He signed the preliminaries of peace, but attached the words "*pour ce qui me concerne*," merely signifying that he accepted Lombardy, but held himself unembarrassed for future events. Then he returned to his capital disgusted with the result of the campaign, and indignant with his minister. Cavour went also to Turin, his rage unabated, to resign his post. Napoleon, in better spirits than either, journeyed to Paris, and on the 15th was recreating within sound of the plashing fountain at St. Cloud.

What influenced the French emperor to abandon the Italian cause on the Mincio? Was he swerved from his purpose by the carnage of Solferino, by his dread of offending the Pope beyond reconciliation, or

by his awakening to the knowledge that he was not a general? Was he alarmed by the attitude of central Italy, that presaged a Sardinia too powerful for the safety of his southern frontier; did he mistrust the hostility of the German federal army? These questions were asked by an astonished world. The emperor's explanation, delivered to the Chambers, July 19, was as follows: "Arrived beneath the walls of Verona, the struggle was inevitably about to change its nature as well in a military as in a political aspect. Obligated to attack the enemy in front, who was intrenched behind great fortresses and protected on his flank by the neutrality of the surrounding territory, and about to begin a long and barren war, I found myself in the face of Europe in arms, ready to dispute our successes or aggravate our reverses. Nevertheless the difficulty of the enterprise would not have shaken my resolution, if the means had not been out of proportion to the results to be expected. It was necessary to crush boldly the obstacles opposed, and then to accept a conflict on the Rhine as well as on the Adige. It was necessary to fortify ourselves openly with the concurrence of revolution. It was necessary to go on shedding precious blood, and at last risk that which a sovereign should only stake for the independence of his country. If I have stopped, it was neither through weariness nor exhaustion, nor through abandoning the noble cause which I desired to serve, but for the interests of France. I felt great reluctance to put reins upon the ardor of our soldiers, to retrench from my programme the territory from the Mincio to the Adriatic, and to see vanish from honest hearts noble delusions and patriotic hopes."

If the world had not learned to doubt the sincerity

of Louis Napoleon's sayings, it would have rested content with this statement, and accepted earlier the fact that he was induced to sheathe his victorious sword by the strength of the Austrian Quadrilateral and the threatening attitude of the German federal army on the Rhine.

CHAPTER XIII.

GARIBALDI AND CAVOUR.

DISAPPOINTMENT IN ITALY AT THE SUDDEN TERMINATION OF THE WAR. — INSURRECTIONS IN CENTRAL ITALY. — DEMANDS OF THE CENTRAL ITALIANS. — ATTITUDE OF VICTOR EMMANUEL. — THE PEACE OF ZURICH. — RECONCILIATION OF CAVOUR AND VICTOR EMMANUEL. — THEIR BATTLE WITH THE PAPAL GOVERNMENT. — NAPOLEON AGREES TO A PLEBISCITE. — CENTRAL ITALY DECLARES FOR ANNEXATION TO SARDINIA. — THE FIRST ITALIAN PARLIAMENT. — CESSION OF NICE AND SAVOY. — REVOLUTION IN THE TWO SICILIES. — GARIBALDI LEAVES FOR SICILY TO HEAD THE INSURGENTS. — HIS RAPID ADVANCE. — HE CAPTURES PALERMO. — EXTRAORDINARY CHARACTER OF HIS ACHIEVEMENTS — EXCITEMENT IN TURIN. — THE POLICY OF CAVOUR. — GARIBALDI BECOMES HEADSTRONG. — HE CROSSES TO THE MAINLAND AND MARCHES UPON NAPLES. — FRANCIS II. ABANDONS NAPLES. — ENTRY OF THE GARIBALDIANS. — CAVOUR'S CONCEPTION OF THE CRISIS. — SARDINIAN TROOPS ENTER PAPAL TERRITORY. — BATTLE OF CASTELFIDARDO. — THE SARDINIANS PASS THE NEAPOLITAN FRONTIER. — MEETING OF GARIBALDI AND VICTOR EMMANUEL. — THE NEAPOLITANS VOTE FOR ANNEXATION TO THE ITALIAN KINGDOM. — GARIBALDI'S HATRED OF CAVOUR. — CAVOUR'S HEALTH GIVES WAY. — HIS DEATH. — THE WORLD'S ESTIMATE OF CAVOUR.

THE statement of the French emperor that Italy must be free to the Adriatic had received a literal acceptance by the Italians, and confidence had grown to certainty as victory after victory crowned the allied arms. The news of the armistice came as a bewildering, crushing blow. It was received first with incredulity, and then with demonstrations that expressed vividly the wrath and disappointment which everywhere abounded.

Venice was in tears. For days the eyes of her citizens had been lifted to the belfry of San Marco, for from there they knew that the allied fleets were visible in the Adriatic beyond Lido. When the glad faces of the Austrian garrison betrayed the news from Villafranca, the high confidence of the Venetians gave way to a despair rendered almost paralyzing from the suddenness of the reaction.

In Piedmont and Lombardy the sympathy for Venice tempered the popular joy. Milan refused to rejoice while Venice, the companion of her long thrall-dom, still remained in chains. The French emperor, upon returning from the front, could not fail to notice the changed temper of Milan and Turin. The French colors were sparingly displayed and where all had been noisy enthusiasm a few weeks before, there was only resentful silence.

While the war was in progress great events had been taking place elsewhere in the peninsula. Ferdinand II. of Naples died, and his last moments were embittered by tidings of the battle of Montebello. His youthful successor recklessly followed in his steps, turning a deaf ear to the entreaties of his people, and spurning the invitation of Victor Emmanuel to enter the anti-Austrian alliance.

In Tuscany the people arose, demanding a constitution and an active participation by the Tuscan forces in the war. The grand duke, finding that the spirit of sedition had extended to his own guards, left Florence and fled into the arms of Austria.

In the Emilian provinces of Parma and Modena the temper of the people necessitated the flight of their rulers.

Bologna, too, broke into revolt, — Bologna the

capital of the Papal Legations, that had been held in subjection for ten years by Austrian bayonets. The imperial commander, nevertheless, held his own until the battle of Magenta necessitated his retirement upon the Quadrilateral. The Cardinal Legate, finding his holy office no longer supported by the foreign troops, also withdrew. Military and priestly oppression left Bologna together on the 12th of June.

Everywhere it was 1848 repeated. In the States of the Church general uneasiness prevailed, and would have developed into insurrection at Rome but for the restraining influences of the French garrison. The state of affairs on the Tiber was curious enough. The Pope was praying for Austrian victories, the Romans were longing for French success, and the French soldiery protected the Pope from the Romans.

In the central Italian states the popular position was strengthened by the presence of a portion of Prince Napoleon's corps, which disembarked at Leghorn and passed through Tuscany on its northward march. Provisional governments were formed in all the states, and deputations sent to Victor Emmanuel offering him their allegiance. To the representatives of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena he extended encouragement, but expressed his inability to accept their offer until after the conclusion of peace. He, however, sent commissioners in his name to administer their governments and organize their military forces for participation in the war. When the deputations from Bologna presented their petition he was forced into a delicate position. It was one thing to undertake the cause of the Tuscans and Emilians, but quite another to interfere in behalf of the subjects of

the church. Any move in favor of the people of the Legations was sure to bring down upon him the denunciations of the Vatican. Furthermore, he mistrusted that his ally, "the eldest son of the church," would not regard such a course with favor. The king, received the deputation cordially, explained his position frankly, and referred them to the emperor, who was then at Montechiaro planning the march that was to bring on the battle of Solferino. From this visit the deputation returned to Bologna with but little encouragement and somewhat crestfallen. But Cavour had the interest of the Legations deeply at heart. He understood the emperor better than his royal master, and judged him to be lukewarm in the position he had taken. He induced the king to send Massimo d'Azeglio as commissioner to conduct the temporary government at Bologna. The result, so far as the Vatican was concerned, confirmed the expectations of the king. Victor Emmanuel, his army and his people, were condemned by a papal allocution and warned to mend their impious ways, while the papal troops suppressed a rising at Perugia with unnecessary severity and shocking cruelty.

The treaty concluded at Zurich in November between the ambassadors of France, Austria, and Sardinia substantially ratified the preliminaries arranged at Villafranca. Lombardy passed to the king of Sardinia; Venetia was retained by Austria. The rulers of Modena and Parma were to be restored, the papal power again established in the Legations, while the various states of the peninsula, excepting Sardinia and the Two Sicilies, were to form a confederation under the leadership of the Pope. According to the terms of the treaty Lombardy was the only

state directly benefited by the war. The emperor, however, had promised Victor Emmanuel that he would not use force to restore the old rulers in central Italy, and that he would not allow another power to do so. Moreover, in addressing his troops at the close of the war he uttered these words: "Italy, henceforth mistress of her destinies, will only have herself to blame if she does not make regular progress in order and liberty."¹ This public statement meant something, and perhaps Napoleon was not inclined to add to the ill repute he had gained in Italy by the abandonment of his project to carry his conquering arms to the Adriatic. At all events the position of the emperor simplified matters from the Sardinian point of view, as the people of central Italy showed no inclination to resume the old régime. They maintained their position firmly and consistently, despite the decisions of the Zurich Congress, the advice of the French emperor, and the threatening attitude of Naples and Rome. Their representatives were at work in London and Paris endeavoring to arouse popular sympathy in their behalf, but the year closed without definite action, leaving the provisional governments in control. In fact, matters were simply drifting, and it seemed imperative to take some vigorous measures to terminate so abnormal a condition of affairs. Finally the project of a European congress was suggested. There was but one opinion as to who should represent Italy in such an event. The king, piqued at Cavour's course at Villafranca, was little inclined to call upon him, though he had already

¹ In conversation with Victor Emmanuel, Napoleon also let drop this portentous statement: "Now we shall see what the Italians can do unaided."

felt painfully the loss of his guiding mind. The necessity brought about a reconciliation. Cavour made the *amende honorable* and the coldness between the king and the minister was at an end. He returned to the head of affairs in January. This event was simultaneous with the removal of M. Walewski at Paris and a change in the policy of the French government. The emperor no longer advised the central Italians to accept the return of their rulers. His influence at Rome was exercised to induce the Pope to allow his subjects in the Legations to have their will.

The months of February and March were prolific in correspondence between Victor Emmanuel and the Pope. The object of the king was to persuade the Holy Father to consent to some arrangement that would satisfy the desires of his people. The tone of his letters was dignified and yet reverential. He addressed the "Most Blessed Father" as a "devoted son of the church," and invariably concluded by requesting the benediction. As for the Pope, though courteous and kindly of heart, he stood like a rock consistent with his unfailing policy of "*non possumus*." The king's note of February 6 struck the nail squarely on the head by the following proposal, "that taking into consideration the necessity of the times; the increasing force of the principle of nationality; the irresistible impulse which impels the peoples of Italy to unite and order themselves in conformity with the model adopted by all civilized nations, an impulse which I believe demands my frank and loyal concurrence, such a state of things might be established not only in the Romagna, but also in the Marches and Umbria, as would reserve to the church

its high dominion, and assure to the Supreme Pontiff a glorious post at the head of the Italian nation : while giving the people of these provinces a share in the benefits that a kingdom strong and highly national secures to the greater part of central Italy." In short, the Pope was invited to relinquish his temporal authority. The response was what might have been anticipated. The war between church and state was waxing bitter, and in the end one must suffer.

The scheme of a European congress was abandoned. With France at his back to neutralize Austria, Cavour had nothing to fear. England, too, was unmistakably friendly ; but despite the disappointment of Villafranca he was still firm in his old theory that Napoleon was the monarch whose whims must be humored. It was in pursuance of this policy that he suggested to the emperor that the central Italians be allowed to settle their fate by plebiscite. This method was to a certain extent a craze with the emperor. It was the glorious ordinance behind which he had attempted to conceal the blood that stained the boulevards during the days of his *coup d'état*. He was the last man who would lift his protest against the plebiscite, and Cavour was not surprised at the affirmative reply he received to his proposal.¹ The elections took place in March, and by an overwhelming majority the people of Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and the Legations declared for annexation to Sardinia. Austria protested, but could do no more in the face of

¹ " Let the populations vote, and when it is demonstrated that the terms of Villafranca can only be executed in contempt of those principles of popular rights from which I draw my power, I may change my mind." — Napoleon to Signor Peruzzi, the Tuscan Envoy, *Mazade*, p. 231.

England and France.¹ Naples followed the Austrian example, while almost simultaneously with the news of the elections there arrived at Turin the papal excommunication for Victor Emmanuel and his subjects.

On the 2d of April the king opened the new parliament and addressed himself to the representatives of 12,000,000 Italians. The natural enthusiasm attending the session was seriously dampened by the royal announcement that, subject to the approval of their citizens and the ratification of parliament, Nice and Savoy were to be returned to France. It was, in fact, the concluding installment of the price arranged at Plombières to be paid for the French troops in the campaign of the previous year. The king was loath to make the sacrifice, and Cavour had acquiesced only after exhausting every expedient. The emperor, meanwhile, had insisted, and with reason, upon his inability to spend the blood and treasure of his state without some tangible recompense to satisfy his people for the outlay. Furthermore, as far as Nice and Savoy were concerned, it must be admitted that in race and language they were more French than Italian.

General Garibaldi, who sat in the parliament for Nice, was especially prominent in the angry debates that followed the king's announcement. Toward Cavour, whom he held solely responsible for the transaction, he conceived a distrust and dislike that he never wholly conquered. When the transfer had been ratified he withdrew to a humble retreat in the island of Caprera, with his heart bitter against the

¹ "He [Napoleon] informed Prince Metternich at Compiègne, that if Austria crossed the Po, it would be instant war with France." — *Mazade*, p. 231.

man who had made him a stranger in his own house. But the excitement over the loss of Nice and Savoy was soon diminished by the startling intelligence which arrived of rebellion in the Neapolitan dominions. Naples was mutinous, while in Sicily, Palermo and Messina were in open revolt. Garibaldi's time had come. Leaving Caprera, he made for Piedmont, and hastily organized a band of volunteers to assist in the popular movement. On the night of May 6, with about a thousand enthusiastic spirits, he embarked from the coast near Genoa in two steamers and sailed for Sicily. Cavour in the mean time winked at this extraordinary performance. He dispatched Admiral Persano with a squadron ostensibly to intercept the expedition, but in reality "to navigate between it and the hostile Neapolitan fleet." On the 11th Garibaldi landed safely at Marsala under the sleepy guns of a Neapolitan man-of-war. On the 14th he was at Salemi, where he issued the following proclamation: "Garibaldi, commander-in-chief of the national forces in Sicily, on the invitation of the principal citizens, and on the deliberation of the free communes of the island, considering that in times of war it is necessary that the civil and military powers should be united in one person, assumes in the name of Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, the Dictatorship in Sicily." With his volunteers increased by several hundred "picciotti," as the native mountaineers were called, Garibaldi routed several Neapolitan battalions in position at Calatafimi, and a few days later had the camp-fires of his rapidly swelling host blazing on the heights above Palermo. Having by skillful manœuvring among the mountains concealed his numbers and plans from the enemy, on the night of the 26th he

led his forces to the plain, and at dawn attacked the city. After a few hours of street fighting, the Neapolitans were driven back upon the citadel and royal palace. In revenge for the defeat, the guns of the fleet and the citadel opened a destructive and indiscriminate fire upon the city. The slaughter and misery worked by this terrific bombardment were terrible beyond description. Having glutted his thirst for vengeance, the Neapolitan commander concluded an armistice with Garibaldi, and on the 6th of June evacuated all his positions and sailed from the port. In the mean time Garibaldi had been further reinforced by another detachment of recruits from the north under General Medici. On July 20 the Neapolitan General Bosco was beaten at Milazzo, and so vast had Garibaldi's prestige become that five days later, when Medici summoned Messina, it came to terms without a blow.

In the eyes of Europe a miracle had been accomplished. Was it a man or devil who in three months time, with a handful of desperadoes at his back, could overthrow trained armies, and conquer the fairest province of a great kingdom? But after all we must now admit that Garibaldi's military achievements in Sicily, however great in the results they accomplished, have been exaggerated. From the moment he landed at Marsala until he had planted the tricolored flag on the walls of Messina, he was regarded by the simple, superstitious Sicilians as a demi-god, mysterious and all-powerful. He had among his followers men whose pens were mightier than their swords, to whose romantic narrations is due the fact that the world became almost Sicilian in its judgment of him. Whether marching silently over the moonlit moun-

tains, or apart from his followers gazing down from the heights upon the twinkling lights of Palermo which gleamed in the valley, or in the glare of the day conspicuous in his scarlet shirt amid the battle-smoke of Milazzo, it was all the same. He was invested with a halo that bordered upon the supernatural.

In reality, Garibaldi had but a contemptible foe to deal with. The Neapolitan army with its imposing array on paper of 30,000 bayonets was a miserable corps of discontented mercenaries, badly distributed and poorly commanded, whose superstitious natures were overwhelmed by the prestige Garibaldi brought with him from the Alps. After the first action at Calatafimi they regarded him as the Scottish Covenanters did Claverhouse, as one who had sold himself to the devil, and against whom no bullet could prevail. Demoralized by these beliefs, and realizing that every Sicilian was their enemy, it is not surprising that Garibaldi's enthusiasts made head against them. Every retreat contributed to this demoralization, as they were harassed by the people in the villages through which they passed. After Milazzo the Neapolitan army of the south had ceased to exist. It succumbed to hard blows less than to its own inherent worthlessness. It was not destroyed, but rather fell to pieces.

Perhaps the excitement at Turin during these days was second only to that which animated the great Sicilian cities. The guns of Bomba's fleet at Palermo were no more active than the diplomatic artillery which the courts of Central Europe trained upon the government at Turin. Indeed, as has been tersely expressed, it literally "rained diplomatic notes" in the Sardinian capital. Garibaldi was a subject of

Sardinia, and the men who were overturning Bourbon rule in Sicily were volunteers from the realms of Victor Emmanuel. Cavour's position at this time was a trying, delicate, and from some points of view a questionable one. He had publicly expressed regret for Garibaldi's expedition, while privately he encouraged it. It cannot be denied that the position into which he forced Sardinia at this time was very far from one of strict neutrality or even of candor. He did not conceal, however, the fact that he would be wholly out of sympathy with any movement on the part of his government to protect the worst government in the peninsula from its just deserts. Cavour's position is revealed clearly in his note to La Farina, the Sardinian envoy at Palermo, under date of June 19, "Persano will give you all the aid he can without compromising our banner. It would be a great matter if Garibaldi could pass into Calabria. Here things do not go badly. The diplomatists do not molest us too much. Russia made a fearful hubbub ; Prussia less. The parliament has much sense. I await your letters with impatience."

Cavour's desire to see Garibaldi in Calabria was changed, a little later. La Farina was at Palermo in behalf of the Sardinian government, to induce Garibaldi to consent to the immediate annexation of Sicily to the new Italian kingdom. This Garibaldi declined to do, preferring to wait until he could lay the entire Neapolitan realm and Rome as well at the feet of Victor Emmanuel. This altered the aspect of affairs. It was evident that Garibaldi was getting headstrong. It was Cavour's constant solicitude to keep the Italian question in such a shape as to allow no foreign power a pretext for interference. Garibaldi's design

against Rome garrisoned by French troops would be almost certain to bring on foreign complications and ruin the cause of Italian unity. It was in consequence of this dread that Victor Emmanuel wrote to Garibaldi a congratulatory letter, urging him to desist from further operations and not carry the conflict into Calabria. The response, while it breathed personal devotion to the king, could not be regarded with much pleasure in official circles at Turin. It was written from Milazzo, July 27, and concluded as follows: "May your majesty therefore permit me this time to disobey. As soon as I shall have finished the task imposed upon me by the wishes of the people who groan under the tyranny of the Neapolitan Bourbon, I shall lay down my sword at your majesty's feet, and shall obey your majesty for the remainder of my lifetime." Garibaldi's followers numbered nearly 20,000 men. The Neapolitan king had been so thoroughly cowed as to proclaim his intention of establishing constitutional liberty within his realms. There was no mistaking that symptom. When a Neapolitan Bourbon proclaimed liberty, he also proclaimed the fact that his throne was in danger. It was too late, and this despairing effort of Francis II. was scarcely heeded in the whirl of events.

On August 1 the Garibaldians were massing about Faro, preparatory to crossing to the mainland. The coast opposite was guarded by Neapolitan forts, while hostile men-of-war ceaselessly patrolled the straits from Reggio to Scilla. Garibaldi was reinforced by 6,000 men, adventurers of all nationalities, who had been raised by Bertani, his agent at Genoa. Seeing that the Neapolitan vigilance was concentrated upon the troops at Faro, Garibaldi moved the fresh forces

rapidly to the south toward Taormina. On the 19th he embarked from that place, and so completely were the enemy deceived that his whole detachment landed unopposed at Melito. Pushing rapidly up the mountains, he gained the heights above Reggio, where the Neapolitan garrison were panic-stricken at finding their position turned. After some fighting the Neapolitan commander surrendered. Some of his troops joined the Garibaldians, while the rest were allowed to embark on their ships. Master now of both banks of the straits, with his numbers still further augmented by many thousand enthusiastic Calabrese, it only remained for Garibaldi to advance directly upon Naples. The excitement along his line of march was most intense. In every village where his troops appeared the same spirit was shown. The Bourbon arms upon the public buildings were torn down, and those of Savoy substituted.

At Naples itself the rioting, which had been partially suppressed, broke out afresh upon the news of Garibaldi's appearance at Reggio. When it became known that he was advancing upon the city, the populace passed fairly beyond the control of the authorities. In these early September days the king sat brooding in his palace, and the cheers for Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel were borne to his ears on every breeze that stirred the seditious air of his capital. From all quarters the tidings became more alarming. His soldiers were cowed, and in many places were attacked and routed by the national guard. From all the provinces came tidings of successful revolts. His proclamation of liberty had won him no friends. His ministry had turned against him and characterized as folly the attempt to check

Garibaldi's advance. There was no help for it. His dynasty was crumbling to pieces, and no hand was raised to save it. The recently liberated political prisoners, the beneficiaries of his eleventh hour clemency, roamed the streets, their dazed and haggard faces presenting a terrible protest against the long era of misrule. On the evening of September 6 the king embarked on a Spanish ship, and leaving his mutinous navy at anchor in the bay, quit forever those beautiful shores which his race had too long defiled. On the morning of September 7 Garibaldi was at Salerno; before night he had reached Naples, and its teeming thousands had run mad. The Neapolitan garrison of Castel Nuovo broke out, and rushing down into the streets with shouts of "Viva Garibaldi" fraternized with the people. Castel Sant' Elmo wrapped itself in the smoke of its saluting artillery and hoisted the Sardinian flag, a compliment that the Sardinian squadron in the bay acknowledged with thundering broadsides. The Neapolitan fleet went over *en masse* to Garibaldi, and by him was placed under the orders of the Sardinian admiral. The Garibaldian troops came swarming into the city, some by land and others by sea. For days the roll of drums and blare of bugles told of new arrivals. With little of military precision about them, in motley uniforms, these heroes of Milazzo and Reggio streamed along Santa Lucia and up the Toledo. Italians and foreigners, strong men and boys, they betrayed by eager faces and elastic step the enthusiasm that animated them. All Naples was out to welcome its liberators. The city, at all times a pandemonium of uproar and confusion, fairly surpassed herself during the first days of Garibaldi's occupation.

Francis II. had shut himself up in the fortress of Gaeta with the remnants of his army, holding the line of the Volturno. Garibaldi's vanguard was at Caserta, and he was pushing his forces forward with all rapidity to strike the Bourbon a final blow.

At Turin the state of unrest continued. Garibaldi's presence at Naples was attended with grave perils. Of course his designs upon Rome formed the principal danger, but his conspicuous inability as an organizer was one of scarcely less gravity. The ignorant subjects of Francis II. were not to be trusted to maintain order among themselves, and Garibaldi was not the man to enforce it. So far the conduct of Naples had been exemplary, but Mazzini was known to be at work forwarding his schemes for a great Neapolitan republic. If left to drift, this state of things might easily develop into anarchy, and anarchy meant foreign interference and the undoing of all the great results of Garibaldi's campaign. Sardinian troops had become a necessity of the situation. "If we do not arrive on the Volturno before Garibaldi arrives at Cattolica, the monarchy is lost, — Italy remains a prey to revolution." That was Cavour's conception of the crisis. There was no time to lose. There could be no difficulty in finding an excuse to enter papal territory. The inhabitants of Umbria and the Marches, who had never ceased to appeal for annexation to the new kingdom, were suppressed by an army of foreign mercenaries that the Pope had mustered beneath his banner. That native-born Italians should be held in subjection by hirelings from abroad was certainly a scandalous matter. It was in reality a worse state of things than Cavour had exposed at the Paris Congress a few years before.

Cavour had interceded in vain with the Vatican to alter its course toward its disaffected subjects. At last on September 7, the day Garibaldi entered Naples, he sent the royal ultimatum to Cardinal Antonelli at Rome. "After having applied to his majesty the king, my august sovereign, for his orders, I have the honor of signifying to your eminence that the king's troops are charged to prevent, in the name of the rights of humanity, the pontifical mercenary corps from repressing by violence the expression of the sentiments of the people of the Marches and Umbria. I have, moreover, the honor to invite your excellency, for the reasons above explained, to give immediate orders for the disbanding and dissolving of those corps, the existence of which is a menace to the peace of Italy." On the 11th the unfavorable reply of Antonelli was received, and the same day the Sardinian troops crossed the papal frontier. "Soldiers," exclaimed the king, "you enter the Marches and Umbria to restore civil order in their desolated cities, and to afford the people the opportunity of expressing their wishes. You have not to combat powerful armies, but to free unhappy Italian provinces from foreign bands of mercenaries. You go not to avenge the injuries done to me and to Italy, but to prevent the bursting forth of popular hatred and vengeance against misrule."

Every European power except England, which expressed open satisfaction, protested against this action. There was an imposing flight of ambassadors from Turin, and an ominous commotion all along the diplomatic horizon. Cavour had not moved, however, without a secret understanding with Napoleon. Francis II. issued his feeble protest from Gaeta, the Pope

hurled his excommunication at his despoilers, but with England friendly and France passive Cavour had nothing to fear. Austria was too much broken by her recent misfortunes to resist, while Russia and Prussia had no interest in the matter that would justify their passing beyond protestations. The Sardinian army advanced rapidly in two columns. General Fanti seized Perugia and Spoleto, while Cialdini on the east of the Apennines utterly destroyed the main papal army under the French general Lamoricière at Castelfidardo. Lamoricière with a few followers gained Ancona, but finding that town covered by the guns of the Sardinian fleet, he was compelled to surrender. "The pontifical mercenary corps" being a thing of the past, Cavour could turn his whole attention to Naples. He had obtained from parliament an enthusiastic permission to receive, if tendered, the allegiance of the Two Sicilies. The army was ordered across the Neapolitan frontier, and the king left for Ancona to take command.

In the mean time on October 1 Garibaldi had inflicted another severe defeat to the royal Neapolitan army on the Volturno. The Sardinian advance was wholly unimpeded. On the 26th, as the king and his staff were approaching the little village of Teano, they descried a group of horsemen moving toward them. It was Garibaldi and a squadron of his red shirts. The simple soldier rode forward, uncovered, and checking his horse beside the king exclaimed in a voice choking with emotion, "King of Italy." "I thank you," was the reply, and clasping each other's hand, the two remained silent for a minute, gazing into each other's eyes, while their followers stood apart. Then the air was rent by enthusiastic cheer-

ing which was caught up by the splendid Sardinian regiments as they went swinging by.

On November 7 the king entered Naples, and on the following day was waited upon by a deputation to announce the result of the election that Garibaldi had previously decreed. "Sire," said their spokesman, "The Neapolitan people, assembled in Comitia, by an immense majority have proclaimed you their king. Nine millions of Italians unite themselves to the other provinces governed by your majesty with so much wisdom, and verify your solemn promise that Italy must belong to Italians."

Then followed an event so sublime as to be without parallel in these times of selfish ambition. Garibaldi bade farewell to his faithful followers, and, refusing all rewards, passed again to his quiet home in Caprera. The man who for months had been attracting the attention of the world by his victories, and who without an army had won a kingdom by the sword, laid his conquest at the feet of the monarch whom he was proud to serve.

The people of Umbria and the Marches followed the lead of Naples in declaring themselves subjects of Victor Emmanuel. Except for the patrimony of St. Peter surrounding the city of Rome and the Austrian province of Venetia, Italy was united under the tricolor. While Garibaldi returned to his humble life, Cavour went to Turin to resume his labors. For years he had been staggering under the vast weight of public affairs; and now, while the darling object of his life seemed almost accomplished, he felt the burden crushing him down. All these petty states must be amalgamated into one strong nation. There were several budgets to be condensed into one, a com-

plete reorganization of the army to be effected, brigandage to be broken up, railways to be opened, ruined cities to be restored, education to be provided. Of all the states the Two Sicilies was in the most deplorable condition with the ignorant superstitions of its long-persecuted people. "Northern Italy is made," exclaimed Cavour; "there are no longer Lombards, Piedmontese, Tuscans, or Romagnols; we are all Italians, but there are still Neapolitans." On the 18th of February, 1861, the first national parliament representing the north and south met at Turin. Five days before, the last stronghold of Francis II. had capitulated, and the enthusiasm ran high. The kingdom of Italy was proclaimed, and the king confirmed as "Victor Emmanuel II., by the grace of God and the will of the nation King of Italy."

There was no mistaking the temper of the parliament in regard to Rome and Venice. Garibaldi was there with his longing for Rome and his distrust of Cavour unabated. Indeed, his fierce attacks upon the man who had bartered away Nice embittered the early days of the session. Cavour bore patiently the criticism of the fiery patriot. "I know," he said sadly, "that between me and the honorable General Garibaldi there exists a fact which divides us two like an abyss. I believed that I fulfilled a painful duty — the most painful that I ever accomplished in my life — in counseling the king, and proposing to parliament, to approve the cession of Nice and Savoy to France. By the grief that I then experienced I can understand that which the honorable General Garibaldi must have felt; and if he cannot forgive me this act, I will not bear him any grudge for it."

That a misunderstanding should exist between Ca-

vour and Garibaldi, both working for a common end, is by no means remarkable. One swept all Europe with his searching eye, and guided his policy with reference to his surroundings; the other defied Europe, and never looked beyond the point of his sword blade. For all this the enthusiastic recluse of Caprera was no more determined that Rome should be the Italian capital than was the prime minister at Turin. While he was being assailed for lukewarmness, Cavour was exhausting every resource to induce Napoleon to withdraw his troops and allow a voluntary Italian solution of the Roman question. The work was almost done. The scheme that a few years before would have provoked a smile in any diplomatic circle in Europe had been perfected almost to the capstone. But the man who had conceived the plan and carried it through its darkest days was not destined to witness its final consummation. Cavour was giving way. On May 29 he was stricken down with a violent illness. On the evening of June 5, when all hope was abandoned, the king visited his bedside. Upon hearing of the royal presence, Cavour rallied from the stupor in which he lay. "Ah, Maestà," he said with a smile, and whispered a few words of farewell. The next day the confessor was by his side. The face of the dying statesman lightened as he seized his hand, exclaiming, "Frate! Frate! A free church in a free state!" So with the battle-cry of his great administration upon his lips, Cavour passed away.

To Mazzini belongs the credit of keeping alive the spirit of patriotism; Garibaldi is entitled to the admiration of the world as the pure patriot who fired men's souls; but Cavour was greater than either, and Mazzini and Garibaldi were but humble instruments

in his magnificent plan of Italian regeneration. Moralists may quibble over his course in drenching Lombardy with French blood; churchmen will denounce his treatment of the pontifical government at Rome; but the verdict of posterity will be one of admiration for the man who, true to his great doctrines of national unity and the freedom of church and state, worked ceaselessly, unselfishly, regardless of enmity abroad and criticism at home; who healed schisms among his people, and converted foreigners into allies; who made anarchy and insubordination to serve his ends, until at last, when he laid the burden down, he bequeathed as a legacy to his countrymen a nation fair and strong.

The universal sorrow in Italy that succeeded the death of Cavour was mingled with misgiving and fear, but for all that the new nation agreed with Massimo d'Azeglio, as he wrote through his tears, "If God will, He can save Italy even without Cavour."

CHAPTER XIV.

GERMANY IN 1850. — THE ADVENT OF BISMARCK.

THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION AND THE FRANKFORT DIET. — OLD UNDERSTANDINGS AND MODERN MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA. — AUSTRIA GAINS THE ASCENDENCY IN GERMANY. — THE OLMÜTZ INCIDENT. — THE CRIMEAN WAR. — PRINCE WILLIAM BECOMES REGENT OF PRUSSIA. — CHANGE IN THE PRUSSIAN POLICY. — THE KAISER ANNOYED. — THE REGENT BECOMES WILLIAM I. OF PRUSSIA. — HIS EARLY CAREER. — HIS STRUGGLE WITH THE HOUSE OF DEPUTIES ON THE ARMY BILL. — HE CALLS BISMARCK TO THE PRESIDENCY OF THE MINISTRY. — BISMARCK'S POLITICAL CREED. — HIS VIEWS ON THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 AND THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION. — HIS EARLY OPPOSITION TO GERMAN UNITY. — HIS ADMIRATION OF AUSTRIA. — CHANGES WROUGHT IN HIS VIEWS AT FRANKFORT. — HIS CONTEMPT FOR THE DIET. — HE DISTRUSTS AUSTRIA. — WARNS HIS GOVERNMENT AGAINST AUSTRIA. — HIS COURSE AT ST. PETERSBURG AND PARIS. — FORESEES WAR WITH AUSTRIA, AND PUSHES ARMY REFORM.

THE Kaiser, Francis Joseph, returned to Schönbrunn from the seat of war to nurse his wrath against Prussia and the German states. In order to comprehend the relations existing between Prussia and Austria at this time, it is necessary to glance at the condition of Germany in 1850 and review the events that characterized the ten years succeeding.

The German confederation was the creation of the Vienna Congress of 1815. It comprised thirty-five sovereign states besides the four free cities of Frankfort, Hamburg, Lubeck, and Bremen. The plenipotentiaries of these various governments met at

Frankfort and formed the national Diet or Bund, of which Austria held the permanent presidency. The principal prerogatives of this famous body, renowned abroad for its solemnity and extreme deliberation, were those of declaring war and settling disputes between the states. One of its peculiar features was the system of voting. On ordinary questions seventeen votes were cast, one each for the eleven larger states, while the others, holding each a fractional vote, made up the remaining six. More weighty questions of constitutional importance were settled by the "Plenum" or "full Diet." In this case each state cast at least one vote, while the six large states had six votes, the next five, four votes, and the next three, two votes each. Under this system it will be seen that Austria and Prussia with three quarters of the population represented always less than one sixth of the voting strength in the Diet. This in itself was an anomaly that might have proved serious, had Austria and Prussia united ever been opposed by the voting majority. The minor states, however, never sacrificed their prudence sufficiently to tempt the wrath of their mighty patrons.

From the first there had been an understanding between the courts of Vienna and Berlin that Prussia should supervise the domestic affairs of the confederation on the condition of her supporting Austria on European questions. The temporary overthrow of the Diet in 1849 was the means of shattering this understanding and establishing a spirit of distrust between the great German powers. The friendly course pursued by Frederick William toward the national assembly, and the evident preference of the German liberals for Prussia, as opposed to Austria,

stirred the anger of the Kaiser and his ministry. To be sure the Prussian king refused the national crown, but in a manner so half-hearted as to indicate that were the experiment repeated under more auspicious circumstances, he would not be found so coy. Indeed, hardly was his refusal pronounced before he commenced to ply the courts of Saxony and Hanover for their support in measures that had imperial ends in view. Early in 1850 a parliament convened at Erfurt at his instigation to discuss national reorganization. By that time Austria had arranged her turbulent realms, and was prepared to deal with German affairs. Prince Metternich was in retirement, but the Kaiser had a bold adviser in Schwarzenberg, and one who was little inclined to follow his predecessor in his policy of non-interference in confederate affairs. In fact, the extraordinary position occupied by Prussia at this time afforded an excuse for his breaking loose from old traditions. He had no sympathy with the national assembly at Frankfort, and he was determined to frustrate Frederick William's scheme at Erfurt. "Prussia must first be abased so that she may afterwards be crushed," were his words at this time. He turned to the southern German states with proposals to restore the old federal diet, and not only succeeded there, but also enticed Saxony and Hanover to his cause. As a result, the Erfurt parliament fell to pieces. Then followed an event which effectually estranged the two great powers of Germany, and threw the controlling influence into the hands of Austria. In the electorate of Hesse the people had revolted against the oppressions of minister Hassenpflug, whose cause was immediately espoused by Schwarzenberg. The Hessians appealed to Prussia

for protection, and Frederick William asked the Chambers for an extraordinary credit to put the army on a war footing. Austria massed troops in Bohemia, and in company with Bavaria invaded Hesse. The Prussians upon this entered Cassel, and shots were even exchanged between the outposts. The great struggle for German supremacy seemed at hand. But the war cloud dissolved as suddenly as it had arisen. While Europe awaited with breathless intensity the clash of arms, the Berlin cabinet was frantically seeking some means of escape from the warlike attitude it had so hastily adopted. Enervated by a long peace, and poorly organized, the Prussian army was in no condition to take the field. "We cannot fight at all, it is impossible for us to prevent the Austrians from occupying Berlin;" such was the confession of the minister of war. Count Manteuffel hastened to meet Schwarzenberg at Olmütz, and there acceded to all Austria's demands. Hassenpflug was restored, and so was the federal Diet. War was averted, but Prussian prestige had ebbed low. By her interference in Schleswig-Holstein and the espousal of the ministerial cause in Hesse, Austria indicated unmistakably the line of conduct she intended to pursue henceforth in German affairs. The Olmütz incident was accepted as a proof of her ability to execute her will. Schwarzenberg openly pronounced against any scheme of national unity that should render the House of Hapsburg subordinate in Germany. In 1851 Austria returned to the presidency of the restored Diet amid the servile bowing and scraping of the petty princes. To all intents and purposes at this time Austria controlled Germany. She assumed there as in Italy the championship of despotism, the rulers in Modena and

Naples being no more secure of her support than the German princes. In the Diet she used her influence over the smaller states systematically to oppose and outvote Prussia. Upon nearly every question introduced the Prussian envoy found himself opposed by an overwhelming and compact opposition. The death of Schwarzenberg in 1852 produced no change in this policy, Count Buol his successor maintaining his methods with relentless energy. In Austria itself the constitution was abolished in January, 1852, the authority of the Catholic priesthood reëstablished, and Hungary throttled by an irritated military. In 1854 the attention of the Vienna cabinet was at length diverted from the prosecution of federal business by the threatening condition of affairs in the east. Prussia was thoroughly under the influence of St. Petersburg, while Austria from her geographical position was led into violent hostility to the schemes of the Czar. The majority of the small states were strongly Russian in their sympathies; and had Prussia been equal to the occasion, she might at this time have found a way out of the galling humiliation to which she had been subjected for three years back. But the memory of Olmütz was still fresh in Germany, and Austria's prestige so firm that she not only held the petty courts in check, but induced the government of Berlin to sign the treaty in which Austria and Prussia guaranteed each other their respective territories against invasion.

This event, however, marks perhaps the flood tide of Austria's influence in Germany. Under a milder régime than was enjoyed in the empire, Prussia had made rapid strides in wealth and national development. Austria, threatened from within by revolu-

tion and menaced from without by great military states, regarded with alarm the growing tendency in Prussia toward independence and disregard of the will of the majority in the Diet. After Frederick William fell ill in 1857, and the regency was undertaken by his brother William, the Austrian cabinet was brought to a knowledge that Prussia was no longer the creature of Vienna.

Prince Schwarzenberg had violated the old understanding between the governments by his policy of German interference, so auspiciously inaugurated at Olmütz. Prussia returned the compliment by proving to Schwarzenberg's successor that he could no longer reckon confidently upon the support of Berlin. The war in Italy offered Prussia a rare opportunity to emphasize her position. At first the cause of Piedmont was intensely popular among the German masses, but the interference of France turned the tide of sympathy to Austria. The old hatred of the Napoleonic dynasty was revived, and the Kaiser became the champion of Germany against French imperialism. The federal army was in a state of readiness under the command of the prince regent of Prussia, and after the first Austrian defeats there was a strong party at Berlin which advocated armed intervention in her behalf. The prince regent, however, remained inactive, and refused to move unless his claim to the command of the entire German army should be acknowledged by Austria. The Kaiser had no idea of thus tacitly admitting the supremacy of his rival in Germany. Prussia's assistance was anything but desirable except in the capacity of a vassal state. He patched up his peace with Napoleon, and hastened to cool his wrath in the shades of Schönbrunn. From

there he addressed his faithful subjects, telling them how he had been "bitterly deceived" in his reliance upon the confederation, and how his natural and "most ancient allies" had "obstinately refused to recognize the great importance of the grand question of the day." The defeats of Magenta and Solferino and the independent attitude of Prussia went far to eradicate the influence of Olmütz and restore the two great German powers to something like an equal footing in the Diet.

On the 2d of January, 1861, Frederick William of Prussia died, and the regent succeeded to the throne with the title of William I. Unlike his brother, the new king had devoted himself with enthusiasm to the career of arms. His memory went back to Blücher's campaigns, and he had entered Paris with the avenging army of that bluff old warrior. He held the command-in-chief of the Prussian army at the time of his assumption of the regency, and realized with pain and mortification its degeneration since he as a boy had won the Iron Cross in its ranks. As regent he had been engaged in one perpetual quarrel with the Prussian Diet for its reorganization. If this body represented truly the spirit of the masses, the love of peace had developed marvelously since the days of the great Frederick. The deputies declaimed against the expense of a military reorganization and ridiculed the idea of its necessity. The ministry of Prince Hohenzollern fell on this issue, and Hohenlohe formed another which continued the contest. The king dissolved one house, but the people returned another even more strongly opposed to his military reforms. Enraged by the persistent opposition he encountered, he rashly appealed to his "divine right," thereby

engendering even more bitter hostility from the liberal factions. He was determined to force the measures which he regarded as indispensable to Prussia's welfare "through or over" the Diet. The ministry, it was clear, was not strong enough for the emergency. The royal eye swept the country for "an iron man" who valued the "divine right" above the constitution. When it was known in September, 1862, that Herr von Bismarck had been recalled from Paris to the presidency of the ministry, the Diet prepared itself for a stern struggle.

Bismarck first came publicly to notice as deputy in the Prussian Diet at Berlin in 1847. Throughout that stormy period when liberalism was rampant, he mingled fearlessly in the parliamentary *mêlée* as a champion of the crown. He listened complacently to the startling announcement of Frederick William, "No power on earth shall ever succeed in moving me to transform the natural relation between sovereign and people into a conventional constitutional one; and never will I consent that a written document should be allowed to intrude between our Lord God in Heaven and this country, and to take the place of the ancient faith." Such words as these, according to Bismarck's ideas, were fitting for a king to utter. "The Prussian crown," he stated in reply to the extreme progressive party in the Diet, "must not allow itself to be thrust into the powerless position of the English crown, which seems more like a graceful and ornamental cupola of the state edifice, than its central pillar of support, as I look upon ours to be."

As for the revolutionists of 1848, Bismarck held them in the most supreme contempt. In September, 1849, he expressed himself as follows: "I am of opin-

ion that the motive principles of the year 1848 were far more of a social than a national kind ; the national movement would have been confined to a small circle of more prominent men, if the ground under our feet had not been shaken by the introduction of a social element into the movement, in consequence of which the lust of the indigent for others' goods, the envy of the less wealthy for the rich, was stirred up by false show. These passions gained ground all the more easily, the more the moral force of resistance in men's hearts was annihilated by a latitudinarianism which had long been nourished from above."

In regard to the Schleswig-Holstein question, Bismarck also expressed very decided ideas entirely at variance with those entertained by the liberal party. He expressed his regret in the Chambers "that the royal Prussian troops have been employed to uphold the revolution in Schleswig against its legitimate sovereign the king of Denmark," and later characterized this military interference as "an eminently iniquitous, frivolous, disastrous, and revolutionary enterprise."

Throughout its short career Bismarck was the uncompromising foe of the national assembly at Frankfort. Referring to the imperial honor which it tendered to Frederick William, he sarcastically observed at Erfurt in 1849, "The Frankfort crown may be very brilliant, but the gold which would give truth to its brilliancy could only be gained by melting down the Prussian crown, and I have no confidence that it could be successfully recast in the mould of that constitution." At this time he was a firm unbeliever in any scheme of German unity. He openly accused those of his colleagues who advocated it of a lack of

patriotism. "The scheme for a union annihilates the integrity of the Prussian kingdom," were his words in 1849. He denied the existence of any such desire in the Prussian people, and appealed to the army in proof of his words. "The army," he said, "cherishes no tricolored enthusiasm. It does not feel the want of a national regeneration any more than the rest of the Prussian people. It is content to be called Prussian. Its hosts follow the black and white banner, not the tricolor; under the black and white banner they gladly die for their country. . . . I never yet heard a Prussian soldier sing 'Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?' The people from whom this army is drawn, and who are most truly represented by the army, feel no desire to see their Prussian kingdom dissolved in the rotten fermentation of South German insubordination. Prussians we are, and Prussians we will remain."

Throughout his three years of service as deputy at Berlin and at Erfurt Bismarck played consistently the rôle of an uncompromising royalist. The position he adopted during these years in regard to German unity and the question of Schleswig-Holstein is rendered conspicuous in the light of his later policy.

But the most remarkable feature of Bismarck's belief at this time, the one that separated him sharply from the mass of his countrymen, was his admiration for Austria. He protested against the scheme suggested at Frankfort for her exclusion from the confederation on the ground of her not being a German power. "People avoid calling Austria a German power," he said sarcastically, "because she has the good fortune to extend her dominion over other nationalities. As far as I am concerned, I would rather

not admit that because the Slaves and Ruthenians happen to be subject to Austria, they therefore more especially represent that state, leaving the German element to play the second part. On the contrary, I look up to Austria as the representative of an ancient German power."

His admiration of the southern empire survived unabated even the ignominy of Olmütz, and in the Prussian chamber in December, 1850, we actually find him justifying the course of the Manteuffel ministry on that occasion, and making the extraordinary assertion that "Prussia ought to submit itself to Austria in order to combat in union with her a menacing democracy."

In 1851 the old Diet reassembled at Frankfort. Frederick William had been reduced to a conciliatory mood, and was willing to placate Austria and convince her that his theory of a federal German state under Prussian leadership had been finally abandoned. In this case, who so fit to represent Prussia at Frankfort as the deputy who defended Austria at Berlin and condoned her course at Olmütz?

Bismarck arrived at Frankfort in April, 1851, the regularly accredited envoy of the Prussian government to the Diet. He entered upon his duties with the same brusque energy that had characterized him at Berlin, and was not long in making his reputation a national one. Few were better known by sight to the dwellers in the federal capital than the Prussian envoy, his erect figure arrayed in a tight-fitting uniform of lieutenant of Landwehr. The life at Frankfort he found arduous and often irksome. The monotony of parliamentary strife was varied only by diplomatic journeys to Berlin or Vienna. For the

Diet he conceived the most supreme contempt. "I already know perfectly well what we shall have accomplished in one, two, or five years," he wrote during his early days in Frankfort, "and am ready to accomplish it in twenty-four hours if the others would only be sensible and straightforward for a whole day. . . . I am making tearing progress in the art of saying nothing in a great many words; I fill several pages with reports as neat and well rounded as leading articles, but if after reading them Manteuffel understands one word, his intelligence is greater than mine. Each one behaves as if he believed that the other were crammed full of ideas and plans, if he would only tell them; and meanwhile not one of us is an atom the wiser as to what will become of Germany."

As for his Austrian sympathies, a few months of the Diet thoroughly eradicated them. A short time after his arrival we find him on the parade at Frankfort with a host of official personages, admiring the evolutions of a body of the Kaiser's chosen troops. An Austrian officer approaches him and glancing at his broad chest, almost unadorned by medals, derisively inquires as to where he won his orders. The retort was ready. "All of them before the enemy here in Frankfort." And yet this was the man who had made enemies among his own countrymen by his veneration for the House of Hapsburg.

At the opening of 1853 Bismarck was defiantly opposed to the Austro-German alliance in Frankfort. Even before the expiration of the year 1851 he wrote his misgivings as follows to Berlin: "The attitude of the Vienna cabinet since Austria, having for the moment arranged her domestic affairs, has been once more enabled to meddle with German politics, shows

that on the whole Prince Schwarzenberg is not satisfied to reoccupy the position accorded to the empire by the federal constitution up to 1848, but desires to utilize the revolution (that all but ruined Austria) as a basis for the realization of far-seeing plans. . . . In any case of divergence between Austria and Prussia, as matters now stand, the majority of the federal assembly is insured to Austria."

In 1856 Bismarck saw clearer, and on April 26 wrote as follows to Manteuffel at Berlin, summing up the state of affairs in Germany. "I only desire to express my conviction that ere long we shall have to fight Austria for our very existence; it is not in our power to avert that eventuality, for the course of events in Germany can lead to no other result."

In 1859 he was recalled from Frankfort for the St. Petersburg mission. He took the opportunity to forward to Baron von Schleinitz, the foreign minister, a *résumé* of his experiences at the Diet and the conclusions he drew from them. In this document he confirms his views of 1856 by declaring: "I see in our federal alliance that Prussia has an infirmity which sooner or later we shall have to heal *ferro et igne*, unless we begin in good time to apply a remedy to it." He also mentioned in this connection certain contingencies in which he might be glad to see "the word German" exchanged "for Prussian" on the royal standard, proving that his life at Frankfort had also wrought a change in his hostility to the unification of Germany.

Bismarck went to St. Petersburg, but his mind was far from relinquishing the thoughts that had absorbed it at the Diet. He became fretful and alarmed after the opening of the Italian campaign lest Prussia

should use the federal army to support Austria. "Our policy is slipping more and more into the wake of Austria," he wrote in a private letter at this time, "and once we have fired a shot across the Rhine there will be an end of the Italo-Austrian war, and in its place a Franco-Prussian war will step on to the stage. After we have taken the burden off Austria's shoulders she will stand by us or not, as it suits her own interests." But his fears proved groundless, and doubtless he entered warmly into the general satisfaction that pervaded official circles in St. Petersburg over Austria's reverses. Furthermore, he was a warm personal friend of Prince Gortschakoff, the Russian chancellor, and perhaps in his presence he touched upon many of the points of his future policy then dimly defined. At all events, from that time until he had reached his final goal, Bismarck had a faithful friend and invaluable ally in the Russian chancellor.

Bismarck returned to Prussia in 1861, and had an interview with the king. In the spring of 1862 he was definitely transferred from St. Petersburg and sent as ambassador to Paris. His stay there was abruptly terminated after a few months by his call to the head of the ministry at Berlin. His brief sojourn on the Seine, however, he used to good advantage. The French emperor at this time was a firm believer in the "Piedmontese mission" of Prussia in Germany, and there can be no question that Bismarck gained some encouragement from his conferences at the Tuileries.

Upon his return to Berlin in the autumn, he was somewhat changed from the bluff, outspoken deputy of 1849. While still "the king's man," he was will-

ing to concede something to gain the good will of the liberals. He had a policy, however, and he would allow nothing to thwart it. It included among its main features the humiliation of Austria and the reconstruction of Germany under the leadership of Prussia. So far as external influences were concerned, he already felt secure in the neutrality of his friends on the Neva, while as for Napoleon he could always be tempted by Luxemburg or Belgium. "The policy of France is one of tips," was Bismarck's saying.¹

The one indispensable adjunct to the successful prosecution of his plans was a Prussian army of perfect discipline and invincible strength. This mighty weapon once forged and thoroughly whetted, — then "*ferro et igne*," and an end of Hapsburg domination in Germany.

¹ "La France fait une politique de pourboire."

CHAPTER XV.

THE RISE OF PRUSSIA.

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY REORGANIZATION AND ITS REORGANIZERS. — BISMARCK FORCES THE MEASURE OVER THE LOWER HOUSE. — COMMENCEMENT OF THE PRUSSO-AUSTRIAN DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN. — PRUSSIA MISUNDERSTOOD AT VIENNA. — BISMARCK EXPLAINS HER POSITION. — ALARM OF THE AUSTRIAN STATESMEN. — BISMARCK'S POLISH POLICY AND ITS RESULT. — THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION REVIVED. — STATE OF THE QUARREL. — THE CONFEDERATION INTERFERES IN BEHALF OF THE DUCHIES. — BISMARCK INVITES AUSTRIA TO INDEPENDENT ACTION. — THE TWO POWERS LAY THEIR ULTIMATUM UPON DENMARK. — FIRMNESS OF THE DANISH GOVERNMENT AND THE REASON FOR IT. — THE ALLIED ARMIES ENTER SCHLESWIG. — EVACUATION OF THE DANNEWERK BY THE DANES. — AUSTRIAN VICTORY AT OEVERSEE. — THE DANISH POSITION AT FREDERICIA AND DÜPPEL. — BOMBARDMENT OF THE DÜPPEL LINES. — DESTRUCTION OF THE DANISH ARMY AT DÜPPEL. — EVACUATION OF FREDERICIA. — THE LONDON CONFERENCE. — RENEWED FIGHTING. — THE PEACE OF VIENNA.

BISMARCK returned to Berlin to face a house of deputies whose majority judged him in the light of his performances in 1848-49. The task of army reform had already been confided to two generals, Moltke and Roon, neither of whom at that time possessed scarcely more than a local reputation. The former had witnessed but one campaign, that between the Turks and Egyptians in Syria, while as for Roon he had been even less favored, and was known principally through his writings on military geography. Nevertheless they possessed the confidence of the gov-

ernment, and according to their own devices and ideas undertook the labor of constructing that mighty engine which William I. had declared to be indispensable to the welfare of his people.

It is needless to say that Bismarck's appearance in the Diet was the signal for a resumption of bitter parliamentary strife, or to trace minutely the contest that was waged through four long years. It was the same state of things that had existed since the old king's death, save that Bismarck was a far different foe for the deputies to deal with than Hohenzollern or his successor had ever been. Indeed, the conflict resolved itself, as Bismarck himself expressed it, into "a struggle between the House of Hohenzollern and the House of Deputies for the dominion of Prussia."

Both parties accused each other of unconstitutionality. The deputies combated the crown, taking their stand on the letter of the constitution. Bismarck, on the other hand, based his action on what the constitution admitted or implied. He was continually upon his feet, asserting, as of old, the prerogatives of the crown, and fiercely declaiming to the opposition that it could not be shaken by their *liberum veto*. Finally, when the house refused to vote the necessary supplies, Bismarck unhesitatingly adopted the extreme remedy and dissolved it. New elections brought no better results. Month after month the noisy strife went on with threats of impeachment and dissolving diets, but at no time was there any sign of flagging in the activity at the war office. The barrack yards resounded with busy life, as the raw peasantry passed through the grinding-mill that was to discharge them soldiers with a perfect knowledge of the deadly

needle-gun. The army question was the one on which the crown and the deputies split, and throughout the contest it must be admitted that the crown had its way.

After all, the strife in the deputies was only interesting to Bismarck as it affected through the army his foreign policy. Within a few weeks after his assumption of office he opened his campaign against Austria. He squarely inaugurated his policy, when in January, 1863, he informed Count Karolyi, the Austrian ambassador at Berlin, that he was convinced that Prussia's "relations with Austria must unavoidably become better or worse." Karolyi refused to take so solemn a view of the state of affairs, and even ventured the belief "that both great powers would revert to their old alliance, whatever might occur, should Austria find herself engaged in a perilous war." This was placing Prussia in exactly the position that Bismarck had determined she should no longer occupy. He lost no time in assuring the Austrian ambassador that his view of the case was "a dangerous error, which, it might be, would only be cleared up at a critical moment and in a manner fraught with calamity to both cabinets." He pointed out that Austria had two courses open to her, either of persisting in her anti-Prussian policy with the support of the smaller states, or of seeking an alliance with Prussia.

The Vienna statesmen, however, could not as yet believe that Prussia had really passed beyond the possibility of another Olmütz. They failed to make due allowance for the difference in character between the late king of Prussia and William I., and moreover they were guilty with the world at large of un-

derrating and misunderstanding the first minister at Berlin. The Austrian cabinet, too, had carried its policy too far to admit of any compromise with its principal victim. At all events, Karolyi declared that "the imperial house could not possibly renounce its traditional influence upon the German governments." The position of affairs when Bismarck turned to reply was more threatening than at any time since the days preceding Olmütz. It was nothing different, to be sure, from what he had anticipated in the pursuance of his policy, and Moltke and Roon reported their portion of the contract as progressing favorably. With every word suggesting conscious power, Bismarck sarcastically observed "that the alleged traditions of the Austrian imperial house date only as far back as the Schwarzenberg epoch," and concluded by emphasizing the fact that Austria, in her treatment of Prussia, "seemed to be prompted by the assumption that Prussia was more exposed to foreign attacks than any other state, and must consequently put up with inconsiderate behavior from those states to which she had to look for support. It would therefore be the aim of the Prussian government, which had at heart the interest of its royal house and its country, to take steps to point out the error in this assumption, if its words and wishes are not regarded."

As the year 1863 drew to a close, the relations existing between the two great German powers had become very far removed from those of cordiality. Austria was irritated and alarmed at the altered policy of her northern neighbor, and longed for the old days of Schwarzenberg and Manteuffel. Bismarck felt that he had carried things so far that it was time

to test the edge of the weapon that Moltke and Roon had been preparing. As for his great European neighbors, his relations with them had been steadily improving. The revolution in Poland during the early weeks of the year had proved a lucky dispensation in his favor. His first act was to conclude a military convention with Russia in the face of the openly avowed Polish sympathies of the deputies. The plan seemed attended with scarcely any danger. If the insurgents were crushed, Prussia merely held her frontiers against the refugees; if the Russian troops were worsted, then Prussia entered Poland, subdued the insurrection, and later exacted her price. The result demonstrated the ability of Russia to deal with her own rebellions, but the gratitude of Prince Gortschakoff toward the cabinet of Berlin was fervid in its warmth. This was not all that Bismarck gained. Austria earned the redoubled hatred of Russia by her action in throwing open Galicia as a Polish recruiting ground and depot of supplies, while the Emperor of the French committed the fatal error of protesting against the Russian course in Poland. Doubtless, too, he would have gone farther, could he have persuaded England to accompany him. The results of the Polish outbreak, then, were to knit Prussia and Russia closely together, to deepen Russia's hatred for Austria, and to overturn the friendly feelings that had existed between Paris and St. Petersburg and Paris and London.

Meanwhile, in the north Frederick VII. of Denmark was busily smoothing Bismarck's path. The Danish tendency for years had been toward the amalgamation of Schleswig with its own governmental system, and Frederick VII. was led to promulgate a

new constitution incorporating Schleswig in the monarchy. The Schleswig-Holstein question was thus again forced into prominence. By far the greater part of the population of these duchies and of Lauenburg as well, were German by race and sympathy, and had never yielded themselves cheerfully to the authority of Denmark. Schleswig formed practically an integral part of the Danish kingdom, while the others were merely governed by the king as duke of Holstein and Lauenburg, in which capacity he was a member of the German confederation. It had been plain for years that nothing would satisfy the people of the duchies but complete independence of Denmark and a closer alliance with the German states. The hope had been entertained that upon the extinction of the old royal line of Denmark, an event apparently of the near future, a loophole would be opened for the accomplishment of this end. An open letter of Christian VIII. in 1846, combating this idea, engendered serious discontent, which was increased upon his death a few months later, when a new constitution was promulgated by his successor. The revolt of 1848 followed. Upon the disarming of the insurgents by Austria, the Schleswig-Holstein question was left to a conference of the powers that convened in London in 1852. The Danish claims were sustained, and it was provided in case of the failure of the ancient line of Denmark, that the duchies should fall to Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg. The other aspirant for the honor was Duke Christian of the Augustenburg line, but he was finally induced to forego his claim for a pecuniary consideration which was paid by Denmark, nor did this act call forth any public protest from his sons. The

congress came to an end, and the Schleswig-Holstein question seemed settled. The duchies relapsed into sullen silence, but bided their time.

The proclamation of Frederick VII. again aroused them from their lethargy. Their outcry found ready acknowledgment from the Frankfort Diet, but inasmuch as Schleswig was not included in the German confederation, no decisive steps could be taken in behalf of that duchy. Federal execution, however, was immediately decreed in behalf of Holstein, Hanoverian and Saxon troops entering the territory and pushing their outposts to within rifle-shot of the Danes on the Eider. To complicate matters still more, Prince Frederick of Augustenburg denounced his father's concession, and came forward to assert his claim to the dukedom of both Schleswig and Holstein. Then on November 15 Frederick VII. died, and according to the stipulations of the London treaty the prince of Glucksburg succeeded as Christian IX., king of Denmark and duke of Schleswig and Holstein. He was immediately forced by the popular will to ratify the new constitution for Denmark and Schleswig.

The long-mooted question of the duchies had thus assumed a tangled complexity without parallel in its history. Danish and German sentries glowered at each other across the ice-bound channel of the Eider. The prince of Augustenburg was at Kiel receiving the homage of his would-be subjects, and bending his gaze toward Frankfort for an acknowledgment of his right. At Copenhagen the determination was fixed to recover Holstein from the German grip; at Kiel the hope was to wrest Schleswig from Denmark. In both Copenhagen and Kiel the Frankfort government

was looked to with confidence, and the two great German powers regarded with distrust. At Kiel they argued that no good could come from an unprincipled absolutist like Bismarck Schonhausen ; at Copenhagen they believed that he might engender any amount of evil.

In the mean time Bismarck was busily at work at Berlin. Prussian aggrandizement being his aim, he thought he detected among the sleet clouds of the northern peninsula a chance for his first decisive move. At this time he had determined that the duchies so long in dispute must become the property of his royal master. Had Christian IX. withstood the pressure at Copenhagen, Bismarck might have found difficulty in so early carrying out his designs. Inasmuch as Prussia was a party to the London conference, he could hardly have raised a doubt as to the claim of Christian IX. to the dukedom over Schleswig and Holstein. But the treaty concluded at that conference also stipulated that the duchies should always remain distinct from the Danish monarchy, and the act of Christian IX. in ratifying the incorporation of Schleswig formed Bismarck's opportunity. A quarrel with the little northern power, with territorial compensation at its close, was by no means distasteful to him. It would besides form a rare chance to test the new army. Russia and France being "fixed," he cared nothing for England. Austria was his only fear, and to guarantee Prussia against her enmity he conceived the extraordinary idea of dragging her into the contest with him. He argued that Austria's presence in Denmark was preferable to leaving her to mass her strength in the Prussian rear. She would also be in a position to share the oppro-

brium which a Prussian invasion of Denmark would be sure to arouse in Europe. Inasmuch, too, as the Diet was opposed to any military interference in behalf of Schleswig, if Austria could be lured into independent action with Prussia it would almost of necessity bring about a rupture between her and the smaller states.

The Vienna cabinet fell into the Prussian trap. They dreaded a Prussian annexation of the duchies, and had a dim notion that by following Prussia into Denmark they would be able to prevent this evil. Moreover, a chance might be afforded to restore something of the lustre which the imperial eagles had lost at Magenta and Solferino.

The state of affairs in South Jutland thus brought Austria and Prussia together. The two powers which seemed on the point of engaging in a death grapple clasped hands, and turned their swords against Denmark early in 1864.

Of course Bismarck met nothing but hostility in the deputies, regarding his alliance with Austria. This fact failed to alter his course a jot, and by December his accord with the Vienna cabinet had become so well established, that both powers made a formal demand upon the Diet to insist upon the withdrawal of the new Danish constitution. The Diet refusing to comply, the powers on January 16 laid the demand upon Denmark as their ultimatum. The Copenhagen government declined to accede, and the allied troops immediately entered Holstein, the Prussians under Marshal Wrangel and Prince Frederick Charles, the Austrians under General Gablenz.

The policy adopted at Copenhagen in withstanding the demands of the German powers was dictated by

other considerations than the undoubted valor of the little Danish army. It was upon outside help that Denmark depended, upon armed assistance from Russia or England. To the former, from her friendly course in 1848-49, the Danes felt they could appeal with confidence. But Alexander II. improved this opportunity to display his gratitude to Prussia for her course in the Polish troubles, and Prince Gortschakoff was enthusiastically Prussian in his conferences with the English ambassador at St. Petersburg. The Danes naturally felt that the great northern power was cruelly unsympathetic, but they could not claim that she had betrayed them. The same cannot be said of England. To her Denmark looked confidently for aid, and with ample reason. On July 23, 1863, in reply to certain questions touching the probable course of the government in case of a Danish war, Lord Palmerston declared in the English House of Commons, "We are convinced—I am convinced at least—that if any violent attempt were made to overthrow the rights, and interfere with the independence of Denmark, those who made the attempt would find in the result that it would not be Denmark alone with which they would have to contend." This was accepted in Denmark as well as in England as a declaration of the position of the English government in case of war, nor is there any reason to suppose that at the time they were uttered these words did not voice accurately the sentiments of the cabinet. Lord John Russell, since 1862, had been busy building up Danish hopes. He advised and instructed the Danish government as to the course it should pursue; and when the Copenhagen statesmen evinced an inclination to chafe under his guidance, he brought them

back by the solemn warning that unless they complied strictly with instructions from London, they need not look to England for support. Declarations like these scarcely admitted of misinterpretation, and Denmark followed blindly the English lead.¹ When the war came Palmerston looked about for allies with whom to defend Danish rights. The English ambassador sounded the Russian chancellor sufficiently to ascertain that it was useless to proceed farther, while a proposal at the Tuileries was met by a rebuff administered in payment for the non-compliance of England in the emperor's Polish project. The English government had no idea of going to war without an ally. After publicly deploring the hostile and lukewarm attitudes of the various signers of the London treaty, the English statesmen turned their attention to domestic affairs, and left Denmark to its fate.

With Marshal Wrangel's announcement to the Danish commander that he was under orders to occupy the duchy of Schleswig, and the response of the latter that he was charged to defend the same, the war in Denmark began. The allies crossed the Eider with nearly 60,000 men, of whom 37,000 were Prussians and 23,000 Austrians. Prussia sent a division of the infantry of the Guard under General Mülbe, the 6th infantry division of the line under Manstein, and the 13th division under Wintsingerode, two cavalry brigades, and eighteen batteries of artillery. Austria sent the 6th army corps, with a brigade of cavalry and seven batteries.

¹ Evidently Bismarck did what he could to stimulate the Danish confidence in England. Count Beust states in his memoirs (vol. i. p. 242) that Bismarck admitted as much to him: "I made the cabinet of Copenhagen believe that England had threatened us with active intervention, if hostilities should be opened, although, as a matter of fact, England did nothing of the kind."

At the Danish war office there was no disposition to belittle the danger which threatened the kingdom. All hopes were pinned to the Dannewerk, where it was hoped the army would hold its ground until England, Russia, or perhaps Sweden could be induced to come to the rescue.

The Dannewerk was a chain of redoubts and forts extending across Schleswig from the head of the Schlei Fiord on the east to the village of Holingsted on the Treen. The length of this line was nearly fourteen miles, but in order to secure it against a turning movement, it was necessary to guard the shores of the Schlei, and patrol the marshy country from Holingsted to Frederickstadt. Thus the defenders of the Dannewerk were obliged to extend their vigilance along a front of nearly sixty miles. Manned by a force of 150,000 men the position might reasonably be regarded as impregnable; to attempt the defense with less would be a perilous undertaking. Neither of the three divisions of the Danish army exceeded 10,000 men on a war footing, and yet it was with this handful that the authorities at Copenhagen expected General de Meza to hold the Dannewerk against the armies of two first-rate powers.

The Danish soldiery, however, had confidence both in the Dannewerk and in themselves, and there was no lack of assurance among the strapping officers who thronged the streets and hotel cafés of Schleswig town. The king came down from Copenhagen to inspect the position, and fly the Dannebrog for a few days in the wintry blasts that howled around the turrets of Castle Gottorp. He was not long in appreciating the difficulty of the task De Meza had to perform. The frozen surface of the Schlei formed the

principal danger of the position, and a mere glance through the glasses across the bleak sea-indented country at the activity in the Prussian lines was sufficient to prove that they saw their advantage. On February 2 Canstein's Prussian brigade carried the Danish advance posts before Missunde at the narrowest point of the Schlei. On the following day Nostitz's Austrian brigade made a dash more to the west against the redoubts at Bustrup. Perhaps this latter was intended for nothing but a demonstration, but it sent the Danish bugles ringing through the frosty air all the way to Schleswig, and alarmed the king in the castle on the hill. These two days were sufficient to convince De Meza of the hopelessness of a longer stand at the Dannewerk. The cold weather had transformed the marshy country into a fair field for the operation of the allied armies. It seemed imperative that the Danish troops should be withdrawn, and placed on a narrower front.

It was toward evening on February 5 when orders were circulated for the immediate evacuation of the Dannewerk. It was a terrible humiliation to the Danish officers to abandon thus their celebrated fortress without a blow, and there were long faces and bitter words among the military devotees of Schleswig. The king had already left for the north, and to complete the misery the elements conspired against the unhappy Danes. In the midst of a driving snow-storm the retreat began. Rarely have the patience and endurance of an army been more severely tested. Horses and men tugged together at the cannon over ice-coated roads, where to stand against the gale was an arduous task. After forty-eight hours of these hardships, the Danish army began to concentrate at

Sonderburg in the Isle of Alsen, in the rear of the intrenchments of Düppel. The allies pushed the pursuit vigorously, and on the 6th the brigade Nostitz, stumbling over the slippery roads, came up with two Danish regiments near Oeversee. The contest that ensued was stubborn and sanguinary, and the Austrians could attribute their victory to their superior *élan* as well as to their overwhelming numbers.

From this time the interest in the war centred about Düppel and Fredericia. The latter town, situated at the entrance of the Little Belt, being hemmed in on three sides by the sea, presented a narrow front for land defense. It played a prominent part in the campaign of 1849, and the growth of its defensive works since that time had earned it the title of a fortress. A portion of the Danish army from the Dannewerk had continued the retreat to Fredericia, and was followed by the Prussian Guard division and the Austrian brigades Tomas and Nostitz.

The Düppel position was strong and compact. The main works, consisting of ten detached redoubts, extended across the little Sondeved peninsula along the Düppel heights, a distance of a mile and a quarter. These protected the bridge that crossed the narrow Alsen Sound to Sonderburg one mile to the east. The Danish outposts were strongly posted in Düppel village, on the hill known as the Avnbjerg, and in the forests to the west. There were other defenses nearer the bridge-head and on the Sonderburg side to cover a retreat in case the works on the heights became untenable, while the ironclad Rolf Krake patrolled the waters south of the Sondeved peninsula.

General de Meza was sacrificed to satisfy the anger that pervaded Copenhagen on account of the

abandonment of the Dannewerk, and General Gerlach succeeded to the command of 18,000 men behind the Düppel defenses. The headquarters were at Sonderburg and the troops billeted in all the neighboring villages, whence they could quickly make their way across the bridges and up the heights to where the vast wings of Düppel windmill marked the centre of the Danish position.

The Prussians settled down to a regular siege with their two infantry divisions supported by a powerful artillery, but for six weeks nothing occurred save occasional skirmishes. The Danes adhered to their defensive tactics, partly on account of their inferior numbers, and still more because they dreaded to risk their clumsy though courageous infantry against their more agile adversaries in the open field. If this latter cause prevailed less at Düppel than at Fredericia it was due to the poor esteem in which the Prussian soldiers were held. The Danes hated the Prussians and were little inclined to do them justice. Every day of inaction only increased the contempt of the Danish army for its foes. The Austrians they admitted to be worthy of their steel, but it was with confidence and gladness that the fair-haired soldiers, huddling about their fires on the windy heights, roared like true descendants of the Vikings the martial chorus, —

“Now shall we fight the Prussians again.”

In the mean time the Prussians went about their work leisurely under the eye of Prince Frederick Charles, who established his headquarters in the picturesque schloss among the beeches of Gravenstein. There was no haste, nor any anxiety displayed to raise the reputation of Prussia as a military power in Dan-

ish estimation, but as soon as the alternation of cold and thaw was superseded by milder weather and high winds that dried the soil, then activity began, and one by one the ponderous batteries were unmasked to try the range of the Danish positions. A general assault was ordered on the Danish advance posts on the Avnbjerg and in Düppel village. The Danes made a courageous stand, but numbers and modern weapons overcame them. The Avnbjerg was carried with a rush, and after a fierce battle about the church, Düppel village fell. The Danes returned pluckily to the onset, only to swell their losses. The needle-guns swept the approaches with a ceaseless leaden rain. Night fell and progress was reported at the Prussian headquarters.

Düppel taught the Danes a lesson in modern small arms. Even before that, they had learned something in regard to modern artillery. The peninsula of Broager, three miles southwest of their main position, which their engineers had deemed too distant to be of any service to an enemy, had been lined with Prussian batteries whose great guns covered Sonderburg itself. From the middle of March the Danes had no reason to complain of Prussian inactivity. Day after day the bombardment was continued. The Prussians seemed bent on destroying not only the redoubts, but every shelter beneath which the Danes could find refuge. In every direction villages and farm buildings were in flames. When the new Prussian batteries on the Avnbjerg and at Düppel churchyard opened their fire, the effect was terrific. Even at night the fire was maintained, allowing the weary Danes no opportunity to repair damages. Day after day they worked patiently at their smooth-bore guns

behind breastworks little better than rubbish, with a burning town behind them and an irresistible enemy in their front. It is no discredit to the Danish soldiers if during the last days of their defense their spirits failed them.

At last the windmill on the heights, whose wings had fanned so long the sulphurous air was shot away, an event regarded as an evil omen. The Prussians pushed their parallels close under the Danish works, and frequently the roll of the needle-guns was added to the tumult. The Danish officers, driven from the burning streets of Sonderburg, conferred at Ulkebol upon the advisability of abandoning their almost dismantled works. The conference was speedily decided by the production of orders from Copenhagen to hold the position to the last extremity. This order was fatal to the Danish army. The moral effect of the terrible cannonade had been most pronounced, and it was everywhere realized that the end was near.

On the morning of the 18th of April the Prussian infantry suddenly burst from their lines against the Danish left. It was a matter of only a few moments before the Danes were struggling down the hill under the deadly fire of the needle-guns. On the crest of the captured heights the Prussian artillery went promptly into action. Sublime confusion reigned among the Danes. The attack was unexpected, Gerlach was ill, there was no one to give orders. The whole Düppel line was abandoned, the batteries in the rear were wholly untenable, while the Rolf Krake was disabled by a shell before she had fired a gun. When night fell, the remnants of the brave Danish army were scattered through the villages and along the roads of western Alsen.

The garrison of Fredericia, discouraged by the news from Alsen, evacuated the town and withdrew into Fünen, leaving all Jutland at the mercy of the invaders.

England in the mean time had been ceaselessly bestirring herself in behalf of peace, and had invited the five powers to a conference at London. The ambassadors gathered on the Thames, and an armistice was concluded between the belligerents. Austria and Prussia demanded the establishment of the duchies under the sway of the prince of Augustenburg. Their claims were supported by the congress, and Denmark was advised to relinquish her rights over Holstein-Lauenburg and the German districts of Schleswig. To these terms the Danes refused to accede, and resorted once more to arms. What they hoped to gain by this rash step it is difficult to see, unless some dim hope yet lingered in Copenhagen of European interference. The fighting that followed was insipid in the extreme. The Austrians overran Jutland; the Prussians swarmed through Alsen. Denmark was beaten to her knees. Finally Prince John was sent to Berlin to sue for peace. Preliminaries were arranged on August 1, and finally ratified by the treaty of Vienna, October 31, according to which the king of Denmark ceded all his rights over the duchies, including the island of Alsen, to the king of Prussia and the emperor of Austria.

CHAPTER XVI.

BISMARCK *vs.* AUSTRIA.

BISMARCK'S ATTITUDE ON THE AUGUSTENBURG CLAIM. — HIS SUDDEN CHANGE OF FRONT. — MENSENDORFF'S BLUNDER. — BISMARCK ANTICIPATES WAR. — HIS REMARK AT SALZBURG. — THE CONFERENCE AT GASTEIN AND THE BARGAIN ARRANGED THERE. — BISMARCK'S OPINION OF THE CONFERENCE. — HE SOUNDS ITALY. — INTERVIEWS NAPOLEON AT BIARRITZ. — NAPOLEON'S VIEWS ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS. — HIS IDEAS RESPECTING THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA. — CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN THE ELBE DUCHIES. — BISMARCK REOPENS THE DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN AGAINST AUSTRIA. — AUSTRIA AND ITALY BEGIN TO ARM. — ATTITUDE OF THE DIET ON THE DISPUTE. — BISMARCK'S BAIT TO GERMANY. — THE PRUSSO-ITALIAN ALLIANCE. — THE PRUSSIAN ARMY MOBILIZED. — THE CLAIMS OF PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA PRESENTED IN THE FRANKFORT DIET. — PRUSSIAN TROOPS ENTER HOLSTEIN. — BISMARCK'S PROPOSITION FOR A NEW CONFEDERATION. — ITS FAILURE. — AUSTRIA MOVES THE MOBILIZATION OF THE FEDERAL ARMY AGAINST PRUSSIA. — THE MILITARY SITUATION. — THE DIET VOTES TO SUPPORT AUSTRIA. — PRUSSIA DECLARES WAR UPON THE PETTY STATES. — PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF HANOVER, HESSE-CASSEL, AND DRESDEN. — BRILLIANCY OF THE PRUSSIAN CONQUEST.

IN the London Congress Bismarck had advocated the claims of the prince of Augustenburg, and stated that Prussia and Austria were merely holding the duchies in trust for their lawful ruler. Six months later, however, we find him in the Prussian Diet opposing the claims of the Augustenburg pretender, and declaring that "his majesty the king and his majesty the emperor of Austria are the duke of Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg." This inconsistency admits of easy explanation.

Austria and Prussia at London were agreed upon the legality of the Augustenburg claims. Austria backed the prince because she aimed at the establishment of another anti-Prussian state in the confederation, with its prince under her influence. Bismarck, on the other hand, never seriously advocated the Augustenburg cause, and merely chimed in with the Austrian views so long as it suited his policy. He understood the Vienna government well enough to appreciate its designs in regard to the duchies, and on his part was determined to frustrate them.

Shortly after his return from London, when Austria and the smaller states began to clamor for the recognition of the prince of Augustenburg by the Frankfort Diet, he first showed his hand. He declared that other pretenders having arisen, he was in doubt after all of the value of Prince Frederick's claim to the duchies; indeed, the succession being so doubtful, no lawful ruler could be acknowledged save the king of Denmark. Inasmuch, however, as by the treaty of Vienna the king had ceded his rights to the German powers, the position of affairs was quite clear: "his majesty the king and his majesty the emperor of Austria are the duke of Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg."

This position adopted by Bismarck removed the question from the authority of the confederation. The endeavor of Austria, on the other hand, from the first was to make it a federal matter for the purpose, as of old, of combating her rival with the small states at her back.

It was on December 13 that Bismarck first definitely unmasked his desire at Vienna for a Prussian annexation of the duchies. Count Mensdorff imme-

diately compromised the moral and federal aspect of the Austrian cause by expressing a tacit compliance with the Prussian proposals, on condition that Austria should be compensated — by the county of Glatz, for instance. This was rejected by Bismarck, who on the 22d of February, 1865, came forward with a scheme to recognize the prince of Augustenburg, on the condition that the control of the foreign, military, postal, and commercial affairs of the duchies should be supervised by Prussia. At Vienna they saw no advantage in this scheme over that possessed by a direct annexation, and refused it. From this time on, Bismarck never entertained a shade of doubt that “iron and blood” would settle the dispute. There was a pause in the negotiations, but domestic affairs offered sufficient opportunity for the play of his energy. He had to smooth matters out considerably at home before he could proceed to greater lengths. The king himself was the principal impediment with his conscientious scruples against warring with the House of Hapsburg, for which he as a true Hohenzollern entertained a deep veneration and respect. In the summer the king went to Carlsbad, where Bismarck followed him. That the royal mind was influenced by his arguments was demonstrated by the fact that Bismarck soon reopened the discussion with Vienna by a communication more forcible than friendly.

A few days later he met the president of the Bavarian council at Salzburg, to whom he spoke glibly of an Austrian war. “Austria cannot sustain a campaign,” he declared; “a single blow will suffice, a single and great battle from the side of Silesia, to obtain satisfaction of the Hapsburg.”

The Prussian king, however, was desirous of peace,

and hastened to Gastein to confer with the emperor of Austria. Thither Bismarck was also summoned to meet Count Blome, and arrange some compromise in regard to the duchies. As a result of the conference a convention was signed on August 14, by which Prussia undertook the provisional government of Schleswig and Austria of Holstein, while both powers "reserved to themselves the common sovereignty over the duchies." Prussia gained the command of the long-coveted harbor of Kiel, purchased of Austria her right to Lauenburg, and with it of course another practical admission that the two powers had the right to dispose of their conquest as they pleased. The result of the Gastein convention was certainly a Prussian victory, and King William testified his appreciation of the fact by creating Bismarck a count in September.

A tremendous uproar was engendered in Germany by this cold-blooded bargaining. There were denunciations from all quarters, and the Prussian deputies protested with rage and horror. The Prussian policy, however, was influenced by all this no more than in the past. Prussian troops occupied Lauenburg on September 15. The Austrians withdrew into Holstein, and the Prussians into Schleswig. General Gablenz was appointed governor of Holstein and General Manteuffel governor of Schleswig.

Bismarck, at heart, had no faith in the Gastein contract as a preventive of war. He referred to it lightly as a mere "stopping of the cracks," and even while the conference was sitting he was suggesting to the Italian government an alliance against Austria. It was plain that Prussia would have to fight, not only the empire of the Hapsburgs, but the German

confederation as well. It was to overcome the strength of the smaller states that Bismarck had recourse to Italy. Venetia was the magic word that would send the war fever throbbing through the veins of every true Italian. With Venetia as an inducement the Italian armies were ready at any time to throw their strength against the Quadrilateral. Bismarck found Italy, as he expected, ready and eager to hear more of his project.

Early in October he turned to sound and interrogate the monarch who at the time was believed to be most potent in shaping the destinies of Europe. It was at Biarritz that he met the Emperor of the French, who was rustivating in the companionship of Prosper Mérimée. It was certainly a rare trio that in those bright October days strolled along the beach where the blue waters of the Bay of Biscay broke in foam. The emperor was amused with the glibness with which this Prussian count rattled on about the future of Europe. "He is crazy," he whispered to Mérimée. The novelist, however, held his own ideas. "M. de Bismarck pleased me. . . . He is deficient in sentiment, but has a great mind," such was the tenor of Mérimée's comments in his letters from Biarritz. Time was to prove whether the emperor or the writer was the most sagacious observer.

Bismarck left the cliffs and cool breezes of Biarritz not without recompense. He found time for business as well as pleasure, and he went away with the belief that the emperor would be unlikely to interfere in a German war. There can be no question, in fact, that the emperor longed for such an event at that time. He believed he had nothing to fear from Prussia. She must of necessity be crushed by the splen-

did Austrian army, inured to service. A chance would be afforded him to step in and interfere in behalf of Prussia, to lighten her punishment, and obtain from her grateful statesmen a reward, — the old Rhenish frontier, perhaps. Italy's alliance with Prussia gave him too an additional interest in the schemes of the Hohenzollern, for if Napoleon had an unselfish spot in his heart, it was warm toward Italy. He would see that Victor Emmanuel gained Venetia this time. Austria must of necessity acquiesce. After an arduous campaign against Prussia she would not care to ruffle the power which had so recently asserted its superiority at Solferino and Magenta. Altogether Bismarck's plans must have fallen as sweet music upon the ears of the French emperor. There was only one possible contingency in which a German war might affect France unfavorably, a contingency so vague that it seemed hardly worth considering, and that was a Prussian victory.

The emperor had definite ideas in regard to the relative strength of the European military powers. He held the same views that the cadets at Metz gleaned from the text-books. "The Prussian army, in which service is of very short duration, is nothing but a kind of Landwehr school. It is a magnificent organization on paper, but a very doubtful weapon of defense, and most useless during the first period of an offensive war. Austria, whose population numbers about thirty-seven millions of inhabitants, has a large and splendid army, which is far superior in its organization to the Prussian or Russian armies. After France she occupies the first rank as a military power." Leaving the emperor to his complacent dreams, Bismarck, hardly less satisfied, reached Ber-

lin fortified for the contest. Sure of Russian friendship, French neutrality, and Italian coöperation, he was ready to enter upon his heroic treatment of the Schleswig-Holstein and German questions.

In the mean time matters in the duchies had been progressing exactly as he expected. In Schleswig, Manteuffel was upholding Prussian prestige; in Holstein, Gablenz was encouraging agitation in favor of the Augustenburg prince. The Gastein arrangement had simply made matters worse.

On January 20, 1866, Bismarck forwarded to the Prussian envoy at Vienna a protest against the Austrian policy in Holstein. After summing up the various objectionable features of this policy, the license allowed the press in attacking Prussia, and the deference exercised toward the pretender, the dispatch continued, "All these circumstances make his (the pretender's) mere presence in Kiel a chronic protest against the rights of both sovereigns. . . . His majesty the king has a right to demand that this evil be remedied by the expulsion of the prince, if the imperial government really feels itself unequal to putting a stop to the demonstrations in question." The dispatch declared in conclusion, "The democratic agitation, animated by hatred of conservative Prussia, blossoms out luxuriantly in the associations and the press. The imperial Austrian government may contemplate this demoralization and corruption of the populace with comparative indifference. Not so we. Whatever may be the decision ultimately arrived at respecting the duchies, their condition will always be a matter of importance to Prussia; and should they become a nucleus of democratic and revolutionary tendencies, it will become Prussia's business to put them in order."

On February 7 Count Mensdorff in his reply to Count Karolyi stated "that Austria regards each separate question arising within the sphere of her administration in Holstein, as exclusively pendent between herself and her lord lieutenant, and exempt from interference from any other quarter." Bismarck then took occasion to point out the fact that "Prussia's relations to Austria, despite the intimate character they had assumed during the past year or two, had now been thrust back to the standpoint they occupied before the Danish war, — neither better nor worse than those obtaining with any other power."

Austria's attitude now became distinctly warlike. On March 10 a council of war was held at Vienna, to which General Benedek was summoned in haste from Verona. Not only was the attitude of Prussia threatening, but Italy was actually arming. The council decided upon defensive measures, and orders were issued for the mobilization of the army in Bohemia and Moravia. On the 16th Mensdorff, in a dispatch to the Austrian ambassadors at German courts informing them of Prussia's menacing attitude, declared also, "Should the danger of a breach of peace become still more imminent, it would be necessary to take measures promptly and decisively for self-defense. In view of Prussia's threatened attack, these measures could only consist of mobilizing the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th federal army corps, and placing them in the field side by side with the Austrian army."

On March 24 Bismarck, to offset the effect of this, informed the Prussian ambassadors at German courts that Prussia was in favor of federal reform, and was about to arm in self-defense, that Prussian and German interests were identical, and that the fall of Prus-

sia meant the fall of Germany. The dispatch concluded with the question, "Whether and to what extent Prussia could count upon assistance from the government addressed, in case she should be attacked by Austria or compelled to make war by unmistakable threats?" The response of the various governments was generally evasive or hostile, and they referred Prussia to the Diet for a consideration of her plan of federal reform. This latter scheme including, as it did, the longed-for national representation by suffrage, was Bismarck's last trump-card to win over popular sympathy. In the mean time he had been pushing things with the government of Victor Emmanuel. On April 8 the treaty of alliance was signed, and within a fortnight ratified at both Florence and Berlin. Matters then progressed smoothly toward war. During the last days of March the Prussian regiments in Silesia were reinforced, a fact that occasioned the protest of Count Mensdorff. He denied that Austria was arming against Prussia, and claimed that the strengthening of the imperial forces in Bohemia was due to the supposed imminence of outbreaks among the Jews. Negotiations followed between Berlin and Vienna concerning disarmament. Austria finally agreed to decrease her strength in Bohemia, but insisted upon the necessity of placing Venetia in a state of defense. Bismarck saw in this proposal merely a scheme of the Austrian statesmen to crush Italy and Prussia in detail. He refused to entertain the suggestion, and during the first week in May the question of disarmament was suffered to drop.

By May 1 the whole Austrian mobilization machinery was working at its highest pitch, but it was not until a week later that the king of Prussia issued his

final orders for placing the whole army on a war footing. The ease and celerity with which the Prussian army was mobilized, however, more than compensated for the time which Austria had gained. In fourteen days from the royal order nine Prussian army corps, were thoroughly equipped and ready for the field.

On June 1, in compliance with Bavaria's motion of May 24, the envoys of the various German governments which had armed made their explanations before the Diet. Prussia and Austria of course had done nothing save in self-defense, but the Austrian envoy, after explaining the dispute between his government and that of Berlin, declared that Austria placed the whole question of the duchies at the disposal of the Diet, and furthermore signified that General Gablenz had been instructed to summon the Holstein assembly for the purpose of obtaining its will as to the future of the duchy. This move was in direct antagonism to the Prussian policy, and an assertion of a theory that Austria herself had denied by the sale of Lauenburg. Bismarck, adhering to the Vienna treaty and the Gastein agreement, regarded Austria's course in this matter as irreparable, and dispatched a circular message to the German courts with the declaration, "Vienna has resolved upon war; the next thing to be done is to choose the most auspicious moment for beginning it."

General Manteuffel received orders to enter Holstein immediately upon the summoning of the Assembly by Gablenz. Bismarck's position was briefly this: Austria, having violated the Gastein convention by attempting to make the question of the duchies a federal one, had violated and thereby annulled

that convention. The dual occupation must be renewed, and in consequence Prussian troops were ordered to reënter Holstein. Gablenz summoned the estates for the 11th of June, and on the 8th the Prussian troops crossed the Eider and moved slowly southward. Gablenz, who had but one brigade, fell back to Altona, taking with him the prince of Augustenburg. On the 9th Itzehoe, where the assembly was to convene, was occupied by Prussian troops, and on the 11th the assembly hall itself was placed under guard. On the same evening Gablenz withdrew his forces to Harburg, and dispatched them by train through Hanover and Hesse to Bohemia. At last the Schleswig-Holstein question was settled.

On June 10 Bismarck had submitted to the German governments a constitution for a new confederation, "to consist of those states which had hitherto been included in the confederation, with the exception of the dominions of the emperor of Austria and the king of the Netherlands." This bold project for the elimination of Austria as a federal power was not generally well received at the petty courts. On the 11th, at an extraordinary session of the Diet, the Austrian ambassador retaliated by moving, in consideration of Manteuffel's "violent self-help" in Holstein, the mobilization of the federal army against Prussia. The vote was postponed until the 14th, and in the interval the various governments made their final preparations for war. The Austrians had seven corps in readiness in Bohemia, and the Saxon and Bavarian forces were ready to take the field. The Hanoverian army had not been mobilized, while the troops of Baden, Würtemberg, Nassau, and Hesse Darmstadt, forming the 8th federal corps, were in a very backward state of prepa-

ration. Prussia, however, had thoroughly equipped for service three corps in the vicinity of Görlitz under Prince Frederick Charles, four in Silesia under the crown prince, three divisions under General Bittenfeld about Halle and Torgau, and a reserve corps at Berlin under General Mülbe. In addition to these there was Manteuffel's division in Holstein, the division of General von Falckenstein at Minden in Westphalia, and another under General Beyer at Wetzlar. It was to the roll of drums and clank of arms that the Diet convened on the 14th. By a vote of nine to six the Austrian motion was sustained. Prussia and Holstein were unrepresented, and Baden was the only one of the large states to oppose the Austrian project. The Prussian ambassador then pronounced the confederation dissolved and withdrew from the hall.

That night the wires all over Germany were loaded with messages of grave importance. Scarcely had the Prussian ambassador at Frankfort turned his back upon the palace of Thurn and Taxis than there went flashing out from Berlin the ultimatum of Prussia to Hanover, Saxony, and Hesse, which had supported the Austrian motion. Its tenor was simply this: in case within twelve hours the governments addressed did not signify their intention to reduce their armies to a peace footing and accept the Prussian proposals of June 10, the Berlin government would resort to arms.

Perhaps these states had not counted upon the efficiency of Prussia's preparations and did not believe it possible that she was in a position to undertake immediate action. At all events they deliberated too long, and on the afternoon of the 15th, no reply having been received to its summons, the Prussian

government declared war. At the same time there went forth from the Leipsiger Strasse the orders to set in motion those perfect battalions upon which such time and care had been expended.

Before daylight on the 16th Manteuffel and Falckenstein were on the march for Hanover, Beyer's division was grinding into dust the long road from Wetzlar to Cassel, while in the east Prince Frederick Charles was over the Saxon frontier.

On the night of the 16th King George of Hanover abandoned his capital, and with his half-constructed army retreated to Göttingen. At four o'clock on the afternoon of the next day the tramp of the Prussian troops awoke the echoes of the deserted streets.

The Hessian army eluded General Beyer by retreating to Fulda and thence to Frankfort. On the 19th, however, the black and white banner was hoisted over Cassel, where the crestfallen elector sullenly awaited his conquerors.

The army of Prince Frederick Charles approached Dresden on the 18th. The Saxons had fallen back upon the Austrians in Bohemia, and that evening the Prussian officers strolled along the Brühl Terrace and gravely saluted each other in the Grosse Garten.

Thus in four days after the declaration of war by Prussia against Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse, her troops without firing a shot had subjugated and occupied those states, captured the Hessian elector, and hopelessly isolated the Hanoverian army at Göttingen. It was a brilliant combination, brilliantly executed, and there was amazement at Paris and at Vienna, yet it was but the first of a series of achievements with which this mighty creation of Moltke and Roon was to astonish the world.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE PRUSSIANS IN BOHEMIA.

THE MILITARY SITUATION ON JUNE 20. — BENEDEK'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN CHECKMATED. — ADVANCE OF THE PRUSSIANS INTO BOHEMIA. — COMBATS AT LIEBENAU AND PODOL, AND DEFEAT OF THE AUSTRIANS. — CAPTURE OF MÜNCHENGRÄTZ BY THE PRUSSIANS. — RETREAT OF THE AUSTRIANS UPON GITSCHIN. — BATTLE OF GITSCHIN AND ROUT OF THE AUSTRIANS. — BISMARCK AT GITSCHIN. — ADVANCE OF THE SECOND PRUSSIAN ARMY INTO BOHEMIA UNDER THE CROWN PRINCE. — VICTORIES OF THE PRUSSIAN 5TH CORPS AT NACHOD AND SKALITZ. — DISCOMFITURE OF THE PRUSSIANS AT TRAUTENAU. — BATTLE AT SOOR WON BY THE PRUSSIAN GUARDS. — ARRIVAL OF THE SECOND ARMY ON THE ELBE. — COMMUNICATIONS RESTORED BETWEEN THE PRUSSIAN ARMIES. — DILEMMA OF THE AUSTRIAN COMMANDER. — HIS ORDERS TO HIS ARMY. — HIS IGNORANCE OF THE PRUSSIAN DESIGNS. — CHARACTER OF THE AUSTRIAN POSITION ON THE BIS-TRITZ.

I.

THE action of the Frankfort Diet on June 14 was virtually a declaration of war by the German confederation against Prussia. On the 17th the Kaiser issued his manifesto to his people, and three days later the Italian government formally declared war against Austria and Bavaria.

On the 20th the military situation was as follows: the Prussians by their seizure of Saxony had divided Germany into an eastern and western battlefield. In the east they had three distinct armies ready for the invasion of Bohemia: the army of the Elbe, comprising three divisions under General Herwarth von Bit-

tenfeld ; the first army, made up of the 2d, 3d, and 4th corps under Prince Frederick Charles ; and the second army under the crown prince, comprising the 1st, 5th, 6th, and Guard corps.

The first army and the army of the Elbe in Saxony were under orders to pass into Bohemia by separate routes through the Iron Mountains, and unite on the Iser.

The second army was to move from Silesia through the mountain passes and gain the left bank of the Elbe. On account of the dangerous character of the hilly country through which this army was to pass, the crown prince was ordered to delay its movements until the attention of the Austrians had become distracted by the operations of Prince Frederick Charles. The total strength of these three armies was 254,000 men, of which the first army comprised 93,000, the second army 115,000, and the army of the Elbe 46,000.

In the west Prussia had the divisions of Falckenstein, Manteuffel, and Beyer in Hesse and Hanover, an aggregate of 48,000 men. In reserve was the corps of General Mülbe at Berlin, in process of mobilization.


The Austrian army of the north, concentrated mainly about Olmütz and Brunn, comprised the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 10th corps, with five divisions of cavalry. To these must be added the 24,000 men of the Saxon army, which had retired into Bohemia before the Prussian advance. These forces, numbering nearly 270,000 men, were commanded by General Benedek, whose brilliant conduct at Solferino had won him a most exalted reputation as a soldier among his countrymen.

In the west, opposed to the Prussian armies, was the Bavarian army with its 50,000 bayonets, the troops of Hanover and Hesse, and the 8th federal corps. This made a total strength on paper of 119,000 men, of which, however, the 19,000 Hanoverians were isolated at Göttingen, and the 8th federal corps was only in the first stages of formation.

It will thus be seen that while both in the east and west the Prussian troops were outnumbered, they were thoroughly prepared, advantageously posted, and armed with a breech-loading weapon. Benedek's corps, on the other hand, were badly distributed, the federal troops only half organized, and the whole dependent upon the muzzle-loading rifle. It must be admitted, therefore, that the situation was decidedly favorable to Prussia, a fact due to the foresight and preparation of her statesmen and the skill and vigor of her generals.

It had doubtless been Benedek's plan, supported by the Bavarian army, to push through the passes of the Giant Mountains into Saxony, and in company with the army of that kingdom undertake an invasion of Prussia. The extraordinary rapidity of the Prussian advance overthrew his calculations. Saxony passed into the hands of his enemy, and with it the control of the passes through which the Bavarian coöperation was to be expected. Benedek was forced to regard himself as beaten in the first move of the contest, and compelled to stand on the defensive.

On June 23 the Prussian armies crossed the Saxon frontiers into Bohemia, the first army advancing in three columns with the Elbe army several miles to the west. At daybreak Prince Frederick Charles had notified the Austrian outposts at Reichenberg that



SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATE THE

EARLY OPERATIONS OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMIES IN BOHEMIA, 1866.

Prussia regarded herself as in a state of war with Austria. A few hours later he had taken his stand by the toll-house on the frontier to review the troops as they entered Austrian territory. The headquarters that night were in the Castle of Grafenstein, the seat of Count Clam Gallas, who had left its retirement to assume command of the 1st Austrian corps in Bohemia. The next day Reichenberg, the key to the passes, was occupied by the Prussians without a blow, and the various columns reunited.

Count Clam Gallas had been ordered by Benedek to hold the line of the Iser from Turnau to Münchengrätz, and had at his disposal in the vicinity of the latter place the 1st corps and the Saxons. He had thrown forward one brigade on the north of the Iser with a few companies in advance at Liebenau. It was in the vicinity of this village that the first fighting of the campaign occurred on the 26th. The Austrians retired before Von Horne's Prussian division, maintaining a running fight to Turnau, where they broke the bridge over the Iser and retreated along the road to Podol. Horne followed fast, and throwing a bridge at Turnau continued the pursuit.

Podol was a point of great strategical importance, as the railway to Prague crosses the river at that point side by side with the road. It was almost dusk when the Prussian vanguard approached the outskirts of the town. A sharp fight at once commenced, which increased in warmth with the continued arrival of Prussian reinforcements. Podol was held by the "Iron Brigade," which had won the title by its sturdy conduct in the Danish war. The action was wholly one of musketry. The Austrians were forced to the village, and from there to the bridgehead, over-

matched by numbers and the rapid discharge of the needle-guns. Podol, in fact, was the first fair trial of the Prussian weapon, and was terribly satisfactory in its results. Shortly after midnight the Austrians drew off toward Münchengrätz, leaving the Prussians in undisputed possession of Podol and the bridges.

On the same day as the action at Podol communication was reëstablished between the first and Elbe armies, and on the 27th the latter, after a sharp skirmish at Hühnerwasser, compelled the retirement of the Austrians across the Iser at Münchengrätz. A combined movement was immediately undertaken against that town with the purpose of capturing the whole Austrian force. While Bittenfeld moved from Böhmisch-Aicha and Hühnerwasser toward Münchengrätz, Prince Frederick Charles sent his troops down the valley against the same place. He also dispatched the 1st corps from Turnau to turn the Austrian position on the heights east of Münchengrätz and cut off their retreat on Gitschin. Münchengrätz was captured, but the Austrians escaped, their commander realizing the dangers attaching to a prolonged defense. The whole line of the Iser was thus relinquished to the Prussians. In five days, and with losses aggregating hardly 500 men, they had massed four and a half corps in the very heart of the enemy's country.

Clam Gallas retreated upon Gitschin, and seized a strong position with his left resting on the Anna Berg, his centre on the heights of Brada, and his right extending beyond Diletz east of the Turnau road. On the 29th the Prussians advanced upon Gitschin in four columns, the left from Turnau, the centre from Podol, the right from Münchengrätz, with the army of the Elbe still farther south. About four o'clock Wer-

der's division of the 2d corps forming the Prussian centre began to engage the enemy on the road between Sobotka and Gitschin. About the same time General Tümpling's division from Turnau encountered the Saxon posts in advance of Brada and Diletz. Werder's troops attacked without delay. The country west of Gitschin is broken by several ravines into which the road dips. Through and over these ravines a desperate fight was maintained, the Austrians fighting stubbornly under cover of the woods, but suffering terrible losses when exposed on the open ground to the rapid fire of the Prussians. It was nearly midnight when Werder's men finally approached Gitschin.

General Tümpling on the north had succeeded in carrying the village of Podultz, thereby cutting the Austrian right in two. Werder's division, moreover, being well on the road to Gitschin, the retreat of the Austrians in Brada was wholly cut off. The Saxon troops in Diletz retired hastily upon Gitschin under a murderous fire, and acted as a rearguard to the discomfited army. They held Gitschin until midnight, resisting successfully the efforts of the Prussians to gain the market-place, and then withdrew. Gitschin was a better contested action than any of its predecessors, and the losses were correspondingly heavy. On the 30th a detachment of Prussian cavalry opened communication with the second army at Arnau on the Elbe. On that same day Bismarck and the king started for the front, leaving Berlin uproariously enthusiastic over the tidings of victory. Two days later, and "the iron count" was mingling with the military men in Gitschin, himself adorned with the white coat and helmet of the cuirassiers. In the midst of the

bustle at headquarters he still found leisure to write his wife, "I have just arrived, the ground is heaped with corpses, horses, and arms. Our victories are much greater than we thought. Send me some French novels to read, but not more than one at a time. May God bless you."

II.

In the mean time the troops of the crown prince had been discharging their duties with the same success, though at a greater expenditure of blood than their comrades on the Iser. It was on June 20 that the crown prince notified the Austrian outposts of his intention to commence hostilities. His plans were already formed for an advance in three columns. The 1st corps and cavalry division on the right were to move from Landeshut through the mountains to Trautenau. The Guards in the centre were to march from Wünschelburg *via* Braunau to occupy the pass at Eypel, while on the left the 5th corps, followed by the 6th, was to move by Reinerz to Nachod.

On the evening of the 26th the Guards passed the frontier. The 5th corps under Steinmetz occupied the town of Nachod after a slight skirmish, seizing also the castle commanding the defile, which the Austrians with unaccountable negligence had left undefended. In the morning, upon resuming the march, the vanguard of this corps found itself in the presence of the Austrian 6th corps under General Ramming. Finding his way blocked by such superior forces, Steinmetz seized the woods fringing the road, where, partially screened from the Austrian shells, his infantry stood stoutly on the defensive. It devolved upon this detachment in the wood to cover the de-

bouching of the main body of the corps, which was still tangled up in the narrow defile. Thanks to the excellence of their weapons and the presence of the crown prince, who had forced his way to the front through the confusion of the crowded road, their defense was successful. The Austrian infantry were unable to face the murderous fire that blazed from all corners of the wood. At last the Prussian corps, having extricated itself from the pass, began to assume the offensive. The general advance was preceded by a cavalry combat in which the Austrian cuirassiers who had been threatening the flank of the wood were overthrown. The Austrian retreat commenced shortly after, Ramming drawing off in the direction of Skalitz. At that place the Austrian 8th corps was already stationed under the Archduke Leopold. There was only time to send the 6th corps to the rear for recuperation when on the 28th General Steinmetz came up with his leading brigades. Skalitz was bravely defended by the Austrian jägers, though they were finally driven across the Aupa. Toward evening the archduke relinquished the heights beyond, and began his retreat, leaving 4,000 prisoners and eight guns in the hands of the Prussians. On the 29th, after some artillery fighting, General Fesetics with three brigades of the Austrian 4th corps abandoned Schweinschädel, the troops of Steinmetz pushing on the same night to the village of Gradlitz on the Elbe, about two miles from Königinhof.

The 1st Prussian corps, forming the right of the second army, did not cross the frontier until dawn on the 27th. The day was intensely warm, and the troops were already somewhat fatigued when shortly before noon they encountered the Austrian outposts

in front of Trautenau, a hill-girdled town on the Aupa. The Prussians immediately crossed the river, and forced the fighting in the streets of the town. The Austrians, not being in force, slowly retired to a position on the hills beyond. About one o'clock they were dislodged from there, and by three they had relinquished the village of Hohenbruck south of Trautenau and the heights southeast of that place. General von Bonin was so well satisfied with the progress of affairs that he rejected an offer of assistance from the 1st division of the Guards, which had halted at Qualitch upon hearing the heavy firing at Trautenau. But Von Bonin was deceived, for about 3.30 General Gablenz came up with the other three brigades of the Austrian 10th corps, and fell heavily upon the weary Prussians. By five o'clock the Prussians were giving ground in all directions, and the Austrian infantry streamed through Hohenbruck at the charge. Von Bonin bivouacked that night on the same ground occupied by his corps in the morning.

The battle of Trautenau was an Austrian victory, inasmuch as it forced the Prussian corps back into the mountains. The losses of the Prussians, however, were only 1,300 men to the 5,500 of the victors. This contest alone is sufficient to prove the hopeless character of the struggle which Austria was waging with her better armed antagonist.

After receiving Bonin's refusal of aid on the 27th, the 1st division of the Guards had taken up the march to Eypel. That night the prince of Würtemberg commanding the Guard corps received tidings from the crown prince of the battle at Trautenau with orders to proceed immediately to extricate the 1st corps. Pushing the 1st division rapidly forward with

the 2d a few miles in the rear, the prince of Würtemberg crossed the Aupa early on the 28th and moved toward Königinhof. This compelled Gablenz who was facing northward against the 1st corps to change his front, a feat which he skillfully accomplished just in time to receive the attack of the Guards all along the heights of Soor. The attack, however, was successful, and Gablenz fell back toward Königinhof. Later in the afternoon the 2d division of the Guards came up, stormed Trautenau, and captured the greater portion of the Austrian brigade engaged there. This opened the way for the advance of the 1st corps, which pushed on to Arnau and fell in with the cavalry patrols of Prince Frederick Charles. The Guards on the 29th continued their advance, storming Königinhof, thus completing the union of the second army on the Elbe.

III.

Communications were reopened between the three Prussian armies in Bohemia on the 30th of June, or just one week from the time the first battalion passed the frontier. Unquestionably Benedek's plan had been to detain the crown prince in the mountains while with his main army he overwhelmed Prince Frederick Charles. Military critics claim that had Benedek reversed this plan, standing on the defensive on the Iser while he massed his strength against the crown prince, better fortune might have attended the Austrian arms. It is also asserted that Benedek committed a grave error in delaying his attack upon the crown prince's columns until they had debouched from the mountain passes; that by so doing he left his isolated corps to be beaten in detail by superior

forces, and exhausted the strength with which he should have succored Clam Gallas on the Iser. It is certainly to the credit of the Austrian commander, that he did not lose his head when the tidings of disaster poured in upon him from all quarters. No sooner had he received information of the actions at Münchengrätz and Skalitz than he issued orders for the army to form on a new line, from Josephstadt to Gitschin. For this purpose he urged Clam Gallas to hold firm at the latter place. Scarcely had he done so when the news arrived that Clam Gallas was in full retreat. Nothing daunted by this disappointment Benedek with commendable promptness ordered the retreat of the whole army under the guns of the fortress of Königgrätz, though he must have realized before this that the chances of the campaign were against him. His enemies were consolidating in his front after he had lost 40,000 men in the attempt to keep them divided. In this crisis it seems to be generally admitted that Benedek made the most of the opportunities afforded him by seizing a strong defensive position in the hilly country between the Elbe and the Bistritz rivers.

On the afternoon of July 2d Benedek issued his orders in anticipation of a Prussian attack. "The royal Saxon corps will occupy the heights of Popowitz. . . . The 10th corps will take post on the right of the Saxon corps, and lastly the 3d corps will occupy the heights of Lipa and Chlum, on the right of the 10th corps. The principal duty of the 8th corps will be to serve as support to the Saxon corps, behind which it will station itself. Troops not herein named have merely to hold themselves in readiness so long as the attack is confined to our left wing; but should

the enemy's attack assume greater dimensions, and be directed against our centre and right wing as well, then the whole army will be formed in order of battle, and the following measures will be taken: the 4th corps will move up on the right of the 3d to the heights of Chlum and Nedelist, and the 2d corps on the extreme right flank, next to the 4th." These orders also provided that the 1st and 6th corps should act as a reserve, the former to take position near Rosnitz, the other to occupy the heights of Wsestar. Of the five cavalry divisions two were on the left near Prim, one on the right, and two in reserve in the rear of the 1st and 6th corps.

These dispositions were made clearly with a view to repelling an attack from the west. Benedek held the opinion that the mass of the Prussian second army had moved toward Gitschin, and that the forces left on the Elbe were too weak or too distant to be dangerous. He anticipated a Prussian attempt to turn his left, but he seems to have given himself no uneasiness respecting his right. This is demonstrated by the tone of his instructions to the 2d and 4th corps forming the latter wing, which were to apply only in case of the action becoming general, a contingency which he plainly regarded as improbable. He clung tenaciously to the theory that his enemies were all before him, and this was the fatal blunder of his campaign. Whether it was due to lack of information or faulty information, to the sluggishness of patrols or to obtuseness on the part of the commander himself, it was the blunder that was destined to decide a great battle, and settle the long dispute between the German powers.

The heights on which the Austrian army took

position overlooked the Bistritz, and no labor was spared to render their slopes unassailable. A chain of redoubts was thrown up to protect the central positions between Lipa and Nedelist, while the woods above Sadowa and Benatek were obstructed by abatis. Other works were ordered for the protection of the Saxons on the left, but the Prussian advance prevented their completion.

The main road from Königgrätz to Horsitz intersected the centre of the Austrian position, passing south of Rosberitz and Chlum and crossing the Bistritz at Sadowa. The Austrian line was in the shape of a half circle sprung from the vicinity of Prim on the left through Lipa and Nedelist nearly to the Elbe on the right. The Saxon outposts were in Nechanitz on the Bistritz, the Austrians in Mokrovous, Dohalicka, Dohalitz, Sadowa, and Benatek farther up the stream. To hold this line, nearly seven miles in length, Benedek had eight corps, comprising perhaps 200,000 men. All but two of these corps, however, were suffering from the depression and demoralization consequent upon recent contact with the needle-gun. The pluck of the Austrian army was still good, but its enthusiasm was gone.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE PRUSSIANS AT KÖNIGGRÄTZ AND BEFORE VIENNA.

PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES PREPARES FOR BATTLE. — NIGHT MARCH OF THE FIRST PRUSSIAN ARMY UPON THE BISTRITZ. — ARRIVAL OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA AT DUB. — OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ. — THE PRUSSIANS CROSS THE BISTRITZ. — STATE OF THE BATTLE AT NOON. — CRITICAL POSITION OF THE PRUSSIAN LEFT. — ANXIETY OF THE PRUSSIAN STAFF. — APPROACH OF THE CROWN PRINCE TO THE FIELD. — HE THREATENS THE AUSTRIAN RIGHT. — CONFUSED STATE OF THAT WING AND CAUSES THEREFOR. — THE CROWN PRINCE MOVES UPON CHLUM. — CAPTURE OF CHLUM BY THE PRUSSIAN GUARDS AND ITS RESULTS. — BENEDEK'S AMAZEMENT UPON LEARNING OF THE FALL OF CHLUM. — HE HEADS HIS RESERVES IN THE EFFORT TO RETAKE IT. — FAILURE OF THE ATTACK. — TOTAL DEFEAT OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMY. — HEROISM OF THE AUSTRIAN ARTILLERY. — IMMEDIATE RESULTS OF THE BATTLE. — ARCHDUKE ALBRECHT ASSUMES COMMAND OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMIES. — THE PRUSSIAN ADVANCE UPON VIENNA. — BENEDEK'S RETREAT. — BATTLE OF BLUMENAU. — THE ARMISTICE.

ON the afternoon of July 2 Prince Frederick Charles was at Kammenitz, having just returned from a council of war at the royal headquarters in Gitschin. This council had decided that on the following morning the first army should push a reconnoissance in the direction of Königgrätz, and the prince returned to Kammenitz to direct the intended movements. Immediately upon his arrival, however, he received information that led him to assume the responsibility of disregarding the decision of the high military con-

clave he had just quitted. The reports of the officers whom he had sent out in the morning to explore the country in his front demonstrated clearly that the Austrians were in force all along the Bistritz River from Benatek to Nechanitz. He immediately concluded that Benedek was on the point of assuming the offensive with his entire army. Recognizing that his present position was unfavorable for the acceptance of a great battle, the prince determined upon an immediate advance. The plan he hastily evolved had for its object the decisive overthrow of Benedek's army. While the first army advanced against Sadowa, the army of the Elbe was to move on its right against Nechanitz, the second army on the north threatening meantime the Austrian right and rear. Considering the distance that separated the first and second armies, there was a strong element of risk in this scheme. The strength of the Austrian army was not definitely known, but it was certain that the first and Elbe armies would be obliged to hold their own against vastly superior forces until the crown prince had time to develop his attack.

Prince Frederick Charles immediately ordered General Bittenfeld to advance upon Nechanitz, while he dispatched a messenger to the crown prince requesting his coöperation. It was not until after these orders had been issued that he acquainted the king at Gitschin with his proposed movements and secured his hearty approval. Indeed a royal messenger was hurried off to the crown prince with orders for the immediate advance of his entire army.

Before midnight on the 2d the first army was on the march toward the Bistritz. While the 8th division, supported by the 5th and 6th, followed the König-





grätz road, the 3d and 4th divisions moved through the cultivated country on their right. The 7th division marched on the left of the main army from Horsitz toward Cerekwitz. The night was dark, save occasionally when the moon broke through the driving clouds and revealed glimpses of the trees and cornfields waving in the damp wind. The dawn was ushered in by a dismal rain that transformed field and road into sloughs that seriously clogged the progress of the artillery. About four o'clock the head of the columns began to ascend the long hill on which stands the village of Dub. From the crest of the hill the Bistritz valley burst upon the view from Benatek on the north to the clustering roofs of Nechanitz four miles below Sadowa. All along the river nestled little hamlets, backed by hills and woods that showed dimly through the rain and mist of the gray morning.

It was half past eight when the king of Prussia and his staff came within sight of the battlefield, and then the contest had fairly begun. Franzecky's 7th division was hotly engaged on the left in front of Benatek, while Sadowa and the villages farther down the stream were belted with the smoke of the Austrian riflemen, whose fire increased as the Prussian skirmishers advanced. All along the heights above the Austrian guns were at work, flashing through the haze and mingling their billowy smoke with the mist and fog. Their practice was good, and the shells swept the Königgrätz road in front of Sadowa, and went rushing up the hillside into the environs of Dub where the royal staff had taken position.

Before ten o'clock Benatek had been set on fire and occupied by the Prussian 7th division. About

this time, too, the Austrian artillery on the slope between Dohalitz and Mokrovous began to show signs of weakening under the continually increasing weight of the Prussian fire. Prince Frederick Charles, noticing this, gave the word for the infantry to advance against the villages along the river. The 8th division moved against Sadowa, the 4th against Dohalitz, and the 3d against Mokrovous. It was no part of the Austrian plan to sacrifice much for these positions, and Colonel Proshaka commanding the garrison of Sadowa received orders to retire. The abandonment of Sadowa settled also the fate of Dohalitz, Dohalicka, and Mokrovous, and before eleven o'clock the whole left bank of the Bistritz had passed into the hands of the Prussians. The army of the Elbe had driven the Saxon outposts from Nechanitz, and was crossing the river at that place preparatory to turning the left of Benedek's position.

At noon, however, the state of affairs was hardly satisfactory to the Prussians. Franzecky was barely able to maintain himself in the wood above Benatek, while all along the river from Sadowa to Mokrovous the Prussians were subjected to a murderous and crushing artillery fire. Shortly after noon Prince Frederick Charles sent the 5th and 6th divisions forward to the support of those already engaged in the woods on the slope above Sadowa.¹ At one o'clock, with all their reserves engaged, the Prussian staff could trace no improvement in the situation. The Austrian artillery still maintained its terrible fire.

¹ The Prussian generals at no time meditated a strong offensive by their centre, but dreaded such a movement on the part of the Austrians. The reserves went forward to be at hand in case of a general assault by their enemy.

Franzecky's position on the left had become one of absolute peril,¹ while on the right the army of the Elbe was still painfully defiling through the swamps at Nechanitz, and unable to gain ground.

Everything depended upon the prompt arrival of the crown prince. The royal staff recognized this fact. The king, erect and white-haired, turned his gaze from the wood where the Austrian shells were playing sad havoc with his devoted troops, for some sign of his son, whose arrival was to decide the day. Bismarck turned in his saddle and peered anxiously from under the vizor of his helmet in the vain endeavor to penetrate the smoke that hung over the valley about Benatek. Even Moltke's furtive glances belied the habitual imperturbability of his face. Every eye was strained for some glimpse of the second army, every ear alert to catch the music of its approaching artillery. The moments dragged heavily. At two o'clock the situation was still unchanged.² The soldiers of the Kaiser were fighting a grand battle. Just before three the Prussian 8th division received orders to retire, and the cavalry was held in readiness to cover a retreat.

The Prussian staff was anxious and Benedek was complacent, but the condition of each was induced by ignorance of the true position of affairs. The crown prince was in reality keeping his engagements

¹ Franzecky had 14 battalions and 24 guns against 51 Austrian battalions and 128 guns. Indeed, nearly the whole strength of the Austrian 2d and 4th corps was employed against him. The Prussian headquarters, however, did not feel justified in reinforcing Franzecky at the expense of their centre.

² Von Moltke knew at this time that the crown prince was approaching the field, but did not realize his troops were really engaged. At 1.45 he informed General Bittenfeld, "the crown prince is at Zizelowes."

to the letter. His information as to the position of the enemy was very indefinite, but he commenced his advance at five in the morning. The 6th corps crossed the Elbe near Jaromir and marching southwest formed the left of his army. The 1st corps on the right headed for Gross Burglitz, while the Guards in the centre, accompanied by the crown prince in person, moved from Königinhof on Lhota and Jericeek. After passing Daubrowitz the crown prince obtained his first distant view of the battle, but not until he gained the hills opposite Horenowes did he appreciate its extent, and the fact that the Prussian left was in actual danger. About noon he directed the Guards toward the two famous trees on the hilltop above Horenowes, covering their left by an attack of the 6th corps upon Racitz. Both of these villages and the heights were carried with slight loss, their garrisons consisting only of weak detachments of the Austrian 2d corps. The commander of the Austrian 4th corps had long since left his intrenchments between Chlum and Nedelist and plunged forward to engage the Prussian 7th division in the wood of Maslowed. This he did on his own responsibility, while the 2d corps, to which had been assigned the ground between Nedelist and the Elbe, moved up on his right. As a result, at one hour before noon Benedek's right wing stood on the line Maslowed-Horenowes-Racitz, with its main strength massed in the vicinity of the first-named place. It was only after suffering great losses, and after Benedek's order had been twice repeated, that the insubordinate corps commanders began to retire upon their original positions. Indeed, at the time when the crown prince was developing his attack upon Racitz and Horenowes these weary, demoralized

battalions were in the confusion of executing this movement.

The crown prince saw his opportunity. The Guards seized Maslowed; the 6th corps pushed from Racitz upon Lochenitz to cut the bridge at that place. From Maslowed the leading regiments of the Guard marched along the rear of the Austrian detachments still engaged in the Maslowed wood, and headed for the conspicuous church tower of Chlum. They reached the precincts of that village almost unopposed and stormed it from the east. The slender garrison was immediately overpowered, while a Prussian battalion seized the village of Rosberitz farther down the hill, from which point they easily commanded the main avenue of the Austrian retreat on Königgrätz. At three o'clock the 1st division of the Prussian Guards were in full possession of the heart of the Austrian position. All about them the battle was still raging. Just below toward Königgrätz they could see the huge masses of the Austrian reserves. A few rods to the east Benedek was confidently directing what he regarded as a satisfactory battle, little dreaming that the key of his position was already in the iron grasp of his adversaries.

Benedek was certainly satisfied with the progress of events. Strong in the belief that he had the whole Prussian army before him, with his line nowhere broken, and with ample reserves, he felt he had the contest well in hand. He had no anxiety for his right. It is true he was annoyed with the commander of the 4th corps for quitting his allotted position and for not promptly obeying his orders to return to it. Apparently, however, he thought these instructions were obeyed earlier than they were.

It was a little before noon that Benedek learned that his right was threatened by a Prussian corps. He was undisturbed by the information and merely sent orders for the 2d corps to hold its ground. What followed can readily be included among the marvels of military history. No tidings reached the Austrian commander that his 2d corps was being worsted near Maslowed, or that the Prussian Guards had gained that place. Indeed, he was never more complacent than when, shortly before three o'clock, an orderly came dashing up to his side with the information that the Prussians were in Chlum.

If Feldzeugmeister von Benedek had been informed that the Prussian army had taken to itself wings and was flying away in the direction of Vienna, the tidings would have been no more astonishing or incredible. He refused to credit the news, and followed by his staff galloped away through the Lipa wood to where the church spire of Chlum was revealed through the smoke. The rolling of the needle-guns and the deadly volley that came pelting among his followers at the entrance of the village left no doubt as to the truth. He turned to his reserves and ordered the 6th corps against Rosberitz and Chlum in a wild effort to recover the day. Determined that he would not survive the disaster he put himself at the head of the storming columns. Rosberitz was cleared, but the attack failed at the churchyard and orchards of Chlum. The dense masses of the Austrians only served as better food for the close discharges of the needle-guns. The losses suffered at this point were simply enormous. Whole battalions were literally annihilated, blown away in the hot blasts of fire and iron. Every moment of delay added to the hopelessness of the

Austrian efforts, for the whole of the crown prince's army was approaching the field. Benedek was conspicuous in the *mêlée*, powder blackened and furious, but no kindly bullet found his breast.

Alas for Benedek! Raised to the supreme command on the wave of popular approval earned by good service on Italian battlefields, he was destined to lose the opportunity to render his name forever illustrious. He was trained in the wrong school and fought the wrong foe to make a great military name. Perhaps no general in Europe with troops similarly equipped could have contended successfully with the hosts which Prussia poured into Bohemia. Certain it is that the remodeled Prussian army was an obstacle against which reputations even more brilliant and secure than Benedek's were destined to be shivered to atoms.

At half past three the Austrian army was beaten; on the left the Saxons were retiring, and the reserves had exhausted themselves in their useless struggle at Chlum. The 2d Austrian corps had been driven across the Elbe, and the 4th corps was hopelessly lost. The 2d division of the Prussian Guards stormed the batteries in front of Chlum which had been holding the first army so long in check. This attack revealed for the first time the position of the crown prince to the king and his staff. They could descry the dark masses of the Prussian infantry struggling across the fields on the heights. They appreciated the situation, and ordered a general advance. The Austrian guns in position were hastily abandoned, but the artillerists saved many fieldpieces, and covered themselves with glory before night. The whole Austrian army, in fact, proved its high discipline by its conduct in these trying circumstances. The retreating infantry never

broke under the murderous Prussian fire, nor allowed their retreat to become a rout. Again and again the Austrian artillerists unlimbered, and checked their pursuers. The Austrian cavalry also added to its high reputation, charging infantry and artillery alike, and shedding its blood like water to cover the retreat of the discomfited army.

The battle of Königgrätz, in the point of numbers engaged, the losses sustained, and results achieved, must be designated as one of the mightiest military conflicts of the century. The Austrian army sustained a loss of over 40,000 men, 174 guns, and 11 standards, while the Prussian army was reduced by 10,000 men killed and wounded. The Prussians only appreciated the full magnitude of their success when, on the day following the battle, General Gablenz passed through their lines with Benedek's proposal for an armistice. His mission was wholly unsuccessful. In fact, his errand stimulated such confidence at the royal headquarters as to cause Bismarck himself some misgivings. He had "the thankless task of pouring water into the foaming wine, and reminding his people that they were not living alone in Europe, but with three other neighbors."

So far as Austria was concerned, there was little more to fear. The army of the north which Benedek had addressed with such flowery assurance a fortnight before was a mere wreck cowering under the intrenchments of Olmütz. Vienna was ablaze with rage, and Benedek was its unhappy object. His resignation which followed was a matter of necessity. The Archduke Albrecht was called from Italy to the command of the united Austrian armies, and on his arrival bent his energies to placing Vienna in a state of defense. He dispatched imperative orders to Benedek

at Olmütz to forward his army by rail as rapidly as possible, at the same time instructing his successor in Venetia to hurry all his available troops to the defense of the capital.

The three Prussian armies renewed their advance on the 5th, the crown prince moving upon Olmütz, while Frederick Charles and Bittenfeld marched for Vienna, — the former *via* Brünn; the latter by Iglau and Znaim. The monotony of the long marches was broken only by occasional alarms and cavalry skirmishes. The tide of advance swept on, leaving the crops waving uninjured to await the harvesting of their owners, and the stolid villagers with bare larders but abundance of Prussian coin.

On the 13th the vanguard of the first army entered Brünn unopposed, and the next day cut the railway line at Lundenburg over which Benedek had been hurrying his troops to Vienna. It was at Brünn that the equipage of M. Benedetti first appeared, a harbinger of peace and of would-be French aggrandizement. On the 20th the Prussian columns gained the banks of the Danube, and the soldiers obtained the long-coveted view of the spire of St. Stephens floating dimly over the haze of Vienna.

Before the cutting of the railway line Benedek had sent four of his broken corps to the capital. With the remainder of his army he determined to move down the March valley to the same destination. On the 15th, however, his right flank was struck savagely by the cavalry of the crown prince, an event that led him to abandon his line of march and adopt a more circuitous route westward over the Carpathian Mountains. On the 21st he reached Pressburg, and opened communications with the archduke at Vienna.

In the mean time the Austrian cabinet had come to

the conclusion that an armistice could alone prevent the humiliation of a Prussian military pageant on the Ring-Strasse. The archduke had succeeded in bringing up but a small portion of the army from Venetia, while the troops from Olmütz were still in a state of partial demoralization. The news that Benedek's weary battalions were streaming into Pressburg produced no change in the conviction of the government. On the 22d Count Karolyi and General Degenfeld repaired to the Prussian headquarters at Nikolsburg to arrange an armistice and discuss the preliminaries of a peace.

On this day an action was fought in the vicinity of Blumenau between the 7th and 8th Prussian divisions and four Austrian brigades of the 2d and 10th corps. The action was interrupted by news of the armistice, though not until the Austrian position had been seriously compromised. Blumenau was a useless contest, but it brought laurels to General Franzecky and will remain conspicuous as the last action of the Seven Weeks' war.

The armistice was to expire on the 27th, but on the 26th, after conferences in which M. Benedetti essayed to play a part, preliminaries of peace were signed. The tenor of these preliminaries alone attested the extent of the Austrian reverse. She agreed to withdraw from the confederation, to pay a heavy war indemnity, and to oppose no objection to Prussia's reorganization of North Germany. Everything which Austrian statesmen since Schwarzenberg had been contending for was hopelessly lost in the development of Bismarck's policy of "iron and blood." The arrangement of details devolved upon the diplomats, and the Prussian army withdrew to the line of the Thaya to await the signature of a definite peace.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE OVERTHROW OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL ARMY.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST. — CRITICAL SITUATION OF THE HANOVERIAN ARMY. — INDIFFERENCE OF PRINCE CHARLES OF BAVARIA. — VICTORY OF THE HANOVERIANS AT LANGENSALZA. — CAPITULATION OF THE HANOVERIAN ARMY. — INDECISION IN THE FEDERAL COUNCILS. — ADVANCE OF THE PRUSSIAN GENERAL FALCKENSTEIN UPON FRANKFORT. — PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF FULDA. — BATTLE OF KISSINGEN AND DEFEAT OF THE BAVARIANS. — DEFEAT OF THE 8TH FEDERAL CORPS AT LAUFACH AND ASCHAFFENBURG. — PRUSSIAN ENTRY INTO FRANKFORT. — JUNCTION OF PRINCE ALEXANDER WITH PRINCE CHARLES. — GENERAL MANTEUFFEL SUCCEEDS FALCKENSTEIN. — HE MARCHES FROM FRANKFORT. — INDECISION OF THE FEDERAL COMMANDER. — FIGHTING ON THE TAUBER. — RETREAT OF THE FEDERAL ARMY UPON WÜRZBURG. — BOMBARDMENT OF WÜRZBURG BY THE PRUSSIANS. — THE ARMISTICE.

DURING the progress of the campaign in Bohemia, the Prussian armies in the west had been gaining most decisive successes. In three days after the declaration of war they had occupied Hanover and Cassel, and held the Hanoverian army in their power. In fact, the only chance for the escape of King George and his devoted troops lay in the coöperation of the Bavarian army then massed in the vicinity of Bamberg and Würzburg. Prince Charles of Bavaria refusing to recognize the gravity of the crisis, it devolved upon the hard-pressed Hanoverians to extricate themselves unaided from the necessity of a capitulation. King George was despondent, realizing the unpreparedness of his troops and the utter dilap-

idation of his commissariat. He opened negotiations with Berlin in the hope of securing a free passage for his army into Bavaria on the condition that they would not turn their arms against Prussia during the succeeding six months. The delay caused by this correspondence was fatal to him. The Hanoverian army had been slowly moving in the direction of Gotha, and on the 26th bivouacked about the town of Langensalza. That night four Prussian divisions were closing in upon it from the northwest and south. On the morning of the 27th the Prussian General Flies advancing from Warza with 12,000 men encountered the Hanoverian outposts in front of Langensalza. The conflict that ensued was the last which the Hanoverians were destined to wage for their royal house. Poorly armed, poorly organized, with every circumstance dispiriting, the raw battalions of King George proved themselves nevertheless invincible. General Flies was compelled to abandon the field to his foes, and draw off toward Warza.

The victory, however, stirred no enthusiasm in the Hanoverian ranks. The king recognized the fact that a prolongation of the contest could only result in useless slaughter. Forty-two thousand Prussians were concentrating upon his position, and there was no sign of help from the Bavarians. Even the cannon of Langensalza had failed to awake Prince Charles from his lethargy. On the 29th, finally despairing of aid, the king accepted the Prussian terms and capitulated. The soldiers laid down their arms and were dismissed to their homes. The king became an exile from his people.

The Hanoverians disposed of, there remained to confront the Prussians the Bavarian army and the

8th federal corps which was still in process of mobilization. The plan conceived at Vienna for the movement of the federal forces in the west comprised an early junction of the Bavarians and the 8th corps and an invasion of Prussian territory. The fall of the Hanoverian army, which was to lend its support to this movement, threw all the military calculations out of joint. Prince Charles, after allowing his opportunity to slip, made a tardy advance to succor the Hanoverians. At Meiningen he received tidings of the battle of Langensalza and the subsequent capitulation. Upon this he began a hurried retreat to join the 8th corps, which at the same time commenced its northward march from Frankfort. The rapid movements of the Prussians, however, again frustrated the federal commander.

General von Falckenstein, who had been appointed to the command of all the Prussian forces in the west, rapidly concentrated his army after the capitulation of the Hanoverians, and moved upon Frankfort *via* Fulda. On July 4 he worsted the Bavarian detachment at Wiesenthal, inducing the retirement of the whole Bavarian army beyond the Saale. Prince Alexander, commanding the 8th corps, upon learning of this commenced his retreat on Frankfort. On the 6th General von Falckenstein occupied Fulda, and in view of the fact that seventy miles of country separated the two corps of the federal army, he determined to overwhelm them in detail. He did not overrate the demoralization in Prince Alexander's ranks when he concluded that there was little to fear from the 8th corps for some days to come. On the 8th he broke up his quarters at Fulda, on the 9th he crossed the Hohe Rhön, and the next morning hurled his forces

against the astonished Bavarians at Hammelburg, Kissingen, and Waldaschach on the Saale. At every point the Bavarians were outnumbered, and so far separated from their supports that no aid was possible during the day. Kissingen became sadly changed in a few hours. Its fashionable devotees were awakened by the uproar of military preparations, and found themselves enforced witnesses of a fierce combat. The bridges over the Saale were destroyed and the streets barricaded; but before these precautions were completed Goeben's Prussian division was attacking. The Bavarians fought well, but under cover of their superior artillery the Prussians crossed the river, and carried the fight into the streets of the town. In the Kurgarten, where twice a day fashion held high carnival, the combatants closed with the bayonet. At three o'clock the Prussians had carried the town, leaving its finery sadly battle-scarred. The Bavarians, doggedly retreating, maintained desultory skirmishing until dark. The retreat from Hammelburg had commenced earlier in the day, while at Waldaschach General Manteuffel's division encountered only feeble resistance.

By these successes General Falckenstein won the line of the Saale, and temporarily paralyzed the Bavarian army for offensive movements. On the 11th he turned against the 8th corps, directing Beyer's division to Hanau, and Goeben's division against Aschaffenburg *via* Laufach, where the troops of Hesse Darmstadt were in position. On the 13th Goeben carried Laufach, and the next day encountered the Austrian brigade of the 8th corps at Aschaffenburg. The action there was not especially severe. The Austrian artillery was well served, but their in-

fantry, composed largely of Italians, was thrown into confusion, and lost 2,000 prisoners by becoming jammed in the streets of the town. This fight settled the fate of Frankfort, and there was a general stampede of federal functionaries, civil and military. Alarmed at the defeat of his advanced brigades, Prince Alexander hastily withdrew from the city, and on the 15th had his whole army on the south side of the Main. On the 16th General Falckenstein entered Frankfort, the public buildings were placed under military guard, and the Prussian colors hoisted upon the palace of Thurn and Taxis. The free city of Frankfort, the capital of the German confederation, was to be from henceforth a Prussian municipality.

From this time the federal cause in the west was hopeless. On the 15th Prince Alexander effected a junction with the Bavarians, but it was then too late to reap the benefits that would have attended an earlier consummation of the movement. Both the federal corps were dispirited by their lack of success as well as by the tidings of Königgrätz and the Prussian advance on Vienna. The Bavarians had lost confidence in their leaders, and the heterogeneous soldiery of the 8th corps had fought without enthusiasm from the first.

As for the Prussians, their condition was exactly the reverse. General von Falckenstein was called to assume the military governorship of Bohemia, but he was ably succeeded by General Manteuffel. Furthermore, a reserve corps had been formed at Leipsic, and under the command of the grand duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was preparing to invade Bavaria in the direction of Hof. The army of the Main, as Manteuffel's army was now styled, had been strength-

ened also by the military contingents of Oldenburg, Hamburg, Lübeck, Waldeck, Bremen, and Schwarzbürg-Sonderhausen, aggregating 10,000 men.

On the 21st Manteuffel advanced from Frankfort. Prince Charles of Bavaria was at a loss what course to pursue. If he stood fast against Manteuffel he left the road open for the grand duke of Mecklenburg to march on Munich. If he retreated to cover the capital he permitted a union of the two Prussian armies. While he was thus undecided, on the 24th Manteuffel attacked the 8th corps on the Tauber. At Werbach where the Badenens were in position, and at Tauberbischofsheim held by the Würtembergers, there was some sharp fighting, but at both places the Prussians forced a passage of the river. Prince Alexander retired to Gersheim midway between Würzburg and Tauberbischofsheim. That night the Bavarian army came up on his right, prolonging the line of battle to the vicinity of Utingen and Helmstadt on the north.

There was desultory fighting all along this front of ten miles on the day following. After dark Prince Alexander began his retreat upon Würzburg. Prince Charles, ignorant of this movement, and having his troops better in hand, moved against Utingen on the morning of the 26th. He was not long in discovering that his left flank was uncovered, and that his communications with Würzburg were threatened by Goeben's victorious troops. A hasty retreat at once commenced, and before night the whole federal army was reunited at Würzburg. With the Main in its rear and a determined foe in front, the position of this army was most critical. It was literally besieged, while the troops of the Prussian reserve corps at

Baireuth had an open march to München. The one hope of the federal forces lay in the efforts of Herr von der Pfordten, the Bavarian ambassador, who had been at Nikolsburg for some days endeavoring to arrange an honorable peace with Prussia.

Bismarck's dealings with Pfordten were more brief than conciliatory. Bavaria must yield all her territory north of the Main, and consent to the payment of a war indemnity. In vain the Bavarian protested against these harsh conditions. When it became clear that Vienna was at the mercy of the Prussians, and he learned that the great fortress of Würzburg was fast becoming a rubbish heap under the bombardment of Manteuffel's artillery, Pfordten yielded to the inevitable. News of the armistice reached Würzburg on the 29th after a day of terrific cannonade. Hostilities were immediately suspended, and before the close of the month preliminaries of peace had been signed between Prussia, Bavaria, and all those states whose contingents made up the 8th federal corps.

CHAPTER XX.

THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1866.

ITALIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DEATH OF CAVOUR. — GARIBALDI AGAIN. — THE BATTLE AT ASPROMONTE. — FALL OF THE RATAZZI MINISTRY. — FRANCE AND THE ROMAN QUESTION. — DROUYN DE LHUYS ON THE SITUATION. — TRANSFER OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO FLORENCE. — JOY OF THE FLORENTINES. — DECLARATION OF WAR UPON AUSTRIA. — CONDITION OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES. — THE GERMAN PLAN FOR THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN AND ITS REJECTION AT FLORENCE. — THE ITALIAN ARMY CROSSES THE MINCIO. — THE PLANS OF THE OPPOSING COMMANDERS RESULT IN A COLLISION. — THE THEATRE OF ACTION. — OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF CUSTOZZA ON THE ITALIAN RIGHT. — FIGHTING AT OLIOSI AND ROUT OF THE ITALIAN LEFT WING. — BOLD AND SUCCESSFUL MOVE OF THE ITALIAN GENERAL PIANELLI TO CHECK THE AUSTRIAN PURSUIT. — PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE IN THE CENTRE. — LA MARMORA'S INCAPACITY. — STATE OF THE BATTLE AT TWO O'CLOCK. — CONCENTRIC ATTACK OF THE ARCHDUKE UPON CUSTOZZA AND RETREAT OF THE ITALIANS. — THE ITALIAN ARMY RECROSSES THE MINCIO. — RESPONSIBILITY OF LA MARMORA FOR THE DEFEAT. — THE ARCHDUKE ALBRECHT SUMMONED TO VIENNA. — ADVANCE OF THE ITALIAN ARMY UNDER CIALDINI. — DEFEAT OF THE ITALIAN FLEET AT LISSA. — DEGRADATION OF ADMIRAL PERSANO. — GOOD FAITH OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN 1866.

ON the evening when Prince Frederick Charles was concentrating his troops at Reichenberg, preparatory to their first contest with the Kaiserliks, the last echoes of a stern battle were reverberating among the hills of the Lago di Garda, and an Italian army was retreating from a disastrous field.

The course of events in Italy since Cavour's death

had been marked by bitter parliamentary strifes, by the fall of ministries, and by inglorious insurrections, until the battle-cry of "Venetia" united the nation anew. The ministry of Baron Ricasoli, who succeeded Cavour, fell in a few months for alleged lukewarmness on the Roman question. Signor Ratazzi would have left an enviable record as prime minister except for this same Roman question. After a few months of prosperity, however, during which the diplomatic relations of Italy steadily improved, and numerous internal improvements were instituted, he was confronted by a Garibaldian revolution with its battle-cry of "Rome or death." This was in July, 1862. Garibaldi made his appearance in Sicily, and summoned his old comrades about him for the march upon the eternal city. Perhaps Cavour would have found a way of turning even this crowning folly of Garibaldi to some good account, but Ratazzi saw but one course of action in the crisis. He immediately placed the Two Sicilies in a state of siege, and dispatched General La Marmora to restore order. On the 29th of August Garibaldi was confronted by the royal troops at Aspromonte. There was but little fighting, but an unlucky bullet inflicted a wound upon Garibaldi's ankle that was attended with the most serious political consequences. The republican faction heading all disaffections started a fierce agitation against the Ratazzi ministry. Garibaldi was held up as a patriot and martyr. The prime minister was decried as an imperialist and a traitor. The ministry resigned, and in the fall of 1862 was succeeded by that of Signor Farini. Ill health brought his administration to an end in a few months. Signor Minghetti followed, and infused new vigor into the government. Brig-

andage in the southern provinces was mercilessly hunted down, new railways were opened, and the whole financial system was reformed.

At length (1864) the incessant importunity of the Italian government with reference to Rome began to bear fruit at Paris. The emperor wanted Austria driven from Italy, but so long as he held Rome he could hardly lay stress upon this point. At length he agreed to withdraw his troops on the promise of the Italian government to protect the Papal See; a promise accompanied by the transfer of the royal capital from Turin to Florence as a pledge of good faith. "Of course this will all end in your going to Rome," was the whispered remark of M. Drouyn de Lhuys to the Italian minister at Paris, "but it is important that between this event and that of the evacuation such an interval may elapse, and such a series of incidents occur, as to do away with the possibility of establishing any connection between them: France must not be held responsible."

The Italian government accepted the conditions, and yet so bitter was the feeling engendered throughout Piedmont, and especially in Turin, upon its announcement that the Minghetti ministry resigned. The king summoned General La Marmora to form a new cabinet, and he proved the right man for the crisis. He supported the odious arrangement in a curt and military fashion. "The king's signature is there — and that is enough," he declared in the Chamber. The arrangement was finally indorsed and by a large majority. Turin became simply the chief city of Piedmont, the ancient seat of the Sardinian kings. Florence became the capital of united Italy. If Turin was grieved and angry, Florence welcomed the king

with open arms. In November, 1865, the parliament convened in the great hall of the Palazzo Vecchio, from the walls of which the strong features of the Medici looked down through the dimness of the centuries. Florence rang her bells anew, not in warning but in joy. The banner of the republic or the arms of the Medici had never been so glad a sight to Florence as the tricolor with the emblem of Savoy that now floated from the battlements of the Palazzo Pitti.

Having so far settled the Roman question as to have gained a promise of the withdrawal of the French troops, Victor Emmanuel and his ministry turned their attention to Venice. The hostility between Austria and Prussia proved their opportunity. The king through the French emperor sought to induce Austria to yield Venetia as the price of Italian neutrality in the approaching contest, but Austria was too confident at this time to heed such a proposal. In the mean time General Govone concluded the Italo-Prussian alliance with Bismarek at Berlin. From this time Italy steadily prepared for war.


The Italian declaration of war was issued on the 20th of June. The king left Florence to take the command of the army, General La Marmora acting as chief of staff. The army consisted at this time of four strong corps, the 1st under General Durando at Cavriana, the 2d under Cucchiari at Castelluccio, the 3d under Della Rocca at Gazzoldo, and the 4th under Cialdini in the vicinity of Ferrara, a total strength of nearly 160,000 men. The Archduke Albrecht, who commanded the Kaiser's forces in Venetia, could muster about Verona scarcely more than one third as many bayonets as his foe. He had the

5th corps under General Rodich, the 7th under Field Marshal di Madonna del Monte, the 9th under General Hartung, and a reserve infantry division commanded by General Rupprecht. Each of these corps comprised three infantry brigades of an average strength of 5,000 men.

It seems that a plan of campaign was forwarded from Berlin for the consideration of the royal staff. It provided for the masking of the Quadrilateral and the embarkation of the main Italian army for some point near Trieste from which it could conveniently march upon Vienna. In other words, the Prussian idea was for the Italians to fight a defensive battle on the Mincio and the Po, while they threatened Vienna from Styria. In consideration of the great numerical superiority of the Italians, this plan was feasible from a military point of view, but it did not find favor with La Marmora. His preference and the sentiment of Italy was for a march on Venice rather than on Vienna.

The plan adopted at the Italian headquarters at Goito was to occupy the Quadrilateral in force, to isolate the fortresses, and push back the Austrian field army. On the 23d, in pursuance of orders issued from headquarters on the day previous, the Italian armies began their advance. The 1st corps passed the Mincio at Monzambano, Borghetto, and Molino di Volta, Pianelli's division being retained on the right bank to watch the garrison of Peschiera. The entire 3d corps crossed at Goito and bivouacked between Massimbona and Pozzolo. The 2d corps was badly distributed. Three of its brigades were directed upon Mantua, another brigade detailed to watch Borgoforte, while two divisions remained at Castellucchio

BATTLEFIELD OF CUSTOZZA



with orders to cross the Mincio on the 24th as a support to the 1st and 3d corps.

General La Marmora took it for granted that the archduke would not accept a battle west of the Adige. On the 23d he issued his orders to the commanders of the 1st and 3d corps to occupy the heights of Sona and Sommacampagna. No one seems to have anticipated that it might be necessary to fight for these positions. Consequently at daybreak on the 24th the men commenced their march with empty stomachs, in heavy marching order, and without even the protection of patrols.

The Archduke Albrecht kept himself well informed as to the whereabouts of his enemy and used his cavalry to good advantage. The passage of the 3d Italian corps at Goito and the position of Durando's forces led him to infer that the Italian armies were aiming at concentration in the vicinity of Albaredo on the Adige. With this impression in mind he gave orders on the 23d to occupy the heights of Sommacampagna. His plan was excellently conceived. His forces took position on a line from Sandra through Sona to Sommacampagna, and pivoting on the latter place executed a wheel to the left, establishing a new line from Castelnovo to Sommacampagna facing southwest. It will thus be seen that on the morning of June 24, when La Marmora's hungry and heavily-laden troops were marching loosely to occupy the coveted positions, the Austrians were also advancing excellently prepared for combat.

The theatre of action was a memorable one in Austrian and Italian military history. For the Italians it was teeming with gloomy and bitter memories. Here in Villafranca, resounding this morning with

the rumble of artillery and the blare of the bugles of Prince Humbert's division, the hateful convention of 1859 was signed by Napoleon and the Kaiser. Hardly a league distant, drowsily sleeping among those hilltops above the hot valley of the Tione is the village of Custozza where the Sardinians were defeated by Radetsky in 1849. A few miles away toward the west, invisible it is true, is the shot-scarred tower of Solferino and the grave-sprinkled slope before San Martino. It was indeed a sad country for the Italians, and destined to become more so.

About seven o'clock Prince Humbert's division, advancing from Villafranca upon Ganfardine and Dossobuono, fell in with the Austrian outposts. Upon this General Brignone, whose division had crossed the Tione and was approaching Staffalo, promptly seized the heights of Custozza and the Monte Croce, whose summits command the road from Custozza to Sommacampagna. This movement was executed none too soon, for when the first troops gained the Monte Croce the Austrians could be descried on the heights of the Berettara across the valley to the north. Brignone was soon warmly engaged, the Lombard grenadier brigade on the heights of Custozza, the Piedmontese grenadiers on the Monte Croce.

About the same time the Italian left wing on the eastern bank of the Tione had begun the action. General Cerale's division, after having lost its way at Monzambano and marched nearly to Valeggio in the efforts to find Castelnuovo, came up with the Austrian division of reserve infantry near Oliosi about six in the morning. The Pisa brigade drove the Austrians from Mongrabia and from their strong positions on the Monte Cricol. The other brigade of the division,

however, was thrown into disorder by a flank attack of Piret's brigade of the 5th corps, which had arrived to General Rupprecht's succor. General Cerale was wounded in the *mêlée*, and the Pisa brigade had no alternative but to retire. The young soldiers, so full of *élan* in the advance, became panicky when the bugles sounded the retreat. The reserve of the 1st corps arrived at Monte Vento about half past ten and covered the retreat of the discomfited battalions.

General Sirtori with his division had likewise been warmly engaged with the Austrian 5th corps on the Pernisa plateau and between that point and Santa Lucia. About two o'clock, however, despairing of supports, he abandoned the latter place and began his retreat upon Valeggio. This movement also necessitated the withdrawal of the reserve from Monte Vento, the right flank of the position being exposed, and no hope remaining of rallying Cerale's division.

In the mean while, unknown to his colleagues, General Pianelli had crossed the Mincio and administered a severe repulse to the extreme Austrian right. He retired to Monte Sabbione with several hundred prisoners, and had his presence there been known earlier the retreat of Sirtori and the reserve artillery would hardly have been necessary.

The dissipation of the Italian left wing compromised the central positions about Custozza. The fight in that vicinity had been stubbornly maintained throughout the morning, the Archduke Albrecht employing the 7th and 9th corps in repeated efforts to gain the heights. The Lombard grenadiers were driven from Custozza in disorder and Prince Amedeo wounded. The Piedmontese made good the Monte Croce against all assaults, but were relieved about

ten o'clock by Cugia's division. Brignone's division had been subjected to such losses as to be considered out of the fight. Govone's division covered Cugia's left, and after some hard fighting recaptured Custozza. Before this La Marmora had left his centre, and was riding away to Valeggio to hunt up his missing divisions. The Italian commander had no staff with him on this critical day, and in his efforts to be at every point and keep track of the battle was never to be found when wanted and always laboring under erroneous impressions. At noon La Marmora at Valeggio believed the army to be lost, but in point of fact at two o'clock Pianelli, Sirtori, Cugia, and Govone were still unshaken, while Bixio and Humbert had not been fairly engaged and were being held in inaction by the movements of a few audacious cavalrymen. But at 3.30 another face was put upon matters. Sirtori was then in retreat, and Pianelli moving toward the Mincio. The Archduke Albrecht, with his right wing free, inaugurated a strong concentric movement against the heart of the Italian position. One brigade of the 5th corps, advancing from Santa Lucia, threatened Govone's flank and rendered the heights of Custozza untenable. In vain the Italian general pleaded for reinforcements. The divisions of Bixio and Humbert continued idle, though a movement by them upon Sommacampagna would have paralyzed the Austrian attack. Govone retired slowly, relinquishing Custozza about six o'clock, while Cugia, finding himself abandoned by his colleague, also began to retreat. When at last the archduke found himself master of the heights of Custozza, the strength of his troops was spent. The intense heat of the cloudless day had been almost insufferable. No pur-

suit was attempted, and the soldiers of Bixio and Humbert had scarcely an opportunity to foul their gun-barrels in covering the retreat upon Villafranca. The retrograde movement did not cease at that point, and through the darkness of the sultry night the broken battalions of the Italian army plodded heavily over the roads to Goito and Valeggio. Even the bridge at the latter place was destroyed, a move that for the first time led the archduke to appreciate the magnitude of his success. This unwarrantable act proclaimed that the Italian commander, far from meditating a renewal of the march upon Venice, had entirely abandoned the Quadrilateral, and deemed the unbroken current of the Mincio necessary to the safety of his rear-guard.

Most military critics agree that La Marmora's negligence in not keeping his staff near him was the principal cause of the defeat of Custozza. It was Cerale's fugitives streaming through Valeggio that frightened the Italian general into the idea that all was lost, and that Bixio and Humbert must be held intact to cover the rout. If he had been in communication with his whole line, and spent more time on the Tione and less on the Mincio, Sirtori need not have abandoned Santa Lucia, and Custozza would have been impregnable.

The Archduke Albrecht showed himself a capable soldier, and handled his troops wisely, if not brilliantly. He became the idol of the army, and a fortnight after the battle was summoned to Vienna to succeed the hapless Benedek. The 5th and 9th corps were also called to the defense of the capital, leaving a force of barely 25,000 men for the defense of the Quadrilateral.

The battle of Custoza cost La Marmora his command, which was conferred upon Cialdini. On the 7th of July, the confidence of the Italian army having been somewhat restored, he commenced an advance, pushing his vanguard across the Po that evening. The Austrian general did not attempt to oppose him. On the 14th the Italian vanguard occupied Padua; on the 15th Vicenza. On the 18th the division of General Nunziante drove the Austrian garrison from Borgoforte. On the 22d, when a truce was concluded, Cialdini's left was on the Isonzo and his right within view of Venice.

But the improved military status was offset by another humiliation. On July 20 the Italian fleet of Admiral Persano was worsted by an inferior squadron off Lissa. Three Italian iron-clads, the *Affondatore*, *Re d'Italia*, and *Palestro* were sunk. Lissa was Custoza repeated at sea. While Persano had the advantage in ships, tonnage, and weight of metal, the Italian seamen were always fighting at a disadvantage against odds. A feeling of pity for Persano is irresistible, for he had served his country well in past years. He was brought before the senate, of which he was a member, for trial, charged with cowardice, disobedience, incapacity, and negligence. The upper Italian house had not attained the spirit that animated the Roman Senate when they received the consul who had commanded the legions at Cannæ. Persano was acquitted of cowardice on a close vote, but found guilty of all other charges and deprived of command and rank.

The events of 1866 have always been humiliating memories to Italians. They gained Venetia, but not by the force of their own arms. Though the military

pride of Italy was wounded, she certainly has high claims to satisfaction. The policy of the royal government throughout the year 1866 was conspicuously honorable. The king since 1859 had always insisted upon his determination to carry Italian freedom to the Adriatic. His position was thoroughly understood at Vienna, and his practical avowal that the cession of Venetia was the only inducement which would keep him neutral in a German war was no surprise to the Austrian statesmen. After the conclusion of the treaty with Prussia the king, though tried, proved himself above temptation. In the spring Austria, thoroughly alarmed, agreed to his proposition made in the winter. But she met with a rebuff, for Victor Emmanuel was then bound, not only to Venetia, but to Prussia as well. After the battle of Königgrätz, with his army still demoralized by Custoza, he again put aside Venetia and the blessings of peace until his duty toward Prussia was thoroughly fulfilled. Cialdini's advance into Venetia was ordered after the Austrian cession of that province to the Emperor of the French. The Italian army was poorly organized, poorly equipped, and badly directed, but its prowess was unquestionable. If it did not win a battle, it detained 75,000 good Austrian soldiers, who might have turned the scale on the Iser or at Königgrätz.

Italy need not blush for Custoza or Lissa, but she may take pride in the whole-souled commendation of her powerful ally. On December 20, 1866, Prince Bismarck made the following declaration in the Prussian Chambers: "We had powerful support in the incorruptible fidelity of Italy — fidelity which I cannot too highly commend, whose value I cannot too highly appreciate. The Italian government resisted

firmly the temptation to violate the alliance on account of Austria's gift (the cession of Venetia), who was our mutual foe ; from this fact we may draw strong hopes that in the future the most cordial relations will unite Germany and Italy."

CHAPTER XXI.

RESULTS OF THE SEVEN WEEKS' WAR.

THE TREATY OF PRAGUE. — THE FOUR GREAT RESULTS OF THE SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. — THE FEDERAL REICHSTAG. — BISMARCK AND BENEDETTI. — BISMARCK AND SOUTH GERMANY. — THE NEW ERA IN AUSTRIA. — THE TRANSFER OF VENETIA. — VICTOR EMANUEL IN VENICE. — CRITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE IN 1867.

PRUSSIA concluded peace with all the South German states except Darmstadt before the close of August. On August 23 the treaty of Prague was concluded with Austria, and on October 3 the treaty of Vienna was signed between Austria and Italy.

The treaty of Prague was a substantial ratification of the Nikolsburg preliminaries. South Germany procured peace at the expense of heavy indemnities, and in the case of Hesse Darmstadt and Bavaria the cession of territory north of the Main. The treaty of Vienna ratified the union of Venetia with the Italian kingdom.

The results of the Seven Weeks' war may be summed up under four heads: first, the exaltation of Prussia and the formation of the North German confederation under her leadership; second, the disappearance of Austria as a German power; third, the realization of Italian freedom from the Alps to the Adriatic; and fourth, the shattering of Napoleon's air-castles. England and Russia were not seriously influenced. The London government experienced

some misgiving over what it regarded as the downfall of continental conservatism, while St. Petersburg was still inclined to regard with complacency any humiliation of Austria.

Bismarck returned to Berlin with his policy vindicated and his popularity assured. In 1849 he had publicly declared that the most prominent characteristic of Prussian nationality was its warlike element. It remained for the first battles in Bohemia to demonstrate the truth of his words. The news of victory worked a transformation throughout the nation, and the very men whose names had been prominent on peace petitions joined lustily in the popular shout of "to Vienna." The soldiers who left their occupations with reluctance, and entered the ranks without enthusiasm, took kindly to the bloody work on the heights above Sadowa, and even grumbled over the early cessation of hostilities. It was remarked by foreigners that there was a tinge of ferocity in the joy which animated Berlin when the regiments from the Danube began to throng the Linden, suggesting that it was induced more by victorious war than the satisfaction of renewed peace.

Bismarck upon returning to the Diet found a spirit of congratulation and adulation, where two months before he had encountered only hostility and invective. The houses almost unanimously acquiesced in the proposed incorporation of Hanover and Hesse Cassel and Nassau into the Prussian kingdom, and the amalgamation of all the German states north of the Main into a commercial and military confederation. In June, 1866, Prussia had an area of 127,350 square miles and a population of 19,000,000. Before the close of that year she had extended her sway over

160,000 miles and 23,000,000 souls. Every state north of the Main was either incorporated in the Prussian monarchy or joined with it in the iron bands of the North German confederation. The fate of Saxony hung for a time in the balance, and but for the efforts of Austria backed by France its ancient house would have shared the fate of that of Hanover. The settlement reached was complex and satisfactory only to Prussia. The Saxon throne remained intact on the following conditions: That Saxony entered the confederation, that the military and postal affairs passed under the control of Prussia, that the fortress of Königstein should receive a Prussian garrison, and Dresden a garrison half Prussian, half Saxon, under a Prussian commandant. The salt tax was abolished and a war indemnity exacted of 10,000,000 thalers.

But matters in the federal Reichstag did not run smoothly. Bismarck, having mollified his old enemies, found new ones in the delegations from Hanover, Hesse, and Saxony. He had no mercy upon these unhappy patriots with their complaints and protestations. "They who dealt us a stab in the side in the hour of our danger," he stormed, "have no right afterwards to become sentimental and complain of hard usage." When in July, 1867, Bismarck was proclaimed chancellor of the confederation, he could look back upon a great work accomplished. The annexed states were still turbulent, but for all that they recognized that the confederation was a safeguard against foreign menace. All the military forces were in process of reorganization on the Prussian plan, and the closer union of commercial interests was bearing good fruit.

Bismarck was preparing even at this time for a

danger that the German people and the world at large did not suspect ; he alone could see it looming darkly in the west and casting its shadow over the Rhineland. M. Benedetti moved conspicuously in diplomatic circles at Berlin ; he was frequently in conference with the chancellor ; he passed restlessly back and forth between Paris and Berlin. Even the diplomatic world did not know what this portended, nor that the French ambassador in his efforts to "indemnify France" had placed in the hands of the wily chancellor a weapon that was destined to make Germany a military unit from the Baltic to the Alps. South Germany hated Prussia and the northern confederation, princes as well as people. When, however, Bismarck placed before them the paper which Benedetti had confided to him, they, too, caught a glimpse of the tempest gathering in the west. In fact, before the close of August, 1866, while the graves at Kissingen and Laufach were still fresh, the armies of South Germany as well as those of the confederation were at the disposal of the king of Prussia in case of war. Six months passed before this was developed, but in the cabinet at Berlin, and in certain circles in Munich, Darmstadt, and Stuttgart, they knew that French diplomacy had miscarried, and that the would-be trickster had been tricked.

Austria, though humiliated in the field, turned her losses to excellent account. Driven from the German brotherhood at the point of the bayonet, it is questionable if she gained less by her reverse than did her conqueror by the victory. Austria since 1815 had been endeavoring to "run" Europe, so to speak, or at least a large portion of it. Menacing

Russia on the eastern Danube, ruling Italy from Venice and Milan, snubbing Prussia at Frankfort, and grappling with Denmark in Schleswig, she had been creating foes upon all hands and frittering away her strength. The warning of 1859 passed unheeded, and it remained for the disaster of Königgrätz to teach the Kaiser the lesson he had persistently refused to learn by milder methods. His reputed military power was proved a mere bubble. His soldiers fought stubbornly but without enthusiasm. It was plain that greater content must be achieved at home before conquests either of a moral or military nature could be achieved abroad. With Hungary hostile or indifferent, it was impossible to make the will of Vienna a powerful factor in the politics of Europe.

The battle of Königgrätz closed an epoch of Austrian history and inaugurated a new era. The Kaiser extended the olive branch to his Magyar subjects, and gracefully conceded the national parliament for which they had been clamoring since 1848. The result demonstrated the wisdom of the act. The warm-hearted Hungarians expressed their satisfaction by electing the emperor and empress king and queen of Hungary, and establishing the hereditary succession in the House of Hapsburg. Austria had at last entered upon the path that was destined to secure for her the strength and cohesion she had always lacked. If the power of the Kaiser was felt no longer on the Rhine it became doubly potent on the Danube. If his soldiery had held their last parades at Frankfort and Mayence, there was more than a compensating satisfaction in the newly gained assurance that their presence was no longer necessary in the loyal streets of Buda-Pest. At Vienna they could not fail to

remark how contentedly the empire developed without the responsibility of Europe upon its shoulders. The enthusiasm that attended the coronation ceremonies at Buda-Pest in July, 1867, formed a most happy contrast to many of the then recent political events in the Hungarian capital. With a parliament at Buda-Pest and another at Vienna the internal machinery of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy worked smoothly enough, while in the Delegations¹ the Kaiser found no more loyal subjects than the men who had been nurtured in bitter hatred of Austria, and who had followed the standard of Kossuth.

The transfer of Venetia was a move beneficial alike to the Venetians and the contracting powers. Austria lost a discontented province that had brought her nothing but trouble and expense. Italy gained an intensely patriotic people, who only required political content to make them prosperous. When in October the question of their fate was placed in their own hands to be decided by ballot, the Venetians by an almost unanimous vote declared for annexation to the kingdom of Italy.

So the Austrian garrison sailed from the Lagune, and the broad folds of the tricolor displaced the black and yellow banner on the arsenal. It remained for the 7th of November to furnish the culmination of this most dramatic period in the history of northern Italy. On that day Victor Emmanuel passed, amidst the plaudits of his newly gained subjects, across the crowded piazza and up the dim nave to the altar of San Marco. The work of Italian libera-

¹ The Delegations is the national parliament which sits at Vienna, representing Austria and Hungary alike, its members being chosen by the houses in session at Vienna and Pest.

tion inaugurated by the mysterious interview at Plombières was thus dramatically consummated on the shores of the Adriatic within the walls of the cathedral of Venice.

It was a conspicuous fact that none of the powers participating in the war of 1866 laid down their arms upon the conclusion of peace. A spirit of unrest pervaded diplomatic circles. In Italy the king was in constant correspondence with the French government respecting Rome, while at the same time he suppressed the feverish enthusiasm of "Young Italy." The Austrian chancellor, Baron Beust, while applying himself indefatigably to the restoration of the resources of the empire, kept an ever watchful eye upon Prussia, and smiled encouragingly upon France as a possible avenger of Königgrätz. And the chancellor of the north German confederation, while maintaining his military strength, was looking for an ally against France. He chatted pleasantly with the French ambassador at Berlin and hinted at great possibilities, but in the mean time he was using soft words on the Danube, and talking business on the Neva.

France was the centre in 1867 around which Europe was revolving. She held the key to the Roman question and Italy was her suitor; she possessed an unbeaten army and Austria was her flatterer; but she sought a slice of Rhineland and Prussia was her foe.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE DECLINE OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE.

NAPOLÉON'S DREAM IS SHATTERED. — THE CRISIS OF HIS REIGN. — DROUYN DE LHUYS' CONCEPTION OF THE CRISIS. — INDECISION OF THE EMPEROR. — CONDITION OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1866. — THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT UNABLE TO MEET THE MILITARY SITUATION. — BENEDETTI AT NIKOLSBURG. — BENEDETTI IN BERLIN. — EFFORTS OF THE PARIS GOVERNMENT TO INDEMNIFY ITSELF THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. — REFUSAL OF THE FRENCH PROPOSITIONS BY BISMARCK. — POLICY OF DROUYN DE LHUYS AND HIS REMOVAL FROM OFFICE. — BISMARCK ESTABLISHES AN ALLIANCE WITH THE SOUTH GERMAN STATES. — SECOND ATTACK OF M. BENEDETTI. — CONFIDENCE IN PARIS OVER THE SUCCESS OF HIS MISSION. — BENEDETTI'S DISCOMFITURE AND RETURN TO PARIS. — DESPERATION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. — THE CONTEMPLATED PURCHASE OF LUXEMBURG FRUSTRATED BY BISMARCK. — PRUSSIA CONSENTS TO REMOVE HER GARRISON FROM LUXEMBURG. — SUMMARY OF THE FRENCH DIPLOMACY FOR 1866-67. — THE DECLINE OF THE EMPIRE. — PARIS IN 1867.

THE Emperor of the French had counted upon a Prussian defeat. Indeed, dreading lest Austria's victory might be too sweeping, he had gone so far as to offer the services of the French army to the Berlin government on the basis of a territorial remuneration in Bavaria, Hesse, and Rhenish Prussia. This suggestion, however, meeting with no favor at Berlin, he guaranteed Austria his neutrality, and determined to wait a later opportunity to arouse Prussia's gratitude, and gain his long-coveted acquisitions in the Rhineland.

The emperor regarded a long campaign as a necessity of the situation, and the astonishing news of Königgrätz was wholly unexpected. Austria was beaten to her knees, and he had no understanding with Prussia. The crisis of his reign was suddenly forced upon him; and if in his first bewilderment he failed to realize this, his foreign minister was fully alive to it. In fact, M. Drouyn de Lhuys insisted that the necessities of the situation demanded a French army on the German frontier to enforce the emperor's demand that no remodeling of Central Europe should take place without his sanction. M. Benedetti, ambassador at Vienna, also warmly urged this course. "Let the emperor make a simple military demonstration," he wrote, "and he will be astonished at the facility with which he will become arbiter and master of the situation without striking a blow." On July 5 at a cabinet council M. Drouyn de Lhuys warmly urged his project, and was seconded by Marshal Randon, minister for war. When the council broke up, it was understood that the emperor would on the following day promulgate his manifesto convoking the Chambers, but during the evening he was importuned by M. de Lavalette and other leaders of the Prussophile party. Broken by disease, his power of decision impaired, the unhappy emperor was led to change his mind, and choose the course that was to lead his dynasty to ruin.

The army was in a wretched state, and it has even been asserted that it would have been a physical impossibility for the war office to have carried out the scheme of M. Drouyn de Lhuys at that time. It seems hardly reasonable, however, to believe that the French military establishment had sunk so low as this

would imply. It is more probable that the emperor had misgivings lest the "simple military demonstration" might result in hard blows. In this case his recent losses in Mexico and the tried excellence of the Prussian weapons must have exerted an influence upon his mind. Again, in case of war, where were his generals capable of coping with such masters in the science as the Prussians had proved themselves? What could be expected from such a trio as Niel, MacMahon, and Canrobert, who were always at each other's throats? It was a bad quandary, and unquestionably the decision of the emperor made it worse.

We cannot refrain from speculating at this time upon what the result would have been, had Marshal Randon been ordered to move two *corps d'armée* to the Prussian frontier during those critical July days. We can hardly doubt that the disaster which overwhelmed the empire would have been at least delayed. We know, too, that the possibility of French interference was a danger which Bismarck had foreseen, dreaded, and against which he had been unable to make any adequate provision. We have it from his own lips in reference to this crisis, "If France had then had only a few available troops, a small body of French soldiers would have sufficed to make quite a respectable army by joining the numerous corps of South Germany, which on their part would furnish excellent materials, and whose organization alone was defective. Such an army would have first placed us in the prime necessity of covering Berlin and of abandoning all our successes in Austria." ¹

¹ "I was much interested by the opinion expressed by his majesty (King William of Prussia) that the war of 1866 was the ruin of France, 'because Napoleon should have attacked us in the rear!' He went on to say that in 1866 he never would believe in the neutrality

The French emperor, when he abandoned military coercion as a means of restraining Prussia from exorbitant territorial demands, adopted an extraordinary substitute. He determined to appeal to her sense of honor and of gratitude, which should certainly have been awakened by his friendly course since 1864. The gratitude of Prussia with Bismarck Schönhausen to dispense it! It was in pursuance of this meek and gentle policy that M. Benedetti sought Bismarck at Nikolsburg. The conversations there developed to Bismarck the object of the French desires, and that the emperor was in reality inclined to allow Prussia free scope in disposing of Austrian territory, provided he was allowed certain privileges in the Rhineland as "indemnification" for her increased area.

Bismarck's reception of Benedetti's schemes seems to have been distinctly non-committal, but he said enough to leave hope still bright in the bosom of the French ambassador. He enlarged upon his desire for a good understanding between France and Prussia, and pointed out the fact that were their interests similar their position was such they could unitedly bid defiance to all Europe. There is a touch of the pathetic in the eagerness with which M. Benedetti seized these crumbs from the rich man's table, and in the manner in which he displayed them upon the imperial board at the Tuileries. Benedetti was not only hopeful, but sanguine. The emperor began to turn his energies in real earnest to effect that good understanding which Bismarck had so pleasantly referred to at Nikolsburg.

of France, and that only after a long struggle did he consent to remove his forces from the Rhine provinces. He had always been grateful to the Emperor Napoleon for his neutrality on that occasion." — Beust, vol. ii. p. 280.

Bismarck returned to Berlin, where he was followed by Benedetti armed with a form of treaty to be submitted to the Prussian government for approval. The gist of this project was the restoration to France "of the territories which were within the French frontiers of 1814," including all districts of Bavaria and Hesse on the left bank of the Rhine. Benedetti heartily approved of these demands. "Convinced," he said, "that the imperial government has kept within the bounds of equity by thus limiting itself to demanding the guarantees rendered necessary by Prussia's territorial aggrandizement, I shall not be easily induced to put up with alterations of any moment. . . . I shall steadfastly point out that Prussia would ignore the dictates of justice and prudence, beside proving her ingratitude, were she to refuse us the guarantee which the enlargement of her frontiers compels us to demand."

On August 5 a draft of this secret treaty came under Bismarck's eye. On the day following he summoned the French ambassador, and met him with an unqualified refusal. In vain Benedetti expostulated, wheedled, and threatened. As a last resort, finding himself refused on all points, he hinted that the just rage of his sovereign might lead him to "let slip the dogs of war." "Very well," was the curt rejoinder, "then we will have war; but" — and one can imagine a keen irony in the chancellor's tones — "let his majesty well observe that such a war could become in certain eventualities a war with a revolution, and that in presence of revolutionary dangers the German dynasty would prove to be much more firmly established than that of Napoleon." In short, the project which Benedetti had approved as just, and which he

had determined to insist upon without modification, had been squarely refused. Prussia had shown no compunction whatever about "proving her ingratitude." Furthermore, M. Benedetti had been dismissed by the "iron count" with an assurance that Prussia had even outgrown the traditional fear of the French army.

The idea of war which Benedetti had hinted at as a last resort seems not to have been seriously entertained at Paris. The causes that prevented military measures in July were quite as potent in August; France was no better prepared and Prussia had both hands free again. In this humiliating perplexity a scapegoat was found in the person of the foreign minister. Judging his views in the light of subsequent events, M. Drouyn de Lhuys seems to have comprehended the political situation at this time far better than the majority of his contemporaries. He was firmly opposed to the party represented by M. Benedetti, though the exigencies of the times served to swell its ranks. He laughed at the idea that what the government had shown itself too nerveless to grasp was to be placed at its disposal by a government whose army was already in the field flushed with victory and capable of sustaining a long campaign. An alliance with Prussia was to M. Drouyn de Lhuys an absurdity. Prussia and France were natural enemies. To disguise that fact was to make a cat's-paw of France.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys was bestirring himself earnestly to lighten the burdens imposed by Prussia on the conquered states when Benedetti returned from Berlin after his discomfiture. The emperor was still firm in the conviction that nothing was to be gained

by war. Can anything be imagined more humiliating than the French position at this time? A proposal approved by the emperor himself had been submitted to the Prussian government, and rejected even in the teeth of threats of military enforcement. What was the course of the French government to recover their shattered prestige? They disavowed the scheme that had aroused the admiration of Benedetti himself as an act of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who had extorted the sanction of the emperor while he was ill. M. Drouyn de Lhuys passed from office, and the Prussophile party seized the helm. The Berlin government thoroughly appreciated the political situation, however, and were not to be misled by apologies and official decapitation. France had tasted the cup of humiliation, she had proclaimed her weakness and military unpreparedness to the power which of all others she should have held in ignorance of it.

Prussia in the mean time kept quietly at work demonstrating the enormity of her ingratitude. During August Bismarck had made Germany a military unit. He merely displayed the French project, that freak of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as the new régime at the foreign office chose to regard it, with its damning clauses concerning the cession of Bavarian and Hessian territories, and the South German confederation was quickly brought to terms. Between the 17th and 23d of August informal military treaties were concluded against France between Prussia and the states lately in arms against her. Bismarck hastily threw off these important duties in season to welcome Benedetti to Berlin once more.

That the government of the emperor should have approached Prussia again on the question of indemni-

fication seems almost incredible, and yet it was another project of this nature that Benedetti presented to Bismarck during the last week of August. There is nothing in the diplomatic history of the period to show the grounds on which the French ambassador based his assurance of success in this second effort. Certainly it was no less objectionable than the first in its tenor. The Rhenish frontier was avoided, it is true, but Luxemburg and Belgium formed a substitute. A strong military alliance between the two governments was also provided for. Great stress was laid by the emperor's government upon the necessity of maintaining the absolute secrecy of these negotiations. The tone of feeling at the foreign office on the Quai d'Orsay seems really to have approached confidence. Day after day, too, the reports from Benedetti were encouraging. He returned the draft of the treaty for inspection, and the emperor suggested certain alterations. Upon receiving the draft again Benedetti confidently placed it in the hands of Bismarck. The Tuileries waited expectant, but they were not to be long held in suspense.

General Manteuffel suddenly turned up in Berlin, and after a few hours' conference with the chancellor left for St. Petersburg. Benedetti's alarm was natural, and the information carried a chill to the heart of the French emperor. "I asked the president of the council," wrote Benedetti, "if this general officer had been informed of our overture; he answered that he had had no occasion to make him a party to it, but that he could not guarantee to me that the king had not told him the substance."

Bismarck's reception of this treaty was far different from that with which he met the first. There was

no refusal whatever ; he merely demurred, meditated, and then apparently forgot it, for he left Berlin and shut himself up for weeks from the worry of political life, without even taking the trouble to return the document in question.

Poor Benedetti ! It was his hard fate, not only to be the prominent actor in these inglorious proceedings, but to break the doleful news of failure to the sanguine officials of the Quai d'Orsay. " They have elsewhere obtained assurances which dispense with our aid," he wrote shortly after Manteuffel's arrival at St. Petersburg. " If they decline our alliance, it is because they are already provided or on the eve of being." Prussia needed the alliance of a great power, and she arranged it on the Neva.

After these repeated rebuffs, culminating in a Russo-Prussian alliance, it would surely seem that the French emperor would have desisted from his fruitless attempts to obtain " indemnification " at the hands of his heartless and athletic neighbor. The dregs in the cup of shame, however, yet remained to be swallowed. Trusting apparently to some vague remarks made by Bismarck in 1866 respecting the existing relations between Luxemburg and the north German confederation, Napoleon opened negotiations with the king of the Netherlands direct for the purchase of the duchy. That is, notwithstanding his former lack of success the emperor was persuaded that, could the matter be peacefully arranged with Holland on a financial basis, Bismarck would not take the trouble to interfere.

Everything progressed smoothly for a time ; the king of the Netherlands was willing and it only remained to consult Prussia. On March 21, 1867, M.

de Moustier, then foreign minister, expressed himself as follows in relation to the Luxemburg purchase: "We believe that the grand duke possesses the unrestricted right to dispose of Luxemburg with the consent of its inhabitants, and that we have as indisputable a right to acquire that country under similar conditions. But we, as well as the king of the Netherlands, entertain the sincere wish to maintain good relations with the court at Berlin; and it is impossible not to take into account the presence of a Prussian garrison, although no longer justified by a legal right. . . . We have no objection to the cabinet of Berlin being made acquainted with these negotiations, but we wish that the information may reach it through ourselves."

In this latter wish the French government was disappointed. The information leaked out prematurely through the Dutch envoy at Berlin. The details received an uncomfortable publicity, and all Germany was stirred with rage. Then the emperor's diplomatic fabric came crashing down again. Bismarck seized the opportunity of making himself popular with the masses, and again placed himself squarely in the path of French aggrandizement. M. de Moustier hastened to inform the Chambers that the negotiations respecting Luxemburg had not assumed an official character, and were in reality merely an exchange of ideas.

There was no dignity in the final forlorn demand of France that if she was not to be allowed to consummate her bargain, Prussia must at least consent to remove her garrison from Luxemburg. It was a demand little better than trivial, but Bismarck refused to accede to it. It was a matter, however, that involved the powers and was referred to a conference.

Finally Prussia agreed to withdraw the garrison, and raze the fortress, on the condition that the powers guaranteed the neutrality of the duchy.

At last the Tuileries had scored a success. The French government between May, 1866, and May, 1867, had demanded of Prussia a military alliance, the frontiers of 1814 including Mayence, and freedom of action concerning Belgium and Luxemburg. Refused on all these points, they had the mortification of facilitating the Russo-Prussian alliance. Finally with the desperation of despair they had insisted upon the withdrawal of the Prussian garrison from Luxemburg, and this amid the laughter of diplomatic Berlin had been allowed them. This was their "indemnification" for the benefits accruing to Prussia from the campaign of Königgrätz.

That other attempts were made by the French government during the spring of 1867 to bring about a Franco-Prussian alliance there can be no question, but before this the hopelessness of the situation was apparent even to the infatuated statesmen of the second empire. One by one the deluded diplomatists found themselves forced to adopt views held by Drouyn de Lhuys months before. For a government dependent upon its prestige, the empire had been subjected to an appalling list of slights and insults. It had abased itself in so far that, had the full truth been made public, a victorious war would have been a necessity to its maintenance. It was with this eventuality fully in mind that the emperor confided to Marshal Niel the reorganization and rearming of the army which had proved itself so inadequate to meet the crisis of the summer of 1866.

So far as external appearances were concerned,

however, it must be admitted that in 1867 the French empire was at the zenith of its splendor. The countless thousands who visited Paris in the spring and summer of that year could hardly fail to be impressed by the air of elegance and conscious power that seemed to pervade the city. The monarch who had made his name illustrious by his victories over the proudest military states in Europe had gathered within his capital the products of the globe, and invited his faithful subjects and the world at large to inspect them. The splendor of the exhibition was worthy of the city, at last incontestably the most splendid in the world. The marks of Napoleonic taste and prodigality were everywhere apparent. Streets crooked and dark had mysteriously disappeared, and been supplanted by broad avenues straight as the Roman roads, and lined with noble edifices in every stage of completion. The magic initial N with its laurel wreath again appeared upon all sides in stone and metal, and to the group of thoroughfares known by the stirring titles of Friedland, Eylau, and Wagram had been added those of Sebastopol, Solferino, and Magenta. St. Cloud had never been more gay even in the days of Marie Antoinette, and at Fontainebleau, never since the time of Louis le Grand had such gorgeous companies followed the stag through the mazes of the forest. In a word, Paris had become the resort of all lovers of the splendid and beautiful. Everything was gayety and frivolity, from the atmosphere and conversation of the Tuileries or St. Cloud to the atmosphere and conversation of the café tables. Indeed, the manners and customs of the café and boulevard only reflected the standard of the court, whose fair and trivial mis-

tress had become the emulation of feminine society in Paris and the toast of every mess-room. The merely casual observer was in ignorance of the secrets of the foreign office, and could not recognize in the pomp and luxury about him the signs of debility and decay. Gorgeous the empire certainly was, but its virility was waning. The intrigues and dissipations of the court did not beget loyalty, the bitter feuds and jealous wrangling of officers did not promote military discipline or sagacity. The pampered garrison of Paris did not truly represent the army, any more than the reports of ministers truly represented the state of their departments. Everything was corrupt, shifting, unreliable, and false.

Among the visitors to Paris in 1867 was Count Bismarck, and as he strolled through the exhibition halls and along the Champs Elysée, where fashionable Paris amused itself after the questionable methods of the day, he was asking himself how it would have been had the Luxemburg quarrel been fought out? Would he have been in Paris or the French in Berlin? He moved about comparatively unobserved, for royalty itself was at this time enjoying the hospitality of the Tuileries, but in less than four years his name was to be on the lips of every Parisian, and the ignorant were to see in the glow of the Aurora Borealis the sign of his bloody hand.

CHAPTER XXIII.

LAST DAYS OF THE SECOND EMPIRE.

CONDITION OF EUROPE IN 1867. — THE POWERS AT PEACE. — UNSETTLED STATE OF SPAIN. — GARIBALDI IN THE FIELD AGAIN. — THE BATTLE OF MENTANA. — BITTER FEELING ENGENDERED BY IT IN ITALY TOWARD FRANCE. — POWER OF THE EMPRESS IN THE FRENCH COUNCILS. — HER AMBITION. — EFFORTS OF THE EMPEROR TO STEADY HIS THRONE. — THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY. — WARLIKE SENTIMENT IN PARIS. — THE HOHENZOLLERN INCIDENT. — THE RAGE OF FRANCE. — EXCITEMENT IN THE CORPS LÉGISLATIF. — M. BENEDETTI SEEKS THE PRUSSIAN KING AT EMS. — THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT BECOMES UNREASONABLE. — INSULTING DEMAND UPON THE KING OF PRUSSIA. — BISMARCK'S CIRCULAR IN REFERENCE TO IT. — OLLIVIER'S BELLICOSE SPEECH IN THE CORPS LÉGISLATIF. — ENTHUSIASM IN PARIS. — THE EMPEROR'S MISGIVINGS. — HIS HOPES AND FEARS. — THE SHATTERING OF HIS HOPES. — BARON BEUST'S LETTER. — THE ISOLATION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE. — THE EMPEROR'S PROCLAMATION AND DEPARTURE FOR METZ. — WRETCHED CONDITION OF AFFAIRS THERE. — IMPATIENCE OF PARIS — THE "AFFAIRE" OF SAARBRUCK.

AT the opening of the year 1867 the great continental peoples were turning their attention to the husbanding of their resources and developing the arts of peace. Though imposing military forces were maintained, the political atmosphere seemed purified by the seven weeks' tempest of blood and iron, and at no time since 1850 had the public mind been so free from forebodings of the future. Russia seemed absorbed in the awkward effort to accustom herself to the new régime inaugurated by the emancipation

of the serfs, while Austria-Hungary was likewise endeavoring to turn to the best account her newly gained blessings of constitutional liberty. As for France, the great exhibition at Paris seemed to indicate that the emperor was inclined to convert the sword into the plowshare, and abandon the paths of military glory for those of domestic improvement. In Spain and Italy alone were there any indications of political unrest. So far as Spain was concerned, however, her struggles and contentions had long since failed to arouse the apprehension of Europe. Insurrections, banishments, executions, and assassinations were regarded as inseparable features of the political life of a people once among the most cultivated, patriotic, and chivalrous the world has ever known. Indeed, when in the early summer of 1868 Prim and Serrano returned from their enforced exile and set up the standard of revolt on Spanish soil, no serious alarm was felt north of the Pyrenees. The army enthusiastically espousing the cause of the distinguished rebels, the days of the debauched and priest-ridden court were numbered. Isabella fled to France, and Serrano seized the reins of government. With the dethronement of the queen the direful question of the succession was again laid open, but still with Serrano as regent and the army in the hands of so just and capable a soldier as Prim, quiet in Spain seemed far better assured than at any time for years. Indeed, there was nothing to indicate in 1869 that Madrid was to furnish the spark which was to set Europe in warlike flame again.

The time-worn dispute betwixt church and state was still agitating Italy in 1867. A long step was taken towards its settlement when on the 4th of Decem-

ber, 1866, the French emperor withdrew his troops from Rome. Scarcely had this long delayed movement been consummated, when "Young Italy" again forced itself into serious prominence. Garibaldi once more started the Roman battle-cry, and had set a respectable revolution afoot before he was seized and conveyed to Caprera. In vain the king endeavored to allay the popular excitement. The papal government, alarmed, appealed to Paris for protection. Despite the assurances of Victor Emmanuel that his government was fully equal to the emergency, and against his protests as well, the French emperor dispatched a military expedition to Civita Vecchia. This proved too much for Garibaldi's self-control. Once again he broke from Caprera and joined the ranks of the insurgents. Before this, one attack on Rome had been repulsed by the papal guard. Garibaldi hurried from the sea-coast at the head of a motley but determined band, and at Monterotundo routed a detachment of the pontifical mercenaries. Encouraged by this he pushed rapidly on toward Rome, and at Mentana encountered a detachment of the newly arrived French troops under General de Failly. These troops represented the reorganized army of Marshal Niel, and were armed with the new breech-loading rifle known as the chassepot. There was no fighting; the unhappy Italians were literally mowed down by the steady fusillades. "The chassepot rifle has done wonders," was De Failly's enthusiastic comment in his report of the battle. The demonstration of the effectiveness of the new weapon, however, scarcely compensated for other results of Mentana. On November 6 the Marquis Pepoli, who had succeeded Minghetti as head of the government,

wrote to the emperor at Paris: "The late events have suffocated every remembrance of gratitude in the heart of Italy. It is no longer in the power of the government to maintain the alliance with France. The chassepot gun at Mentana has given it a mortal blow." It is not too much to say that this skirmish which General de Failly regarded merely as a happy test of firearms was the means of depriving the French emperor of the only allies possible to him in Europe. The personal regard in which Victor Emmanuel held the emperor continued until death, but the slaughter of Mentana forever estranged the nation, whose gratitude had been awakened by Magenta and Solferino, and had even survived the disappointment of Villafranca. The emperor definitely sealed his fate in Italy when he refused to again withdraw his garrison from Rome.

Most assuredly a change had been wrought in the Italian policy of France. The influence of the empress had begun to make itself felt in the schemes of the foreign office. In her the Catholic Church had a powerful champion, and every word from the Vatican came to be all potent at the Tuileries. In Cavour's time the emperor had not hesitated to incur the wrath of Rome; in 1868-69 his policy came to represent indifference to the interests of his old ally at Florence. The empress aspired to see France the acknowledged protector of the Romish Church. The emperor, with a deadly disease sapping his strength and weakening his nerve, resigned himself to the guidance of the empress, the church, and the army. The empress and the church urged that Protestant Prussia must be humbled, and the army clamored that it might be allowed to execute the task.

The emperor dreaded this struggle with Prussia, which was represented to him as a necessity of the situation. The elections of 1869 certainly seemed to indicate that his prestige at home had sunk so low that he must choose between a foreign war and a domestic revolution. In the election of 1852 the city of Paris had sustained his government by a majority of 46,000; the country had sustained it by over 7,000,000. In 1869 Paris rolled up an adverse majority of 150,000, while the government majority in the country at large had fallen to 755,000. It was plain there must be more glory earned in some quarter with which to prop the failing strength of the dynasty. With this necessity in view in 1868 the emperor had made advances for a triple alliance between France, Austria, and Italy against Prussia. Matters progressed so far that a draft treaty stipulating a general plan for a German campaign passed between the governments. Then the fruits of Mentana made themselves manifest. The Florence government made the evacuation of Rome the condition of its acceptance of the French project. The emperor was compelled to make choice between the friendship of Italy and the friendship of Rome. The clerical party with the empress at its head gained the day. Italy refused to consider the alliance in consequence, and Austria, whose coöperation depended upon Italy, was also lost to the scheme. The empire and the Roman Church stood alone in Europe.

The reorganization of the army progressed slowly, but the enthusiasm of the empress and the swagger of generals failed to arouse the confidence of the emperor for the future. The minister of war pronounced everything satisfactory, and it was the opinion of that

officer which the emperor proclaimed to the Chambers on the 18th of January, 1869: "The military law and the supplies voted by your patriotism have strengthened the confidence of the country, which is now proudly conscious that it is in a position to encounter whatever may betide. . . . Our perfect armaments (chassepots and mitrailleuses), our replete arsenals and magazines, our trained reserves, our mobile National Guard, our reconstructed fleet, and our powerful fortresses impart an imperative necessary development of our might. The permanent object of my endeavors is attained; our military resources will henceforth be adequate to their mission in the world." This declaration, the truth of which on many fundamental points the emperor was inclined to doubt, was generally accepted in France and elsewhere as a just presentation of the military condition of the country. It also marked an epoch, for from this time all the influential factions at court were agreed as to the advisability of seizing the first provocation for a quarrel with Prussia. The emperor, balancing his dread of revolution against his dread of war, was borne along on the current of brag and bluster. The talk in military circles became bellicose and swaggering; the tone of the foreign office, especially toward Prussia, became supercilious and irritable.

It was in this frame of mind that the summer of 1870 found the sanguine and adventurous schemers of the French court. But the diplomatic sky seemed unpropitious for their schemes, inasmuch as it was unflecked by a menacing cloud. It was remarked at the foreign office in London that for years there had never been "so great a lull in foreign affairs." Wearied diplomatists began to throng the watering-

places of Austria and South Germany. The king of Prussia left Berlin for the retirement of Ems; the French court exchanged the Tuileries for the more rural magnificence of St. Cloud. The great tide of summer travel swept through Paris and up the Rhine to Switzerland. Official life was at a standstill; nothing more sinister was developed than a universal tendency toward rest and recreation.

It was on July 3 that the news was telegraphed from Madrid to the European courts that the crown of Spain had been tendered to Prince Leopold, of Hohenzollern, a kinsman to the king of Prussia. So far as France was concerned, the news was not unexpected. The fact had been recognized that Serrano's regency could not last forever, and the French ambassador at Madrid had fully acquainted his government with the prospects. To the French people, however, the news came like a thunderbolt from a clear sky. In the nomination of a Prussian prince for royal honors in Spain they could see the hand of Bismarck at his favorite task of Prussian aggrandizement. There was a furious outburst of public disapproval. All parties became a unit in the Chambers in urging the government to resist what was regarded as a Prussian scheme. The French government suddenly found itself forced by popular opinion to adopt an attitude for which for months they had been seeking a justification. The Duc de Gramont declared in the Corps Législatif that the action of the Madrid government had "imperiled the interests and honor of France," at the same time informing the Prussian ambassador at Paris that the government expected Prussia to insist upon the withdrawal of Prince Leopold as a candidate to the Spanish throne, and that a failure to do so

would be regarded as a *casus belli*. The press represented accurately the public excitement. The "Moniteur" proclaimed that the time had come to put an end to Prussia's pretensions to acquire preponderance in Europe. The "Pays" declared that Prussia had reached the Caudine forks, and that her humiliation was at hand. The "Temps" shrieked that the monarchy of Charles V. was being revived. The "Liberté" claimed that Prussia must be driven across the Rhine with the butt-end of French muskets.

The grievance of the French nation lay simply in the fact that a prince related to the House of Prussia was to be elevated to the Spanish throne. The remedy for this seemed simple enough; indeed, the Duc de Gramont stated to the English ambassador as early as July 8 that the voluntary withdrawal of the prince of Hohenzollern would be a "most fortunate solution" of the trouble. This was by no means, however, what was desired by the powers at court. On the 9th M. Benedetti, the French ambassador at Berlin, received instructions from Paris to repair to Ems, and demand of the king of Prussia that he should insist upon the withdrawal of his kinsman as a candidate for the Spanish throne. The attitude of the king was dignified and just. He informed the ambassador that Prussia could have no interest in the matter whatsoever, and that if the French government objected to the choice of the Spanish authorities they could settle the matter to better advantage at Madrid than at Berlin. On the 12th, the day following this interview, the news was telegraphed to Paris and Ems that Prince Leopold had revoked his acceptance of the Spanish crown. "The fortunate solution" that Gramont had suggested had been brought

about. It was believed that the last menace to peace had been cleared away, and an inexpressible feeling of relief animated every European capital. Up to this point the French government had been justified in its course by the state of public feeling. On the 13th, however, they committed themselves to a deliberate effort to plunge the nation into war. On that day instructions were telegraphed to M. Benedetti to demand of the king of Prussia a pledge that he would at no time in the future allow the name of any member of the Hohenzollern family to be used in connection with the Spanish throne. Inasmuch as the king had already stated that he regarded the matter as one altogether outside the province of the Prussian government, there could be no doubt as to the reception this demand would meet. The action of the French government was as deliberate as it was unjustifiable and unnecessary.

In the Kurgarten at Ems a marble tablet marks the spot where, on the 13th of July, 1870, M. Benedetti encountered the king of Prussia and presented the latest demand of his government. The tidings of the day's proceedings reached Count Bismarck in Berlin the same evening as he was dining with Generals Moltke and Roon. In their presence the chancellor prepared the following statement, which was transmitted to the Prussian ambassadors at foreign courts, and appeared in the Berlin papers on the morning of the 14th.

“Telegram from Ems, July 13, 1870: When the intelligence of the hereditary prince of Hohenzollern's renunciation was communicated by the Spanish to the French government, the French ambassador demanded of his majesty the king, at Ems, that the latter should

authorize him to telegraph to Paris that his majesty would pledge himself for all time to come never again to give his consent, should the Hohenzollerns revert to their candidature. Upon this his majesty refused to receive the French ambassador again, and sent the aide-de-camp in attendance to tell him that his majesty had nothing further to communicate to the ambassador."

That this document was issued by Bismarck with the purpose of inflaming French wrath may reasonably be doubted, but that he was well aware of the consequences which would attend its publicity there can be no question. It was the truth expressed in bold language, and not in the circumspect and carefully-chosen sentences that a timid diplomacy would have dictated. It is certain that M. Benedetti did not regard the king's action as in any way disrespectful, and it was not until the receipt of Bismarck's version that the Paris government decided upon forcible measures. On July 15 the Duc de Gramont declared to the English ambassador that "the Prussian government had deliberately insulted France by declaring to the public that the king had affronted the French ambassador." On that day amid tremendous excitement M. Ollivier addressed the Corps Législatif in a manner that left no doubt of the intentions of the government. Amid a tempest of applause the minister declared that the government accepted the responsibility of the crisis with "a light heart." There was an attempt at debate, but the credit asked for by the government for military purposes was enthusiastically granted by a majority of four fifths. That night vast crowds filled the boulevards and swarmed in the brilliantly lighted Champs Elysées, singing the Mar-

seillaise, and raising the cries of "A Berlin" and "Vive la Guerre." So far as it was possible to judge, the course adopted by the French government met with the unqualified approval of Paris.

On this same day, when Paris was running mad with turbulent patriotism, the emperor remained at St. Cloud, heavy-hearted and dreading the issue of events into which his government was so confidently plunging. He had yielded his consent to the war party almost upon compulsion.¹ He certainly had no cause to complain of lukewarmness and disloyalty in the temper of the capital, and except for the reason that he had learned to distrust his servants he might have looked into the future with some assurance. Marshal Lebœuf had declared that the army was "thrice ready for war to the last button on the last soldier's gaiter." He had placed in the hands of the emperor a document affirming his ability to place 400,000 men on the eastern frontier in fifteen days from an order for mobilization. This certainly was an excellent showing. The emperor did not underestimate the strength of the North German confederation, but he counted upon atoning for his numerical deficiencies by his early preparation, which would enable him to overthrow the enemy while their corps were in process of formation. He also anticipated the powerful

¹ "Before the final resolve to declare war the emperor, empress, and ministers went to St. Cloud. After some discussion, Gramont told me that the empress, a high-spirited and impressionable woman, made a strong and excited address, declaring that 'war was inevitable if the honor of France was to be sustained.' She was immediately followed by Marshal Lebœuf, who, in the most violent tone, threw down his portfolio, and swore that if war was not declared, he would give it up and renounce his military rank. The emperor gave way, and Gramont went straight to the Chamber to announce the fatal news." — Malmesbury, p. 665.

coöperation of the fleet with its division of marine infantry, and looked for great results from the new equipment of chassepots and mitrailleuses. Up to the time, too, of M. Ollivier's bellicose speech in the Corps Législatif the emperor had not counted upon the South German states as foes, and was even inclined to the belief that a victory for the French arms would bring them into the field as allies. So far as Austria and Italy were concerned, he had not on July 15 abandoned hope of their coöperation in arms. Taking everything into consideration, then, the outlook for France from the emperor's standpoint was by no means cheerless. With 400,000 men standing ready to cross the Rhine, with a fleet threatening the German ports on the North Sea, with Austria, Italy, and South Germany neutral and perhaps friendly, his ultimate success seemed assured. From this time, however, every day developed the falseness of the basis on which the emperor had been calculating. On the 19th the king of Bavaria set the example for South Germany by placing his army under the command of the king of Prussia. It was not North Germany, then, but Germany united with which France was to contend. On the 20th Baron Beust strangled the hope of Austrian coöperation in this dispatch to the Austrian ambassador at Paris: "You will repeat to the emperor and his ministers that—true to the engagements defined in letters that passed between both sovereigns last year—we regard France's cause as our own, and shall, within the limits of possibility, contribute to the success of her arms. These limits are prescribed by foreign considerations and our own domestic conditions. We have reason to believe that Russia adheres to her connection with Prussia, so

that the intervention of Russian forces, under certain eventualities, may be regarded, not only as probable, but as certain. Our participation in the struggle would be immediately followed by that of Russia, who threatens us on the Pruth and Lower Danube, as well as in Galicia. . . . Under these circumstances the word neutrality — which we do not pronounce without regret — is an imperative necessity, as far as we are concerned." This was bitter news to the Paris statesmen. Not only united Germany, but Russia was pitted against them. "Russia has done us great harm," groaned the Duc de Gramont, as he began to comprehend the hopeless isolation of France. Only one possible ally remained, and that was Italy, but the price of her coöperation was still unchanged, the evacuation of Rome. The French government could not yield at this crisis without betraying weakness. So a curt message settled the affair: "We can do nothing whatsoever with respect to Rome. If Italy does not choose to march, she can stay at home."

Thus one by one the air castles of the French emperor melted into mist. The neutral powers had developed into enemies; his friends had become neutral. It was upon its own strength alone that the empire must rely for its success. Paris was enthusiastic, but clamored for the march on Berlin to begin. Something was evidently wrong in the military situation on the frontier. The emperor issued his proclamation to the people, and on the 28th, accompanied by the prince imperial, stepped aboard the train at St. Cloud that was to carry him to the front. The same night he entered Metz, and found it gay with uniforms and uproarious with warlike enthusiasm. Twenty-four hours at the front, however, convinced

him that he had been cruelly deceived. In every hotel, café, and mess-room irreparable disasters to the Prussians were freely predicted, and yet no intelligent opinion as to their whereabouts or plans was forthcoming. Jealousy was rampant among the corps commanders. Discipline was lax, and generals inspected their commands in cushioned barouches, accompanied by wives, families, and mistresses. The regiments were far below their war strength; indeed, of the 400,000 bayonets which Marshal Lebœuf had promised only 220,000 were with the colors on August 1. The state of the commissariat was little better than chaos; chassepots, and ammunition were scarce; the troops were littered with useless baggage and in no condition for rapid marching.¹

In the mean time Paris was clamoring for a victory. Miserably conscious of the state of his army, and aware that every hour was swelling the German hosts, the unhappy emperor set himself stolidly to await whatever the future might bring. His judgment urged a consolidation of his corps, and a retirement upon a strong line of defense. The temper of Paris would not permit such a move. To advance was impossible; to stand fast was to court destruction from the German armies; to retreat meant the unloosing of the "red revolution" in his capital. There is something at once pathetic and ludicrous in the affair of Saarbrück on the 2d of August. It was the last feeble effort of Napoleon III. to arouse the enthusiasm

¹ General Michel's dispatch of July 21 to the war office at Paris, quoted in Hooper's *Campaign of Sedan*, is indicative of the confusion pervading the French army. "Have arrived at Belfort. Can't find my brigade; can't find the general of division. What shall I do? Don't know where my regiments are."

of Paris for his dynasty. In Saarbrück village lay a German infantry battalion and a squadron of cavalry. On the heights above a division of Marshal Frossard's corps was encamped. The emperor came down by train from Metz with the prince imperial, and gazed upon the evolutions which he had ordered. The infantry deployed, wheeled, and skirmished. Brilliant troops of cuirassiers cantered along the road; the mitrailleuses whirled and rattled. The sun glanced and glinted upon a scene that would have adorned the peaceful acres of the Champ de Mars. The Prussian battalion retired; the French divisions entered Saarbrück. The emperor had done what he could to satisfy Paris and steady his throne. That evening the news was posted up in sight of the shouting devotees of the boulevards, that the campaign had opened, a battle had been fought, the French were victorious, and Prince Louis had received "his baptism of fire."

CHAPTER XXIV.

WÖRTH AND FORBACH.

DELIVERY OF THE FRENCH DECLARATION OF WAR AT BERLIN. — PERFECT PREPARATION OF PRUSSIA FOR WAR. — MOBILIZATION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY. — COMPOSITION OF THE THIRD ARMY. — POSITION OF THE CONTENDING FORCES ON AUGUST 3. — FIGHT AT WEISSENBURG AND DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH. — MACMAHON PREPARES TO RECEIVE AN ATTACK ON THE SAUER. — HIS CONFIDENCE ON THE 5TH OF AUGUST. — OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF WÖRTH. — MACMAHON IS OUT-FLANKED. — HEROISM OF THE FRENCH CAVALRY. — DESTRUCTION OF MACMAHON'S ARMY. — HARD FIGHTING ON THE SAAR. — CRITICAL SITUATION OF THE GERMAN FORCE ENGAGED THERE. — FINAL RETREAT OF THE FRENCH. — CONSTERNATION AT METZ OVER THE RESULT OF THE DAY'S FIGHTING. — DESPAIR OF THE EMPEROR. — HE TURNS TO BAZAINE AS A SAVIOUR. — BAZAINE ASSUMES THE COMMAND UNDER PROTEST. — HE APPRECIATES ITS FULL IMPORT. — HE IS EMBARRASSED BY THE EMPEROR. — THE CONDITION OF AFFAIRS AT THE GERMAN HEADQUARTERS. — MOLTKE'S PLAN. — THE MARCH THROUGH LORRAINE.

It was on the 19th of July that Le Sourd formally delivered the French declaration of war at Berlin. On the same day King William of Prussia addressed the North German Reichstag in words that received the hearty indorsement of both houses. The army was in process of mobilization, and by the 20th the South German princes had placed their armies at the disposal of the king of Prussia. For the first time Europe began to comprehend the fullness of Bismarck's diplomatic skill. He had used the machinations of his enemies for their confounding. He had

used the Napoleonic proposition of 1866 concerning the Rhenish frontier to bring South Germany into line. Later, too, he caused the publication of Napoleon's proposals concerning Luxemburg and Belgium. The result of this was to shatter the emperor's influence in every continental capital, while it completely estranged England, which had been inclined on the whole to support the French views in the Hohenzollern quarrel. Austria and Denmark were hostile, but Bismarck by his Polish policy, supported by Manteuffel's visit, had made of Russia a friend sufficiently strong to guarantee their neutrality. Bismarck had made Germany a military unit, and it remained for the declaration of war to consummate the work by effecting a union of hearts, interests, and power. No sooner had the bellicose speeches of July 15 in the French Chambers been made public, than the entire people, "from the shores of the sea to the foot of the Alps," sprang enthusiastically to arms. The reserves rushed to join the colors, and the stout Landwehrmen swarmed to the depots. Every city, village, and town was ablaze with enthusiasm, and every train that rolled toward the threatened frontier was densely packed with soldiers. Munich, Dresden, and Stuttgart vied with Berlin in the fervor of their patriotism, and sent their sons forth to fight in the cause of the German fatherland.

Notwithstanding the fact, however, that the mobilization of the German armies progressed with even greater rapidity and precision than that which four years before had astonished Europe, the suddenness with which the emperor's government had unmasked its policy and drawn the sword left the frontier for ten days but scantily defended. Indeed, in Germany

the affair of Saarbrück was not appreciated in all its absurdity till some weeks later, inasmuch as it was recognized that had Frossard pushed his advantage he would have hardly met with serious resistance west of the Rhine. By the middle of the first week in August, however, the danger for Germany and the opportunity of France had passed away. The German armies had entered in huge force that tract of country lying between the Rhine and the Lower Moselle, and their pickets were close to the French frontier. The command was nominally vested in the king of Prussia, though Von Moltke as the chief of staff planned and directed everything. As in the Austrian campaign the huge host was divided into three armies. The first army of General Steinmetz crossed the Rhine about Bingen, and followed the Moselle toward Thionville. It comprised the 7th, 8th, and 10th corps of the North German confederation, the latter corps representing the Hanoverian army. The second army under the command of Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia comprised the Prussian Guard corps, and the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 9th, and Saxon 12th corps of the North German confederation. This army passed the Rhine at Mayence, and moving on the left of the first army was directed upon Kaiserslautern. The third army consisted of the 5th, 6th, and 11th corps of the North German confederation, the two corps of Bavaria, and the divisions of Baden and Würtemberg. This was by far the most interesting of the three armies, for united Germany was embodied in its ranks. The popular crown prince of Prussia was in command, an appointment that proved at once the wisdom and the conciliatory spirit of the German headquarters. This army concentrated in the angle

formed by the Rhine and the Lauter. The diplomats at Munich and Stuttgart loved Prussia no better than in 1866, but at the front old feuds were forgotten. The Prussian soldiers in bivouac broke into cheers as the straight-stepping Bavarians passed them on their march. A glimpse of the Prussian prince threw the camps of Baden and Würtemberg into tumultuous enthusiasm. The colors of North and South Germany floated in unmistakable amity over the sea of bayonets that rolled along the eastern base of the Vosges during those early August days.

So far as the French army was concerned, no material change in its position was effected during the days when Germany was in a measure defenseless. On August 3 the various corps were in the same positions they had occupied for a fortnight. The 1st corps of Marshal MacMahon was massed between Hagenau and Strasburg. The 2d corps of General Frossard, instead of improving the advantage of the 2d, still clung to the heights above Saarbrück. Marshal Bazaine with the 3d corps was at St. Avold, the 4th corps of Ladmirault in the vicinity of Thionville, the 5th corps of General de Failly at Saargemünd. These were all the troops the emperor had instantly available on August 3. The Imperial Guard was just arriving at Metz, and the 6th corps of Canrobert was on the road from Châlons to Nancy. The 7th corps was detained far away at Belfort to cover that weak point in the frontier. Altogether the French army in line between Metz and Strasburg mustered something less than 175,000 men, nor was full advantage taken of this strength. The corps about Metz were loosely posted, while MacMahon was hopelessly isolated. With thin ranks, but vain in their own con-

ceit, the French commanders indolently awaited the future.

The German hosts congregated in the angle between the Rhine and the Moselle on August 3 aggregated more than 400,000 men. The outposts of the first army were on the Saar, the vanguard of the second army had passed Kaiserslautern, while the crown prince was approaching the Lauter.

In the mean time the French general Douay with a division of MacMahon's corps had gone into camp on the Lauter, occupying the old fortress of Weissenburg and the heights to the south. On the morning of the 4th, when the French troops were preparing their coffee, the Bavarian forces suddenly appeared on the heights of Schweigen. At the same time their artillery opened a terrific fire upon the camps and the town of Weissenburg itself. Douay, upon finding himself so suddenly forced into the presence of grim-visaged war, demeaned himself like a stout soldier. The Bavarians from the north, assisted by a part of the 5th corps on the east, stormed Weissenburg, and captured the garrison after a sanguinary fight in the streets, while the mass of the 5th corps and a division of the 11th corps from the south closed in on the Geisberg and the farm of Schafsberg, where the main strength of the French was concentrated. The château of Geisberg on its commanding hill-top was stubbornly defended, and only capitulated when the contest in other quarters was hopelessly lost. Douay was killed by a shell, and the survivors of his division went streaming away into the Vosges.

The news of this disastrous affair reached MacMahon at Metz, where it caused great consternation. A council of war was immediately held, as a result

of which MacMahon left that night to join his corps, while the emperor ordered General De Failly with the 5th corps to his support. MacMahon, appreciating the necessity of an early atonement for the disaster of Weissenburg hastened to oppose the advance of the crown prince with all his forces. On the 5th he was reinforced by Dumesnil's division of the 7th corps and Bonnemain's cuirassier brigade of the 6th corps. These with his four divisions made a total strength of nearly 50,000 men, with which he seized the heights that skirt the Sauer between Neewiller and Morsbronn. His centre occupied Fröschweiler and Elsasshausen with its advance posts in Wörth. His left crested the heights from Fröschweiler northwesterly to Neewiller. His right occupied the Niederwald south of Fröschweiler with its extremity resting upon the Lansberg that overlooks the village of Morsbronn. MacMahon had the divisions of Ducrot, Raoult, and Lartigue on this line, while he held Pellé's division, which had been shattered at Weissenburg, in the rear of Fröschweiler as a reserve. Dumesnil's division was stationed in the vicinity of Eberbach as a support to Lartigue in the Niederwald. The position was well chosen for purposes of defense, while it covered the road to Strasburg and afforded good lines of retreat. That MacMahon's army was too small to make the most of the position there can be no question, though with the exception of the division which had fought at Weissenburg the "morale" of his troops was excellent. They comprised several of those superb Algerian regiments that had made a world-wide reputation on Crimean and Italian battlefields. The artillery was also strengthened by several batteries of the much vaunted

mitrailleuses. Naturally, too, the marshal looked for support from De Failly. Indeed, when on the evening of the 5th he received notice from the emperor that the 5th corps was to act under his orders, he exclaimed in his joy, "Messieurs les Prussiens, I have you." He was not aware at that time of the demoralized and broken condition of De Failly's corps consequent upon a multiplicity of conflicting orders from Metz.

The crown prince of Prussia passed the Lauter in force on the 5th, and that evening the 5th corps bivouacked along the road between Dieffenbach and Wörth, while the 2d Bavarian corps halted at Langensulzbach. At dawn on the 6th the 5th corps began to skirmish in front of Wörth, while the Bavarians advancing from their bivouacs drew the French fire in front of Neewiller. The crown prince had not intended to attack MacMahon that day, and upon hearing of the engagement ordered it to be broken off immediately. While the Bavarians who had actually gained a foothold on the heights of Neewiller began reluctantly to retire, General von Kirchback, commanding the 5th corps, found himself too deeply involved to allow of such a movement. As a result he dispatched messengers to his Bavarian neighbor as well as to the commander of the 11th corps which was just arriving on the field, to help him continue the contest.

The crown prince, upon learning how far the action had progressed, ordered the 1st Bavarian corps and the Würtembergers to hasten their march to the front where he himself arrived at one P. M., shortly after the 11th corps had gone into action on the left of the 5th, against the French in the Niederwald.

The German batteries occupied the heights northwest of Gunstett with 120 cannon and rained a perfect tempest of shells upon the opposing hills from Fröschweiler to the Lansberg. About twelve o'clock the Prussians crossed the Sauer and carried Wörth. Against the heights of Fröschweiler, however, they could make no impression, the French fighting superbly at this point despite the terrific artillery fire to which they were subjected. The crown prince, seeing the terrible slaughter inflicted upon his centre and despairing of success at that point, determined to use his superior strength by outflanking the French position. While the 1st Bavarian corps was pushed forward between the 5th corps and the 2d Bavarians against the French left centre, the 11th corps began to exert a pressure against the French right too strong to be resisted. The Niederwald was soon rendered untenable, and the German columns pushing forward between Eberbach and Morsbronn threatened to envelop the French flank. MacMahon in the desperation of the crisis hurled Michel's cavalry brigade against the advancing Prussians. The cuirassiers and lancers rode well to their death, and heaped the fields about Morsbronn with their slain. Their sacrifice enabled Lartigue's and Dumesnil's divisions to extricate themselves from their precarious position and rally on Elsasshausen. At 1.30 the line of battle of the Prussian 11th corps extended from Eberbach to the foot of the hill of Elsasshausen, while the extreme French right was flying in disorder toward Hagenau. The resources of the French marshal were nearly exhausted. He had fought a good battle and was yielding to overwhelming numbers. He sent appeal after appeal to De Failly for aid, but his glass

swept the country in vain for a glimpse of his approaching regiments. At two o'clock the French abandoned Elsasshausen to the flames and to the Prussians. Realizing that his salvation depended upon the recapture of this village, MacMahon threw his last infantry reserve against it, and a few moments later ordered Bonnemain's cuirassier brigade to charge. The wreck of this fine corps soon strewed the hopfields between Elsasshausen and the Niederwald; the infantry recoiled from the hornet's nest of Elsasshausen; Ducrot's division on the heights of Neewiller was crumbling to pieces; worse than all, assailed on three sides, Fröschweiler was yielding. It was not until four o'clock that MacMahon ordered the retreat, but before this a genuine rout had set in. All along the heights, however, the carnage still continued. The sun shone crimson through smoke clouds upon the blazing village, within which fragments of regiments that had never learned to fly still fought madly on, upon broken batteries whose hot cannon still thundered the French defiance, and upon the sea of glistening helmets that crested the Prussian advance. It was nearly dusk, the roads leading to Saverne and Niederbronn were crowded with the wreck of MacMahon's corps, when De Failly's first regiments arrived. They came rushing into Niederbronn incredulous over the rumors that had reached them, fierce and angry at the mere supposition of a French reverse. They had come to support MacMahon; they were scarcely able to cover his retreat. At all events, shortly after dark the Bavarians stormed into Niederbronn, wrested the railway station from their grasp, and drove them back. So the battle of Wörth ended. The crown prince had little

cavalry available and the French rout streamed on unmolested.

At the same time that Marshal McMahon was being driven from his carefully chosen positions the corps of General Frossard was recoiling shattered and demoralized from the disastrous battle of Forbach. On the Saar as well as on the Sauer the Germans had struck a savage blow. The conflict at Forbach, like that of Wörth, was unpremeditated, and the result of insubordination on the part of Frossard, and the extraordinary daring of the Prussian General Kamecke. Frossard, who had been encamped on the Spicheren heights since his skirmish on the 2d, was under orders from the emperor to retire upon St. Avold. Although twenty-four hours had passed since the receipt of these orders, the morning of the 6th found his rear guard just breaking camp on the heights, while the mass of his corps was only approaching Forbach. He might have made good progress during the day had not a Prussian force suddenly appeared in Saarbrück. The slenderness of this force tempted him to resume the offensive. He recalled his troops and occupied his old positions on the Spicherenberg. General Kamecke, who had but one division of the German 7th corps, was in no sense overawed at being confronted by a superior force in an almost unassailable position. He was not even content to stand on the defensive, but trusting to the cannon thunder to bring him supports, he hurled his infantry against the Spicherenberg. These gallant troops shed their blood like water on the steep fire-swept slopes, but to no purpose. At noon Kamecke's position was grave; at two o'clock it was desperate; at three the battle was saved by the arrival

of General Goeben with Barnekow's division of the 8th corps. A portion of the 5th division of the 3d corps also arrived and Goeben, who had assumed command, renewed the offensive with energy. The French continued to dispute the possession of the Spicherenberg until dark, when in a broken and panic-struck condition they began their retreat.

In the mean time Glümer's division of the 7th corps, having crossed the Saar six miles west of Saarbrück, marched southward upon hearing of the events transpiring at that place. In the evening they approached Forbach, and notwithstanding the fact that huge quantities of stores were collected here the French garrison evacuated and retreated upon Metz.

The victory of Saarbrück or Forbach was due to the superb steadiness of Kamecke's Westphalian infantry, to the splendid marching of the supporting divisions, to the overweening confidence of General Frossard, and to the confusion of orders that left him unsupported. Three divisions of Bazaine's corps were within half a dozen miles of the Spicherenberg, but none of the leaders cared to move on their own responsibility. Bazaine's early proffer of assistance was rejected by Frossard, and after that the various divisions spent their time in marching and counter-marching in the vain efforts to execute the erratic orders of an incompetent commander-in-chief.

The 6th of August witnessed the crippling of the French army of invasion. Wörth annihilated the right wing, Forbach shattered the centre. De Failly, finding himself in danger of being cut off at Bitsche, started on a wild chase after MacMahon. Not a field battalion was left to confront the Prussians between Metz and Strasburg.

At Metz the news was received first with incredulity and then with consternation. The cries of "A Berlin" suddenly ceased and noncombatants began preparations for a hasty flight. The temper of the imperial staff from a confident flippancy became despondent in the extreme. The army was beaten, France was beaten, the German empire was an accomplished fact, — these sentiments were frequently expressed at headquarters during Sunday the 7th of August. The sense of discouragement pervaded all classes from the emperor down to the ranks. At the opening of the second week in August the emperor had under his command the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 6th corps, with the Guard, a total of 125,000 men, but of these, Frossard's corps was too much demoralized to be immediately available. With this force the emperor had to contend against two armies aggregating 300,000 men, flushed with success. It required a soldier of rare genius and energy to maintain the contest against such odds, and unhappily the emperor even in his prime was never a military leader of the first order. In these days, moreover, of bodily pain and mental weariness, he lost all heart and turned from Lebœuf and the carpet soldiers of the Tuileries, to men of sounder judgment and less selfish impulses. From the crowd of brilliant hangers-on and would-be advisers he selected two men to aid him in the crisis; the first was General Changarnier, the other Marshal Bazaine. In 1851 the emperor had committed the former to prison because he was hostile to his interests and too popular with the army. Forgetting the past, Changarnier left his retirement and placed his sword at the disposal of the emperor. The political prisoner of 1851 became the trusted imperial adviser in 1870.

As for Bazaine, he had come by his honors honestly, and fought his way upward through the grades at the cannon's mouth. The emperor looked upon Bazaine, and Changarnier concurred in his judgment, as the man who might pull him through his difficulties. These days at the French headquarters succeeding the early August battles are memorable in modern European history, and we have their details from the pens of the principal actors. The first move of the emperor after the 6th of August was the appointment of Bazaine to the command of the 2d, 3d, and 4th corps, with orders to bring them back under the guns of Metz. In the mean time the emperor was contemplating his resignation. The army and the nation had lost confidence in him, he never had much confidence in himself, and Paris was uncomfortably peremptory in its demands for a new commander. On the 12th Lebœuf fell from his position as chief of staff, and on the day following the emperor formally resigned the command of the army of the Rhine in favor of Bazaine. These events were well received by the army, and Paris was satisfied. The influences that were exerted to effect these changes have long been in dispute. The emperor claimed that the interests of France determined his course; in reality it was determined for him by the ministry. There is a strong chain of evidence to indicate that the Paris statesmen foresaw the magnitude of the coming disasters, and the necessity of finding a scapegoat who should take the responsibility from the imperial shoulders. As far as the emperor is concerned, he doubtless yielded to what he regarded as a public as well as a ministerial demand. He called upon Bazaine not to save the empire by a personal sacrifice of all that

a soldier holds dear, but by his military genius and force of arms.

Bazaine, however, appreciated fully what his appointment meant. Canrobert and MacMahon were his seniors, but they never thought of contesting the dangerous honor of the supreme command. Bazaine tried to evade the appointment, but the emperor entreated. Then in a manly, soldierly fashion the marshal succumbed, and shouldered the duty which he recognized was almost certain to bring upon him the rage and contempt of his countrymen. The army, we know, was ill-disciplined, dispirited, and terribly outnumbered, but this was not the worst feature of Bazaine's dilemma. He was destined to be hampered by the emperor just long enough to complete the misery of the military situation. Bazaine had a plan, a rare thing among the French marshals of those degenerate days, and upon it he had laid some stress. He wished to move the whole army to a position on the Nied, to accept a battle there, and if victorious, to fall away southward, effect a junction with MacMahon, and take up a new position in front of Nancy. This scheme was perhaps the only feasible one of the French campaign, and it was the last upon which the emperor exercised an influence. He opposed it. Unquestionably Bazaine might have insisted, but he yielded as commander-in-chief as he had been wont to yield when a general of division. As a result the army began to execute the move substituted by the emperor, and commenced the retreat to Verdun. The orders for retreating fell like a deathblow upon the already disheartened soldiers of the army of the Rhine.

In the mean time all the machinery of the German

headquarters was moving with perfect precision. In every direction the lieutenants of Von Moltke were vigorously pushing his carefully elaborated plans. Every one was at work, and working for some definite end. No one had prophesied or anticipated an easy victory, and yet there was no undue elation over recent events. All the armies had been engaged, the first and second touching shoulders in front of the Spicherenberg. If some grumbled over the risks taken by Kamecke, the splendid marching of the supporting divisions seemed to indicate that a Prussian officer could afford to take some risks. There was certainly something more than commendable in the swift rush of the Brandenburgers and Rhinelanders toward the "kannonendonner" on the day of Forbach. Regiments that in the morning were a score of miles from Saarbrück had turned off the dusty leagues under the exhilarating influence of the distant artillery, and been found at sunset in the fighting line on the crest of the Spicherenberg.

Moltke had a plan far-reaching in its aims, for it meant the bagging of the French army of invasion with Metz and the emperor included. He divined the emperor's purpose of retreating on Verdun. The crown prince directed his march upon Nancy, but the army of Prince Frederick Charles moved on Pont à Mousson on the Moselle, while Steinmetz covered his right, and threatened Metz from the east and northeast. If Bazaine moved up the Moselle against Frederick Charles, he laid open his flank to Steinmetz. If he turned against Steinmetz, or took the roads to Verdun, his flank was exposed to Frederick Charles. If he remained quiescent, he rendered it possible for Frederick Charles to pass the Moselle in force, push

his columns northward from Pont à Mousson, and cut the roads to Verdun.

The villagers of Lorraine still tell with wonder, if with sadness, of that mighty flood of German invasion that engulfed them during the summer days of 1870; of the never-ceasing tide of the soldiers of the Fatherland that poured out of the Rhineland, — cavalry clattering and jingling through the village street, dust-covered infantrymen timing their march to martial chorus or tap of drum, and artillery rumbling and jolting over the rough ways.

From dawn until dusk and even after darkness fell and weary regiments bivouacked by the roadsides, still the steady muffled tramp continued as fresher troops pursued their march. Days and weeks passed, and still Germany poured forth her sons, and still they streamed westward into the heart of France. "It is not an army," groaned the Lorrainers, "but a nation that has come among us." At last the helmets became scarce, and the shakos appeared crowning foreheads that were wrinkled and hair that was streaked with gray. It was the Landwehr going to the front to teach the "youngsters" how to fight. They came on by tens of thousands, the memories of other days clustering about their standards, the memory of wife and children clustering about their hearts, strong, sturdy, arousing the echoes of the Lotharingian woods and hills with the full-voiced chorus, —

"Dear Fatherland no danger thine,
Firm stand thy sons to guard the Rhine."


CHAPTER XXV.

THE AUGUST BATTLES BEFORE METZ.

THE FRENCH RETREAT UPON VERDUN BEGINS. — BATTLE OF BORNY. — BAZAINE'S NIGHT VISIT TO THE EMPEROR. — FLIGHT OF THE EMPEROR TO GRAVELOTTE. — BAZAINE VISITS HIM THERE. — FAREWELL BETWEEN BAZAINE AND THE EMPEROR ON THE DEPARTURE OF THE LATTER FOR VERDUN. — POSITION OF THE ARMIES ON AUGUST 16. — GENERAL VON ALVENSLEBEN OPENS THE BATTLE OF VIONVILLE. — CHARACTER OF THE BATTLE AND ITS RESULTS. — BAZAINE TAKES UP A NEW POSITION. — MOLTKE'S PLAN FOR AUGUST 18. — THE BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE. — REPULSE OF STEINMETZ. — INCAPACITY OF BAZAINE. — SECOND REPULSE OF STEINMETZ. — CANROBERT OVERPOWERED. — CAPTURE OF ST. PRIVAT AND TURNING OF THE FRENCH RIGHT. — CLOSE OF THE BATTLE. — INFLUENCE OF THE BATTLE UPON THE MILITARY SITUATION. — FORMATION OF THE ARMY OF THE MEUSE. — THE SIEGE OF METZ BEGINS.

It was dawn on the 14th of August when the French army of the Rhine commenced its passage of the Moselle and inaugurated the retreat upon Verdun. The immediate result was chaos, the blockading of roads with cumbersome baggage and artillery trains that caused at once confusion and delay. To make matters worse, about four P. M. the 3d corps and a portion of the 4th corps, which still retained their positions between Columbey and Nouilly on the east of Metz, were furiously attacked by the first German army under Steinmetz. The effect of the cannon thunder in their rear was most demoralizing upon the French army. The retreat came to a standstill; the Guard was moved to Borny to support the troops in action, while





the army began to recross the Moselle. The French fought well, outnumbering their assailants; and when the action ceased at dark they claimed the victory. The German purpose, however, had been fully accomplished. They had held three entire *corps d'armée* on the east of Metz, checked Bazaine's movement in retreat, and enabled the columns of Prince Frederick Charles to make good progress westward.

Bazaine, who from the first had deprecated the retreat, recognized distinctly after this action its probable issue. From the battlefield about Borny he made his way at midnight across the Moselle through the streets of Metz crowded with weary, grumbling soldiery, threading his way among the wreck and disorder that strewn the roads beyond the town, until he reached the emperor's quarters at the Château de Longueville. There he eased his mind of his forebodings, and disclosed his dread of being outflanked. The miserable emperor merely entreated caution and the avoidance of any fresh defeat. Bazaine rode away through the military confusion to his quarters, while shortly before dawn the emperor was apprised of the proximity of the Germans by the shells that came crashing into the château garden. The army of the Rhine had sunk so low in efficiency that it was incompetent to protect its sovereign from this audacious field battery that unlimbered on the farther bank of the Moselle. So the emperor commenced the day, the day of the great Napoleonic festival, by a hurried flight. Accompanied by Prince Louis and a small escort he made the best of his way to Gravelotte. At the inn of this village he received Bazaine in the afternoon, while along the road in front the sullen, dispirited regiments passed in retreat without raising a cheer at the sight of their unhappy monarch.

Bazaine and the emperor met but once more, and that on the following morning, the 16th. The marshal being summoned by an aide found the emperor seated in his carriage, suffering depicted on his usually imperturbable face. His words betrayed his utter hopelessness. "I have decided to leave for Verdun and Châlons. Make the best of your way to Verdun. The gendarmes have abandoned Briey to the Prussians." The marshal found the gigantic task upon his shoulders of consummating with a disorganized and crestfallen army a movement which from the first he had regarded as suicidal. Almost before the dust raised by the imperial escort had faded from sight, the roar of cannon that was borne to his ears on the south wind told him that another battle was afoot.

The action fought on this day was the most sanguinary of the entire war. It was commenced by the army of Prince Frederick Charles to intercept Bazaine's retreat on Verdun, and maintained by it throughout the day against vastly superior forces. The position of the two armies at daybreak on the 16th was substantially as follows: the French were preparing to retreat upon Verdun, the 2d, 6th, and Guard corps by the southern road *via* Mars la Tour, the 3d and 4th corps moving over the northern route *via* Etain. On the other hand, the mass of the German second army was still distant from the Moselle, only the 3d and 10th corps being close up to its banks. The 19th infantry division of the 10th corps and the 5th division of the 3d corps had even crossed the river, the former being in the vicinity of Thiaucourt, and the other between Onville and Gorze. The 5th cavalry division was near Mars la Tour, while the Guard dragoon brigade was with the 19th division at Thiaucourt.

General von Alvensleben commanding the 3d German corps pushed the 6th infantry division across the Moselle at daybreak, and marched by Gorze upon Vionville. It was Redern's cavalry, supported by this division, that first surprised the French. Frossard's corps was encamped about Vionville and Flavigny, and the effect of the sudden attack was to bring up the 6th corps on his right and establish a line of battle from Flavigny to Bruville. In other words, the French corps, which had been facing westward, executed a partial wheel to the left and faced southwest. Bazaine seems to have had no conception of the slenderness of the forces opposing him, and to have exercised undue caution. The small force of German infantry on the ground rendered it necessary to use the cavalry immoderately, and a series of brilliant but murderous charges resulted. The position of the German forces was critical throughout the day; and even at five o'clock when the entire 3d and 10th corps had come up, they were confronted by no less than five French corps. Indeed, the battle of Vionville was a marvel of military audacity. General von Alvensleben, realizing the great importance of holding Bazaine in Metz, risked everything for its accomplishment, hurling battalions against brigades, and driving his depleted cavalry squadrons again and again against the blazing lines of French cannon. The strong men of Brandenburg and Hanover proved equal to the emergency. The Hanoverians arrived late on the field, but they did grand service. The strapping fair-haired men who under their king drove the Prussians at Langensalza fought no less stoutly in the cause of the Fatherland when they faced the French lines at Vionville.

The battle of Vionville settled the fate of Bazaine's army. The marshal was outmanœuvred, and at the close of the action, while he claimed the victory, could not disguise the fact that the command of the southern route to Verdun had passed into the control of his foe. From this time date the first charges against the marshal, which in the end were to bring about his ruin and disgrace. It is asserted that had he shown any energy on the 15th, fought with more spirit on the 16th, or improved his opportunities on the 17th, he might have shaken himself free from the steel talons which the German headquarters was closing upon him. Bazaine's excuses are based upon the demoralization of his army and the insubordination of his corps commanders. These facts rendered him unwilling to attempt another move on Verdun. On the 17th he led his army back to an impregnable position under the guns of Metz. He occupied with all his forces the high plateau west of the Moselle, his left resting on St. Ruffine, his right on Roncourt. In the choice of this position the marshal displayed excellent judgment, and his engineers rendered its natural strength even more formidable. At no point save perhaps on the extreme right could the enemy attack except at a great disadvantage and exposed to a terrific artillery fire. The marshal had in his first line the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 6th corps, while he retained the Guards as a reserve in the rear of his left wing.

On the same day that Bazaine was taking up these positions the German headquarters in a high state of satisfaction was making preparations for a final blow. Long before dawn on the 18th all the corps of the German second army were marching rapidly northward in the rear of the first army that was confront-

ing the French left in front of St. Ruffine. Von Moltke was ignorant of Bazaine's intentions and whether it would devolve upon him to receive or deliver an attack. The movements of the German corps had been ordered with a view to meeting either eventuality. At ten o'clock the king of Prussia was on the ground, and Von Moltke had become convinced that the French were standing on the defensive. The entire first army under Steinmetz was detailed to act against the almost impregnable French left southward from the farms of Moscow and St. Hubert. The 6th and 9th corps went in about Vérneville against the positions among the farms of Montigny-la-Grange, La Folie, and Leipsig. The Saxons followed by the Guards continued their march along the rear of this line to find the French right, and turn it.

The artillery of the 9th corps opened the action about eleven o'clock, and for three hours it raged furiously all along the extended line from Amanvillers to the extreme French left. The 6th and 9th corps were cautiously handled, and made no progress in their front, while Steinmetz, after wresting St. Hubert from the French, failed at the Point du Jour, and was thrown back with frightful slaughter.

Moltke's plan was to hold the French centre and left while the turning movement of the Guards and Saxons was being developed. Bazaine's conduct on this day strongly suggested that of Benedek at Königgrätz. He posted himself in the fortress of Plappeville where he commanded an excellent view of Frosard on the left, of Lebœuf and Ladmirault in the centre, while Canrobert on the right was out of sight and in poor communication. Bazaine gave no uneasy

thought to his right, notwithstanding the fact that it was naturally the weakest point in his line. The fury of Steinmetz's attacks upon Frossard and Lebœuf held all his attention exactly as Moltke intended they should do, although it was clear that the positions held by these generals were little less than impregnable.

At five o'clock no change had been effected in the state of the battle, the French line being everywhere intact. The lull that prevailed at this time was rudely broken by another furious assault of the first army. Steinmetz, who had been chafing at his temporary inaction, stimulated by the debouching of the 2d corps from the Bois des Ognons for his support, ordered another rush against the French positions beyond the Mance. The attacking columns were withered by a fiery blast that nothing human could endure. The French sallying from their trenches in great force, an incipient panic ensued. The opportune arrival of supports alone prevented a rout; and when darkness fell, the weary soldiers of the first army were standing fiercely on the defensive under a crushing fire of chassepots and mitrailleuses.

In the mean time the stubborn battle had been decided on the extreme left. Canrobert backed by the strong high village of St. Privat held his position without difficulty during the day against the attacks of several weak detachments of the Saxon and Prussian Guard corps. At sundown, however, another face was put upon matters in that vicinity. The 12th corps had completed its turning movement, and was fighting its way southward through Roncourt toward St. Privat, which had been already set on fire by the German artillery. The Prussian Guards moving up

from the vicinity of Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes also deployed for the attack upon St. Privat. Canrobert was left unsupported at this crisis. Bourbaki was in the vicinity with a few thousand grenadiers of the French Guard, but the battle was raging fiercely then about Amanvillers, and he was at a loss where to strike in. The sun sank below the forests, and in its stead the glare of the blazing village illuminated the darkening country. In the flame-swept streets a handful of Frenchmen lingered to cross bayonets with the Prussian guardsmen and meet the fate they courted. Canrobert drew off his corps slowly and in tolerable order, notifying Ladmirault of his movements.

All through the evening the combat was maintained here and all along the line. Malmaison sent a pillar of fire skyward, while St. Privat was visible for miles by the light of its own destruction. The king of Prussia and his staff left the position they had occupied during the day upon the gratifying intelligence from the left wing, but it was later still before Frossard's cannon ceased to illuminate the air over Point du Jour and Lebœuf's musketry to belt the hillsides north of the Verdun road with an incessant blazing. At midnight silence reigned, and the German pickets were holding the line from Vernéville through Amanvillers.

The battle of Gravelotte or Amanvillers, as the French demoninate it, was the last of that bloody trio that, commencing with Borny on the 14th, cost the German armies a loss of 42,000 and the French 34,000 officers and men. Though the Germans had shed their blood like water, they had in every case achieved their end. The battle of Borny was fought to gain

time to cut the roads to Verdun, Vionville to check the French retreat, and Gravelotte to "nail" the French to Metz. On the other hand, Bazaine aimlessly wasted his army. He fought Borny because he had no other alternative; at Vionville he was frightened into the defensive when a bold use of his strength would have given him the victory; at Gravelotte he fought to retain a hold on the road to Verdun, and lost it.

The military situation was simplified. Only one field army was left to France, the one gathering at Châlons, and against which the crown prince of Prussia was moving. On the day following the battle of Gravelotte the German fourth army (of the Meuse) was formed to coöperate with the third army, and the command given to the prince royal of Saxony. It comprised the 4th and 12th corps, the Prussian Guards, and the 5th and 6th cavalry divisions, and on the 20th began its westward march in search of the French army of Châlons. The strength of this army was close upon 100,000 men, that of the third army about 120,000 men. The first and second armies united were 225,000 strong, and upon their shoulders devolved the siege and subjection of Metz. The king of Prussia and General von Moltke left the lines before Metz to follow the headquarters of the third army.

CHAPTER XXVI.

SEDAN.

CONFUSION AT THE FRENCH HEADQUARTERS AT CHÂLONS. — MACMAHON'S ARRIVAL THERE. — RESULT OF THE MILITARY COUNCILS. — THE PARIS CABINET TAKES A HAND. — MACMAHON'S IRRESOLUTION. — FINALLY CONCLUDES TO MARCH UPON METZ. — STRENGTH AND CONDITION OF HIS FORCES. — DESPERATION OF THE MINISTRY AT PARIS. — GENERAL BLUMENTHAL ON MACMAHON'S MOVEMENT. — MOLTKE MOVES TO CHECKMATE HIM. — SITUATION ON THE 27TH OF AUGUST. — ON THE 29TH. — BATTLE OF BEAUMONT. — ROUT OF DE FAILLY'S CORPS. — DISCOMFITURE OF THE FRENCH 7TH CORPS BY THE BAVARIANS. — TERRIBLE DEMORALIZATION OF MACMAHON'S ARMY. — THE RETREAT UPON SEDAN AND MACMAHON'S TELEGRAM TO THE MINISTRY. — THE GERMANS CLOSE IN UPON SEDAN. — THE FRENCH POSITION AT SEDAN. — FIRST ATTACK OF THE GERMANS ON SEPTEMBER 1. — MACMAHON WOUNDED. — SPLENDID WORK OF THE SAXON ARTILLERY. — THE QUARREL AT THE FRENCH HEADQUARTERS AND ITS RESULT. — GENERAL DE WIMPFEN. — HEROISM OF THE FRENCH MARINES. — TERRIBLE FIGHTING AT BAZEILLES. — AWFUL EFFECT OF THE GERMAN ARTILLERY FIRE. — MISERY OF THE EMPEROR. — THE WHITE FLAG AT SEDAN. — THE PRUSSIAN KING ON THE HEIGHTS OF FRESNOIS — NAPOLEON'S LETTER. — EVENING ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

MEANWHILE all was confusion and indecision at Châlons. The emperor arrived on the evening of the 16th and found little encouragement in the military situation. The newly formed 12th corps and a few battalions of the Mobile Guard were in camp, and on the 18th MacMahon brought in his corps that had been so rudely handled at Wörth. On the 20th the 5th corps, which had followed MacMahon in his flight

from the Sauer, began to make its appearance, while the 7th corps was reported *en route* from Belfort *via* Paris, and the 13th corps in process of formation at the capital. The emperor held anxious conferences with Prince Napoleon, Marshal MacMahon, and General Trochu, the commander of the 12th corps. Prince Napoleon urged that it was time to reject the advice of the empress and her Jesuit advisers and to cultivate the friendship of Italy. He carried his point, and on the 19th left for Florence to inform his royal father-in-law "that he might do as he pleased with Rome if he would come promptly to the aid of France in arms." General Trochu insisted that the mobiles should be shipped back to Paris, as their uproarious insubordination threatened to contaminate the entire army. MacMahon urged that the army should retreat upon the capital and accept if need were a battle for its defense. It was decided, furthermore, that the emperor should return to Paris, whither General Trochu was to precede him and assume the military governorship of the city.

As a result then of the conference of Châlons, Prince Napoleon was sent to Florence, Trochu to Paris, and the army directed upon Reims. On the evening of the 21st the army reached the environs of the latter place, where it was reinforced the next day by the 7th corps. The retreat of the army and the proposed return of the emperor to his capital had been bitterly opposed from the first by the ministry of the empress. On the 22d the emperor received another dispatch from Paris to this effect: "If you do not march to Bazaine's assistance the worst is to be feared in Paris." At the same time a hopeful message was received from Bazaine in which he spoke

confidently of breaking through the German lines of investment on the north. The first of these telegrams frightened the emperor, while the two together shook MacMahon's resolution. He had previously informed the ministry that he knew nothing of Bazaine's condition, and that it would be inexcusable foolhardiness to attempt his relief with demoralized and half-trained troops. The telegram received from Metz on the 22d divulged Bazaine's plans, and MacMahon became convinced that he had no alternative but to march to his relief. Consequently on the 23d he issued his orders for an advance of the whole army upon Montmédy.

The strength of MacMahon's army was about 140,000 men. Of the corps composing it, however, the 1st had been shattered by battle, the 5th and 7th dispirited by forced retreats, and the 12th, while it included an excellent division of marine infantry, was made up largely of raw regiments. A long period of arduous training was necessary to lend anything like cohesion to this force, and there was not an hour to spare. The success of a movement for Bazaine's relief depended upon celerity, and of this MacMahon's regiments were incapable. The first day's march filled the country with stragglers. The intendance broke down, and orders were issued from headquarters for the army to live upon the country.

On the 27th, after a laborious march, the headquarters were at Le Chesne-Populeux. MacMahon was alarmed by unmistakable evidences that the crown prince of Prussia was moving northward against his flank. On the evening of that day he telegraphed to the ministry that he had determined to abandon Bazaine, and issued orders for retreat upon Mézières.

A few hours later and the agonized response of the ministry was placed in his hand. "If you leave Bazaine in the lurch there will be a revolution in Paris." This was supplemented by another message more imperative in tone from the minister of war. "I require you to march to the relief of Marshal Bazaine, by utilizing the thirty hours' start which you have over the crown prince (of Prussia). I am sending Vinoy's corps (the 13th) to Reims. The dynasty is lost, and we, all of us, with it, unless you accede to the wishes of the inhabitants of Paris." The emperor entreated MacMahon to hold to his resolution to retreat. It had been a struggle from the first between the headquarters and the Paris cabinet for the direction of the army of Châlons. The former manœuvred with reference to the German armies, the latter with reference to the Paris mob. The headquarters succumbed, and the army and the emperor marched on to their ruin.

In the mean time at Bar-le-Duc General von Moltke could hardly credit the reports that the French army was advancing on the Meuse. General Blumenthal with the map of northeastern France before him exclaimed, "These French are lost, you see. We know they are there, and there, and there, MacMahon's whole army. Where can they go to? Poor foolish fellows. They must go to Belgium or fight there and be lost," and his finger was close to the fortress of Sedan. On the 25th the orders were issued from headquarters that were to checkmate the army of Châlons. The Meuse army was already in the Argonnes, the third army was approaching the Aisne farther south and one day's march in advance. The orders of the 25th wheeled both these armies to the

right. The march "nach Paris" was suspended and 200,000 German soldiers turned their faces northward. The orderly promptitude with which this change of front was accomplished, and the new march sustained has long been a subject for admiring comment among military men.

On the 27th of August the French 7th corps had not crossed the Aisne, while the rest of the army held a line from Vouziers to Stonne. The 6th German cavalry division was hovering on the flank of the 7th corps. The Saxon 12th corps already held the line of the Meuse from Mouzon to Dun, while the Prussian Guards, 4th corps, and the two Bavarian corps were distant but a day's march to the south.

So heavy and painful were the movements of the French army that MacMahon could not issue his orders for passing the Meuse until the 29th. At nightfall on that day the 12th corps alone had crossed and was in bivouac about Mouzon. The Saxon 12th corps, which had repassed the Meuse to take a position on the flank of the French advance, fell upon a brigade of the 5th corps and drove it in upon the main body at Beaumont.

On August 30 the French 5th corps at Beaumont received orders to cover the crossing of the army at Villers and Remilly, and to cross itself at Mouzon later in the day. Notwithstanding the well proven fact that the whole country southward was swarming with the enemy, De Failly took no precaution against a surprise. He had one division in camp on the plain south of Beaumont and the rest of his corps on the heights to the north. Toward noon the German 4th corps fell on the leading division, surprised and routed it. The position north of Beaumont was

stoutly defended under the personal direction of De Failly, but assailed on front and flank by the 4th and Saxon corps was soon rendered untenable. Then began a disorderly retreat upon Mouzon. A brigade of the French 12th corps sent by General Lebrun to cover the flight of De Failly's battalions was roughly handled and only added to the confusion. The artillery of the 12th corps, well served on the heights east of Mouzon, checked the German pursuit.

During this combat the 1st Bavarian corps, which had been threatening De Failly's right, unexpectedly encountered a brigade of the French 7th corps which had lost its way. The baggage and supply trains were thrown into confusion by the Bavarian artillery and nearly annihilated. The French General Douay saw his corps demoralized without fighting, and, despairing of reaching Villers, directed its march upon Remilly. One division pursued a confused march to Sedan, where it crossed the Meuse the following morning.

This day's work threw the French army into terrible confusion. The 5th corps had been badly beaten, as had one brigade of the 12th corps. The 7th corps had been hotly pursued and lost a portion of its baggage. The 1st corps alone remained intact. The emperor had met MacMahon on the hills above Mouzon late in the afternoon, and the latter had then no idea of the magnitude of the disasters that had overtaken the army. When the rout of the 5th corps came streaming through Mouzon, however, he grasped the situation. He could only choose between giving battle at Mouzon and retreating northwest in the hope of finding an open road to Paris. He determined upon the latter course, and the ministry were in-


formed of it by this curt telegram, "MacMahon informs the minister of war that he is compelled to direct his march on Sedan." Through the dense darkness the army struggled on, crossing and blocking itself on unknown roads, the emperor making his way miserably on foot through the crowded streets of Sedan. After this night of panic, doubt, and confusion, MacMahon still failed to recognize the full gravity of his situation, although he was sufficiently uneasy to hurry the prince imperial off to Mézières, where he had pretty much determined to retreat the next day.

Throughout the day of the 31st the Germans advanced with wonderful energy. At sundown the jägers of Von der Tann's Bavarian corps were close up to the Meuse at Bazeilles, — near enough, indeed, to prevent the destruction of the bridge at that point, while the artillery engaged in a fierce duel with that of the French 12th corps. This action was maintained by the German commanders to hold the French marshal at bay while they cut his line of retreat upon Mézières, although they were not inclined to believe that their efforts to delay his march would meet with such complete success. It is worthy of note that the German headquarters invariably overvalued the military sagacity of its foes. All through the night of the 31st the 5th and 11th German corps were on the march, passing the Meuse at Donchery and moving northward to cut the road to Mézières. Shortly after one o'clock on the morning of September 1 the crown prince of Saxony issued orders to the 12th corps to direct their march from Douzy upon Sedan *via* La Moncelle, the Guard corps to move on their right upon the same point, the 4th corps to act as a reserve to these as well as to the Bavarians.

The French army was crowded into that narrow tract between the Meuse and Givonne, bounded on the north and northeast by a tangled wooded country that extends beyond the Belgian frontier. The only feasible lines of retreat were over the road to Mézières and up the Chiers to Carignan. MacMahon, as a precaution against an attack from the east, placed the 1st and 12th corps to cover the line of the Givonne from Bazeilles to the village of Givonne. He posted the 7th corps on the high land between Floing and Illy facing northwest, prepared to inaugurate a movement upon Mézières, at which place General Vinoy had arrived the day previous with one division of the 13th corps.

At daybreak on the morning of September 1 a heavy fog enshrouded the Meuse valley about Sedan, and before the sun had dissipated its fleecy folds a messenger came galloping up to the French headquarters with the tidings that the Bavarians were attacking Bazeilles. Hastening to the threatened point, MacMahon found the village stoutly defended by the marine infantry of the 12th corps. The Saxon artillery opening fire upon La Moncelle, the marshal next rode in that direction. As he was engaged in studying the country he was struck by a fragment of a shell and painfully wounded. His early incapacitation was certainly an unfortunate episode for the French. It was followed by a conflict of authority that was attended with the most serious results. General Ducrot, the general of the 1st corps, assumed the command upon MacMahon's fall. The Saxon corps was developing a strong attack against the whole French line between Dagny and Bazeilles, while the corps artillery massed on the highlands to

SKETCH OF SEDAN AND VICINITY.



the east fired with a power and precision that stirred at once the awe and admiration of the French generals. Ducrot decided that no time was to be lost in getting away to Mézières, and issued orders accordingly to the 12th corps to begin their retreat. No sooner had this been done than General de Wimpffen appeared on the scene, produced an order of the minister of war appointing him to the command of the army of Châlons in case of the disabling of MacMahon, and angrily countermanded Ducrot's orders. General de Wimpffen had been with the army only two days. He had been summoned to Paris by Palikao, and armed with instructions to supersede De Failly in command of the 5th corps. Before leaving for the front Palikao had also given him the order which he produced on the morning of the 1st of September. He was a confident, energetic, blustering man, and in Paris seems to have been impressed with the idea that he was destined to restore the fading lustre of the French arms. He first saw the army of Châlons at Mouzon on the evening of the 30th of August, when the panic-stricken refugees of the 5th corps were executing their "*sauve qui peut*." He presented himself to MacMahon but was coldly received, while his orders in reference to the 5th corps were entirely disregarded. The next morning he took the field, and upon hearing of MacMahon's wound hastened to assert himself before General Ducrot, who had more respect for the orders of the minister of war. Ducrot gave way only after a heated altercation in which General Lebrun of the 12th corps seems also to have borne a hand. Wimpffen reiterated his orders, and declared with bombast that he was going to throw the Bavarians into the Meuse and cut his way to Carignan.

During the morning the emperor wandered aimlessly about, watching gloomily the ever-increasing fire of the German artillery, an object of no consideration in the general *mêlée*. The 12th corps had begun to retire in obedience to Ducrot's order, and had lost ground which it must recover in order to lead the way to Carignan. The brightest spot in the French defense was at Bazeilles, where the marine infantry held the Bavarians at bay. Von der Tann had not met opponents like these since he crossed the Lauter. Ducrot's men at Wörth were stubborn fighters, but these marines laughed at odds and held Bazeilles for hours against nearly the whole power of King Ludwig's realm. The villagers joined in the conflict and wreaked vengeance upon the Bavarian wounded after each repulse. As a result the fighting became embittered, and a veritable hell raged within the flaming streets. At last the Bavarians, assisted by the vacillation of the French headquarters, obtained possession of the ruins of Bazeilles, and supported by the heavy fire of their splendid artillery advanced upon Balan. By ten o'clock the French army was beaten, and lost as well. The position on the Givonne had fallen into the hands of the Guards and Saxons; the Bavarians had carried Balan. Douay was appealing frantically for help against the German 5th and 11th corps, which had deployed between St. Menges and Fleigneux, and were extending their lines toward Olly. His artillery had been literally knocked to pieces by the fire of these two corps assisted by the guns of the Prussian Guard near Givonne. His cannons were dismounted, his tumbrils blown up, while his infantry could find no shelter from the terrific cross-fire.

Rarely, if ever, has an opportunity to annihilate an army with artillery been more relentlessly improved than by the Germans at Sedan. A French army nearly 100,000 strong, crowded into an area of hardly eight square miles, was subjected to the fire of 426 cannon served by the most perfect artillerists in the world. What wonder that the town of Sedan became blocked with military fugitives, that soldiers threw away their arms and rushed into churches and cellars for protection? There is no need of following the despairing efforts which the French made to recover a long lost day, to describe the hopeless contest waged by Douay against the Poseners and Hessians at Floing and Illy, to recite the heroism of Marguerittes' chasseurs and their bold ride to death, to depict the agony of the emperor and the fierce wrangling of his generals. It was by order of the emperor that the white flag was hoisted on the citadel. It was torn down by General Faure, MacMahon's chief of staff. "Why does this useless struggle go on?" groaned Napoleon, "too much blood has been shed." He rejected the proposition to lead a forlorn hope upon Balan and insisted upon closing the contest. Wimpfen in a rage tendered his resignation, but was shamed into its withdrawal. The white flag again went aloft, the German batteries ceased their roaring, and, freed from the engulfing smoke, the cannon and their defenders became revealed on the encircling hillsides. The uproar about the gate of Torcy where the Bavarians had been knocking hard for admission was stilled. A Prussian officer with a message to the commander-in-chief was admitted to the presence of the emperor. He had come to summon the surrender of Sedan. When he rode back it became known for

the first time at the German headquarters that the French emperor was with the ill-fated army.

About six o'clock the king of Prussia, the crown prince, and their staffs stood on the heights of Frénois awaiting a message from Napoleon III. concerning the capitulation of the army. The air had become cleared of smoke, and the golden evening light streamed into the valley and glowed upon the placid surface of the river. A dun cloud of smoke still brooded over Bazeilles, but save for this and the dark clumps of steel-fringed warriors visible here and there, there was little sign of the iron hand of war to be traced from this airy height. At last the French General Reille came toiling up the hill with the expected letter from his emperor. The king breaking the seal read the words now familiar to the whole world: "Sire, my brother, — Having failed to meet death in the midst of my troops, it only remains for me to place my sword in the hands of your majesty."

The Emperor of the French had surrendered, but not his army. Upon being informed that De Wimpfen was in command, the king requested his presence at Donchery in the evening to discuss the terms of capitulation with General von Moltke. Then the brilliant assemblage on the heights broke up amid general congratulations. The king and his staff rode away to Vendresse. Bismarck made his way to Donchery, where he was joined by Moltke. Darkness fell on the field that registered the downfall of the second empire. A loiterer on the heights of Frénois might still have marked the position of Bazeilles by its lurid smoke-pall; he might have traced the course of the river as the moon broke through the windy clouds and silvered its bosom. All through the val-

ley bonfires flashed out, lit by jubilant soldiers of the Fatherland. The progress of the king toward Vendresse was marked by distant cheering, and then as night deepened from bivouac after bivouac came the sound of singing, until the air throbbed with the strains of the grand old choral, "Nun danket alle Gott."

CHAPTER XXVII.

LAST MEETINGS OF BISMARCK AND NAPOLEON.

THE MILITARY CONFERENCE AT DONCHERY. — BISMARCK'S ACCOUNT OF IT. — WIMPFEN SEEKS THE EMPEROR. — THE MEETING BETWEEN THE EMPEROR AND BISMARCK AS NARRATED BY EACH. — SCENE AT THE WEAVERS' COTTAGE. — SIGNATURE OF THE CAPITULATION. — THE EMPEROR LEAVES FOR BELGIUM.

THE two prominent actors in the events following the battle of Sedan were the French emperor and the German chancellor. Both have given their narrative to the public, and one may well discard all other authority for theirs.¹

In a small room in the village of Donchery the conqueror and the conquered met for consultation on the evening of the battle of Sedan. The incident has been perpetuated on the canvas of a distinguished artist.² On one side of a baize table is Wimpffen, and

¹ Bismarck's narrative of the capitulation has been made public with the full consent of the chancellor by Dr. Moritz Busch in his work entitled *Bismarck in the Franco-German War*. The extracts in this chapter have been taken from the authorized English translation of this work. Napoleon's story of the war of 1870 was edited after his death by the Count de la Chapelle, with other sundry papers, in a volume styled *Posthumous Works and Unpublished Autographs of Napoleon III. in Exile*. The count was war correspondent for the *London Standard* during the campaign of 1870, and later held a confidential post in the house of the exiled emperor. He has written an account of the war that is a model of historical misrepresentation and inaccuracy, but the military memoir he has edited as the work of Napoleon is generally accepted as authentic.

² A. von Werner's *Capitulation of Sedan*.

behind him a few crestfallen officers in the uniform of the second empire. On the other side are Bismarck, Moltke, and behind them partially visible in the dim lamplight four or five of those clear-headed men who had helped to build up Germany's military power. Here are the events of that meeting in the words of Bismarck himself :—

“ Besides Moltke and myself, Blumenthal and three or four other officers of the general staff were present. General Wimpffen was the spokesman for the French. Moltke's terms were short: the whole French army to surrender as prisoners of war. Wimpffen found that too hard. ‘The army,’ said he, ‘had merited something better by the bravery with which it had fought. We ought to be content to let them go, under the condition that as long as this war lasted the army should never serve against us, and that it should march off to a district of France which should be left to our determination, or to Algiers.’ Moltke coldly persisted in his demand. Wimpffen represented to him his own unhappy position: that he had arrived from Africa only two days ago; that only towards the end of the battle, after MacMahon had been wounded, had he undertaken the command; now he was asked to put his name to such a capitulation. He would rather endeavor to maintain himself in the fortress, or attempt to break through. Moltke regretted that he could take no account of the position of the general, which he quite understood. He acknowledged the bravery of the French troops, but declared that Sedan could not be held, and that it was quite impossible to break through. He was ready, he said, to allow one of the general's officers to inspect our positions, to convince

him of this. Wimpffen now thought that from a political point of view it would be wise for us to grant them better conditions. We must, he said, desire a speedy and an enduring peace, and this we could have only by showing magnanimity. If we spared the army, it would bind the army and the whole nation to gratitude, and awaken friendly feelings; while an opposite course would be the beginning of endless wars. Hereupon I put in a word, because this matter seemed to belong to my province. I said to him that we might build on the gratitude of a prince, but certainly not on the gratitude of a people — least of all on the gratitude of the French. That in France neither institutions nor circumstances were enduring; that governments and dynasties were constantly changing, and the one need not carry out what the other had bound itself to. That if the emperor had been firm on his throne, his gratitude for our granting good conditions might have been counted upon; but that as things stood, it would be folly if we did not make full use of our success. That the French were a nation full of envy and jealousy; that they had been much mortified with our success at Königgrätz, and could not forgive it, though it in no wise damaged them. Now, then, should any magnanimity on our side move them not to bear us a grudge for Sedan? This Wimpffen would not admit. ‘France,’ he said, ‘had much changed latterly; it had learned under the empire to think more of the interests of peace than of the glory of war. France was ready to proclaim the fraternity of nations;’ and more of the same kind. It was not difficult to prove the contrary of all he said, and that his request, if it were granted, would be likelier to lead to the prolonga-

tion than to the conclusion of the war. I ended by saying that we must stand to our conditions.

“Thereupon Castelnau became the spokesman, and as the emperor’s personal commissioner declared that on the previous day he had surrendered his sword to the king only in the hope of an honorable capitulation. I asked, ‘Whose sword was that—the sword of France or the sword of the emperor?’ He replied, ‘The emperor’s only.’ ‘Well, there is no use talking about any other conditions,’ said Moltke sharply, while a look of contentment and gratification passed over his face. ‘Then, in the morning we shall begin the battle again,’ said Wimpffen. ‘I shall recommence the fire about four o’clock,’ replied Moltke; and the Frenchmen wanted to go at once. I begged them, however, to remain and once more to consider the case; and at last it was decided that they should ask for a prolongation of the armistice in order that they might consult their people in Sedan as to our demands. Moltke at first would not grant this, but gave way at last, when I showed him that it could do no harm.”

So through the darkness the unhappy Frenchmen made their way to Sedan, where Wimpffen told his pitiful story to the emperor. He, poor man, promised his general to seek the king of Prussia in the morning, and personally intercede for better terms for the army. Here is an extract from Napoleon’s recital of the events of that morning:—

“On the morning of the 2d of September Napoleon III., accompanied by the prince of Moskowa, entered a droschky drawn by two horses, and drove towards the Prussian lines. General Reille preceded him on horseback in order to inform Count von Bismarck of the emperor’s arrival. As the latter reckoned upon

returning to the town, he did not take leave either of the troops which surrounded it or of the battalion of grenadiers and the centgardes who formed his customary escort; when the drawbridge of the south gate of Sedan was lowered, the zouaves who were on duty there again saluted him with the cry of ‘Vive l’Empereur.’ It was the last adieu which was to meet his ears. When he arrived within a quarter of a league of Donchery, not wishing to proceed to the Prussian headquarters, the emperor stopped at a small house which stood by the road, and there awaited the arrival of the chancellor of the northern confederation. The latter, having been apprised of this by General Reille, soon arrived.”

“I met him on the high road near Frénois,” says Bismarck, describing the same event, “a mile and three quarters from Donchery. He sat with three officers in a two-horse carriage, and three others were on horseback beside him. . . . I gave the military salute. He took his cap off, and the officers did the same; whereupon I took mine off, although it is contrary to rule. He said, ‘Couvrez-vous donc.’ I behaved to him just as if in Saint-Cloud, and asked his commands. He inquired whether he could speak to the king. I said that would be impossible, as the king was quartered nine miles away. I did not wish them to come together till we had settled the matter of the capitulation. Then he inquired where he himself could stay, which signified that he could not go back to Sedan, as he had met with unpleasantnesses there, or feared to do so. The town was full of drunken soldiers, who were very burdensome to the inhabitants. I offered him my quarters in Donchery, which I would immediately vacate. He accepted this.

But he stopped at a place a couple of hundred paces from the village, and asked whether he could not remain in a house which was there. I sent my cousin, who had ridden out as my adjutant, to look at it. When he returned, he reported it to be a miserable place. The emperor said that did not matter. He went across to the house, and came back again, apparently not being able to find the stairs, which were at the back. I went up with him to the first floor, where we entered a little room with one window. It was the best in the house, but had only one deal table and two rush-bottomed chairs. Here I had a conversation with him which lasted nearly three quarters of an hour."

Says Napoleon in his account, "The conversation first entered upon the position of the French army, a question of vital urgency. Count von Bismarck stated that General Moltke alone was competent to deal with this question. He afterwards inquired of the emperor if he wished to commence negotiations for peace, and the latter replied that his present situation prevented him entering upon this subject; also that the regent, being in Paris, and surrounded by her ministers and the Chambers, could in complete independence negotiate for the attainment of an end so desirable for all. . . .

"When General von Moltke arrived, Napoleon III. requested of him that nothing should be settled before the interview which was to take place, for he hoped to obtain from the king some favorable concessions for the army. M. von Moltke promised nothing; he confined himself to announcing that he was about to proceed to Vendresse, where the king of Prussia then was, and Count von Bismarck urged the emperor to

go on to the Château de Bellevue, which had been selected as the place of the interview. It became evident that the latter would be delayed until after the signature of the capitulation."

Napoleon divined rightly in regard to this last fact. "I was determined," says Bismarck, "that the military men who can be harder should have the whole affair to settle."

For a short time the Emperor of the French and his staff were left alone in front of the little yellow cottage as Bismarck rode away to Donchery to see about their quarters. The Emperor of the French sat there on the edge of the weaver's potato patch, gaped at by German teamsters and curious rustics, awaiting the pleasure of the German chancellor. Did the days of Paris and Biarritz come to the emperor's remembrance? An hour later, when he was rolling along toward the château with the helmets and breastplates of the cuirassier guard flashing on all sides, did he recollect that he had pronounced the iron man who cantered his charger at his side as one "of no consequence?" Bismarck recalled it, but he tells us laughingly, "I did not think myself at liberty to remind him in the weaving shed at Donchery."

While Napoleon awaited the king of Prussia at the Château Bellevue, in one of the lower rooms General de Wimpffen in despair was signing the capitulation. Says Napoleon, "When it was signed, General de Wimpffen came to inform the emperor, who had remained all this time on an upper floor. A few minutes afterwards, the king of Prussia arrived on horseback, accompanied by the crown prince and attended by a few officers.

"It was now three years since the sovereigns of

France and Prussia had met, under very different circumstances. . . . Now, betrayed by fortune, Napoleon III. had lost everything, and had surrendered into the hands of the conqueror the only thing left him — his liberty.”

The ink was hardly dry upon the papers that converted the French soldiers into prisoners of war than the orders were issued for the march to Paris. With the exception of Vinoy's corps at Mézières, which began its retreat upon the capital as soon as apprised of the result of the battle of Sedan, no troops remained to oppose it.

On the 4th of September Napoleon left Sedan for the castle of Wilhelmshöhe near Cassel, which the Prussian king had placed at his disposal. The day was dark and sad, and the falling rain converted the roads into mire. So, bidding adieu to France forever, escorted by a hostile soldiery, the Man of December, the Arbiter of Europe, the Modern Cæsar, was whirled away northward into the mist and gloom that enshrouded the Belgian hills.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

PARIS IN WAR TIME.

THE EARLY WAR DAYS IN PARIS. — FALSE REPORT OF VICTORY. — POPULAR RAGE OVER THE DECEPTION. — THE EMPRESS RECEIVES THE NEWS OF DISASTER. — THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO DECEIVE THE PUBLIC. — THE EMPRESS CONVOKES THE CHAMBERS. — FALL OF THE OLLIVIER MINISTRY. — PALIKAO. — THE EMPRESS AT THE TUILERIES. — DEMORALIZATION IN THE PALACE. — THE NEWS OF SEDAN. — NIGHT SESSION OF THE CORPS LÉGISLATIF. — THE 4TH OF SEPTEMBER. — THE BLOODLESS REVOLUTION AND FALL OF THE EMPIRE — FLIGHT OF THE EMPRESS FROM PARIS. — GENERAL TROCHU. — THE DEFENSES OF PARIS. — THE DEFENDERS OF PARIS. — REGULARS, MOBILES, AND NATIONALS. — THE MARINES AND THE FORTRESS ARTILLERY. — ARRIVAL OF VINOY'S CORPS AT PARIS. — FAVRE AND BISMARCK AT FERRIÈRES. — PARIS INVESTED. — FIRST COMBATS OF THE SIEGE. — DISPOSITIONS OF THE BESIEGING ARMY. — THE TEMPER OF PARIS. — MORE SORTIES. — DESTRUCTION OF THE CHÂTEAU AT ST. CLOUD. — INSUBORDINATION IN THE NATIONAL GUARD. — ASPECT OF PARIS DURING THE LAST WEEKS OF OCTOBER. — THE BESIEGERS.

IN the mean time great events had taken place in Paris. Upon the departure of the emperor for the front the empress regent continued her residence at St. Cloud, and awaited confidently the tidings of victory. On the evening of August 2 came news of "the baptism of fire," which aroused some enthusiasm but more ridicule in Paris. On the 3d and 4th no news was made public, but on the evening of the 5th the London papers arrived with a description of Douay's rout at Weissenburg. Paris became strongly agitated by the news of defeat and the conviction

that the government was suppressing news from the front.

On the afternoon of August 6 it was announced at the Bourse that the French had won a great victory against overwhelming odds, that they had captured the crown prince of Prussia with 25,000 prisoners, and occupied Landau. The effect of this news upon the anxious Parisians was indescribable. In a twinkling great crowds swarmed into the squares and boulevards, the tricolor appeared on all hands, and above the cheers and manifestations of delight the air resounded with the exhilarating strains of the Marseillaise. The name of MacMahon was in every mouth, and the cries of "A Berlin en huit jours" thundered out with renewed intensity. Gradually the Parisians came to their senses. The government was obliged to profess ignorance of the reported victory. Rage took the place of enthusiasm. The tricolor disappeared as if by magic. The people stormed the Bourse, broke furniture, and beat and ejected the few remaining occupants. All through the evening agitated crowds thronged the boulevards, while a great mob besieged the residence of M. Ollivier and demanded freedom and truth in the press reports. It was a hard day for the police and military authorities of the city, and their vigilance alone prevented serious and violent disturbances.

On this evening when Paris was seething with violent emotions, the empress was anxiously awaiting more definite news from the front. Shortly after midnight came this telegram from the emperor: "MacMahon has lost a battle. Frossard has been compelled to retreat from the Saar. The retreat was effected in perfect order." Then followed the omin-

ous words, "Tout peut se rétablir." Within a few hours after the receipt of this dismal message the empress had abandoned St. Cloud; and when the morning of the 7th broke gloomily over the restless, troubled city she was conferring with her ministry at the Tuileries.

The government made an effort to break the news gently. A bulletin announcing, "The corps of General Frossard is in retreat. No details," only stimulated popular anxiety. Then followed the statement, "It almost appears as if the enemy wished to offer us battle on our own territory. This would insure us great strategical advantages." The supposition from this combination was that Frossard was retreating for strategical reasons. The proclamation of the empress in the afternoon, however, dispelled all delusions. She announced that the army had suffered a check, declared Paris in a state of siege, convoked the Chambers for the 9th, and published the emperor's doleful telegram of the 6th in full.

The Corps Législatif convened on the 9th, and it was deemed advisable to surround the Palais Bourbon with a cordon of troops. The morning session was tumultuous beyond description. Ollivier was repeatedly interrupted and insulted. Jules Favre declared that the country had been compromised by the imbecility of its chief, and declared that the emperor should be brought back to Paris and not allowed to embarrass the military councils at the front. Granier de Cassagnac, a firm Bonapartist, replied to Favre, denounced his propositions as "the beginning of revolution," and amid fist-shaking and general uproar advocated arraigning the entire Left before a military tribunal. A babel of uproar followed in which men

lost their heads and tempers. Before night the Ollivier ministry had fallen on a vote of confidence, and been succeeded by that of Count de Palikao. Palikao was a bluff soldier with a good record, and he stirred a ripple of enthusiasm in the Chambers when he entreated the members to pardon the weakness of his voice, as he carried a bullet in his chest. But the Chamber was no place for weak lungs in these days, and honorable wounds would not suffice to secure for an imperial minister the favor of the Left. Palikao's régime was brief and turbulent.

The life of the empress at the Tuileries was an anxious one. She had moments of flickering confidence, but she left her gay spirits at St. Cloud. On the 14th she held her last state reception; the next week she was busily engaged in poring over the dispatches that narrated the details of the great battles before Metz. They were all recited as victories, and yet Bazaine had become hemmed in; the empress could not understand this. It is said that after the middle of August the atmosphere of the Tuileries became so hopeless and dejected that well-known faces began to disappear; that all discipline was lost in the palace; that articles of bric-à-brac and wearing apparel were missed simultaneously with pages and maids. Of these facts, however, the empress took little note. The army in the field and the mob in Paris held her attention; of the latter she lived in daily dread. She agreed with Palikao that the emperor must not return to Paris, and that MacMahon must march to the aid of Bazaine, who was enjoying such singular fruits of victory. The real danger in which MacMahon and the emperor stood was not appreciated until September 1, when a telegram was received from General

Vinoy at Mézières, requesting full discretionary powers. This, coupled with MacMahon's dispatch that he was "compelled" to retire upon Sedan, awoke serious misgivings at the war office. On the afternoon of September 3 the worst fears of the government were realized. A telegram from the emperor epitomized the disaster of Sedan: "The army is defeated and captured. I myself am a prisoner." The terrible news leaked out, and by evening Paris was aware that some new misfortune had fallen upon the country. At one o'clock on the morning of the 4th the Corps Législatif convened. Palikao gloomily announced the news, and requested that all discussion be postponed for a few hours. Jules Favre then offered a proposition under three heads: 1, That Napoleon and his dynasty be declared fallen; 2, The nomination of a committee of defense; 3, The retention of General Trochu as governor of Paris. The assembly then adjourned until 1.30 P. M.

The 4th of September will long be remembered in the history of Paris and of France. At dawn Paris began to make its presence felt. The cries of "Déchéance" and "Vive la République" were raised on the boulevards and in the Place de la Concorde, and were audible in the gilded saloons of the Tuileries. Before night the French empire had become a thing of the past, and a French republic had arisen. A revolution vast, irresistible, but bloodless had swept away the last vestige of imperialism, and left an uproarious democracy in possession.

Let us look at the events of the day through the eyes of an American bystander.¹ It is noon in the Place de la Concorde crowded with excited humanity.

¹ Sheppard's *Shut-up in Paris*.

“The Garde Mobile are scattered here and there. armed with muskets, without order or commander, The blouses are carrying muskets, yelling ‘Vive la République.’ They look like bandits. A distant group starts the Marseillaise. It is caught up by all the immense concourse. . . .

“The day is bright. The sun is kindly. The blue sky smiles. Turn round once at the Egyptian obelisk, and you shall see the Arc de Triomphe; . . . the Madeleine pillars, standing sentinel against the angry horrors of the hour; the palace of the Tuileries, with the flag of the empire still floating from its top, and the Corps Législatif, where all the interest has now concentrated, while beyond it the gilded dome of the tomb of the other exiled Napoleon glistens under the blaze of noon. The fountains are playing as usual. . . .

“The Tuileries clock strikes twelve. The flag is not down yet. The empress is still there. Crowds assemble — and so does the Corps Législatif at twenty minutes past one. The National Guard and some mounted sabres protect the bridge and the approaches.

“Again the galleries are packed to overflowing. No ventilation, great smell of unclean democrats. The diplomatic corps are in full force. Wonderfully magnificent ladies, and the time-honored revolutionary dames of dauntless front and enormous diameter. The Corps Législatif are debating. In a few minutes there is a fearful uproar outside — soldiers and people fraternize, and in the briefest time the edifice is inundated with soldiers and people, young and old, both men and women, as well as little boys and girls; they burst through the door opposite the president’s desk, and fill the chamber, shouting ‘Déchéance’ and ‘Vive la République.’

"Some are in the costume of the National Guard; some in that of the Guard Mobile. Many carry chassepots, and some short swords. The women carry only their native arms, bare and brawny, and uplifted. There is the usual proportion of these masculine dames, and of young women with their babes, and of family men, taking no part particularly, simply smoking and watching, and of boys laughing and shouting. It is an indescribable tableau; and after all attempts at description, one returns to the only adequate one — it is French.

"President Schneider rises, looks down upon the tumult with a most disconsolate countenance, not unmixed with disdain, rings the bell nervously, and says: 'All deliberation is impossible under these circumstances. I accordingly pronounce the sitting at an end.'

"The president puts on his hat at about 3.20 P. M., steps down, and disappears, followed by all the deputies present, except those of the extreme Left, several of whom, and particularly Gambetta, in vain endeavor to control the new 'government.'

"The owners of the blouses, petticoats, and shirt-sleeves continue to dance and howl, to brandish fists, babies, and chassepots, as it may happen; they cry 'Déchéance,' 'Vive la République.' . . .

"Jules Favre tries to pacify them by saying: 'Union is necessary; the Republic has not been declared, but it will be presently.'

"The noise grows more unearthly, — dancing, howling, babies screaming, women and men gesticulating, dogs joining in the chorus of cries with all their might, till the 'extreme Left' are driven to their wits' end. Some of the National Guard mount the

president's rostrum; a villainous, ill-looking fellow takes the chair and shakes the bell; the green sprigs in the muskets are waved; one man in a blue shirt mounts the tribune and makes a speech, but it is inaudible. Some men seize the pens and ram them into the inkstands, and pretend to write; but as they do not know how, they can only 'make their mark,' and spill the ink around. The ill-looking man rings the bell furiously; the members of the 'extreme Left' continued their exertions on behalf of 'law and order,' but at length they give up in despair, and depart, leaving the mob in possession.

"The 'extreme Left' is succeeded by the extremer Left. Somebody thinks of Rochefort, and cries, 'To St. Pelagie.' Nobody stirs, however. But the next cry, 'To the Hôtel de Ville — to proclaim the Republic,' carries all before it; and they move tumultuously and noisily to the Hôtel de Ville.

"In one of the rooms of the Hôtel de Ville the members of the 'extreme Left' assemble and declare the Republic, and themselves its rulers. Favre chooses the portfolio of foreign affairs. Gambetta prefers that of the interior. Trochu is continued governor of Paris. The legislative body and senate are pronounced dissolved. All political prisoners and exiles are pardoned."

The fall of the empire was dramatically registered as the clock of the Tuileries sounded for half past three, by the lowering of the imperial flag. This was the signal to all republicans who were not otherwise engaged. The Tuileries were stormed. The soldiers on guard interposed little resistance, but appealed to the people with good effect to refrain from pillage and vandalism. Just before the mob broke into the

building Signor Nigra, the Italian ambassador, entered the apartments of the empress and informed her that she must fly. Hastily bidding a tearful adieu to the little knot of adherents who remained faithful to her, under the escort of Signor Nigra and Prince Metternich she made her way to the street, where a close cab was in waiting. She was driven to the house of Dr. Evans, the American dentist, where she rested a few hours. She left the same night, however, for the north, and made her way in disguise to the little seaport town of Déauville. Here she embarked on the yacht of Sir John Burgoyne, and after a perilous and protracted voyage landed in England, a weary, saddened woman, her bright hopes blighted, her husband an exile, his dynasty lost, her son a mere pretender.

As president of the government of national defense and military governor of Paris, General Trochu occupied an unenviable position. He was the servant of a turbulent people, the head of a dubious government, the commander of a motley army of doubtful efficiency. Before the downfall of the empire he had commenced his extraordinary efforts to place the city in a state of defense. Paris was protected, first, by the enceinte with its ninety-eight bastions; and, second, by an outlying chain of detached forts fifteen in number and occupying a circle thirty-six miles in circumference. On the north of the city about St. Denis were the strong works of La Briche, Double Couronne du Nord, and De l'Est. On the northeast between St. Denis and the Canal de l'Oureq was the fort of Aubervilliers. On the east between the canal and the Marne, well situated on a commanding plateau, were Forts Romainville, Noisy, Rosny, and Nogent.

The Fort of Charenton stood southeast of Paris in the angle formed by the Seine and Marne. The hilly wooded country in the peninsula formed by the bend of the Seine south of the city was protected by a line of five forts, Ivry, Bicêtre, Montrouge, Vanves, and Issy. On the west Paris was protected by a single fort, the largest and most formidable of all, Mont Valérien, perched on a commanding hilltop 363 feet above the Seine, and commanding with its fire all the low adjacent country. Beside these there was the wood embowered, fortified château of Vincennes with its formidable outworks, which, however, did not play a prominent part in the outer line of defense. Advantageous points between and in advance of the forts were occupied by redoubts. The country beyond the northern forts was inundated by damming the river Rouillon, the magnificent bridges over the Seine were blown up, houses and forests that threatened to interfere with the action of the fortress artillery were ruthlessly demolished or burned. The armament of the forts and enceinte was ample, though many of the pieces were antiquated. Indeed, as regards defenses and armament combined, Paris may be said to have been strongly, though by no means perfectly, protected.

Trochu had, to defend the city, a force more numerous than the necessity required, and more motley than numerous. The garrison may be classed under three heads: first, the regular troops; second, the Mobile Guard;¹ and third, the National Guard. The regu-

¹ The Mobile Guard while strong in numbers was defective in organization and indifferently drilled. It was made up of men under thirty years of age and officered by the vote of the rank and file. It corresponded in many respects with the state militia of the United States.

lar troops were made up largely of the 13th and 14th army corps, the marines, pompiers, gendarmerie, etc., aggregating about 90,000 men. The Mobiles comprised 115,000 men, 15,000 being the Paris contingent, the remainder having been brought in from the provincial districts. The influence of Paris upon these latter troops was baneful in the extreme. "They obstructed the boulevards and cafés; idleness and debauchery caused almost as great ravages in their ranks as the fire of the enemy," such was General Ducrot's criticism upon them. The National Guard was literally Paris in arms, and was ever swelling in numbers and fomenting disorder.¹ By the last of October the garrison of Paris numbered nearly half a million of men, 300,000 of which were ill-drilled National Guardsmen.

Trochu in assigning duties to the different branches of his vast army made the best of a bad dilemma. To the marines he confided the fortress artillery. When as the siege progressed he was accused of throwing undue hardship and danger upon the shoulders of this gallant corps, he retorted, "How in God's name am I to help it? I must have men at the guns who will not run away at the first round." The Mobile Guard was detailed to garrison the forts and redoubts. The National Guard occupied the enceinte. The regular troops and picked battalions of the Mobile Guard were held for fighting in the open country,

¹ General Ducrot's comment on these troops was as follows: "The Parisian as a soldier is either very good or very bad, rather good than bad on the field; but when enrolled in the Mobile or National Guard he is always a detestable soldier, because his instincts of laxness and revolt always dominate his natural courageous qualities. . . . They could not be preserved from the evil contact of the masses, and they took part in many political manifestations."

for sortie work, and it must be confessed for intimidating the National Guard as well.

On the afternoon of September 7 the Parisians were served to a tangible evidence of the French defeats, when the weary corps of Vinoy entered after its breathless run from Mézières. Hardly a fortnight before it had left for the front with all its "fuss and feathers," new uniforms, bands, and standards. It returned in a sad plight. The "jaded columns of red legs and disordered mass of guns and wagons looked like nothing so much as the floating in of a wreck upon the beach."¹

On the 16th of September the last mail left Paris ; on the day following clouds of Uhlans were reported in sight. Paris began to realize that the enemy was at her gates and that a siege was impending. The new government recognized the fact earlier and transferred its seat to Tours. M. de Crémieux, minister of justice, was detailed to represent the government at the latter place, whither nearly all the diplomatic functionaries hastened after him. M. Thiers left for England in the hope of gaining mediation, while Jules Favre visited Bismarck at Ferrières in the hope of arranging an armistice. Unfortunately Favre and Bismarck were so far apart in their views of what the occasion demanded that any agreement was hopeless. Bismarck mistrusted the stability of the new government and refused to consider an armistice except on the basis of the capitulation of Bitsch, Toul, and Strasburg, and the surrender of several of the Paris forts. As regards peace he stood for territorial cession. Favre planted himself squarely on the principle, "not an inch of our territory or a stone of our fortresses."

¹ Sheppard's *Shut-up in Paris*.

“ France will as little forget Sedan, as Waterloo or Sadowa which did not concern you. . . . As we shall shortly have another war with you, we intend to enter upon it in possession of all our advantages,” such were Bismarck’s chilling comments. “ We can perish as a nation, but we cannot dishonor ourselves,” was the heated rejoinder of Favre. In short, Bismarck would not consider an armistice unless France gave up even the slight military advantages that she yet held. He would not discuss peace until the principle of the cession of territory was fully accepted. Favre returned to Paris in great dejection.

In the mean time the city had become invested. The third German army crossed the Seine on pontoon bridges near Villeneuve, the fourth closed in from the northwest. There was skirmishing on the 17th and 18th of September between the vanguard of the third German army and the Parisian forces between Villeneuve and Créteil, and on the 19th the first sharp action occurred on the plateau between Meudon and Sceaux. General Ducrot, who had occupied this position in force, was attacked by the 10th Prussian division.¹ Later the 2d Bavarian corps assumed the burden of the action, and the 5th corps pursued its march to Versailles. The French fought well for a time, and then became demoralized. The Bavarians carried the plateau of Châtillon-Clamart and the redoubt at Moulin de la Tour. The 5th corps occupied Versailles that evening, and seized the unfinished works at Montretout and Sèvres. The fugitives from Ducrot’s forces rushed madly into Paris, where they told wild stories of the action and spread consternation abroad. The conduct of the troops was anything

¹ Of the 5th corps.

but satisfactory, and Trochu was compelled to publicly expose certain battalions. On the 21st the headquarters of the third German army was transferred to Versailles.¹ The next day the investment was practically complete. The outposts of the fourth army were on the line Bezons, Argenteuil, Epinay, Pierrefitte, Stains, Dugny, Le Bourget, Villemonble, Neuilly. The third army was on the line Brie, Champigny, Créteil, Choisy-le-Roi, Thiais, Chevilly, L'Hay, Bourg, Meudon, Sèvres, Bougival.

Paris blustered, threatened, and fumed. The affair at Chatillon-Clamart shook public confidence for a time. The citizens and National Guard "manifested" repeatedly before the Hotel de Ville with shouts of "La guerre à outrance" and "A bas les Prussiens." Cries of "Vive la Commune" also became noticeable on these occasions. A clamor was raised for decisive measures, for a sortie in force. The commandant of Mont Valerien was removed because "protests against the silence of this fort were so loud and strong."² His successor felt compelled to keep his guns warm, and fired continually. On October 2 came the news of the fall of Strasburg and Toul. Another "manifestation" resulted, in which the communistic element again developed great strength.

On September 30 General Vinoy conducted a reconnaissance in force against the 6th German corps between Choisy-le-Roi and La Belle Epine. The French fought well, and even carried the little village of L'Hay. They were finally expelled, however, and General Guilhelm was killed. This attack through-

¹ The king of Prussia transferred his headquarters from Ferrières to Versailles on October 1.

² Labouchere's *Diary of a Besieged Resident*.

out was ably seconded by the fire of forts Montrouge and Bicêtre.

On October 13 Vinoy conducted another attack against the Bavarian lines in the direction of Bagneux and Châtillon. General Susbielle's division carried the latter village, but the Mobiles failed at Bagneux, where the young Count Dampierre lost his life. Châtillon was then evacuated, and the French retreat began. In the afternoon of this day a demonstration was made from Mont Valérien toward St. Germain. The king of Prussia witnessed the operations from the viaduct of Marly until the withdrawal of the French. Mont Valérien maintained a lazy fire during the evening, and shelled the Park of St. Cloud. The château was set on fire and burned throughout the night. Much of its valuable contents had been removed before the siege began, considerable more was saved by the Prussian soldiers, but at dawn nothing remained of the building but bare walls and smoking ruins.

The first three weeks of the siege indicated that the army of Paris was no match for its foe. The mass of the National Guard had no stomach for fighting, and the Mobiles and the line were unsteady. In the National Guard there was little improvement in discipline; soldiers wrangled over political problems, and threatened their officers. The hope of Paris was transferred from her own defenders to the armies organizing under the direction of the Tours government on the Loire and in the northern provinces. News from these forces was received only by balloon or carrier-pigeon, and anxious suspense was the result. Gambetta left Paris for Tours in a balloon on the 7th of October, and arrived safely at his destination.

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Had the traveler who visited the International Exhibition of 1867 found himself again in Paris during the last weeks of October, 1870, he would have been shocked at the change that had come over the city. The imperial flag no longer floats from the Tuileries, the gay turnouts are gone, the superb soldiery of the Guard has given place to the slouchy ill-dressed National and Mobile. The garden of the Tuileries is a bivouac; the Champ de Mars a camp; the Cirque de l'Impératrice a barrack; the Palais de l'Industrie a hospital; the Luxembourg and Elysée military headquarters. In the Place de la Concorde crowds gather, chatter, and "manifest" about the statue of Strasburg; the quais along the Seine are blocked with soldiery. In the Place de l'Etoile and at the Trocadéro knots of citizens gather, watch Mont Valérien, and search in vain for a trace of the enemy. The restless inhabitants of Belleville and St. Antoine are busily drilling or lounging about in uniform at the expense of "the government." As darkness falls, a full sense of the change that has come to the city of gayety and light is apparent. The boulevards are dimly lighted, many of the cafés and theatres are closed. The semi-military population is omnipresent, the gay loungers of happier days have disappeared. The deep ominous roar of the fortress artillery forms a dismal accompaniment to these scenes. Does the traveler desire to drive in the Bois de Vincennes or the Bois de Boulogne? He is informed first that horses are scarce and beginning to be devoted to other uses than excursions of pleasure. He also learns that these fashionable parks have been converted into camps where the Prussian "obus" is a frequent visitor. At the silent railway stations

crowds gather about the balloons that are preparing to wing their uncertain way to Tours. St. Denis, no longer a centre of attraction for the tourist, is reported under the fire of the Prussian artillery.

The traveler wishes to pass the lines. Many apply, but few receive permission. These happy mortals who do succeed in getting out and in satisfying the importunities of the German outposts in these days have little desire to linger in the vicinity, but hasten to place the water between themselves and La Belle France. If our traveler is successful, and allowed by the German headquarters to make the "tourist's round," he is struck first with the invisibility of the besieging army. Nothing so dismays the Parisian soldier as this same facility of his foe for keeping out of sight. No one would dream from the evidence of his eyes on the German forepost line that 250,000 sons of the Fatherland are around the capital of France. Yet on a moment's warning these quiet villages, these still woods, are ready to bristle with spiked helmets and bayonets, and wrap themselves in battle smoke.

At Versailles the traveler finds the quietude of the old château town rudely disturbed. Here his attentive eye is rewarded by a glimpse of the German princes and generals by the score. Bismarck's white coat is as conspicuous here as at Gitschin or at Nikolsburg. Orderlies come and go galloping, cavalry troops clatter along the avenues, swords and spurs clanking and jingling. The bronze figure of Louis XIV. before the château still points grimly in the direction of Paris as though turned traitor and urging the national foe to the attack. The picture-gallery is not to be inspected. The pictures have been covered,

and the château turned into a hospital. One wing forms the residence of the king of Prussia, who lives and sleeps under the same roof with his wounded children.

From the terrace of Meudon the traveler gains the same view that charmed him three years before, Paris lying resplendent amid her favored suburbs. The Bavarian artillery has usurped the ground where the Parisian loves to lounge and recreate. The erect officer in the sky-blue uniform peering through his field glass is not admiring the towers of Notre Dame or the dome of the Invalides: he is sweeping his eye along the French fore post line and up the glacis of Fort Issy.

At Sèvres the outposts of the 5th corps are unappreciative of porcelain and china, but grim proficients in the use of steel and lead. The hand of Mont Valérien lies heavily upon St. Cloud with its guard of Poseners. The sun and stars shine through the gaping windows of the desolate fire-blackened pile which has been the delight of Marie Antoinette, and of the great Napoleon, and which only a few weeks ago was gay with the court of Eugénie.¹

¹ History has repeated itself at St. Cloud during the present century. These stanzas are from Sir Walter Scott's *St. Cloud*, written during the allied occupation in 1815. They are equally applicable to the events of 1870.

"The evening breezes gently sighed
Like breath of Lover true,
Bewailing the deserted pride
And wreck of sweet Saint Cloud.

"The drum's deep roll is heard afar,
The bugle wildly blew,
Good night to Hulan and Hussar
That garrison Saint Cloud."

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE WAR IN THE PROVINCES.

STRASBURG AND ITS GARRISON. — THE BOMBARDMENT. — BURNING OF KEHL. — FIRMNESS OF GENERAL UHRICH. — GENERAL WERDER INVESTS STRASBURG. — FINAL BOMBARDMENT AND SURRENDER OF THE PLACE. — CONDITION OF METZ. — REPULSE OF BAZAINE'S SORTIE. — CAPITULATION OF METZ. — BAZAINE'S CULPABILITY. — COMPLEX NATURE OF THE MILITARY PROBLEM FROM THE GERMAN STANDPOINT. — VITALITY OF REPUBLICAN FRANCE. — A FRENCH FORCE APPEARS ON THE LOIRE. — ITS DEFEAT BEFORE ORLEANS. — FORMATION OF THE ARMY OF THE LOIRE. — ITS ORGANIZATION BY GENERAL D' AURELLE DE PALADINES. — WINS A VICTORY AT COULMIERS. — RETREATS UPON ORLEANS. — CONFLICT BETWEEN GAMBETTA AND THE FRENCH COMMANDER. — APPEARANCE OF THE FRENCH ARMY OF THE NORTH. — PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES MARCHES UPON ORLEANS FROM METZ. — ADVANCE OF THE ARMY OF THE LOIRE. — ITS RIGHT WING IS BEATEN AT BEAUNE. — GAMBETTA INSISTS UPON A CONTINUATION OF THE ADVANCE. — THE LEFT WING DEFEATED AT LOIGNY AND POUFRY. — FREDERICK CHARLES ASSUMES THE OFFENSIVE. — THE TWO DAYS' BATTLE IN FRONT OF ORLEANS AND ROUT OF THE ARMY OF THE LOIRE. — CHANZY RALLIES THE LEFT WING AND TAKES POSITION AT JOSNES. — IS ATTACKED BY THE GRAND DUKE OF MECKLENBURG. — RETREAT OF CHANZY UPON LE MANS. — INACTION OF THE FIRST ARMY OF THE LOIRE UNDER BOURBAKI. — GAMBETTA MARCHES IT EASTWARD. — FREDERICK CHARLES AND MECKLENBURG CONCENTRATE AGAINST CHANZY. — SEVERITY OF THE WEATHER AND SUFFERING BY THE TROOPS. — THE BATTLE BEFORE LE MANS AND DEFEAT OF CHANZY. — THE SECOND ARMY OF THE LOIRE AND ITS RECORD. — DESTRUCTION OF THE FRENCH ARMY OF THE NORTH BY MANTEUFFEL. — MARCH OF MANTEUFFEL TO WERDER'S SUCCOR. — BOURBAKI CROSSES THE SWISS FRONTIER.

WHEN MacMahon took up his position on the heights of Wörth, the fortress of Strasburg was left

in charge of an infantry regiment of the line and a few thousand Mobile guardsmen. This slender force received a substantial reinforcement on the day following the battle, when 10,000 fugitives from MacMahon's right wing poured into the city. General Uhrich, the commandant, reestablished order and confidence among these refugees to such an extent that when, on the 8th, the German General Beyer at the head of the Baden division of the third army summoned him to surrender, he was enabled to return a firm refusal. As a result the Baden division, reinforced by a Pomeranian regiment from Rastatt and a few Bavarian batteries, sat down before the place. General Werder of the Prussian army was appointed to command the besieging army, while the Landwehr division of the Guard and the first reserve division were ordered to Strasburg from their stations in the north of Prussia. Moltke was eager for the immediate reduction of the place, and Werder, with a just idea of the character of the garrison, thought to bring it to terms by a short bombardment. Strasburg being undefended by detached forts, the besiegers were enabled to approach at short range and ply their field artillery. On August 17 the batteries in front of Kehl on the eastern bank of the Rhine opened fire. The French, far from being overawed, responded by raining shell upon the unprotected town of Kehl, while they attempted numerous sorties against the German infantry in the suburban villages on the western bank of the river. On the 24th the fire of the besiegers assumed greater precision and intensity, and was maintained incessantly for three days, a period which was improved by the engineers in pushing their shelter trenches closer to the French

bastions. The destruction wrought by the French as well as the German guns was considerable. Several of the villages in which the Prussian infantry had found shelter were destroyed, while Kehl itself was set on fire and vied with Strasburg in the intensity of its conflagration. The scene at night was grand beyond description. The delicate spire of the cathedral seemed to float in the midst of the lurid glare that rose from the burning city, while the dark waters of the Rhine glowed angrily as they swept seaward between the stricken shores.

Though the inhabitants of Strasburg clamored for capitulation, Urich was immovable. General Werder desisted from his bombardment, sent to Prussia for siege trains, and prepared for a regular investment. The northwest front of the Strasburg defenses was selected as the weak point in the line, being open to flanking fire, and on September 1 the siege began. The full strength of Werder's corps was then on the ground. Parallels were opened and the work covered by a heavy fire from the siege batteries. The siege operations of the Prussians form an interesting and instructive study to the engineer and the sapper. Every day witnessed progress. The mining galleries of the French were unearthed and turned to account by the Prussian engineers. An indirect breaching fire was maintained with admirable success. The Badenens occupied the Sporen island where the French mortar batteries had been located. At length on September 27, when two French lunettes had been converted into Prussian works and breaches opened in the main wall for an infantry attack, when the citadel had been battered into rubbish and the streets of the city placed at the mercy of bullets and shrap-

nel, Uhrich hoisted the white flag on the cathedral. On the morning of September 28 the terms of capitulation were arranged, and on the day following the garrison marched out. Their utter demoralization was evident; many were drunk and raised shouts of "Vive la Prusse." More than 19,000 prisoners, including 2,000 sick and wounded, fell into the hands of the Germans, these latter representing the loss of the besieged during the seven weeks' contest. Unhappily, three or four hundred citizens also perished, though Werder allowed several hundred of this class to pass out, and sent word into the city that the cathedral would form a safe refuge to noncombatants. The roof of this magnificent structure was partially burned by shells fired at the tower, where the French established a post of observation, but the interior remained uninjured.

In strong contrast to the events at Strasburg were the episodes of the blockade of Metz. There was no bombardment and but little fighting. A great French army 175,000 strong lay sullenly in the midst of the encircling forts and pined away day by day, week by week, from stagnation and disease, until at last it succumbed to the iron embrace of its conqueror. It might almost be said that this vast army gave up without a blow. The only sortie in force, undertaken primarily with the object of breaking through the investors' lines, occurred on August 31. Bazaine was induced to make this attempt by messages which had been smuggled through the German lines from Thionville, announcing the presence of MacMahon's army upon the Meuse. He determined upon breaking through on the east of Metz in the direction of St. Barbe, and brought no less than four corps into ac-

tion for that purpose. His attack was not delivered until late in the day, and the noise and bustle of his preparation had thoroughly aroused the Germans. The French right carried Columbey and the centre Noisseville. This latter village was taken and retaken, but at ten in the evening remained in the hands of the French. The 1st German corps, upon which the brunt of the afternoon's fighting had fallen, was heavily reinforced during the night from the 7th and 9th corps, and on the morning of the 1st of September assumed a vigorous offensive. The French seemed to have lost all the *élan* of the day before. Canrobert was driven in on the left; Lebœuf lost Noisseville. At noon the whole army was in retreat and the sortie was a failure. If we omit the feeble attempt of October 7 against the Prussian Landwehr on the north of Metz, we have done with the offensive operations of Marshal Bazaine as commander of the army of the Rhine. He signed the capitulation at the Château of Frescati on the 27th of October which delivered the virgin fortress into the hands of Germany, and with it three marshals of France, 50 generals, 6,000 officers, 173,000 men, 53 eagles, 66 mitrailleuses, 541 fieldpieces, and 800 fortress guns.


The principal charges against Bazaine, which were sustained by the Trianon court-martial, were as follows: that he made no serious attempt to break through the lines of an enemy but little his superior in numbers, and upon whom devolved the guardianship of a line thirty-eight miles in length; that he communicated with the deposed emperor; that he engaged in an illicit correspondence with the Prussian headquarters; and that his final capitulation was not a necessity. Bazaine's defense to the first

charge was the disorganization of his army, and his lack of horses which were short of fodder. As to the second charge, Bazaine claimed that his oath was to the emperor, and when the empire fell he regarded the war as at an end. He had no faith in the republic and deprecated further bloodshed. He certainly corresponded with the German headquarters, and even suggested that his army might be used to restore domestic order in France. Bazaine claims that his capitulation was a necessity. To subsist longer in Metz was out of the question. The hospital and public buildings were crowded with 20,000 sick and wounded, the water was impure, salt had given out, there were no horses for the artillery. Without attempting to settle the question as to whether or not the marshal was guilty of treason, the penalty of which he suffered until his death, we must recognize the fact that the fall of Metz sealed the fate of France. Two hundred and twenty-five thousand German soldiers were let loose upon the raw levies which the republic was everywhere organizing in the frantic hope of saving Paris.

With the fall of Metz the last soldiers of the empire crossed the Rhine as prisoners of war. Yet the military situation had attained from the German standpoint a more tangled complexity than at any previous period of the campaign. The republic was displaying extraordinary vitality. It reflects great credit upon the energy of the government of national defense, as impersonated by Gambetta at Tours, that when the armies of Prince Frederick Charles and Manteuffel commenced their westward march from Metz, there were more men in arms beneath the tri-color than at any time since the emperor's declaration of war.

While Metz still held out Moltke had made great efforts to check the organization of new French armies. Cavalry columns were pushed in all directions from Paris to overawe the country but without effect. The peasantry flocked to the colors in great numbers, until by the middle of October a strong French corps was reported in the vicinity of Le Mans, another was known to be organizing on the Somme, while a German cavalry division was compelled to abandon Toury to the advance of the French 15th corps, which had sprung up in a night on the banks of the Loire. The latter force was rightly judged by Moltke as the most threatening. Consequently the 1st Bavarian corps, the 22d division of the 11th corps, and the 2d and 4th cavalry divisions were directed southward. On October 10 these troops encountered the 15th corps near Chevilly, and after some preliminary skirmishing crushed it on the day following, capturing three guns and seven thousand prisoners. The panic-stricken survivors fled through Orleans and across the Loire in such terror that another Joan of Arc could hardly have brought them to their senses and saved the city. The Germans entered at midnight, having sustained the most insignificant losses.

With the Bavarians in possession of Orleans, and with the surrounding country well patrolled by two cavalry divisions, Moltke withdrew the 22d division and 4th division of cavalry to Chartres. This column arrived at its destination after a lively fight at Châteaudun, which had been barricaded by a force of mobiles and Franc-tireurs. The grand duke of Mecklenburg assumed command at Chartres, and held himself in readiness to support Von der Tann at Orleans,



to march to Paris, or threaten the French army in the west.

Moltke hardly did justice to the extraordinary vitality of republican France. Before the close of October a 16th corps under Chanzy had taken the field, the 15th had been reorganized, and a 17th was in process of formation. General d'Aurelle de Paladines was appointed to the command of all these forces by the government at Tours. He found them without the *esprit* and discipline indispensable to a formidable army. Their nucleus was formed by some 15,000 regulars, more than half of whom had escaped during the early morning hours from the carnage of Sedan, and around these were grouped the raw peasantry and Mobile Guards. Thanks to the energy of the new commander, the chaotic battalions soon assumed a more military bearing. At last it was thought they might reasonably undertake an important enterprise. D'Aurelle fixed his mind upon the Bavarians at Orleans and determined upon their capture or annihilation. When it is considered that he had a force of at least 70,000 men, while the Bavarians had no substantial supports nearer than Chartres, this plan cannot be pronounced imprudent. He decided upon November 9 as the day for his great stroke. No time was to be lost, as Metz had capitulated and the first and second German armies were moving westward by forced marches.

General d'Aurelle was a good strategist, and he laid his plans carefully. While the 15th and 16th corps concentrated on Orleans from the west and south, General Pallières with one division of the former corps was to cross the Loire east of Orleans, and march in the direction of Chevilly to bar the

Bavarian retreat on Paris. Fortune, however, was not favorable to the French. Von der Tann, warned by his cavalry of the French concentration, left one regiment in Orleans, and with the balance of his troops crossed the Loire to reinforce his division near Coulmiers. In this vicinity he was attacked on the 9th by the 15th and 16th corps. Divining the trap that was being laid for him, and sending word to the regiment in Orleans to retreat upon Artenay, he evacuated Coulmiers, and fighting hard began to retire over the road to Patay. At nine o'clock in the evening, after suffering a loss of less than one thousand men, the main body of his corps was approaching that place. D'Aurelle had been foiled utterly in his "enveloping" scheme. His extreme left had been thrown into disorder by a cavalry panic, while on the right Pallières only reached Chevilly at midnight. The influence of the action upon the French soldiery, however, was very inspiring. They had seen the backs of German columns, and this unwonted exhibition was productive of wild sensations in the raw and enthusiastic troops. Von der Tann halted at Toury, where he placed himself in communication with the 22d division at Chartres. The 17th division was moved from the Paris army to the south, and the command of the united forces conferred upon the grand duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. His four divisions of infantry and three of cavalry constituted a force of nearly 50,000 men.

The battle of Coulmiers marked a great crisis for France. M. Gambetta enthusiastically hailed the army as conquerors, and urged an immediate advance upon Paris. He became convinced in his joy that the ardent soldiers of the republic were man for man

superior to their experienced adversaries. General d'Aurelle de Paladines, on the other hand, regarded matters from another standpoint. Far from advocating a movement upon Paris, he insisted that the army should return to the intrenched camp at Orleans. The 9th of November convinced him that these same soldiers whom Gambetta regarded as invincible were inclined to be panicky and incapable of great manœuvres. Even the knowledge that Prince Frederick Charles with his whole army was approaching the Loire could not shake D'Aurelle's determination. In spite of Gambetta's remonstrance that he was wasting valuable time, he brought the army back to Orleans for reorganization and drill. This was the commencement of a struggle between the government and the military authorities. M. Gambetta failed to profit by the dismal experience of Palikao; and while the army of the Loire was marked by defects that must of necessity have seriously compromised its fortunes, yet, as we shall see, upon his shoulders must rest a large portion of the responsibility for its greatest defeats.

On the 15th of November France had become divided into four distinct battlefields. In the northern provinces two French corps under Bourbaki were preparing to withstand the German army which Mansteuffel was bringing up from Metz; at Paris Trochu and his discordant legions still fumed within their iron girdle; on the Loire the rapidly swelling ranks of D'Aurelle's corps were at last confronted by the combined forces of the grand duke of Mecklenburg and Frederick Charles; while in the southeast Werder with the 14th German corps had invested Belfort, and was watching the south of France as far as Dijon.

Gambetta never ceased to urge upon the French commander the necessity of assuming the offensive. During the last weeks of November he received information from General Trochu that the garrison of Paris was on the eve of a great sortie, and his urgency became imperative. D'Aurelle was ordered to undertake a movement in coöperation with the army of Paris. The German lines at this time extended from the vicinity of Beaune la Rolande on the east, passing north of Artenay, to Ogères on the west. The French commander found himself under the necessity of breaking through or turning this line in the hope of giving the hand to a successful army from Paris. Consequently, on the 28th of November he directed the 18th and 20th corps against Beaune la Rolande with orders to push the German left back from the road to Paris. Beaune was held by the 10th corps and stubbornly defended. The French troops made a determined fight, but the arrival of the German 3d corps finally accomplished their discomfiture. With the retreat came the usual panic, both the French corps losing numerous prisoners, and falling back upon Bellegarde on the outskirts of the forest of Orleans. The French commander after this would willingly have abandoned the offensive, but Gambetta was again excited over a dispatch from Trochu, stating that Ducrot had broken through the German lines of investment, and was marching upon Epinay. D'Aurelle, who had rested passively since the 28th in dread of an advance by Prince Frederick Charles, was once more induced to march northward. He seems to have made no attempt at a general advance, — indeed, the forest of Orleans would have hopelessly divided his corps in such a move, — but in this case

used his left wing exclusively, as on the 28th of November he had used his right. General Chanzy with the 16th corps commenced his advance on December 1, driving before him the outposts of the grand duke of Mecklenburg. On December 2 he struck heavily against the main body of Von der Tann's war-worn Bavarian corps, and bearing them down by sheer weight of numbers carried Loigny, Villeprevost, and Château-Goury. At this crisis, however, the Bavarian general was supported on his left by the 17th division, while the cavalry division of Prince Albrecht covered his right. The grand duke of Mecklenburg assumed the offensive, drove Chanzy from all the ground he had gained, and by a concentric attack carried Loigny. The 15th corps on Chanzy's right had in the mean time encountered the 22d German division, and been driven before it out of Poupry at the point of the bayonet. The French 17th corps also took part in the contest between Poupry and Loigny, but was finally worsted and driven back with the entire wing upon Terminiers. At night the French army rested in the positions it had occupied in the morning. The grand duke of Mecklenburg had engaged his entire force, four weak divisions, or about 35,000 men. The French employed the greater part of their corps, at least 80,000 men.

The result of the combats at Beaune and at Loigny only served to convince the French commander of the unreliability of his young troops. There was no time to argue with Gambetta over the advisability of further offensive movements, for on the 3d Prince Frederick Charles began a concentric advance upon Orleans, the second army forming on a line from Artenay to Beaune, the grand duke of Mecklenburg mov-

ing southward against the French left wing and later upon Orleans over the Châteaudun road. The operations of the 3d and 4th of December, which have become known as the battle of Orleans, were a succession of combats ill-sustained by the French, who at many points seemed more ready to lay down their arms than to use them. The German artillery especially exercised a powerful influence upon their raw soldiery, spreading consternation beyond the reach of its shells. The excitement in Orleans was intense. The French commander, thoroughly disheartened by defeat, and irritated by Gambetta's interference, compromised the vigor of his defense by his indecision. On the 3d the fighting was distant from the city, and the muffled rumbling of the artillery by day and the numerous conflagrations that flared on the moonlit plain at night alone told of the German devastation. On the 4th, however, the pluck of civil and military authorities gave way, and the evacuation commenced. All through the day the firing came nearer, until the rattle of musketry echoed in the streets and the ground trembled with the reverberation of the artillery. Great crowds of terror-stricken soldiers streamed through the streets in flight. As darkness fell the roar of the battle was at the city gate; the troops of Prince Frederick Charles were in the suburbs. In the evening the last fight took place about the railway station. After that it was a general *sauve qui peut*, and shortly after midnight the German troops were tramping unmolested through the city streets. The battle of Orleans cut the French army of the Loire in halves. D'Aurelle with the 15th, 18th, and 20th corps retreated upon Bourges, while Chanzy with the 16th and 17th corps retreated along

the other bank of the Loire under cover of the newly formed 21st corps as far as Beaugency. These two forces were immediately denominated by Gambetta as the first and second armies of the Loire. D'Aurelle was removed from the command of the former, and General Bourbaki summoned from the north to succeed him. General Chanzy was appointed as commander of the other. The first army was in a wretched condition, and Gambetta found Bourbaki little more energetically inclined than his predecessor.

Prince Frederick Charles had wholly allayed the uneasiness that prevailed at Paris in reference to Gambetta's armies, yet it was determined to follow up the divided fragments, and if possible utterly to dissipate them. While Prince Frederick Charles held himself between Orleans and Vierzon to watch Bourbaki, the grand duke of Mecklenburg moved against Chanzy. That general had little of the timidity or misgiving that characterized his colleagues, and having succeeded in infusing into his men something akin to confidence, he promptly established himself in a strong position, his right resting on the Loire at Beaugency, his centre upon the plateau of Josnes, and his left covered by the forest of Marchenoir. In this position he was attacked by the grand duke of Mecklenburg on the 6th. The grand duke was too weak numerically to attempt a turning movement, and consequently attacked boldly the face of the position. The brunt of the fighting fell upon Von der Tann's Bavarians in the centre; and though they lost ground in the afternoon, they still held the village of Cravant which they had wrested from the French in the morning. On the left, in the mean time, the 17th German division advanced steadily along the Loire from

Meung, fought combat after combat, and after making several hundred prisoners carried Beaugency itself in the evening. The 22d division on the extreme right had no serious fighting during the day in front of the forest of Marchenoir. On the next day the grand duke again assumed the offensive, the 17th division and the Bavarians driving in the French right, and approaching close to Josnes, the heart of the French centre. In the evening the opinion prevailed at the grand duke's headquarters that Chanzy would not attempt to maintain himself longer, and would take advantage of the night to draw off. Chanzy, however, again registered his intrepidity and individuality by resuming the struggle at daybreak, driving in Von der Tann's outposts and well-nigh throwing his whole corps into confusion. This attack was beaten back by a heavy artillery-fire, under cover of which the infantry rallied. The grand duke had been reinforced by the 10th corps, which Prince Frederick Charles had detached to his assistance upon becoming convinced of Bourbaki's lethargy, while the 9th corps was approaching Blois on the left bank of the Loire on its march for Tours. Chanzy claims that it was this corps threatening his rear and not the grand duke's assaults that finally induced him to retreat. At all events retreat he did, leaving several hundred prisoners with the Germans. In the prolonged combat at Beaugency and Josnes Chanzy had to defend his almost impregnable position the 16th, 17th, and 21st corps, beside a new division which had been brought up from Tours. These troops, numbering at least 100,000 men, were nearly all engaged. The grand duke on his part employed less than 55,000 men, including the 22d division,

which had no serious fighting, and the 10th corps which acted as a reserve. Chanzy retreated rapidly upon Le Mans in severe weather and over bad roads. He was followed closely by Frederick Charles, and at Vendôme in a rear-guard engagement lost a few hundred prisoners. He arrived at Le Mans on the 16th of December, where he was joined by the 19th corps.

Moltke now determined to give his weary troops a respite. The second army was ordered to adopt a passive attitude and not press Chanzy at Le Mans; the 1st Bavarian corps, weary from incessant campaigning, was recalled to Orleans to observe Bourbaki. The troops of the grand duke of Mecklenburg were withdrawn to Chartres, from which point they could move promptly upon Le Mans, Orleans, or Paris.

Bourbaki's long inaction was due to the wretched condition of his army and the differences that existed between Gambetta and his generals. Chanzy incessantly urged a hearty coöperation of the two southern armies with the army in the north in a simultaneous march upon Paris. Paris was always Chanzy's objective point, and it is beyond dispute that the plans he advocated were the ones which the German staff most dreaded. Gambetta, on the other hand, little by little had his attention drawn from the famishing capital, and began to regard with favor a plan for cutting the German communications with the Fatherland. In an unhappy hour he decided to march to the relief of Belfort. Werder would be overwhelmed, Baden invaded, Carlsruhe and Stuttgart bombarded, the German army isolated in France. On December 20 Bourbaki received his orders from Bordeaux, whither the government had fled after the loss of Orleans.

Bourbaki's movements were slow, and the German staff at Versailles was late in divining his destination. They continued to believe that a combined movement would be undertaken against Paris, and firm in this conviction Moltke determined to annihilate Chanzy. The new year found Prince Frederick Charles and Mecklenburg concentrating towards Le Mans in obedience to the instructions from Versailles. The weather was terribly severe, the roads frozen into ruts or impassable from ice, snow fell frequently, and the artillery and baggage trains were moved with difficulty. The uniforms and shoes of the men were badly worn and unfit for the season, and the movements as a result were slow and painful. On the 10th of January the grand duke after a series of skirmishes succeeded in establishing himself northwest of Le Mans in the left rear of Chanzy's position. The 3d and 9th corps in the mean time were approaching from the east, and the 10th corps from the southeast. The country east of Le Mans is hilly and heavily wooded in parts, and the heights rising abruptly from the Huisne admit of easy defense. Chanzy was confident of holding his own, the more so as he anticipated that the Germans would be unable to bring up their artillery on account of the slippery condition of the ground. On the 9th and 10th of January there was considerable fighting, resulting in the loss of advance positions and several thousand prisoners for the French commander. On the day following Prince Frederick Charles struck home. The French centre made a determined resistance, but the left was threatened from the north by the grand duke of Mecklenburg, while on the right the mobiles disgracefully abandoned La Tuilerie to the advance of the German

10th corps. Upon this Chanzy's retreat commenced, and Le Mans was soon abandoned.

The second army of the Loire does not again attract notice as a military force in any formidable sense. It is true Chanzy rallied it beyond the Mayenne, and continued to assert its worth to Gambetta until the capitulation of Paris ended all. Yet the fact of its preservation was due more to the cold weather and long nights than to its own cohesion or the admitted ability of its chief. More than once the darkness and frost stood Chanzy in good stead by stopping a losing fight and driving the Germans into the villages for warmth and shelter. The rival commanders witnessed the close of a day's campaigning with widely different sensations. While the Red Prince yearned for the power of Joshua to stay the sun in his course, Chanzy bade a glad adieu to the last rays that streamed through the gray forests.

In glancing at the record of the second army of the Loire, we notice first that it invariably fought against inferior numbers, and yet was invariably worsted. Where perhaps five or six thousand of its troops met the soldier's fate in wounds or death, nearly twenty thousand laid down their arms in terror. The achievements of this army are sung more loudly in republican France than those of the army of the Rhine, and yet with equal numbers and equal lack of success we find the latter made the greater sacrifices. The army of the Rhine lost as many men in a few hours at Vionville as the army of the Loire endured in six weeks' campaigning. Furthermore, the army of the Rhine inflicted losses upon its foe at the battle of Gravelotte three times as great as the army of the Loire imposed from the day of its first

fight until the armistice. A well-commanded army may, it is true, accomplish great results without suffering great losses ; skillful manœuvring may prevent butchery. The army of the Loire, however, accomplished nothing, and while admitting that it comprised some excellent material, the lesson taught by its campaign is that patriotism, enthusiasm, and energy are not the only requisites to an efficient army. It is difficult to agree with Chanzy that France was humiliated because she had lost confidence in herself. After the battle of Le Mans France did wisely in recognizing that she no longer had a military basis to build confidence upon.

The army of the north (22d and 23d corps), which never attained the cohesion of the army of the Loire, was shattered at Pont-a-Noyelles in December by Manteuffel, and practically destroyed on the 19th of January in a fight at St. Quentin. Indeed, so impotent had this force become that Manteuffel was enabled to march southward with the 2d and 7th corps to succor Werder at Belfort. He marched hard and fast, passed over bad roads within a few miles of Dijon under the very nose of Garibaldi and his volunteers ; and yet when he approached Belfort he found Bourbaki already defeated. Werder with 40,000 men had maintained the siege of Belfort, frightened Garibaldi into inaction at Dijon, hoodwinked Bourbaki by a demonstration, while he chose a defensive position on the Lisaine, and then in a three days' battle completely foiled and demoralized the three corps of the first army of the Loire. There can be no more interesting study to the student of military strategy than this campaign in the southeast. It was but a by-play, however, to the great drama that was almost played

out on the Seine and in the west. When the starving, freezing levies of Bourbaki, caught in the toils between Manteuffel and Werder, crossed the Swiss frontier for disarmament, the curtain which had risen in August upon the emperor's military pageant at Saarbrück had already fallen at Paris upon the last hopeless struggle of the republic against an invincible invader.

CHAPTER XXX.

THE FALL OF PARIS.

THE EASTERN AND ITALIAN QUESTIONS REOPENED. — THE LONDON CONFERENCE. — OCCUPATION OF ROME BY THE ITALIAN ARMY. — THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE AT VERSAILLES. — ITS ATTITUDE ON EUROPEAN QUESTIONS. — CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN PARIS. — EVENTS OF THE 31ST OF OCTOBER. — TEMPORARY SUCCESS OF THE COMMUNE. — UNRELIABILITY OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. — PREPARATION FOR THE GREAT SORTIE. — THE BATTLE OF CHAMPIGNY. — ITS CHARACTER AND RESULTS. — INCREASING GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION IN PARIS. — FIGHTING NEAR LE BOURGET. — OPENING OF THE GERMAN BOMBARDMENT. — ABANDONMENT OF MONT AVRON BY THE FRENCH. — NEW YEAR'S IN PARIS. — THE KING OF PRUSSIA HAILED GERMAN EMPEROR AT VERSAILLES. — BATTLE OF BUZANVAL AND RETREAT OF THE FRENCH. — FAVRE AT VERSAILLES. — CAPITULATION OF PARIS AND SIGNATURE OF THE ARMISTICE. — THE FRENCH ASSEMBLY MEETS AT BORDEAUX. — APPOINTS THIERS CHIEF OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER. — THIERS AND BISMARCK AT VERSAILLES. — THE PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE RATIFIED BY THE ASSEMBLY. — ENTRY OF THE GERMAN TROOPS INTO PARIS. — THE PEACE OF FRANKFORT. — EUROPE AT THE PRESENT DAY. — PREVALENCE OF MILITARISM AND THE CAUSES THEREFOR.

DURING these exciting autumn days when the German hosts were closing in upon the capital of France, the cabinets of St. Petersburg and Florence were turning the crisis to good account. Gortschakoff officially proclaimed to Europe that Russia no longer felt bound by the terms of the treaty of 1856 respecting her standing in the Black Sea. The Italian premier formally declared his intention to immediately occupy Rome as the national capital.

The contemplated seizure of Rome aroused no protest in Europe, even the Austrian chancellor stating that he "considered the course which the Italian government had taken was reasonable, just, and such as would conduce to an equitable solution." The action of the Czar, while an affront to all the powers represented in the Paris Congress, was especially galling to England. Lord Granville presented Russia's treaty obligations very clearly from a moral standpoint, but the Czar was not inclined to postpone the restoration of Sebastopol and the Black Sea fleet for moral considerations. England could find no ally on the troubled continent, and war was out of the question. Bismarck was induced to suggest a conference, and Gortschakoff gracefully accepted London as the place of meeting. The first session convened on January 17, 1871, and the sittings concluded on March 13. There had never been a question about the success of the revision named in the Russian circular, but the conference smoothed England's vanity and lent an air of official respectability to the whole proceeding.

In the mean time (September 19) the Italian troops under General Cadorna went into bivouac about the Eternal City. On the day following, the Pope having reiterated his intention to resist, the royal artillery battered a breach in the ancient walls, and the infantry entered to an almost bloodless victory. As the tricolor of the Italian nation was flung to the breeze from the walls of the capitol the great bell pealed out above the joyous tumult in the streets, announcing to the world that the Italian question was settled forever, and that Rome was free.

What was the attitude of the German confederation on continental questions at this time? To solve

this question scores of diplomatists made their way to the sleepy château town of Versailles, where in the residence of Madame Jessé in the Rue de Provence the German foreign office was established. There the German chancellor was to be found, bluff and busy as ever, with his finger on the throbbing pulse of Europe. While the soldiers watched the great city before them he watched the world and guided it. Every day brought new conferences, now with Favre or Thiers about the fate of Paris, now with some churchman on the Roman question, again with Odo Russell or the Russian ambassador on the Black Sea clause. Yet among his own people he found time for unbending to laugh at great men, and mix his diplomatic comments with narrations of youthful experiences at the university, or of hairbreadth escapes in hunting. The Italian episode simply seemed to arouse his curiosity: "I am curious to see what the Pope will do. Will he leave the country, and where will he go? . . . There is nothing left for him but Belgium or North Germany. . . . People with lively imaginations, especially women, when they are in Rome, with the incense and splendor of Catholicism about them and the Pope on his throne dispensing blessings, feel an inclination to become Catholics. In Germany where they would have the Pope before their eyes as an old man in want of help, a good, kind gentleman, one of the bishops eating and drinking like the others, taking his pinch, perhaps even smoking his cigar, there would be no such great danger."

Odo Russell and the English tried the patience of the chancellor in these days. When the former appealed to him for support against the Russian

claims he saw no reason to trouble himself about it. "For the rest," he remarked to his subordinates one night at dinner, "I was not of opinion that gratitude was without its place in politics. The present emperor had always showed himself friendly. . . . As for England, he knew well enough how much we had to thank her for. The Russians ought not to have been so modest in their requirements; if they had asked for more they would have had no difficulty in getting what they want about the Black Sea."

If we were to judge of Germany's position during these days by the remarks of the chancellor made for trusty ears in the seclusion of Madame Jessé's dwelling, we should say first that she was following a Prussian policy with a warm side toward Russia, induced by the gratitude which M. Benedetti had wholly failed to evoke, that the occupation of Rome and the wrath of England were alike of trivial interest, while the Pope had become merely the object of a humorous sympathy.

Within Paris matters drifted from bad to worse. The troops had been reorganized into three armies, the first under General Thomas, comprising the bulk of the National Guard, while the regulars and mobiles were embodied in the second army under Ducrot, and the third under Trochu's personal direction. Had this numerous force approximated the army of Metz in military worth the siege might have been raised. As it was, however, the confusion caused by the wholesale conversion of the Parisian populace into citizen soldiery seriously interfered with discipline and cohesive organization. The unsuccessful October fighting also produced an unwholesome effect upon the city. A temporary ripple of satisfaction

was caused on October 29 by General Bellemare's capture of Le Bourget on the northeastern front of Paris. This news was neutralized by the failure of Thiers' conference with Bismarck, and when on the 31st the fall of Metz and the recapture of Le Bourget by the Prussian Guards were officially proclaimed Paris fairly lost its reason. Thousands of soldiers, citizens, and women congregated before the Hôtel de Ville yelling for the Commune and no surrender. The infuriated people broke down the gates, and headed by a detachment of the National Guard under Major Flourens stormed into the building. Windows and furniture fared harshly at the hands of these zealous patriots. Stray shots were fired and added to the excitement. The twenty mayors were uncere- moniously ejected from the chamber; Trochu was visited in his private room and his clothing and decorations torn. Favre and Rochefort were placed under arrest, but Ferry slipped away, and while the new government of the Commune was organizing, proceeded to rally the loyal troops for the rescue of his colleagues. The new government was ejected during the evening with as much noise and as little bloodshed as had characterized its conquest. The loyal battalions poured into the square with shouts of "Vive Trochu" and "A bas la Commune." The soldiery who had been engaged for hours in crying "A bas Trochu" and "Vive la Commune" suddenly melted away. At midnight the government of national defense was busily repairing damages preparatory to resuming its functions. At that time Paris had become absolutely quiet again. "What a city!" remarked the United States minister as he threaded the silent streets, "one moment revolution and the next the most profound calm."

General Trochu after this *émeute* found that he had not only the Prussians but the Commune to deal with. Worse than all, the latter raised its hideous head from the very ranks of the first army. From that day the governor of Paris ceased to reckon upon the National Guards as a reliable force. With the city feverish and excitable and his soldiery infected with Communistic sentiment, Trochu realized that some decisive action was necessary without the walls to maintain the peace within. Paris is much the same under all governments and will have her way. Napoleon III. made war to appease her, MacMahon marched to Sedan to placate her, Mont Valérien burnt its powder to satisfy her, and Trochu must now do his part.

A fortnight of busy preparation heralded the great sortie. Trochu's plan was to engage the Prussian circle by the fire of the forts and infantry demonstrations, while he pushed his main forces across the Marne in the vicinity of Nogent and Joinville, broke the German lines on the southeast of Paris, gained the road to Fontainebleau, and opened communications with the army of the Loire.

The management of this movement was confided to General Ducrot, who proclaimed his determination to come back dead or victorious. The 29th was set as the day, but the sudden rising of the Marne threw the plans into confusion. General Vinoy attacked the Prussian positions about L'Hay and Chevilly, but the remainder of the troops could not cross the swollen flood to coöperate. As a result Vinoy fell back after sustaining some loss. On the evening of this day, however, the forts opened a heavy fire on all sides for the purpose of concealing the main point of

attack, and at daybreak on the 30th General Renault led the 2d corps across the Marne at Nogent against the Saxon lines, while the 1st corps crossing at Joinville attacked the Würtembergers in Champigny. The fighting that followed was the most desperate of the entire siege. By noon Ducrot had 70,000 men in action, had captured Champigny and Brie, and was brought to a stand only by the well-defended park walks of Villiers and Coeuilly. Night put an end to the struggle, leaving the French in possession of the lines held by the German outposts in the morning.

The roar of the battle reverberating through the streets caused intense excitement in Paris, which increased as it became apparent that the garrison had made progress. The return of light brought no continuance of the contest. The French were occupied in the burial of their dead, while the Germans brought up their 2d corps to support an offensive movement on the morrow. Trochu must have realized before this that his great sortie was a failure. Everything depended on celerity, and his inactivity on the 1st was a confession of his defeat.

At dawn on the 2d the storm of battle again burst forth with the Germans as the aggressors. The fire of the forts with that of the artillery in position beyond the Marne alone prevented the complete recapture of Champigny and Brie. When night fell the French army, weary and crestfallen, began to recross the Marne.

The main attack had been ably seconded by demonstrations in force from Fort Charenton and St. Denis. On the whole, however, the influence of the battles upon the French soldiers was extremely dispiriting. They had been encouraged to regard success as cer-

tain, and they never recovered from the consequent disappointment and chagrin. They lost one of their ablest generals in Renault, who fell in the attack upon Villiers.

After the failure of the great sortie Paris settled down disconsolately to siege life again. The insubordination in the National Guard increased, and General Thomas publicly denounced several battalions. The army of Paris was plainly going to pieces. Food and fuel became daily more scarce. Horse meat brought fabulous prices, while hungry, shivering soldiers were detailed to guard wood yards and potato stores from the famishing populace. Paris demonstrated her preference to starve rather than surrender, but so long as the Germans were well fed there was no hope of any beneficial result from these tactics. Paris starved better than she fought.

After General Ducrot's withdrawal across the Marne the occasional sorties and conflicting reports from the provinces hardly stirred the popular enthusiasm. On December 21 General Trochu's efforts to open communication with the army of the north by an attack on the German lines northeast of Paris resulted in another discomfiture. The heaviest fighting was about Le Bourget, which bristled with batteries supported by infantry, whose presence was only to be determined by the smoke and crash of their musketry. The French were falling back when the sunset and the bitter cold night came on. Despite the efforts of the Red Cross societies, hundreds of wounded men froze to death before relief or morning came.

On the 27th of December the first gun of the German bombardment was fired against the French advance posts on the plateau of Mont Avron. For

weeks the German staff had been preparing for this final grim argument with the defenders of Paris. The bombardment was delayed day by day, however, at first to enable the completion of all arrangements, and later in the hope that it might not be necessary to resort to this extreme measure. This delay did not meet with the unqualified approval of the foreign office, where the fear was expressed that the powers would construe it into a symptom of weakness. "If they would give me the command-in-chief for four and twenty hours, and I were to take the responsibility on myself," stormed the chancellor, "I should give just one order — fire!"

The German batteries on the east of Paris continued their fire on the 28th. Though the air was filled with snow and fog, so accurately had the gunners obtained their range that the practice was admirable. Mont Avron was rendered untenable, and during the night the French abandoned their positions. On the 30th and 31st the Germans steadily maintained their fire, raining a ceaseless storm of projectiles upon the forts Rosny, Noisy, and Nogent.

Paris was hardly to be recognized on the first day of the year 1871. New Year's day in beleaguered Paris! There was the old life of the boulevard still struggling for existence like the glimmer of the petroleum lamps that flickered in the wind. There was still a suggestion of the thoughtless throngs of a year before; the theatres were open; while here and there a dimly-lighted café beckoned mournfully to its old devotees. There was nothing in these symptoms to blind one to the universal misery and despondency. The icy wind that swept the streets was charged with the roar of the German siege guns. It was an anx-

ious, despondent day, and the sinking sun left a despondent city wrapped in sleet and darkness.

The sound of the bombardment that chilled the heart of Paris was borne faintly on the frosty air, to fall like sweet music on the ears of the German princes and generals in the palace of Versailles, who thronged about the king of Prussia, as he raised his glass to welcome the new year. Eighteen days later, with the air throbbing to the fire of the siege guns south of Paris, the German princes again gathered about the Prussian king to proclaim him emperor of united Germany.

On the 19th of January, the day following this dramatic episode at Versailles, the army of Paris made its last effort to break the iron talons that were crushing it to death by an attack from Mont Valérien upon the German lines between Rueil and St. Cloud. As usual the French swept away the German foreposts only to be checked by the main lines of defense. At Montretout, Buzanval, and Malmaison there was bloody work, but the impetuous valor and superior numbers of the assailants availed nothing against the cool discipline of their foe. The sound of the heavy firing so close at hand stirred Versailles from its stately lethargy, and brought the princes, emperor and all, galloping to the front. A brigade of the 1st Bavarian corps was also moved to Versailles to be at hand in case of need. About dark Trochu ordered the retreat after suffering terrible losses.

The immediate result of the battle of Buzanval was the transfer of the military command from Trochu to Vinoy, but the last battle had been fought, and hope had even departed from so stout a soldier as Vinoy. Jules Favre had again become a daily visitor at the

German foreign office. He was deputed to negotiate for an armistice and the capitulation of Paris. He no longer advanced the principle "not an inch of our territory or a stone of our fortresses." The state of affairs was briefly this: The government in Paris recognized the futility of longer resistance, but that government had never been recognized by France, and was powerless to conclude a peace. An armistice must be signed to allow of an appeal to the country; Paris must be delivered to the Germans as the price of the armistice. On the afternoon of January 28 the capitulation of Paris was signed, and an armistice agreed upon to expire on February 19 at noon. The provinces occupied by the armies of Bourbaki and Manteuffel were alone excluded from this agreement. On January 29 the German troops quietly took possession of the Paris forts. The regulars and mobiles became prisoners of war, with the exception of 12,000 men who were left under arms to preserve order. At the earnest request of Favre the National Guard were allowed to retain their arms. If Favre urged this as a measure to counteract the imperialistic ideas supposed to be still cherished by the prisoners returning from Germany, it was a political crime as well as a military folly. The National Guard became the armed Commune. It finally devolved upon the veterans of MacMahon and Bazaine to reconquer Paris for the republic.

While the armies withdrew to the lines stipulated in the armistice, the elections went quietly forward. The assembly convened at Bordeaux, and manifested a spirit that won for it universal respect. On February 17 M. Thiers was appointed chief of the executive power, and having named his ministry, he re-

paired to Versailles to arrange the preliminaries of peace. The conferences that followed with the German chancellor were perhaps the most trying ordeals to which the Frenchman had ever been subjected. No peace was possible save on the basis of the cession of miles of territory and the strongest of fortresses. France must also pay a war indemnity of no less than five milliards of francs. Bismarck, it is true, thought Thiers "too sentimental for business . . . hardly fit indeed to buy or sell a horse," but no diplomatist, however astute, could have made better terms for stricken France. So thought the assembly at Bordeaux; and when Thiers announced the result of his mission with a quivering lip, he had its sympathy and support. On the 2d of March the assembly formally ratified the peace preliminaries by a vote of 546 to 107.

It had been stipulated in the armistice that the German troops should not occupy Paris. The extension of time granted by the Germans entitled them to some compensation, and the entry of Paris was the compensation claimed. The troops detailed for this purpose were not chosen at random. To the Frenchman who on the 1st day of March beheld them pass along the Avenue de Malakoff or the Champs Elysées it was an ominous pageant. It was a German and not a Prussian army that he beheld. Prussians there were in the Silesians of the 6th corps, but there, too, were the war-worn regiments of the 11th corps, Nassauers, who had lost their grand duke four years before, and the "kinder" of the exiled elector of Hesse. There also were the faded blue lines of Hartmann's Bavarians. Surely Bavaria deserved the honor accorded her of leading the way up the Avenue of the

Grand Army, for the blood of her gallant sons had been given unsparingly in behalf of the common Fatherland, not only at Weissenburg, Neewiller, and Bazeilles, but in the frost-bound valley of the Loire. Sullenly the Parisians eyed the march as it moved up the Avenue of the Grand Army, the bayonets dimmed for an instant in the shadow of Napoleon's arch broadening into a glittering sea as they swept into the Champs Elysées. When the head of the column entered the Place de la Concorde, the command to halt was passed along the lines. The remorseless tread that for six long months had been trampling France in blood was stilled at last. That night the Hessians smoked their pipes on the Trocadero, and the Bavarians stacked their arms in the Place de la Concorde, while the lights blazing from the palace of the Elysée announced the German military headquarters.

On the third day of the month, the Bordeaux Assembly having ratified the peace preliminaries, the German troops marched out, and Paris was left to herself again. The war was over. Beyond the Rhineland, in Bavaria and Würtemberg as well as in the north, all was joy and enthusiasm over the return of the army that had answered before the world the question, "What is the German Fatherland?" On the 10th of May the definite treaty of peace was signed at Frankfort by which France ceded Alsace and a portion of Lorraine, including the fortresses of Metz and Strasburg, to her conqueror. The prompt and patriotic manner in which the French nation discharged their enormous war debt astounded Europe, and won the admiration of the world. It displayed more truly the spirit of the French people than did

the hideous events that occurred in Paris during the early spring months.

The summer of 1871 found Europe at peace. The German question was settled with the Kaiser at Berlin; the Italian problem was solved with the king in Rome. But out of the war which had finally rid the continent of two of its greatest thorns grew a new complication from the severing of the Rhineland provinces from France. The traveler from the new world who visits Europe to-day is amazed at the military influence that everywhere dominates the continent. Above the roar of the city street sounds the sharp drum-beat of the passing regiment; in the sweet rural country the village church-bell cannot drown the bugle peal from the fortress on the hill. Why is it that France sinks her millions in frontier strongholds, that Russia masses troops in Poland and on the Pruth, that Austria strengthens her fortresses in Galicia, that Germany builds railways to the Rhine and bridges to span its yellow flood? It means that the Eastern and Alsatian questions are not settled; that Republican France broods darkly over the exactions of 1871, while it casts friendly glances upon aggressive and despotic Russia; that Austria, dreading Russian power, draws nearer to Germany, and that Germany still united, with Austria and Italy friendly, holds fast what she has won by the sword, while with the old assurance that has never yet betrayed him Bismarck proclaims both to the east and west, "We Germans fear God and nothing in the world beside."

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